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
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
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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

PALEY'S

NATURAL THEOLOGY,

AND

HORÆ PAULINÆ.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

1743-1

BY WILLIAM PALEY, D.D

ARCHDEACON OF CARLISLE.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

STATE OF THE ARGUMENT.

The stone and the watch, page 9; eight cases, 10–13.

CHAPTER II.

STATE OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED........ 14

CHAPTER III.

APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT.

Eye and telescope, 20; light—distance, 24; eyes of birds, 27; eyes of fishes, 28; minuteness of picture, 29; socket—eyebrow—eyelid—tears, 30; nictitating membrane—muscle, 31; expedients, 33; why means used, 33; ear, 35.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE SUCCESSION OF PLANTS AND ANIMALS.

No account hereby of contrivance, 41; plants, 41; oviparous animals, 42; viviparous—rational animals, 43; instance from the gardener, 44.

CHAPTER V.

APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED.

Repetition from Chap. I., 45; imperfection, 45; superfluous parts, 46; atheistic argument, 47; remains of possible forms, 49; use arising out of the parts, 51; a principle of order, 54; of our ignorance, 55.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ARGUMENT CUMULATIVE.............. 57

CHAPTER VII.

THE MECHANICAL AND IMMECHANICAL PARTS AND FUNCTIONS OF ANIMALS AND VEGETABLES.

Imperfection of knowledge no proof of want of contrivance, 59; on chemistry, 62; secretion, 63.

CHAPTER VIII.

MECHANICAL ARRANGEMENT IN THE HUMAN FRAME.

Of bones, 68; neck, 68; forearm, 69; spine, 71; chest, 76; kneepan, 77; shoulder-blade, 78; joints, 79; ball-and-socket, 80; ginglymus, 81; knee, 81; ankle, 82; shoulder, 82; passage of bloodvessels, 83; gristle, 84; movable cartilages, 85; mucilage, 85; how well the joints wear, 86; bones of the skull, 86.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE MUSCLES.

Suitableness to the joints, 87; antagonist muscles, 88; not obstructing one another, 90; action wanted where their situation would be inconvenient, 90; variety of figure, 91; how many things must be right for health, 92; variety, quickness, and precision of muscular motion, 93; tongue, 93; mouth, 94; nose, 96; music—writing, 96; sphincters, 97; combination of muscles, 97; delicacy of small muscles, 98; mechanical disadvantages, 98; single muscles, 99; lower jaw, 99; slit tendons, 100; bandage at the ancles, 101; hypothesis from appetency repelled, 101; Keill's enumeration of muscles, 102; why mechanism is not more striking, 102; description inferior to inspection, 102; quotation from Steno, 103.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE VESSELS OF ANIMAL BODIES.

I. The circulation of the blood, 104; disposition of the bloodvessels, 104; arteries and veins, 105. II. Heart, as receiving and returning the blood, 106; heart, as referable to the lungs, 108; valves of the heart, 110; vital motion involuntary, 113; pericardium, 113. III. Alimentary system, 114; passage of the food through the stomach to the intestines, 114; passage of the chyle through the lacteals and thoracic duct to the blood, 115; length of intestines, 116; peristaltic motion, 116; tenuity of the lacteals, 116; valves of the thoracic duct, 117; entrance in the neck, 117; digestion, 117. IV. Gall-bladder, 120; oblique insertion of the biliary duct into the intestines, 120. V. Parotid gland, 121. VI. Larynx, 122; trachea—gullet—epiglottis, 122, 123; rings of the trachea, 123; sensibility, 124; musical instrument, 124; lifting the hand to the head, 125.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE ANIMAL STRUCTURE REGARDED AS A MASS.

I. Correspondence of sides, 127; not belonging to the separate limbs, 128, nor the internal contents, 129; nor to the feeding vessels, 129. II. Package, 130; heart, 131; lungs, 131; liver, 132; bladder, kidneys, pancreas, spleen, 132; omentum, 132; septa of the brain, 133; guts, 133. III. Beauty, 134; in animals, 135; in flowers, 135; whether any natural sense of beauty, 136. IV. Concealment, 137. V. Standing, 138. VI. Interrupted analogies, 140; periosteum at the teeth, 141; scarf-skin at the nails, 141; soft integuments at the skull, 141.

CHAPTER XII.

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY.

I Covering of animals, 144; of man, 144; of birds, 145; structure of feathers, 145; black down, 148. II. Mouths of animals, 149; bills of birds, 150; serrated bills, 150; affinity of mouths, 151. III. Gullets of animals, 153. IV. Intestines of animals, 153; valves or plates, 153; length, 154. V. Bones of animals, 154; bones of birds, 154. VI. Lungs of animals, 155; lungs of birds, 155. VII. Birds oviparous, 155. VIII. Instruments of motion, 155; wings of birds, 156; fins of fish, 157; web-feet of water-fowl, 159. IX. Senses of animals, 160.

CHAPTER XIII.

PECULIAR ORGANIZATIONS.

Pax-wax of quadrupeds, 162; oil of birds, 163; air-bladder of fish, 163; fang of viper, 165; bag of opossum, 165; claw of heron, 166; stomach of camel, 167; tongue of woodpecker, 167; babyroussa, 168.

CHAPTER XIV.

PROSPECTIVE CONTRIVANCES.

Teeth, 169; milk, 170; eye of the fœtus, 171; lungs of the fœtus, 172; foramen ovale, etc., 173.

CHAPTER XV.

RELATIONS.

Alimentary system, 176; kidneys, ureters, and bladder, 179; eyes, hands, feet, 179; sexes, 180; teats and mouths, 180; particular relations, 180; swan, 180; mole, 181.

CHAPTER XVI.

COMPENSATION.

Elephant's proboscis, 184; hook in the bat's wing, 185; crane's neck, 185; parrot's bill, 186; spider's web, 186; multiplying-eyes of insects, 186; eyelid of the chameleon, 187; intestines of the alopecias, 188; snail—mussel—cockle—lobster, 188; sloth—sheep, 190; more general compensations, 190; want of fore-teeth—rumination, 190; in birds, want of teeth and gizzard, 191; reptiles, 192.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE RELATION OF ANIMATED BODIES TO INANIMATE NATURE.

Wings of birds—fins of fish—air and water, 194; ear to the air, 194; organs of speech—voice and respiration to air, 194; eye to light, 195; size of animals to external things, 195; of the inhabitants of the earth and sea to their elements, 196; sleep to night, 196.

CHAPTER XVIII.

INSTINCTS.

Incubation of eggs, 199; deposition of eggs of insects, 203; solution from sensations considered, 207.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF INSECTS.

Elytra of the scarabæus, 211; borer of flies, 212; sting, 213; proboscis, 214; metamorphosis of insects, 215; care of eggs, 216; observations limited to particular species, 217; thread of silk-worm and spider, 217; wax and honey of bee, 218; sting of bee, 220; forceps of the panorpa tribe, 220; brushes of flies, 220; glowworm, 220; motion of the larva of the dragonfly, 221; gossamer spider, 221; shell animals, 222; snail shells, 222; univalve shell-fish, 223; bivalve, 223; lobster shell, 224; variety of insects, 225.

CHAPTER XX.

OF PLANTS.

Preservation, perfecting, and dispersing of seed, 227; germination, 234; tendrils, 235; particular species, 237; vallisneria, 237; cuscuta Europæa, 238; mistletoe, 238; colchicum autumnale, 238; dionæa muscipula 240.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE ELEMENTS.

Consolidation of uses, 242. I. Air, 242; reflecting light, 242; evaporating fluids, 242; restoratives of purity, 243. II. Water, 243; purity, 244; insipidity, 244; circulation, 244. III. Fire, 245; dissolvent power, 245. IV. Light, 245; velocity, 245; tenuity, 246; color, 246.

CHAPTER XXII.

ASTRONOMY.

Fixing the source of light and heat in the centre, 249; permanent axis of rotation, 251; spherodicity of the earth, 252; of centripetal forces, 253; attraction indifferent to laws, 254; admissible laws, within narrow limits, 256; of admissible laws, the present the best, 257; united attraction of a sphere, the same as of the constituent particles, 257; the apsides fixed, 258; figures of the planetary orbits, 260; Buffon's hypothesis, 261.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE PERSONALITY OF THE DEITY.

Not the object of our senses, 265; contrivance proves personality, 267; misapplication of laws, 269; mechanism, 270; second causes, 271; of generation as a principle, 274; atheistic suppositions, 275; Buffon's organic nodules, 276; appetencies, 279; analogies by which they are supported, 281; camel's bunch, 281; crane's thighs, 281; pelican's pouch, 281; analogy strained, 282; solutions contradicted, 283; by ligaments—valves, 283; by senses of animals, 284; by the parts without motion, 284; by plants, 284.

CHAPTER XXIV.

OF THE NATURAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY.

Omnipotence, 287; omniscience, 287; omnipresence, 288; eternity, 289; self-existence, 289; necessary existence, 290; spirituality, 290.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE UNITY OF THE DEITY.

From the laws of attraction, and the presence of light among the heavenly bodies, 291; from the laws of nature upon our globe, 291; resemblance of animals, 292; fish, 292; insects and shell-fish, 293.

CHAPTER XXVI.

GOODNESS OF THE DEITY.

From the parts and faculties of animals, 295; the actual happiness of young animals, 296; of winged insects and aphides, 296; of fish, 297. I. Properties of old age, 298; of different animal habits, 299; prepollency of happiness, 299; causes of not observing it, 300; quotation, 301; apparent exceptions, 303; venomous animals, 304; animals of prey, 306. II. Pleasures of sense, 311; adaptation of senses, 312; property, origin of, 317; physical evils of imperfection, 318; of finiteness, 319; of bodily pain, 320; of mortal diseases, 322; of death, 323; civil evils of population, 324; of distinctions, 326; of wealth, 327; of idleness, 329; objections from chance answered, 330; must be chance in the midst of design, 330; ignorance of observance, 331; disease, 333; seasons, 333; station, 334; acquirability, 334; sensible interposition, 335; probation, 337.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CONCLUSION.

Natural religion prepares the way for revelation, 344.

NATURAL THEOLOGY

CHAPTER I

STATE OF THE ARGUMENT.

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a *stone*, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that for any thing I knew to the contrary it had lain there for ever; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a *watch* upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that for any thing I knew the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone; why is it not as admissible in the second case as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, namely, that when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive—what we could not discover in the stone—that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, *e. g.* that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, or placed after any other manner or in any other order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts and of their offices, all tending to one result: We see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavor to relax itself, turns round the box. We next observe a flexible chain—artificially wrought for the sake of flexure—communicating the action of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in and apply to each other, conducting the motion from the fusee to the balance and from the balance to the pointer, and at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work, but in the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed—it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood, the inference we think is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker—that there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer, who comprehended its construction and designed its use.

I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made—that we had never known an artist capable of making one—that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist's skill, if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all the inference, whether the question arise concerning a human agent or concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent possessing in some respects a different nature.

II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer might be evident, and in the case supposed, would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made: still less necessary, where the only question is whether it were made with any design at all.

III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover or had not yet discovered in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case, if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate the manner according to which, or the connection by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or assistance; and the more complex the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment, these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.

IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch with its various machinery accounted for, by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited, namely, of the works of a watch, as well as a different structure.

V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction, to be answered that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker.

VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so:

VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of *metallic* nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power; for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the *law* does nothing, is nothing. The expression, "the law of metallic nature," may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as "the law of vegetable nature," "the law of animal nature," or, indeed, as "the law of nature" in general, when assigned as the cause of phenomena, in exclusion of agency and power, or when it is substituted into the place of these.

VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument; he knows the utility of the end; he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.

CHAPTER II.

STATE OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED.

Suppose, in the next place, that the person who found the watch should after some time discover, that in addition to all the properties which he had hitherto observed in it, it possessed the unexpected property of producing in the course of its movement another watch like itself—the thing is conceivable; that it contained within it a mechanism, a system of parts—a mould, for instance, or a complex adjustment of lathes, files, and other tools—evidently and separately calculated for this purpose; let us inquire what effect ought such a discovery to have upon his former conclusion.

I. The first effect would be to increase his admiration of the contrivance, and his conviction of the consummate skill of the contriver. Whether he regarded the object of the contrivance, the distinct apparatus, the intricate, yet in many parts intelligible mechanism by which it was carried on, he would perceive in this new observation nothing but an additional reason for doing what he had already done—for referring the construction of the watch to design and to supreme art. If that construction *without* this property, or which is the same thing, before this property had been noticed, proved intention and art to have been employed about it, still more strong would the proof appear when he came to the knowledge of this further property, the crown and perfection of all the rest.

II. He would reflect, that though the watch before him were *in some sense* the maker of the watch which was fabricated in the course of its movements, yet it was in a very different sense from that in which a carpenter, for instance, is the maker of a chair—the author of its contrivance, the cause of the relation of its parts to their use. With respect to these, the first watch was no cause at all to the second; in no such sense as this was it the author of the constitution and order, either of the parts which the new watch contained, or of the parts by the aid and instrumentality of which it was produced. We might possibly say, but with great latitude of expression, that a stream of water ground corn; but no latitude of expression would allow us to say, no stretch of conjecture could lead us to think, that the stream of water built the mill, though it were too ancient for us to know who the builder was. What the stream of water does in the affair is neither more nor less than this: by the application of an unintelligent impulse to a mechanism previously arranged, arranged independently of it and arranged by intelligence, an effect is produced, namely, the corn is ground. But the effect results from the arrangement. The force of the stream cannot be said to be the cause or the author of the effect, still less of the arrangement. Understanding and plan in the formation of the mill were not the less necessary for any share which the water has in grinding the corn; yet is this share the same as that which the watch would have contributed to the production of the new watch, upon the supposition assumed in the last section. Therefore,

III. Though it be now no longer probable that the individual watch which our observer had found was made immediately by the hand of an artificer, yet doth not this alteration in anywise affect the inference, that an artificer had been originally employed and concerned in the production. The argument from design remains as it was. Marks of design and contrivance are no more accounted for now than they were before. In the same thing, we may ask for the cause of different properties. We may ask for the cause of the color of a body, of its hardness, of its heat; and these causes may be all different. We are now asking for the cause of that subserviency to a use, that relation to an end, which we have remarked in the watch before us. No answer is given to this question, by telling us that a preceding watch produced it. There cannot be design without a designer; contrivance, without a contriver; order, without choice; arrangement, without any thing capable of arranging; subserviency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing their office in accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind. No one, therefore, can rationally believe that the insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued, was the proper cause of the mechanism we so much admire in it—could be truly said to have constructed the instrument, disposed its parts, assigned their office, determined their order, action, and mutual dependency, combined their several motions into one result, and that also a result connected with the utilities of other beings. All these properties, therefore, are as much unaccounted for as they were before.

IV. Nor is any thing gained by running the difficulty farther back, that is, by supposing the watch before us to have been produced from another watch, that from a former, and so on indefinitely. Our going back ever so far brings us no nearer to the least degree of satisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is still unaccounted for. We still want a contriver. A designing mind is neither supplied by this supposition nor dispensed with. If the difficulty were diminished the farther we went back, by going back indefinitely we might exhaust it. And this is the only case to which this sort of reasoning applies. Where there is a tendency, or, as we increase the number of terms, a continual approach towards a limit, *there*, by supposing the number of terms to be what is called infinite, we may conceive the limit to be attained; but where there is no such tendency or approach, nothing is effected by lengthening the series. There is no difference as to the point in question, whatever there may be as to many points, between one series and another—between a series which is finite, and a series which is infinite.

A chain composed of an infinite number of links can no more support itself than a chain composed of a finite number of links. And of this we are assured, though we never *can* have tried the experiment; because, by increasing the number of links, from ten, for instance, to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, etc., we make not the smallest approach, we observe not the smallest tendency towards self-support. There is no difference in this respect—yet there may be a great difference in several respects—between a chain of a greater or less length, between one chain and another, between one that is finite and one that is infinite. This very much resembles the case before us. The machine which we are inspecting demonstrates, by its construction, contrivance and design. Contrivance must have had a contriver, design a designer, whether the machine immediately proceeded from another machine or not. That circumstance alters not the case. That other machine may, in like manner, have proceeded from a former machine: nor does that alter the case; the contrivance must have had a contriver. That former one from one preceding it: no alteration still; a contriver is still necessary. No tendency is perceived, no approach towards a diminution of this necessity. It is the same with any and every succession of these machines—a succession of ten, of a hundred, of a thousand; with one series, as with another—a series which is finite, as with a series which is infinite. In whatever other respects they may differ, in this they do not. In all equally, contrivance and design are unaccounted for.

The question is not simply, How came the first watch into existence? which question, it may be pretended, is done away by supposing the series of watches thus produced from one another to have been infinite, and consequently to have had no such *first*, for which it was necessary to provide a cause. This, perhaps, would have been nearly the state of the question, if nothing had been before us but an unorganized, unmechanized substance, without mark or indication of contrivance. It might be difficult to show that such substance could not have existed from eternity, either in succession—if it were possible, which I think it is not, for unorganized bodies to spring from one another—or by individual perpetuity. But that is not the question now. To suppose it to be so, is to suppose that it made no difference whether he had found a watch or a stone. As it is, the metaphysics of that question have no place ; for, in the watch which we are examining, are seen contrivance, design, an end, a purpose, means for the end, adaptation to the purpose. And the question which irresistibly presses upon our thoughts is, Whence this contrivance and design ? The thing required is the intending mind, the adapted hand, the intelligence by which that hand was directed. This question, this demand, is not shaken off by increasing a number or succession of substances destitute of these properties ; nor the more, by increasing that number to infinity. If it be said, that upon the supposition of one watch being produced from another in the course of that other's movements, and by means of the mechanism within it, we have a cause for the watch in my hand, namely, the watch from which it proceeded—I deny, that for the design, the contrivance, the suitableness of means to an end, the adaptation of instruments to a use, all of which we discover in the watch, we have any cause whatever. It is in vain, therefore, to assign a series of such causes, or to allege that a series may be carried back to infinity ; for I do not admit that we have yet any cause at all for the phenomena, still less any series of causes either finite or infinite. Here is contrivance, but no contriver ; proofs of design, but no designer.

V. Our observer would further also reflect, that the maker of the watch before him was, in truth and reality, the maker of every watch produced from it : there being no difference, except that the latter manifests a more exquisite skill, between the making of another watch with his own hands, by the mediation of files, lathes, chisels, etc., and the disposing, fixing, and inserting of these instruments, or of others equivalent to them, in the body of the watch already made, in such a manner as to form a new watch in the course of the movements which he had given to the old one. It is only working by one set of tools instead of another.

The conclusion which the *first* examination of the watch, of its works, construction, and movement, suggested, was, that it must have had, for cause and author of that construction, an artificer who understood its mechanism and designed its use. This conclusion is invincible. A *second* examination presents us with a new discovery. The watch is found, in the course of its movement, to produce another watch similar to itself; and not only so, but we perceive in it a system or organization separately calculated for that purpose. What effect would this discovery have, or ought it to have, upon our former inference? What, as hath already been said, but to increase beyond measure our admiration of the skill which had been employed in the formation of such a machine? Or shall it, instead of this, all at once turn us round to an opposite conclusion, namely, that no art or skill whatever has been concerned in the business, although all other evidences of art and skill remain as they were, and this last and supreme piece of art be now added to the rest? Can this be maintained without absurdity? Yet this is atheism.

CHAPTER III.

APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT.

This is atheism; for every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature, with the difference on the side of nature of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. I mean, that the contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the complexity, subtilty, and curiosity of the mechanism; and still more, if possible, do they go beyond them in number and variety; yet, in a multitude of cases, are not less evidently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less evidently accommodated to their end or suited to their office, than are the most perfect productions of human ingenuity.

I know no better method of introducing so large a subject, than that of comparing a single thing with a single thing: an eye, for example, with a telescope. As far as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same proof that the eye was made for vision, as there is that the telescope was made for assisting it. They are made upon the same principles; both being adjusted to the laws by which the transmission and refraction of rays of light are regulated. I speak not of the origin of the laws themselves; but such laws being fixed, the construction in both cases is adapted to them. For instance, these laws require, in order to produce the same effect, that the rays of light, in passing from water into the eye, should be refracted by a more convex surface than when it passes out of air into the eye. Accordingly we find that the eye of a fish, in that part of it called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of terrestrial animals. What plainer manifestation of design can there be than this difference? What could a mathematical instrument maker have done more to show his knowledge of his principle, his application of that knowledge, his suiting of his means to his end—I will not say to display the compass or excellence of his skill and art, for in these all comparison is indecorous, but to testify counsel, choice, consideration, purpose?

To some it may appear a difference sufficient to destroy all similitude between the eye and the telescope, that the one is a perceiving organ, the other an unperceiving instrument. The fact is that they are both instruments. And as to the mechanism, at least as to mechanism being employed, and even as to the kind of it, this circumstance varies not the analogy at all. For observe what the constitution of the eye is. It is necessary, in order to produce distinct vision, that an image or picture of the object be formed at the bottom of the eye.* Whence this necessity arises, or how the picture is connected with the sensation or contributes to it, it may be difficult, nay, we will confess, if you please, impossible for us to search out. But the present question is not concerned in the inquiry. It may be true, that in this and in other instances we trace mechanical contrivance a certain way, and that then we come to something which is not mechanical, or which is inscrutable. But this affects not the certainty of our investigation, as far as we have gone. The difference between an animal and an automatic statue consists in this, that in the animal we trace the mechanism to a certain point, and then we are stopped; either the mechanism being too subtile for our discernment, or something else besides the known laws of mechanism taking place; whereas, in the automaton, for the comparatively few motions of which it is capable, we trace the mechanism throughout. But, up to the limit, the reasoning is as clear and certain in the one case as in the other. In the example before us it is a matter of certainty, because it is a matter which experience and observation demonstrate, that the formation of an image at the bottom of the eye is necessary to perfect vision. The image itself can be shown. Whatever affects the distinctness of the image, affects the distinctness of the vision. The formation then of such an image being necessary—no matter how—to the sense of sight and to the exercise of that sense, the apparatus by which it is formed is constructed and put together not only with infinitely more art, but upon the selfsame principles of art, as in the telescope or the camera-obscura. The perception arising from the image may be laid out of the question; for the production of the image, these are instruments of the same kind. The end is the same; the means are the same. The purpose in both is alike; the contrivance for accomplishing that purpose is in both alike. The lenses of the telescopes and the humors of the eye bear a complete resemblance to one another, in their figure, their position, and in their power over the rays of light, namely, in bringing each pencil to a point at the right distance from the lens; namely, in the eye, at the exact place where the membrane is spread to receive it. How is it possible, under circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of equal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the one, yet to acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the plainest and clearest of all propositions, in the other?

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* PLATE I., FIG. 1. A section of the human eye. It is formed of various *coats*, or membranes, enclosing pellucid humors of different degrees of density, and adapted for collecting the rays of light into a focus upon the nerve situated at the bottom of the eyeball: *a*, is the *aqueous* humor, a thin fluid like water; *b*, the *crystalline lens*, of a dense texture; *c*, the *vitreous* humor, a very delicate gelatinous substance, named from its resemblance to melted glass. Thus the crystalline is more dense than the vitreous, and the vitreous more dense than the aqueous humor. They are all perfectly transparent, and together make a compound lens which refracts the rays of light issuing from an object, *d*, and delineates its figure, *e*, in the focus upon the retina, inverted.

The resemblance between the two cases is still more accurate, and obtains in more points than we have yet represented, or than we are, on the first view of the subject, aware of. In dioptric telescopes there is an imperfection of this nature. Pencils of light, in passing through glass lenses, are separated into different colors, thereby tinging the object, especially the edges of it, as if it were viewed through a prism. To correct this inconvenience had been long a desideratum in the art. At last it came into the mind of a sagacious optician, to inquire how this matter was managed in the eye, in which there was exactly the same difficulty to contend with as in the telescope. His observation taught him that in the eye the evil was cured by combining lenses composed of different substances, that is, of substances which possessed different refracting powers. Our artist borrowed thence his hint, and produced a correction of the defect by imitating, in glasses made from different materials, the effects of the different humors through which the rays of light pass before they reach the bottom of the eye. Could this be in the eye without purpose, which suggested to the optician the only effectual means of attaining that purpose?

But further, there are other points, not so much perhaps of strict resemblance between the two, as of superiority of the eye over the telescope, yet of a superiority which, being founded in the laws that regulate both, may furnish topics of fair and just comparison. Two things were wanted to the eye, which were not wanted, at least in the same degree, to the telescope; and these were the adaptation of the organ, first, to different degrees of light, and secondly, to the vast diversity of distance at which objects are viewed by the naked eye, namely, from a few inches to as many miles. These difficulties present not themselves to the maker of the telescope. He wants all the light he can get; and he never directs his instrument to objects near at hand. In the eye, both these cases were to be provided for; and for the purpose of providing for them, a subtile and appropriate mechanism is introduced.

I. In order to exclude excess of light when it is excessive, and to render objects visible under obscurer degrees of it when no more can be had, the hole or aperture in the eye through which the light enters is so formed as to contract or dilate itself for the purpose of admitting a greater or less number of rays at the same time. The chamber of the eye is a camera-obscura, which, when the light is too small, can enlarge its opening; when too strong, can again contract it; and that without any other assistance than that of its own exquisite machinery. It is farther also, in the human subject, to be observed, that this hole in the eye which we call the pupil, under all its different dimensions, retains its exact circular shape. This is a structure extremely artificial. Let an artist only try to execute the same; he will find that his threads and strings must be disposed with great consideration and contrivance, to make a circle which shall continually change its diameter yet preserve its form. This is done in the eye by an application of fibres, that is, of strings similar, in their position and action, to what an artist would and must employ, if he had the same piece of workmanship to perform.

II. The second difficulty which has been stated was the suiting of the same organ to the perception of objects that lie near at hand, within a few inches, we will suppose, of the eye, and of objects which are placed at a considerable distance from it, that, for example, of as many furlongs—I speak in both cases of the distance at which distinct vision can be exercised. Now this, according to the principles of optics, that is, according to the laws by which the transmission of light is regulated—and these laws are fixed—could not be done without the organ itself undergoing an alteration, and receiving an adjustment that might correspond with the exigency of the case, that is to say, with the different inclination to one another under which the rays of light reached it. Rays issuing from points placed at a small distance from the eye, and which consequently must enter the eye in a spreading or diverging order, cannot, by the same optical instrument in the same state, be brought to a point, that is, be made to form an image in the same place, with rays proceeding from objects situated at a much greater distance, and which rays arrive at the eye in directions nearly, (and physically speaking) parallel. It requires a rounder lens to do it. The point of concourse behind the lens must fall critically upon the retina, or the vision is confused; yet other things remaining the same, this point, by the immutable properties of light, is carried further back when the rays proceed from a near object than when they are sent from one that is remote. A person who was using an optical instrument would manage this matter by changing, as the occasion required, his lens or his telescope, or by adjusting the distance of his glasses with his hand or his screw; but how is this to be managed in the eye? What the alteration was, or in what part of the eye it took place, or by what means it was effected—for if the known laws which govern the refraction of light be maintained, some alteration in the state of the organ there must be—had long formed a subject of inquiry and conjecture. The change, though sufficient for the purpose, is so minute as to elude ordinary observation. Some very late discoveries, deduced from a laborious and most accurate inspection of the structure and operation of the organ, seem at length to have ascertained the mechanical alteration which the parts of the eye undergo. It is found, that by the action of certain muscles called the straight muscles,* and which action is the most advantageous that could be imagined for the purpose—it is found, I say, that whenever the eye is directed to a near object, three changes are produced in it at the same time, all severally contributing to the adjustment required. The cornea or outermost coat of the eye is rendered more round and prominent, the crystalline lens underneath is pushed forward, and the axis of vision, as the depth of the eye is called, is elongated. These changes in the eye vary its power over the rays of light in such a manner and degree as to produce exactly the effect which is wanted, namely, the formation of an image *upon the retina*, whether the rays come to the eye in a state of divergency, which is the case when the object is near to the eye, or come parallel to one another, which is the case when the object is placed at a distance. Can any thing be more decisive of contrivance than this is? The most secret laws of optics must have been known to the author of a structure endowed with such a capacity of change. It is as though an optician, when he had a nearer object to view, should rectify his instrument by putting in another glass, at the same time drawing out also his tube to a different length.

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* Plate I., Fig. 2. There are four straight muscles, *a*, *a*, belong to the globe of the eye, each arising from the bottom of the orbit, where they surround *c*, the optic nerve. They are strong and fleshy, and are inserted by broad thin tendons at the fore part of the globe of the eye into the tunica sclerotica. Their use is to turn the eye in different directions; hence they are severally named levator oculi, depressor oculi, adductor oculi, and abductor oculi.

Observe a new-born child first lifting up its eyelids. What does the opening of the curtain discover? The anterior part of two pellucid globes, which, when they come to be examined, are found to be constructed upon strict optical principles—the selfsame principles upon which we ourselves construct optical instruments. We find them perfect for the purpose of forming an image by refraction; composed of parts executing different offices; one part having fulfilled its office upon the pencil of light, delivering it over to the action of another part; that to a third, and so onward: the progressive action depending for its success upon the nicest and minutest adjustment of the parts concerned; yet these parts so in fact adjusted as to produce, not by a simple action or effect, but by a combination of actions and effects, the result which is ultimately wanted. And forasmuch as this organ would have to operate under different circumstances, with strong degrees of light and with weak degrees, upon near objects and upon remote ones, and these differences demanded, according to the laws by which the transmission of light is regulated, a corresponding diversity of structure—that the aperture, for example, through which the light passes should be larger or less—the lenses rounder or flatter, or that their distance from the tablet upon which the picture is delineated should be shortened or lengthened—this, I say, being the case, and the difficulty to which the eye was to be adapted, we find its several parts capable of being occasionally changed, and a most artificial apparatus provided to produce that change. This is far beyond the common regulator of a watch, which requires the touch of a foreign hand to set it; but it is not altogether unlike Harrison's contrivance for making a watch regulate itself, by inserting within it a machinery which, by the artful use of the different expansion of metals, preserves the equability of the motion under all the various temperatures of heat and cold in which the instrument may happen to be placed. The ingenuity of this last contrivance has been justly praised. Shall, therefore, a structure which differs from it chiefly by surpassing it, be accounted no contrivance at all; or, if it be a contrivance, that it is without a contriver?

But this, though much, is not the whole: by different species of animals, the faculty we are describing is possessed in degrees suited to the different range of vision which their mode of life and of procuring their food requires. *Birds*, for instance, in general, procure their food by means of their beak; and the distance between the eye and the point of the beak being small, it becomes necessary that they should have the power of seeing very near objects distinctly. On the other hand, from being often elevated much above the ground, living in the air, and moving through it with great velocity, they require for their safety, as well as for assisting them in descrying their prey, a power of seeing at a great distance—a power of which, in birds of rapine, surprising examples are given. The fact accordingly is, that two peculiarities are found in the eyes of birds, both tending to *facilitate* the change upon which the adjustment of the eye to different distances depends. The one is a bony, yet, in most species, a flexible rim or hoop, surrounding the broadest part of the eye, which confining the action of the muscles to that part, increases the effect of their lateral pressure upon the orb, by which pressure its axis is elongated for the purpose of looking at very near objects. The other is an additional muscle called the marsupium, to draw, on occasion, the crystalline lens *back*, and to fit the same eye for the viewing of very distant objects. By these means, the eyes of birds can pass from one extreme to another of their scale of adjustment, with more ease and readiness than the eyes of other animals.

The eyes of *fishes* also, compared with those of terrestrial animals, exhibit certain distinctions of structure adapted to their state and element. We have already observed upon the figure of the crystalline compensating by its roundness the density of the medium through which their light passes. To which we have to add, that the eyes of fish, in their natural and indolent state, appear to be adjusted to near objects, in this respect differing from the human eye, as well as those of quadrupeds and birds. The ordinary shape of the fish's eye being in a much higher degree convex than that of land animals, a corresponding difference attends its muscular conformation, namely, that it is throughout calculated for *flattening* the eye.

The *iris* also in the eyes of fish does not admit of contraction. This is a great difference, of which the probable reason is, that the diminished light in water is never too strong for the retina.

In the *eel*, which has to work its head through sand and gravel, the roughest and harshest substances, there is placed before the eye, and at some distance from it, a transparent, horny, convex case or covering, which, without obstructing the sight, defends the organ. To such an animal could any thing be more wanted or more useful?

Thus, in comparing the eyes of different kinds of animals, we see in their resemblances and distinctions one general plan laid down, and that plan varied with the varying exigencies to which it is to be applied.

There is one property however, common, I believe, to all eyes, at least to all which have been examined,* namely, that the optic nerve enters the bottom of the eye not in the centre or middle, but a little on one side—not in the point where the axis of the eye meets the retina, but between that point and the nose. The difference which this makes is, that no part of an object is unperceived by both eyes at the same time.

In considering vision as achieved by the means of an image formed at the bottom of the eye, we can never reflect without wonder upon the smallness yet correctness of the picture, the subtilty of the touch, the fineness of the lines. A landscape of five or six square leagues is brought into a space of half an inch diameter, yet the multitude of objects which it contains are all preserved, are all discriminated in their magnitudes, positions, figures, colors. The prospect from Hampstead-hill is compressed into the compass of a sixpence, yet circumstantially represented. A stage-coach, travelling at an ordinary speed for half an hour, passes in the eye only over one-twelfth of an inch, yet is this change of place in the image distinctly perceived throughout its whole progress; for it is only by means of that perception that the motion of the coach itself is made sensible to the eye. If any thing can abate our admiration of the smallness of the visual tablet compared with the extent of vision, it is a reflection which the view of nature leads us every hour to make, namely, that in the hands of the Creator, great and little are nothing.

Sturmius held that the examination of the eye was a cure for atheism. Besides that conformity to optical principles which its internal constitution displays, and which alone amounts to a manifestation of intelligence having been exerted in the structure—besides this, which forms, no doubt, the leading character of the organ, there is to be seen, in every thing belonging to it and about it, an extraordinary degree of care, an anxiety for its preservation, due, if we may so speak, to its value and its tenderness. It is lodged in a strong, deep, bony socket, composed by the junction of seven different bones,* hollowed out at their edges. In some few species, as that of the coatimondi,† the orbit is not bony throughout; but whenever this is the case, the upper, which is the deficient part, is supplied by a cartilaginous ligament, a substitution which shows the same care. Within this socket it is embedded in fat, of all animal substances the best adapted both to its repose and motion. It is sheltered by the eyebrows—an arch of hair which, like a thatched penthouse, prevents the sweat and moisture of the forehead from running down into it.

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* The eye of the seal or sea-calf, I understand, is an exception Mem. Acad. Paris, 1710, p. 123.

But it is still better protected by its *lid*. Of the superficial parts of the animal frame, I know none which, in its office and structure, is more deserving of attention than the eyelid. It defends the eye; it wipes it; it closes it in sleep. Are there in any work of art whatever, purposes more evident than those which this organ fulfils; or an apparatus for executing those purposes more intelligible, more appropriate, or more mechanical? If it be overlooked by the observer of nature, it can only be because it is obvious and familiar. This is a tendency to be guarded against. We pass by the plainest instances, while we are exploring those which are rare and curious; by which conduct of the understanding we sometimes neglect the strongest observations, being taken up with others which, though more recondite and scientific, are, as solid arguments, entitled to much less consideration.

In order to keep the eye moist and clean—which qualities are necessary to its brightness and its use—a wash is constantly supplied by a secretion for the purpose; and the superfluous brine is conveyed to the nose through a perforation in the bone as large as a goose-quill.* When once the fluid has entered the nose, it spreads itself upon the inside of the nostril, and is evaporated by the current of warm air which in the course of respiration is continually passing over it. Can any pipe or outlet for carrying off the waste liquor from a dye-house or a distillery, be more mechanical than this is? It is easily perceived that the eye must want moisture; but could the want of the eye generate the gland which produces the tear, or bore the hole by which it is discharged—a hole through a bone?

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* Heister, sect. 89.

† Memoirs of the Royal Academy, Paris, p. 117.

It is observable that this provision is not found in fish—the element in which they live supplying a constant lotion to the eye.

It were, however, injustice to dismiss the eye as a piece of mechanism, without noticing that most exquisite of all contrivances, the *nictitating membrane*,† which is found in the eyes of birds and of many quadrupeds. Its use is to sweep the eye, which it does in an instant—to spread over it the lachrymal humor—to defend it also from sudden injuries; yet not totally, when drawn upon the pupil, to shut out the light. The commodiousness with which it lies folded up in the inner corner of the eye, ready for use and action, and the quickness with which it executes its purpose, are properties known and obvious to every observer; but what is equally admirable, though not quite so obvious, is the combination of two kinds of substance, muscular and elastic, and of two different kinds of action, by which the motion of this membrane is performed. It is not, as in ordinary cases, by the action of two antagonist muscles—the one pulling forward and the other backward—that a reciprocal change is effected, but it is thus: the membrane itself is an elastic substance, capable of being drawn out by force like a piece of elastic gum, and by its own elasticity returning, when the force is removed, to its former position. Such being its nature, in order to fit it up for its office, it is connected, by a tendon or thread, with a muscle in the back part of the eye: this tendon or thread, though strong, is so fine as not to obstruct the sight even when it passes across it; and the muscle itself being placed in the *back* part of the eye, derives from its situation the advantage not only of being secure, but of being out of the way, which it would hardly have been in any position that could be assigned to it in the anterior part of the orb, where its function lies. When the muscle behind the eye contracts, the membrane by means of the communicating thread is instantly drawn over the fore part of it. When the muscular contraction—which is a positive and most probably a voluntary effort—ceases to be exerted, the elasticity alone of the membrane brings it back again to its position.* Does not this, if any thing can do it, bespeak an artist, master of his work, acquainted with his materials? "Of a thousand other things," say the French academicians, "we perceive not the contrivance, because we understand them only by their effects, of which we know not the causes; but we here treat of a machine, all the parts whereof are visible, and which need only be looked upon to discover the reasons of its motion and action."†

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* PLATE I., FIG. 3. *a*, is the *lachrymal gland*, which supplies this fluid; it is situated at the outer and upper part of the orbit of the eye, and secretes or separates tears from the blood. There are five or six ducts or tubes, *b*, which convey this fluid to the globe of the eye, for the purpose of keeping it moist and facilitating its movements: the motion of the eyelid diffuses the tears, and *c*, *c*, the *puncta lachrymalia*, take up the superfluous moisture, which passes through *d*, the *lachrymal sac and duct*, into the nostril at *e*.

† PLATE I., FIG. 4. The nictitating membrane, or third eyelid, is a thin, semitransparent fold of the conjunctive, which in a state of rest lies in the inner corner of the eye, with its loose edge nearly vertical, but can be drawn out so as to cover the whole front of the eyeball. By means of this membrane, according to Cuvier, the eagle is enabled to look at the sun.

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* Philosophical Transactions, 1796.

† Memoirs for a Natural History of Animals, by the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris, done into English by order of the Royal Society, 1701, p. 249.

In the configuration of the muscle which, though placed behind the eye, draws the nictitating membrane over the eye, there is what the authors just now quoted deservedly call a marvellous mechanism. I suppose this structure to be found in other animals; but in the memoirs from which this account is taken, it is anatomically demonstrated only in the cassowary. The muscle is *passed through a loop formed by another muscle*, and is there inflected as if it were round a pulley. This is a peculiarity—and observe the advantage of it. A single muscle with a straight tendon, which is the common muscular form, would have been sufficient, if it had had power to draw far enough. But the contraction necessary to draw the membrane over the whole eye, required a longer muscle than could lie straight at the bottom of the eye. Therefore, in order to have a greater length in a less compass, the chord of the main muscle makes an angle. This so far answers the end; but still further, it makes an angle, not round a fixed pivot, but round a loop formed by another muscle, which second muscle, whenever it contracts, of course twitches the first muscle at the point of inflection, and thereby assists the action designed by both.

One question may possibly have dwelt in the reader's mind during the perusal of these observations, namely, Why should not the Deity have given to the animal the faculty of vision *at once?* Why this circuitous perception; the ministry of so many means; an element provided for the purpose; reflected from opaque substances, refracted through transparent ones, and both according to precise laws; then a complex organ, an intricate and artificial apparatus, in order, by the operation of this element and in conformity with the restrictions of these laws, to produce an image upon a membrane communicating with the brain? Wherefore all this? Why make the difficulty in order to surmount it? If to perceive objects by some other mode than that of touch, or objects which lay out of the reach of that sense, were the thing proposed, could not a simple volition of the Creator have communicated the capacity? Why resort to contrivance where power is omnipotent? Contrivance, by its very definition and nature, is the refuge of imperfection. To have recourse to expedients implies difficulty, impediment, restraint, defect of power. This question belongs to the other senses as well as to sight; to the general functions of animal life, as nutrition, secretion, respiration; to the economy of vegetables—and indeed to almost all the operations of nature. The question, therefore, is of very wide extent; and among other answers which may be given to it, besides reasons of which probably we are ignorant, one answer is this: It is only by the display of contrivance that the existence, the agency, the wisdom of the Deity *could* be testified to his rational creatures. This is the scale by which we ascend to all the knowledge of our Creator which we possess, so far as it depends upon the phenomena or the works of nature. Take away this, and you take away from us every subject of observation and ground of reasoning; I mean, as our rational faculties are formed at present. Whatever is done, God could have done without the intervention of instruments or means; but it is in the construction of instruments, in the choice and adaptation of means, that a creative intelligence is seen. It is this which constitutes the order and beauty of the universe. God, therefore, has been pleased to prescribe limits to his own power, and to work his ends within those limits. The general laws of matter have perhaps prescribed the nature of these limits; its inertia; its reäction; the laws which govern the communication of motion, the refraction and reflection of light, and the constitution of fluids non-elastic and elastic, the transmission of sound through the latter; the laws of magnetism, of electricity, and probably others yet undiscovered. These are general laws; and when a particular purpose is to be effected, it is not by making a new law, nor by the suspension of the old ones, nor by making them wind and bend, and yield to the occasion—for nature with great steadiness adheres to and supports them—but it is, as we have seen in the eye, by the interposition of an apparatus corresponding with these laws, and suited to the exigency which results from them, that the purpose is at length attained. As we have said, therefore, God prescribes limits to his power, that he may let in the exercise and thereby exhibit demonstrations of his wisdom. For then—that is, such laws and limitations being laid down—it is as though one Being should have fixed certain rules, and, if we may so speak, provided certain materials, and afterwards have committed to another Being, out of these materials, and in subordination to these rules, the task of drawing forth a creation: a supposition which evidently leaves room and induces indeed a necessity for contrivance. Nay, there may be many such agents, and many ranks of these. We do not advance this as a doctrine either of philosophy or of religion; but we say that the subject may safely be represented under this view, because the Deity, acting himself by general laws, will have the same consequences upon our reasoning as if he had prescribed these laws to another. It has been said, that the problem of creation was, "attraction and matter being given, to make a world out of them;" and, as above explained, this statement perhaps does not convey a false idea.

We have made choice of the eye as an instance upon which to rest the argument of this chapter. Some single example was to be proposed, and the eye offered itself under the advantage of admitting of a strict comparison with optical instruments. The ear, it is probable, is no less artificially and mechanically adapted to its office than the eye. But we know less about it; we do not so well understand the action, the use, or the mutual dependency of its internal parts. Its general form however, both external and internal, is sufficient to show that it is an instrument adapted to the reception of *sound;* that is to say, already knowing that sound consists in pulses of the air, we perceive in the structure of the ear a suitableness to receive impressions from this species of action, and to propagate these impressions to the brain. For of what does this structure consist? An external ear, the concha,* calculated, like an ear-trumpet, to catch and collect the pulses of which we have spoken; in large quadrupeds turning to the sound, and possessing a configuration as well as motion evidently fitted for the office: of a tube which leads into the head, lying at the root of this outward ear, the folds and sinuses thereof tending and conducting the air towards it: of a thin membrane like the pelt of a drum stretched across this passage upon a bony rim: of a chain of movable and infinitely curious bones, forming a communication, and the only communication that can be observed, between the membrane last mentioned and the interior channels and recesses of the skull: of cavities similar in shape and form to wind instruments of music, being spiral or portions of circles: of the eustachian tube, like the hole in a drum, to let the air pass freely into and out of the barrel of the ear, as the covering membrane vibrates, or as the temperature may be altered: the whole labyrinth hewn out of a rock; that is, wrought into the substance of the hardest bone of the body. This assemblage of connected parts constitutes together an apparatus plainly enough relative to the transmission of sound, or of the impulses received from sound, and only to be lamented in not being better understood.

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* PLATE I., FIG. 5. *a*, the tube leading from the external ear; having little glands to secrete the wax, and hairs standing across it to exclude insects without impeding the vibrations of the atmosphere; *b*, the membrane of the *tympanum*, drawn into the form of a funnel by the attachment of the *malleus*; *c*, the chain of four bones lying in the irregular cavity of the tympanum, and communicating the vibrations of the membrane *b* to the fluid in the labyrinth; *d*, the eustachian tube, which forms a communication between the throat and the tympanum, so as to preserve an equilibrium of the air in the cavity of the tympanum and of the atmosphere; *e*, *f*, *g*, the labyrinth—consisting of a central cavity, the vestibule *g*, the three semicircular canals *e*, and the cochlea *f*.

Beginning from the left hand, (see also Fig. 6,) we have the *malleus* or hammer, the first of the chain of bones; we see its long handle or process, which is attached to the membrane of the tympanum, and moves as that vibrates; its other end is enlarged, and has a groove upon it which is articulated with the next bone. This second bone is the *incus* or anvil, to the grooved surface of which the malleus is attached. A long process extends from this bone, which has upon it the *os orbiculare;* to this third bone there is attached a fourth, the *stapes*, which is in shape like a stirrup-iron. The base of this bone is of an oval shape, and rests upon a membrane which closes the hole leading into the labyrinth. This hole is called the *foramen ovale.* The plan of the *cochlea* shows that one of its spiral passages, beginning in the vestibule *e*, winds round the pillar till it meets in a point with another tube. If the eye follows this second spiral tube, it will be found to lead, not into the vestibule, but into the irregular cavity of the tympanum. Sounds striking against the membrane of the tympanum, are propagated by means of the four small bones to the water contained in the cavities of the labyrinth; and by means of this water the impression is conveyed to the extremities of the auditory nerve and finally to the brain.

The communication within, formed by the small bones of the ear, is, to look upon, more like what we are accustomed to call machinery, than any thing I am acquainted with in animal bodies. It seems evidently designed to continue towards the sensorium the tremulous motions which are excited in the membrane of the tympanum, or what is better known by the name of the "drum of the ear." The compages of bones consists of four, which are so disposed, and so hinge upon one another, as that if the membrane, the drum of the ear, vibrate, all the four are put in motion together; and, by the result of their action, work the base of that which is the last in the series upon an aperture which it closes, and upon which it plays, and which aperture opens into the tortuous canals that lead to the brain. This last bone of the four is called the *stapes*. The office of the drum of the ear is to spread out an extended surface capable of receiving the impressions of sound, and of being put by them into a state of vibration. The office of the stapes is to repeat these vibrations. It is a repeating frigate, stationed more within the line. From which account of its action may be understood how the sensation of sound will be excited by any thing which communicates a vibratory motion to the stapes, though not, as in all ordinary cases, through the intervention of the membrana tympani. This is done by solid bodies applied to the bones of the skull, as by a metal bar holden at one end between the teeth, and touching at the other end a tremulous body. It likewise appears to be done, in a considerable degree, by the air itself, even when this membrane, the drum of the ear, is greatly damaged. Either in the natural or preternatural state of the organ, the use of the chain of bones is to propagate the impulse in a direction towards the brain, and to propagate it with the advantage of a lever; which advantage consists in increasing the force and strength of the vibration, and at the same time diminishing the space through which it oscillates; both of which changes may augment or facilitate the still deeper action of the auditory nerves.

The benefit of the eustachian tube to the organ may be made out upon pneumatic principles. Behind the drum of the ear is a second cavity, or barrel, called the tympanum. The eustachian tube is a slender pipe, but sufficient for the passage of air, leading from this cavity into the back part of the mouth. Now, it would not have done to have had a vacuum in this cavity; for in that case the pressure of the atmosphere from without would have burst the membrane which covered it. Nor would it have done to have filled the cavity with lymph, or any other secretion, which would necessarily have obstructed both the vibration of the membrane and the play of the small bones. Nor, lastly, would it have done to have occupied the space with confined air, because the expansion of that air by heat, or its contraction by cold, would have distended or relaxed the covering membrane in a degree inconsistent with the purpose which it was designed to execute. The only remaining expedient, and that for which the eustachian tube serves, is to open to this cavity a communication with the external air. In one word, it exactly answers the purpose of the hole in a drum.

The membrana tympani itself, likewise, deserves all the examination which can be made of it. It is not found in the ears of fish; which furnishes an additional proof of what indeed is indicated by every thing about it, that it is appropriated to the action of air, or of an elastic medium. It bears an obvious resemblance to the pelt or head of a drum, from which it takes its name. It resembles also a drumhead in this principal property, that its use depends upon its tension. *Tension* is the state essential to it. Now we know that, in a drum, the pelt is carried over a hoop, and braced as occasion requires, by the means of strings attached to its circumference. In the membrane of the ear the same purpose is provided for more simply, but not less mechanically nor less successfully, by a different expedient, namely, by the end of a bone—the handle of the malleus—pressing upon its centre. It is only in very large animals that the texture of this membrane can be discerned. In the Philosophical Transactions for the year 1800, vol. 1, Mr. Everard Home has given some curious observations upon the ear, and the drum of the ear of an *elephant*. He discovered in it what he calls a radiated muscle—that is, straight muscular fibres passing along the membrane from the circumference to the centre—from the bony rim which surrounds it towards the handle of the malleus, to which the central part is attached. This muscle he supposes to be designed to bring the membrane into unison with different sounds; but then he also discovered that this muscle itself cannot act, unless the membrane be drawn to a stretch, and kept in a due state of tightness by what may be called a foreign force, namely, the action of the muscles of the malleus. Supposing his explanation of the use of the parts to be just, our author is well founded in the reflection which he makes upon it, "that this mode of adapting the ear to different sounds, is one of the most beautiful applications of muscles in the body; *the mechanism is so simple, and the variety of effects so great.*"

In another volume of the Transactions above referred to, and of the same year, two most curious cases are related of persons who retained the sense of hearing, not in a perfect but in a very considerable degree, notwithstanding the almost total loss of the membrane we have been describing. In one of these cases, the use here assigned to that membrane, of modifying the impressions of sound by change of tension, was attempted to be supplied by straining the muscles of the outward ear. "The external ear," we are told, "had acquired a distinct motion upward and backward, which was observable whenever the patient listened to any thing which he did not distinctly hear: when he was addressed in a whisper, the ear was seen immediately to move; when the tone of voice was louder, it then remained altogether motionless."

It appears probable, from both these cases, that a collateral if not principal use of the membrane is to cover and protect the barrel of the ear which lies behind it. Both the patients suffered from cold: one, "a great increase of deafness from catching cold;" the other, "very considerable pain from exposure to a stream of cold air." Bad effects therefore followed from this cavity being left open to the external air; yet, had the Author of nature shut it up by any other cover than what was capable, by its texture, of receiving vibrations from sound, and by its connection with the interior parts, of transmitting those vibrations to the brain, the use of the organ, so far as we can judge, must have been entirely obstructed.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE SUCCESSION OF PLANTS AND ANIMALS.

The *generation* of the animal no more accounts for the contrivance of the eye or ear, than, upon the supposition stated in a preceding chapter, the production of a watch by the motion and mechanism of a former watch, would account for the skill and attention evidenced in the watch so produced—than it would account for the disposition of the wheels, the catching of their teeth, the relation of the several parts of the works to one another, and to their common end—for the suitableness of their forms and places to their offices, for their connection, their operation, and the useful result of that operation. I do insist most strenuously upon the correctness of this comparison; that it holds as to every mode of specific propagation; and that whatever was true of the watch, under the hypothesis above-mentioned, is true of plants and animals.

I. To begin with the fructification of plants. Can it be doubted but that the seed contains a particular organization? Whether a latent plantule with the means of temporary nutrition, or whatever else it be, it encloses an organization suited to the germination of a new plant. Has the plant which produced the seed any thing more to do with that organization, than the watch would have had to do with the structure of the watch which was produced in the course of its mechanical movement? I mean, Has it any thing at all to do with the *contrivance?* The maker and contriver of one watch, when he inserted within it a mechanism suited to the production of another watch, was, in truth, the maker and contriver of that other watch. All the properties of the new watch were to be referred to his agency: the design manifested in it, to his intention; the art, to him as the artist; the collocation of each part, to his placing; the action, effect, and use, to his counsel, intelligence, and workmanship. In producing it by the intervention of a former watch, he was only working by one set of tools instead of another. So it is with the plant, and the seed produced by it. Can any distinction be assigned between the two cases; between the producing watch and the producing plant; both passive unconscious substances—both, by the organization which was given to them, producing their like without understanding or design—both, that is, instruments?

II. From plants we may proceed to oviparous animals—from seeds to eggs. Now I say, that the bird has the same concern in the formation of the egg which she lays, as the plant has in that of the seed which it drops; and no other nor greater. The internal constitution of the egg is as much a secret to the hen as if the hen were inanimate. Her will cannot alter it, or change a single feather of the chick. She can neither foresee nor determine of which sex her brood shall be, or how many of either; yet the thing produced shall be, from the first, very different in its make, according to the sex which it bears. So far, therefore, from adapting the means, she is not beforehand apprized of the effect. If there be concealed within that smooth shell a provision and a preparation for the production and nourishment of a new animal, they are not of her providing or preparing; if there be contrivance, it is none of hers. Although, therefore, there be the difference of life and perceptivity between the animal and the plant, it is a difference which enters not into the account: it is a foreign circumstance; it is a difference of properties not employed. The animal function and the vegetable function are alike destitute of any design which can operate upon the form of the thing produced. The plant has no design in producing the seed—no comprehension of the nature or use of what it produces: the bird, with respect to its egg, is not above the plant with respect to its seed. Neither the one nor the other bears that sort of relation to what proceeds from them which a joiner does to the chair which he makes. Now a cause which bears *this* relation to the effect, is what we want, in order to account for the suitableness of means to an end—the fitness and fitting of one thing to another; and this cause the parent plant or animal does not supply.

It is further observable concerning the propagation of plants and animals, that the apparatus employed exhibits no resemblance to the thing produced; in this respect, holding an analogy with instruments and tools of art. The filaments, antheræ, and stigmata of flowers, bear no more resemblance to the young plant, or even to the seed which is formed by their intervention, than a chisel or a plane does to a table or a chair. What then are the filaments, antheræ, and stigmata of plants, but instruments, strictly so called?

III. We may advance from animals which bring forth eggs, to animals which bring forth their young alive; and of this latter class, from the lowest to the highest—from irrational to rational life, from brutes to the human species, without perceiving, as we proceed, any alteration whatever in the terms of the comparison. The rational animal does not produce its offspring with more certainty or success than the irrational animal; a man than a quadruped, a quadruped than a bird; nor—for we may follow the gradation through its whole scale—a bird than a plant; nor a plant than a watch, a piece of dead mechanism, would do, upon the supposition which has already so often been repeated. Rationality, therefore, has nothing to do in the business. If an account must be given of the contrivance which we observe; if it be demanded, whence arose either the contrivance by which the young animal is produced, or the contrivance manifested in the young animal itself, it is not from the reason of the parent that any such account can be drawn. He is the cause of his offspring, in the same sense as that in which a gardener is the cause of the tulip which grows upon his parterre, and in no other. We admire the flower; we examine the plant; we perceive the conduciveness of many of its parts to their end and office; we observe a provision for its nourishment, growth, protection, and fecundity; but we never think of the gardener in all this. We attribute nothing of this to his agency; yet it may still be true, that without the gardener we should not have had the tulip. Just so it is with the succession of animals, even of the highest order. For the contrivance discovered in the structure of the thing produced, we want a contriver. The parent is not that contriver; his consciousness decides that question. He is in total ignorance why that which is produced took its present form rather than any other. It is for him only to be astonished by the effect. We can no more look, therefore, to the intelligence of the parent animal for what we are in search of—a cause of relation and of subserviency of parts to their use, which relation and subserviency we see in the procreated body—than we can refer the internal conformation of an acorn to the intelligence of the oak from which it dropped, or the structure of the watch to the intelligence of the watch which produced it; there being no difference, as far as argument is concerned, between an intelligence which is not exerted, and an intelligence which does not exist

CHAPTER V.

APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED.

Every observation which was made in our first chapter concerning the watch, may be repeated with strict propriety concerning the eye; concerning animals; concerning plants; concerning, indeed, all the organized parts of the works of nature. As,

I. When we are inquiring simply after the *existence* of an intelligent Creator, imperfection, inaccuracy, liability to disorder, occasional irregularities, may subsist in a considerable degree without inducing any doubt into the question; just as a watch may frequently go wrong, seldom perhaps exactly right, may be faulty in some parts, defective in some, without the smallest ground of suspicion from thence arising that it was not a watch, not made, or not made for the purpose ascribed to it. When faults are pointed out, and when a question is started concerning the skill of the artist, or the dexterity with which the work is executed, then, indeed, in order to defend these qualities from accusation, we must be able, either to expose some intractableness and imperfection in the materials, or point out some invincible difficulty in the execution, into which imperfection and difficulty the matter of complaint may be resolved; or, if we cannot do this, we must adduce such specimens of consummate art and contrivance proceeding from the same hand as may convince the inquirer of the existence, in the case before him, of impediments like those which we have mentioned, although, what from the nature of the case is very likely to happen, they be unknown and unperceived by him. This we must do in order to vindicate the artist's skill, or at least the perfection of it; as we must also judge of his intention, and of the provisions employed in fulfilling that intention, not from an instance in which they fail, but from the great plurality of instances in which they succeed. But, after all, these are different questions from the question of the artist's existence; or, which is the same, whether the thing before us be a work of art or not; and the questions ought always to be kept separate in the mind. So likewise it is in the works of nature. Irregularities and imperfections are of little or no weight in the consideration, when that consideration relates simply to the existence of a Creator. When the argument respects his attributes, they are of weight; but are then to be taken in conjunction—the attention is not to rest upon them, but they are to be taken in conjunction, with the unexceptionable evidences which we possess of skill, power, and benevolence displayed in other instances; which evidences may, in strength, number, and variety, be such, and may so overpower apparent blemishes, as to induce us, upon the most reasonable ground, to believe that these last ought to be referred to some cause, though we be ignorant of it, other than defect of knowledge or of benevolence in the author.

II. There may be also parts of plants and animals, as there were supposed to be of the watch, of which, in some instances the operation, in others the use, is unknown. These form different cases; for the operation may be unknown, yet the use be certain. Thus it is with the lungs of animals. It does not, I think, appear that we are acquainted with the action of the air upon the blood, or in what manner that action is communicated by the lungs; yet we find that a very short suspension of their office destroys the life of the animal. In this case, therefore, we may be said to know the use, nay, we experience the necessity of the organ, though we be ignorant of its operation. Nearly the same thing may be observed of what is called the lymphatic system. We suffer grievous inconveniences from its disorder, without being informed of the office which it sustains in the economy of our bodies. There may possibly also be some few examples of the second class, in which not only the operation is unknown, but in which experiments may seem to prove that the part is not necessary; or may leave a doubt how far it is even useful to the plant or animal in which it is found. This is said to be the case with the spleen, which has been extracted from dogs without any sensible injury to their vital functions. Instances of the former kind, namely, in which we cannot explain the operation, may be numerous; for they will be so in proportion to our ignorance. They will be more or fewer to different persons, and in different stages of science. Every improvement of knowledge diminishes their number. There is hardly, perhaps, a year passes that does not, in the works of nature, bring some operation, or some mode of operation, to light, which was before undiscovered—probably unsuspected. Instances of the second kind, namely, where the part appears to be totally useless, I believe to be extremely rare; compared with the number of those of which the use is evident, they are beneath any assignable proportion, and perhaps have been never submitted to a trial and examination sufficiently accurate, long enough continued, or often enough repeated. No accounts which I have seen are satisfactory. The mutilated animal may live and grow fat—as was the case of the dog deprived of its spleen—yet may be defective in some other of its functions, which, whether they can all, or in what degree of vigor and perfection, be performed, or how long preserved without the extirpated organ, does not seem to be ascertained by experiment. But to this case, even were it fully made out, may be applied the consideration which we suggested concerning the watch, namely, that these superfluous parts do not negative the reasoning which we instituted concerning those parts which are useful, and of which we know the use; the indication of contrivance, with respect to them, remains as it was before.

III. One atheistic way of replying to our observations upon the works of nature, and to the proofs of a Deity which we think that we perceive in them, is to tell us that all which we see must necessarily have had some form, and that it might as well be its present form as any other. Let us now apply this answer to the eye, as we did before to the watch. Something or other must have occupied that place in the animal's head—must have filled up, as we say, that socket: we will say, also, that it must have been of that sort of substance which we call animal substance, as flesh, bone, membrane, or cartilage, etc. But that it should have been an *eye*, knowing as we do what an eye comprehends, namely, that it should have consisted, first, of a series of transparent lenses—very different, by the by, even in their substance, from the opaque materials of which the rest of the body is, in general at least, composed, and with which the whole of its surface, this single portion of it excepted, is covered: secondly, of a black cloth or canvas—the only membrane in the body which is black—spread out behind these lenses, so as to receive the image formed by pencils of light transmitted through them; and placed at the precise geometrical distance at which, and at which alone, a distinct image could be formed, namely, at the concourse of the refracted rays: thirdly, of a large nerve communicating between this membrane and the brain; without which, the action of light upon the membrane, however modified by the organ, would be lost to the purposes of sensation: that this fortunate conformation of parts should have been the lot, not of one individual out of many thousand individuals, like the great prize in a lottery, or like some singularity in nature, but the happy chance of a whole species; nor of one species out of many thousand species with which we are acquainted, but of by far the greatest number of all that exist, and that under varieties not casual or capricious, but bearing marks of being suited to their respective exigences: that all this should have taken place, merely because something must have occupied these points on every animal's forehead; or, that all this should be thought to be accounted for by the short answer, that "whatever was there must have had some form or other," is too absurd to be made more so by any argumentation. We are not contented with this answer; we find no satisfaction in it, by way of accounting for appearances of organization far short of those of the eye, such as we observe in fossil shells, petrified bones, or other substances which bear the vestiges of animal or vegetable recrements, but which, either in respect to utility or of the situation in which they are discovered, may seem accidental enough. It is no way of accounting even for these things, to say that the stone, for instance, which is shown to us—supposing the question to be concerning a petrifaction—must have contained some internal conformation or other. Nor does it mend the answer to add, with respect to the singularity of the conformation, that after the event, it is no longer to be computed what the chances were against it. This is always to be computed when the question is, whether a useful or imitative conformation be the produce of chance or not: I desire no greater certainty in reasoning than that by which chance is excluded from the present disposition of the natural world. Universal experience is against it. What does chance ever do for us? In the human body, for instance, chance, that is, the operation of causes without design, may produce a wen, a wart, a mole, a pimple, but never an eye. Among inanimate substances, a clod, a pebble, a liquid drop might be; but never was a watch, a telescope, an organized body of any kind, answering a valuable purpose by a complicated mechanism, the effect of chance. In no assignable instance has such a thing existed without intention somewhere.

IV. There is another answer which has the same effect as the resolving of things into chance; which answer would persuade us to believe that the eye, the animal to which it belongs, every other animal, every plant, indeed every organized body which we see, are only so many out of the possible varieties and combinations of being which the lapse of infinite ages has brought into existence; that the present world is the relic of that variety; millions of other bodily forms and other species having perished, being, by the defect of their constitution, incapable of preservation, or of continuance by generation. Now there is no foundation whatever for this conjecture in any thing which we observe in the works of nature; no such experiments are going on at present—no such energy operates as that which is here supposed, and which should be constantly pushing into existence new varieties of beings. Nor are there any appearances to support an opinion, that every possible combination of vegetable or animal structure has formerly been tried. Multitudes of conformations, both of vegetables and animals, may be conceived capable of existence and succession, which yet do not exist. Perhaps almost as many forms of plants might have been found in the fields as figures of plants can be delineated upon paper. A countless variety of animals might have existed which do not exist. Upon the supposition here stated, we should see unicorns and mermaids, sylphs and centaurs, the fancies of painters, and the fables of poets, realized by examples. Or, if it be alleged that these may transgress the bounds of possible life and propagation, we might at least have nations of human beings without nails upon their fingers, with more or fewer fingers and toes than ten, some with one eye, others with one ear, with one nostril, or without the sense of smelling at all. All these, and a thousand other imaginable varieties, might live and propagate. We may modify any one species many different ways, all consistent with life, and with the actions necessary to preservation, although affording different degrees of conveniency and enjoyment to the animal. And if we carry these modifications through the different species which are known to subsist, their number would be incalculable. No reason can be given why, if these deperdits ever existed, they have now disappeared. Yet, if all possible existences have been tried, they must have formed part of the catalogue.

But moreover, the division of organized substances into animals and vegetables, and the distribution and subdistribution of each into genera and species, which distribution is not an arbitrary act of the mind, but founded in the order which prevails in external nature, appear to me to contradict the supposition of the present world being the remains of an indefinite variety of existences—of a variety which rejects all plan. The hypothesis teaches, that every possible variety of being hath, at one time or other, found its way into existence—by what cause or in what manner is not said—and that those which were badly formed perished; but how or why those which survived should be cast, as we see that plants and animals are cast, into regular classes, the hypothesis does not explain; or rather the hypothesis is inconsistent with this phenomenon.

The hypothesis, indeed, is hardly deserving of the consideration which we have given to it. What should we think of a man who, because we had never ourselves seen watches, telescopes, stocking-mills, steam-engines, etc., made, knew not how they were made, nor could prove by testimony when they were made, or by whom, would have us believe that these machines, instead of deriving their curious structures from the thought and design of their inventors and contrivers, in truth derive them from no other origin than this; namely, that a mass of metals and other materials having run, when melted, into all possible figures, and combined themselves in all possible forms and shapes and proportions, these things which we see are what were left from the incident, as best worth preserving, and as such are become the remaining stock of a magazine which, at one time or other, has by this means contained every mechanism, useful and useless, convenient and inconvenient, into which such like materials could be thrown? I cannot distinguish the hypothesis, as applied to the works of nature, from this solution, which no one would accept as applied to a collection of machines.

V. To the marks of contrivance discoverable in animal bodies, and to the argument deduced from them in proof of design and of a designing Creator, this turn is sometimes attempted to be given, namely, that the parts were not intended for the use, but that the use arose out of the parts. This distinction is intelligible. A cabinet-maker rubs his mahogany with fish-skin ; yet it would be too much to assert that the skin of the dog-fish was made rough and granulated on purpose for the polishing of wood, and the use of cabinet-makers. Therefore the distinction is intelligible. But I think that there is very little place for it in the works of nature. When roundly and generally affirmed of them, as it hath sometimes been, it amounts to such another stretch of assertion as it would be to say, that all the implements of the cabinet-maker's workshop, as well as his fish-skin, were substances accidentally configurated, which he had picked up and converted to his use ; that his adzes, saws, planes, and gimlets, were not made, as we suppose, to hew, cut, smooth, shape out, or bore wood with, but that, these things being made, no matter with what design, or whether with any, the cabinet-maker perceived that they were applicable to his purpose, and turned them to account.

But, again, so far as this solution is attempted to be applied to those parts of animals the action of which does not depend upon the will of the animal, it is fraught with still more evident absurdity. Is it possible to believe that the eye was formed without any regard to vision ; that it was the animal itself which found out that, though formed with no such intention, it would serve to see with ; and that the use of the eye as an organ of sight resulted from this discovery, and the animal's application of it ? The same question may be asked of the ear ; the same of all the senses. None of the senses fundamentally depend upon the election of the animal ; consequently neither upon his sagacity nor his experience. It is the impression which objects make upon them that constitutes their use. Under that impression he is passive. He may bring objects to the sense, or within its reach; he may select these objects; but over the impression itself he has no power, or very little; and that properly is the sense.

Secondly, there are many parts of animal bodies which seem to depend upon the will of the animal in a greater degree than the senses do, and yet with respect to which this solution is equally unsatisfactory. If we apply the solution to the human body, for instance, it forms itself into questions upon which no reasonable mind can doubt: such as, whether the teeth were made expressly for the mastication of food, the feet for walking, the hands for holding; or whether, these things as they are being in fact in the animal's possession, his own ingenuity taught him that they were convertible to these purposes, though no such purposes were contemplated in their formation.

All that there is of the appearance of reason in this way of considering the subject is, that, in some cases, the organization seems to determine the habits of the animal, and its choice to a particular mode of life; which, in a certain sense, may be called "the use arising out of the part." Now, to all the instances in which there is any place for this suggestion, it may be replied, that the organization determines the animal to habits beneficial and salutary to itself; and that this effect would not be seen so regularly to follow, if the several organizations did not bear a concerted and contrived relation to the substance by which the animal was surrounded. They would, otherwise, be capacities without objects—powers without employment. The web-foot determines, you say, the duck to swim; but what would that avail if there were no water to swim in? The strong hooked bill and sharp talons of one species of bird determine it to prey upon animals; the soft straight bill and weak claws of another species determine it to pick up seeds; but neither determination could take effect in providing for the sustenance of the birds, if animal bodies and vegetable seeds did not lie within their reach. The peculiar conformation of the bill and tongue and claws* of the woodpecker determines that bird to search for his food among the insects lodged behind the bark or in the wood of decayed trees; but what would this profit him if there were no trees, no decayed trees, no insects lodged under their bark or in their trunk? The proboscis with which the bee is furnished determines him to seek for honey; but what would that signify if flowers supplied none? Faculties thrown down upon animals at random, and without reference to the objects amidst which they are placed, would not produce to them the services and benefits which we see; and if there be that reference, then there is intention.

Lastly, the solution fails entirely when applied to plants. The parts of plants answer their uses without any concurrence from the will or choice of the plant.

VI. Others have chosen to refer every thing to a *principle of order* in nature. A principle of order is the word; but what is meant by a principle of order as different from an intelligent Creator, has not been explained either by definition or example; and without such explanation, it should seem to be a mere substitution of words for reasons, names for causes. Order itself is only the adaptation of means to an end: a principle of order, therefore, can only signify the mind and intention which so adapts them. Or, were it capable of being explained in any other sense, is there any experience, any analogy, to sustain it? Was a watch ever produced by a principle of order; and why might not a watch be so produced as well as an eye?

Furthermore, a principle of order, acting blindly and without choice, is negatived by the observation that order is not universal, which it would be if it issued from a constant and necessary principle; nor indiscriminate, which it would be if it issued from an unintelligent principle. Where order is wanted, there we find it; where order is not wanted, that is, where, if it prevailed, it would be useless, there we do not find it. In the structure of the eye—for we adhere to our example—in the figure and position of its several parts, the most exact order is maintained. In the forms of rocks and mountains, in the lines which bound the coasts of continents and islands, in the shape of bays and promontories, no order whatever is perceived, because it would have been superfluous. No useful purpose would have arisen from moulding rocks and mountains into regular solids, bounding the channel of the ocean by geometrical curves; or from the map of the world resembling a table of diagrams in Euclid's Elements or Simpson's Conic Sections.

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* The claws are strong and hooked; and, as in all climbing birds, have two toes placed forwards and two backwards, by which they take a firm hold of the bark of trees. See Plate V., Fig. 3.

VII. Lastly, the confidence which we place in our observations upon the works of nature, in the marks which we discover of contrivance, choice, and design, and in our reasoning upon the proofs afforded us, ought not to be shaken, as it is sometimes attempted to be done, by bringing forward to our view our own ignorance, or rather the general imperfection of our knowledge of nature. Nor, in many cases, ought this consideration to affect us, even when it respects some parts of the subject immediately under our notice. True fortitude of understanding consists in not suffering what we know to be disturbed by what we do not know. If we perceive a useful end, and means adapted to that end, we perceive enough for our conclusion. If these things be clear, no matter what is obscure. The argument is finished. For instance, if the utility of vision to the animal which enjoys it, and the adaptation of the *eye* to this office, be evident and certain—and I can mention nothing which is more so—ought it to prejudice the inference which we draw from these premises, that we cannot explain the use of the spleen? Nay, more, if there be parts of the eye, namely, the cornea, the crystalline, the retina, in their substance, figure and position, manifestly suited to the formation of an image by the refraction of rays of light, at least as manifestly as the glasses and tubes of a dioptric telescope are suited to that purpose, it concerns not the proof which these afford of design, and of a designer, that there may perhaps be other parts, certain muscles, for instance, or nerves in the same eye, of the agency or effect of which we can give no account, any more than we should be inclined to doubt, or ought to doubt, about the construction of a telescope, namely, for what purpose it was constructed, or whether it was constructed at all, because there belonged to it certain screws and pins, the use or action of which we did not comprehend. I take it to be a general way of infusing doubts and scruples into the mind, to recur to its own ignorance, its own imbecility—to tell us that upon these subjects we know little; that little imperfectly; or rather, that we know nothing properly about the matter. These suggestions so fall in with our consciousness as sometimes to produce a general distrust of our faculties and our conclusions. But this is an unfounded jealousy. The uncertainty of one thing does not necessarily affect the certainty of another thing. Our ignorance of many points need not suspend our assurance of a few. Before we yield, in any particular instance, to the scepticism which this sort of insinuation would induce, we ought accurately to ascertain whether our ignorance or doubt concern those precise points upon which our conclusion rests. Other points are nothing. Our ignorance of other points may be of no consequence to these, though they be points, in various respects, of great importance. A just reasoner removes from his consideration not only what he knows, but what he does not know, touching matters not strictly connected with his argument, that is, not forming the very steps of his deduction: beyond these, his knowledge and his ignorance are alike relative.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ARGUMENT CUMULATIVE.

Were there no example in the world of contrivance except that of the *eye*, it would be alone sufficient to support the conclusion which we draw from it, as to the necessity of an intelligent Creator. It could never be got rid of, because it could not be accounted for by any other supposition which did not contradict all the principles we possess of knowledge—the principles according to which things do, as often as they can be brought to the test of experience, turn out to be true or false. Its coats and humors, con structed as the lenses of a telescope are constructed, for the refraction of rays of light to a point, which forms the proper action of the organ; the provision in its muscular tendons for turning its pupil to the object, similar to that which is given to the telescope by screws, and upon which power of direction in the eye the exercise of its office as an optical instrument depends; the further provision for its defence, for its constant lubricity and moisture, which we see in its socket and its lids, in its glands for the secretion of the matter of tears, its outlet or communication with the nose for carrying off the liquid after the eye is washed with it; these provisions compose altogether an apparatus, a system of parts, a preparation of means, so manifest in their design, so exquisite in their contrivance, so successful in their issue, so precious, and so infinitely beneficial in their use, as, in my opinion, to bear down all doubt that can be raised upon the subject. And what I wish, under the title of the present chapter, to observe, is, that if other parts of nature were inaccessible to our inquiries, or even if other parts of nature presented nothing to our examination but disorder and confusion, the validity of this example would remain the same. If there were but one watch in the world, it would not be less certain that it had a maker. If we had never in our lives seen any but one single kind of hydraulic machine, yet if of that one kind we understood the mechanism and use, we should be as perfectly assured that it proceeded from the hand and thought and skill of a workman, as if we visited a museum of the arts, and saw collected there twenty different kinds of machines for drawing water, or a thousand different kinds for other purposes. Of this point each machine is a proof independently of all the rest. So it is with the evidences of a divine agency. The proof is not a conclusion which lies at the end of a chain of reasoning, of which chain each instance of contrivance is only a link, and of which, if one link fail, the whole falls; but it is an argument separately supplied by every separate example. An error in stating an example affects only that example. The argument is cumulative, in the fullest sense of that term. The eye proves it without the ear; the ear without the eye. The proof in each example is complete; for when the design of the part, and the conduciveness of its structure to that design is shown, the mind may set itself at rest; no future consideration can detract any thing from the force of the example.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE MECHANICAL AND IMMECHANICAL PARTS AND FUNCTIONS OF ANIMALS AND VEGETABLES.

It is not that *every* part of an animal or vegetable has not proceeded from a contriving mind; or that every part is not constructed with a view to its proper end and purpose, according to the laws belonging to, and governing the substance or the action made use of in that part; or that each part is not so constructed as to effectuate its purpose while it operates according to these laws; but it is because these laws themselves are not in all cases equally understood, or, what amounts to nearly the same thing, are not equally exemplified in more simple processes and more simple machines, that we lay down the distinction here proposed, between the mechanical and immechanical parts of animals.

For instance, the principle of muscular motion, namely, upon what cause the swelling of the belly of the muscle, and consequent contraction of its tendons, either by an act of the will, or by involuntary irritation, depends, is wholly unknown to us. The substance employed, whether it be fluid, gaseous, elastic, electrical, or none of these, or nothing resembling these, is also unknown to us: of course, the laws belonging to that substance, and which regulate its action, are unknown to us. We see nothing similar to this contraction in any machine which we can make, or any process which we can execute. So far, it is confessed, we are in ignorance, but no farther. This power and principle, from whatever cause it proceeds, being assumed, the collocation of the fibres to receive the principle, the disposition of the muscles for the use and application of the power, is mechanical, and is as intelligible as the adjustment of the wires and strings by which a puppet is moved. We see, therefore, as far as respects the subject before us, what is not mechanical in the animal frame, and what is. The nervous influence—for we are often obliged to give names to things which we know little about—I say, the nervous influence, by which the belly or middle of the muscle is swelled, is not mechanical. The utility of the effect we perceive—the means, or the preparation of means, by which it is produced, we do not. But obscurity as to the origin of muscular motion brings no doubtfulness into our observations upon the sequel of the process; which observations relate, first, to the constitution of the muscle, in consequence of which constitution, the swelling of the belly or middle part is necessarily and mechanically followed by a contraction of the tendons; secondly, to the number and variety of the muscles, and the corresponding number and variety of useful powers which they supply to the animal, which is astonishingly great; thirdly, to the judicious—if we may be permitted to use that term in speaking of the Author, or of the works of nature—to the wise and well-contrived disposition of each muscle for its specific purpose—for moving the joint this way, and that way, and the other way—for pulling and drawing the part to which it is attached in a determinate and particular direction, which is a mechanical operation, exemplified in a multitude of instances. To mention only one: the tendon of the trochlear muscle of the eye,* to the end that it may draw in the line required, is passed through a cartilaginous ring, at which it is reverted exactly in the same manner as a rope in a ship is carried over a block, or round a stay, in order to make it pull in the direction which is wanted. All this, as we have said, is mechanical, and is as accessible to inspection, as capable of being ascertained, as the mechanism of the automaton in the Strand. Supposing the automaton to be put in motion by a magnet, which is probable, it will supply us with a comparison very apt for our present purpose. Of the magnetic effluvium we know perhaps as little as we do of the nervous fluid. But, magnetic attraction being assumed—it signifies nothing from what cause it proceeds—we can trace, or there can be pointed out to us, with perfect clearness and certainty, the mechanism, namely, the steel bars, the wheels, the joints, the wires, by which the motion so much admired is communicated to the fingers of the image; and to make any obscurity or difficulty, or controversy in the doctrine of magnetism, an objection to our knowledge or our certainty concerning the contrivance, or the marks of contrivance, displayed in the automaton, would be exactly the same thing as it is to make our ignorance—which we acknowledge—of the cause of nervous agency, or even of the substance and structure of the nerves themselves, a ground of question or suspicion as to the reasoning which we institute concerning the mechanical part of our frame. That an animal is a machine, is a proposition neither correctly true nor wholly false. The distinction which we have been discussing will serve to show how far the comparison which this expression implies holds, and where in it fails. And whether the distinction be thought of importance or not, it is certainly of importance to remember, that there is neither truth nor justice in endeavoring to bring a cloud over our understandings, or a distrust into our reasonings upon this subject, by suggesting that we know nothing of voluntary motion, of irritability, of the principle of life, of sensation, of animal heat, upon all which the animal functions depend; for our ignorance of these parts of the animal frame concerns not at all our knowledge of the mechanical parts of the same frame. I contend, therefore, that there is mechanism in animals; that this mechanism is as properly such as it is in machines made by art; that this mechanism is intelligible and certain; that it is not the less so, because it often begins or terminates with something which is not mechanical; that whenever it is intelligible and certain, it demonstrates intention and contrivance, as well in the works of nature as in those of art; and that it is the best demonstration which either can afford.

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* Plate II., Fig. 1. The *trochlear* or *superior oblique* muscle arises with the straight muscles from the bottom of the orbit. Its muscular portion, *a*, is extended over the upper part of the eyeball, and gradually assumes the form of a smooth round tendon, *b*; this passes through the pulley, *c*, which is fixed to the inner edge of the orbit, *d*, then returning backwards and downwards, *e*, is inserted into the sclerotic membrane, *f*. The use of this muscle is to bring the eye forwards, and turn the pupil downwards and outwards.

But while I contend for these propositions, I do not exclude myself from asserting that there may be, and that there are, other cases in which, although we cannot exhibit mechanism, or prove indeed that mechanism is employed, we want not sufficient evidence to conduct us to the same conclusion.

There is what may be called the *chemical* part of our frame; of which, by reason of the imperfection of our chemistry, we can attain to no distinct knowledge: I mean, not to a knowledge, either in degree or kind, similar to that which we possess of the mechanical part of our frame. It does not, therefore, afford the same species of argument as that which mechanism affords; and yet it may afford an argument in a high degree satisfactory. The *gastric juice*, or the liquor which digests the food in the stomachs of animals, is of this class. Of all the menstrua it is the most active, the most universal. In the human stomach, for instance, consider what a variety of strange substances, and how widely different from one another, it in a few hours reduces to a uniform pulp, milk, or mucilage. It seizes upon every thing; it dissolves the texture of almost every thing that comes in its way. The flesh of perhaps all animals; the seeds and fruits of the greatest number of plants; the roots and stalks, and leaves of many, hard and tough as they are, yield to its powerful pervasion. The change wrought by it is different from any chemical solution which we can produce, or with which we are acquainted, in this respect as well as many others, that in our chemistry particular menstrua act only upon particular substances. Consider, moreover, that this fluid, stronger in its operation than a caustic alkali or mineral acid, than red precipitate or aquafortis itself, is nevertheless as mild and bland and inoffensive to the touch or taste as saliva or gum-water, which it much resembles. Consider, I say, these several properties of the digestive organ, and of the juice with which it is supplied, or rather with which it is made to supply itself, and you will confess it to be entitled to a name which it has sometimes received, that of "the chemical wonder of animal nature."

Still, we are ignorant of the composition of this fluid, and of the mode of its action; by which is meant, that we are not capable, as we are in the mechanical part of our frame, of collating it with the operations of art. And this I call the imperfection of our chemistry; for, should the time ever arrive, which is not, perhaps, to be despaired of, when we can compound ingredients so as to form a solvent which will act in the manner in which the gastric juice acts, we may be able to ascertain the chemical principles upon which its efficacy depends, as well as from what part, and by what concoction in the human body these principles are generated and derived.

In the mean time, ought that which is in truth the defect of our chemistry, to hinder us from acquiescing in the inference which a production of nature, by its place, its properties, its action, its surprising efficacy, its invaluable use, authorizes us to draw in respect of a creative design?

Another most subtle and curious function of animal bodies is *secretion.* This function is semichemical and semimechanical; exceedingly important and diversified in its effects, but obscure in its process and in its apparatus. The importance of the secretory organs is but too well attested by the diseases which an excessive, a deficient, or a vitiated secretion is almost sure of producing. A single secretion being wrong is enough to make life miserable, or sometimes to destroy it. Nor is the variety less than the importance. From one and the same blood—I speak of the human body—about twenty different fluids are separated; in their sensible properties, in taste, smell, color, and consistency, the most unlike one another that is possible—thick, thin, salt, bitter, sweet: and if from our own we pass to other species of animals, we find among their secretions not only the most various but the most opposite properties; the most nutritious aliment, the deadliest poison; the sweetest perfumes, the most fetid odors. Of these the greater part, as the gastric juice, the saliva, the bile, the slippery mucilage which lubricates the joints, the tears which moisten the eye, the wax which defends the ear, are, after they are secreted, made use of in the animal economy, are evidently subservient, and are actually contributing to the utilities of the animal itself. Other fluids seem to be separated only to be rejected. That this also is necessary—though why it was originally necessary we cannot tell—is shown by the consequence of the separation being long suspended, which consequence is disease and death. Akin to secretion, if not the same thing, is assimilation, by which one and the same blood is converted into bone, muscular flesh, nerves, membranes, tendons; things as different as the wood and iron, canvas and cordage, of which a ship with its furniture is composed. We have no operation of art wherewith exactly to compare all this, for no other reason, perhaps, than that all operations of art are exceeded by it. No chemical election, no chemical analysis or resolution of a substance into its constituent parts, no mechanical sifting or division that we are acquainted with, in perfection or variety, come up to animal secretion. Nevertheless, the apparatus and process are obscure, not to say absolutely concealed from our inquiries. In a few, and only a few instances, we can discern a little of the constitution of a gland. In the kidneys of large animals, we can trace the emulgent artery dividing itself into an infinite number of branches; their extremities everywhere communicating with little round bodies, in the substance of which bodies the secret of the machinery seems to reside, for there the change is made. We can discern pipes laid from these round bodies towards the pelvis, which is a basin within the solid of the kidney. We can discern these pipes joining and collecting together into larger pipes; and, when so collected, ending in innumerable papillæ, through which the secreted fluid is continually oozing into its receptacle. This is all we know of the mechanism of a gland, even in the case in which it seems most capable of being investigated Yet to pronounce that we know nothing of animal secretion, or nothing satisfactorily, and with that concise remark to dismiss the article from our argument, would be to dispose of the subject very hastily and very irrationally. For the purpose which we want, that of evincing intention, we know a great deal. And what we know is this. We see the blood carried by a pipe, conduit, or duct, *to* the gland. We see an organized apparatus, be its construction or action what it will, which we call that gland. We see the blood, or part of the blood, after it has passed through and undergone the action of the gland, coming *from* it by an emulgent vein or artery, that is, by another pipe or conduit. And we see also at the same time a new and specific fluid issuing from the same gland by its excretory duct, that is, by a third pipe or conduit; which new fluid is in some cases discharged out of the body, in more cases retained within it, and there executing some important and intelligent office. Now supposing, or admitting, that we know nothing of the proper internal constitution of a gland, or of the mode of its acting upon the blood, then our situation is precisely like that of an unmechanical looker-on, who stands by a stocking-loom, a corn-mill, a carding-machine, or a thrashing-machine at work, the fabric and mechanism of which, as well as all that passes within, is hidden from his sight by the outside case; or, if seen, would be too complicated for his uninformed, uninstructed understanding to comprehend. And what is that situation? This spectator, ignorant as he is, sees at one end a material enter the machine, as unground grain the mill, raw cotton the carding-machine, sheaves of unthreshed corn the threshing-machine; and when he casts his eye to the other end of the apparatus, he sees the material issuing from it in a new state, and what is more, in a state manifestly adapted to future uses—the grain in meal fit for the making of bread, the wool in rovings ready for spinning into threads, the sheaf in corn dressed for the mill. Is it necessary that this man, in order to be convinced that design, that intention, that contrivance has been employed about the machine, should be allowed to pull it to pieces—should be enabled to examine the parts separately, explore their action upon one another, or their operation, whether simultaneous or successive, upon the material which is presented to them? He may long to do this to gratify his curiosity; he may desire to do it to improve his theoretic knowledge; or he may have a more substantial reason for requesting it, if he happen, instead of a common visitor, to be a millwright by profession, or a person sometimes called in to repair such-like machines when out of order; but for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of counsel and design in the formation of the machine, he wants no such intromission or privity. What he sees is sufficient. The effect upon the material, the change produced in it, the utility of that change for future applications, abundantly testify, be the concealed part of the machine or of its construction what it will, the hand and agency of a contriver.

If any confirmation were wanting to the evidence which the animal secretions afford of design, it may be derived, as has been already hinted, from their variety, and from their appropriation to their place and use. They all come from the same blood; they are all drawn off by glands; yet the produce is very different, and the difference exactly adapted to the work which is to be done, or the end to be answered. No account can be given of this, without resorting to appointment. Why, for instance, is the saliva, which is diffused over the seat of taste, insipid, while so many others of the secretions, the urine, the tears, and the sweat, are salt? Why does the gland within the ear separate a viscid substance, which defends that passage; the gland in the outer angle of the eye a thin brine, which washes the ball? Why is the synovia of the joints mucilaginous; the bile bitter, stimulating, and soapy? Why does the juice which flows into the stomach contain powers which make that organ the great laboratory, as it is by its situation the recipient of the materials of future nutrition? These are all fair questions; and no answer can be given to them but what calls in intelligence and intention.

My object in the present chapter has been to teach three things: first, that it is a mistake to suppose that, in reasoning from the appearances of nature, the imperfection of our knowledge proportionably affects the certainty of our conclusion, for in many cases it does not affect it at all; secondly, that the different parts of the animal frame may be classed and distributed according to the degree of exactness with which we compare them with works of art; thirdly, that the *mechanical* parts of our frame, or those in which this comparison is most complete, although constituting probably the coarsest portions of nature's workmanship, are the most proper to be alleged as proofs and specimens of design.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF MECHANICAL ARRANGEMENT IN THE HUMAN FRAME.

We proceed, therefore, to propose certain examples taken out of this class; making choice of such as, among those which have come to our knowledge, appear to be the most striking and the best understood; but obliged, perhaps, to postpone both these recommendations to a third, that of the example being capable of explanation without plates, or figures, or technical language.

OF THE BONES.

I. I challenge any man to produce in the joints and pivots of the most complicated or the most flexible machine that was ever contrived, a construction more artificial, or more evidently artificial, than that which is seen in the vertebræ of the *human neck*. Two things were to be done: the head was to have the power of bending forward and backward, as in the act of nodding, stooping, looking upward or downward; and, at the same time, of turning itself round upon the body to a certain extent—the quadrant, we will say, or rather, perhaps, a hundred and twenty degrees of a circle. For these two purposes two distinct contrivances are employed: first, the head rests immediately upon the uppermost part of the vertebræ, and is united to it by a *hinge*-joint, upon which joint the head plays freely forward and backward, as far either way as is necessary, or as the ligaments allow; which was the first thing required. But then the rotary motion is unprovided for; therefore, secondly, to make the head capable of this, a further mechanism is introduced—not between the head and the uppermost bone of the neck, where the hinge is, but between that bone and the bone next underneath it. It is a mechanism resembling a *tenon and mortise*. This second, or uppermost bone but one, has what anatomists call a process, namely, a projection somewhat similar in size and shape to a tooth; which tooth entering a corresponding hole or socket in the bone above it, forms a pivot or axle, upon which that upper bone, together with the head which it supports, turns freely in a circle, and as far in the circle as the attached muscles permit the head to turn. Thus are both motions perfect without interfering with each other. When we nod the head, we use the hinge-joint, which lies between the head and the first bone of the neck. When we turn the head round, we use the tenon and mortise, which runs between the first bone of the neck and the second.

We see the same contrivance and the same principle employed in the frame or mounting of a telescope. It is occasionally requisite that the object-end of the instrument be moved up and down, as well as horizontally or equatorially. For the vertical motion, there is a hinge, upon which the telescope plays; for the horizontal or equatorial motion, an axis upon which the telescope and the hinge turn together. And this is exactly the mechanism which is applied to the motion of the head; nor will any one here doubt of the existence of counsel and design, except it be by that debility of mind which can trust to its own reasonings in nothing.

We may add, that it was, on another account, also expedient that the motion of the head backward and forward should be performed upon the upper surface of the first vertebra; for, if the first vertebra itself had bent forward, it would have brought the spinal marrow, at the very beginning of its course, upon the point of the tooth.

II. Another mechanical contrivance, not unlike the last in its object, but different and original in its means, is seen in what anatomists call the *fore-arm*—that is, in the arm between the elbow and the wrist.* Here, for the perfect use of the limb, two motions are wanted: a motion at the elbow, backward and forward, which is called a reciprocal motion; and a rotary motion, by which the palm of the hand, as occasion requires, may be turned upward. How is this managed? The fore-arm, it is well known, consists of two bones, lying alongside each other, but touching only towards the ends. One, and only one of these bones is joined to the humerus, or upper part of the arm, at the elbow; the other alone to the hand, at the wrist. The first, by means, at the elbow, of a hinge-joint—which allows only of motion in the same plane—swings backward and forward, carrying along with it the other bone and the whole fore-arm. In the mean time, as often as there is occasion to turn the palm upward, that other bone to which the hand is attached rolls upon the first by the help of a groove or hollow near each end of one bone, to which is fitted a corresponding prominence in the other. If both bones had been joined to the humerus (upper arm) at the elbow, or both to the hand, at the wrist, the thing could not have been done. The first was to be at liberty at one end, and the second at the other, by which means the two actions may be performed together.* The great bone, which carries the fore-arm, may be swinging upon its hinge at the elbow at the very time that the lesser bone, which carries the hand, may be turning round it in the grooves. The management, also, of these grooves, or rather of the tubercles and grooves, is very observable. The two bones are called the *radius* and the *ulna*. Above, that is, towards the elbow, a tubercle of the

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* Plate II., Fig. 2. *a*, the humerus; the head, *b*, is a portion of a sphere, and exhibits an instance of the *ball and socket*, or *univer-*

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sal joint; *c*, the elbow, exemplifying the *hinge-joint; d*, the *radius*, and *e*, the *ulna*. The radius belongs more peculiarly to the wrist, being the bone which supports the hand, and turns with it in all its revolving motions. The ulna belongs chiefly to the elbow-joint, and by it we perform all the actions of bending the arm and extending the fore-arm.

* PLATE II., FIG. 3, shows the connection of the radius, *d*, with the ulna, *e*, at the elbow; *a*, being the humerus. The mode of articulation at the wrist is seen in Fig. 2.

radius plays into a socket of the ulna; while below, that is, towards the wrist, the radius finds the socket, and the ulna the tubercle. A single bone in the fore-arm, with a ball-and-socket joint at the elbow, which admits of motion in all directions, might, in some degree, have answered the purpose of both moving the arm and turning the hand. But how much better it is accomplished by the present mechanism any person may convince himself who puts the ease and quickness with which he can shake his hand at the wrist circularly—moving likewise, if he pleases, his arm at the elbow at the same time—in competition with the comparatively slow and laborious motion with which his arm can be made to turn round at the shoulder by the aid of a ball-and-socket joint.

III. The *spine*, or backbone, is a chain of joints of very wonderful construction. Various, difficult, and almost inconsistent offices were to be executed by the same instrument. It was to be firm, yet flexible—now I know no chain made by art which is both these—for, by firmness, I mean not only strength but stability: *firm*, to support the erect position of the body; *flexible*, to allow of the bending of the trunk in all degrees of curvature. It was further also—which is another and quite a distinct purpose from the rest—to become a pipe or conduit for the safe conveyance from the brain of the most important fluid of the animal frame, that, namely, upon which all voluntary motion depends, the spinal marrow; a substance not only of the first necessity to action, if not to life, but of a nature so delicate and tender, so susceptible and so impatient of injury, as that any unusual pressure upon it, or any considerable obstruction of its course, is followed by paralysis or death.

Now the spine was not only to furnish the main trunk for the passage of the medullary substance from the brain, but to give out, in the course of its progress, small pipes therefrom, which, being afterwards indefinitely subdivided, might, under the name of nerves, distribute this exquisite supply to every part of the body. The same spine was also to serve another use not less wanted than the preceding, namely, to afford a fulcrum, stay, or basis—or, more properly speaking, a series of these—for the insertion of the muscles which are spread over the trunk of the body; in which trunk there are not, as in the limbs, cylindrical bones to which they can be fastened: and likewise, which is a similar use, to furnish a support for the ends of the ribs to rest upon.

Bespeak of a workman a piece of mechanism which shall comprise all these purposes, and let him set about to contrive it; let him try his skill upon it; let him feel the difficulty of accomplishing the task, before he be told how the same thing is effected in the animal frame. Nothing will enable him to judge so well of the wisdom which has been employed—nothing will dispose him to think of it so truly. First, for the firmness, yet flexibility of the spine: it is composed of a great number of bones—in the human subject, of twenty-four—joined to one another, and compacted by broad bases. The breadth of the bases upon which the parts severally rest, and the closeness of the junction, give to the chain its firmness and stability; the number of parts, and consequent frequency of joints, its flexibility. Which flexibility, we may also observe, varies in different parts of the chain: is least in the back, where strength more than flexure is wanted; greater in the loins, which it was necessary should be more supple than the back; and greatest of all in the neck, for the free motion of the head. Then, secondly, in order to afford a passage for the descent of the medullary substance, each of these bones is bored through in the middle, in such a manner as that, when put together, the hole in one bone falls into a line and corresponds with the holes in the two bones contiguous to it. By which means the perforated pieces, when joined, form an entire, close, uninterrupted channel, at least while the spine is upright and at rest. But as a settled posture is inconsistent with its use, a great difficulty still remained, which was to prevent the vertebræ shifting upon one another, so as to break the line of the canal as often as the body moves or twists, or the joints gaping externally whenever the body is bent forward and the spine thereupon made to take the form of a bow. These dangers, which are mechanical, are mechanically provided against. The vertebræ, by means of their processes and projections, and of the articulations which some of these form with one another at their extremities, are so locked in and confined as to maintain, in what are called the bodies or broad surfaces of the bones, the relative position nearly unaltered, and to throw the change and the pressure produced by flexion almost entirely upon the intervening cartilages, the springiness and yielding nature of whose substance admits of all the motion which is necessary to be performed upon them, without any chasm being produced by a separation of the parts. I say, of all the motion which is necessary: for although we bend our backs to every degree almost of inclination, the motion of each vertebra is very small: such is the advantage we receive from the chain being composed of so many links, the spine of so many bones. Had it consisted of three or four bones only, in bending the body the spinal marrow must have been bruised at every angle. The reader need not be told that these intervening cartilages are gristles, and he may see them in perfection in a loin of veal. Their form also favors the same intention. They are thicker before than behind; so that when we stoop forward, the compressible substance of the cartilage, yielding in its thicker and anterior part to the force which squeezes it, brings the surface of the adjoining vertebræ nearer to the being parallel with one another than they were before, instead of increasing the inclination of their planes, which must have occasioned a fissure or opening between them. Thirdly, for the medullary canal, giving out in its course, and in a convenient order, a supply of nerves to different parts of the body, notches are made in the upper and lower edge of every vertebra, two on each edge, equidistant on each side from the middle line of the back. When the vertebræ are put together, these notches, exactly fitting, form small holes, through which the nerves at each articulation issue out in pairs, in order to send their branches to every part of the body, and with an equal bounty to both sides of the body. The fourth purpose assigned to the same instrument is the insertion of the bases of the muscles, and the support of the ends of the ribs; and for this fourth purpose, especially the former part of it, a figure specifically suited to the design, and unnecessary for the other purposes, is given to the constituent bones. While they are plain and round and smooth towards the front, where any roughness or projection might have wounded the adjacent viscera, they run out behind and on each side into long processes; to which processes the muscles necessary to the motions of the trunk are fixed, and fixed with such art, that while the vertebræ supply a basis for the muscles, the muscles help to keep these bones in their position, or by their tendons to tie them together.

That most important, however, and general property, namely, the strength of the compages, and the security against luxation, was to be still more specially consulted; for where so many joints were concerned, and where in every one, derangement would have been fatal, it became a subject of studious precaution. For this purpose the vertebræ are articulated, that is, the movable joints between them are formed by means of those projections of their substance which we have mentioned under the name of processes, and these so lock in with and overwrap one another as to secure the body of the vertebra not only from accidentally slipping, but even from being pushed out of its place by any violence short of that which would break the bone. I have often remarked and admired this structure in the chine of a hare. In this, as in many instances, a plain observer of the animal economy may spare himself the disgust of being present at human dissections, and yet learn enough for his information and satisfaction, by even examining the bones of the animals which come upon his table. Let him take, for example, into his hands a piece of the clean-picked bone of a hare's back, consisting, we will suppose, of three vertebræ. He will find the middle bone of the three so implicated, by means of its projections or processes, with the bone on each side of it, that no pressure which he can use will force it out of its place between them. It will give way neither forward nor backward, nor on either side. In whichever direction he pushes, he perceives, in the form, or junction, or overlapping of the bones, an impediment opposed to his attempt, a check and guard against dislocation. In one part of the spine he will find a still further fortifying expedient, in the mode according to which the ribs are articulated to the spine. Each rib rests upon two vertebræ. That is the thing to be remarked, and any one may remark it in carving a neck of mutton. The manner of it is this: the end of the rib is divided by a middle ridge into two surfaces, which surfaces are joined to the bodies of two contiguous vertebræ, the ridge applying itself to the intervening cartilage. Now this is the very contrivance which is employed in the famous iron bridge at my door at Bishop-Wearmouth, and for the same purpose of stability, namely, the cheeks of the bars which pass between the arches ride across the joints by which the pieces composing each arch are united. Each cross-bar rests upon two of these pieces at their place of junction, and by that position resists, at least in one direction, any tendency in either piece to slip out of its place. Thus perfectly, by one means or the other, is the danger of slipping laterally, or of being drawn aside out of the *line* of the back, provided against; and to withstand the bones being pulled asunder longitudinally, or in the direction of that line, a strong membrane runs from one end of the chain to the other, sufficient to resist any force which is likely to act in the direction of the back or parallel to it, and consequently to secure the whole combination in their places. The general result is, that not only the motions of the human body necessary for the ordinary offices of life are performed with safety, but that it is an incident hardly ever heard of that even the gesticulations of a harlequin distort his spine.

Upon the whole, and as a guide to those who may be inclined to carry the consideration of this subject further, there are three views under which the spine ought to be regarded, and in all which it cannot fail to excite our admiration. These views relate to its articulations, its ligaments, and its perforations; and to the corresponding advantages which the body derives from it for action, for strength, and for that which is essential to every part, a secure communication with the brain.

The structure of the spine is not in general different in different animals. In the serpent tribe, however, it is considerably varied; but with a strict reference to the conveniency of the animal. For whereas in quadrupeds the number of vertebræ is from thirty to forty, in the serpent it is nearly one hundred and fifty: whereas in men and quadrupeds the surfaces of the bones are flat, and these flat surfaces laid one against the other, and bound tight by sinews; in the serpent, the bones play one within another, like a ball and socket,* so that they have a free motion upon one another in every direction: that is to say, in men and quadrupeds, firmness is more consulted; in serpents, pliancy. Yet even pliancy is not obtained at the expense of safety. The backbone of a serpent, for coherence and flexibility, is one of the most curious pieces of animal mechanism with which we are acquainted. The chain of a watch—I mean the chain which passes between the spring-barrel and the fusee—which aims at the same properties, is but a bungling piece of workmanship in comparison with that of which we speak.

IV. The reciprocal enlargement and contraction of the *chest*, to allow for the play of the lungs, depends upon a simple yet beautiful mechanical contrivance, referable to the structure of the bones which enclose it. The ribs are articulated to the backbone, or rather to its side projections, *obliquely*: that is, in their natural position they bend or slope from the place of articulation downwards. But the basis upon which they rest at this end being fixed, the consequence of the obliquity, or the inclination downwards is, that when they come to move, whatever pulls the ribs upwards, necessarily at the same time draws them out; and that, while the ribs are brought to a right angle with the spine behind, the sternum, or part of the chest to which they are attached in front, is thrust forward. The simple action, therefore, of the elevating muscles does the business; whereas, if the ribs had been articulated with the bodies of the vertebræ at right angles, the cavity of the thorax could never have been further enlarged by a change of their position. If each rib had been a rigid bone, articulated at both ends to fixed bases, the whole chest had been immovable. Keill has observed that the breastbone, in an easy inspiration, is thrust out one-tenth of an inch; and he calculates that this, added to what is gained to the space within the chest by the flattening or descent of the diaphragm, leaves room for forty-two cubic inches of air to enter at every drawing-in of the breath. When there is a necessity for a deeper and more laborious inspiration, the enlargement of the capacity of the chest may be so increased by effort, as that the lungs may be distended with seventy or a hundred such cubic inches.* The thorax, says Schelhammer, forms a kind of bellows, such as never have been, nor probably will be, made by any artificer.

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* Der. Phys. Theol., p. 396.

V. The *patella*, or kneepan,† is a curious little bone; in its form and office unlike any other bone in the body. It is circular, the size of a crown-piece, pretty thick, a little convex on both sides, and covered with a smooth cartilage. It lies upon the front of the knee; and the powerful tendons by which the leg is brought forward, pass through it—or rather, it makes a part of their continuation—from their origin in the thigh to their insertion in the tibia. It protects both the tendon and the joint from any injury which either might suffer by the rubbing of one against the other, or by the pressure of unequal surfaces. It also gives to the tendons a very considerable mechanical advantage, by altering the line of their direction, and by advancing it further out from the centre of motion; and this upon the principles of the resolution of force, upon which principles all machinery is founded. These are its uses. But what is most observable in it is, that it appears to be supplemental, as it were, to the frame; added, as it should almost seem, afterward; not quite necessary, but very convenient. It is separate from the other bones; that is, it is not connected with any other bones by the common mode of union. It is soft, or hardly formed, in infancy; and produced by an ossification, of the inception or progress of which no account can be given from the structure or exercise of the part.

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* Anat. p. 229.

† See Fig. 4.

VI. The *shoulder-blade* is, in some material respects, a very singular bone, appearing to be made so expressly for its own purpose, and so independently of every other reason. In such quadrupeds as have no collar-bones, which are by far the greater number, the shoulder-blade has no bony communication with the trunk, either by a joint, or process, or in any other way. It does not grow to, or out of, any other bone of the trunk. It does not apply to any other bone of the trunk—I know not whether this be true of any second bone in the body, except perhaps the os hyoïdes—in strictness, it forms no part of the skeleton. It is bedded in the flesh, attached only to the muscles. It is no other than a foundation bone for the arm, laid in separate as it were, and distinct from the general ossification. The lower limbs connect themselves at the hip with bones which form part of the skeleton; but this connection in the upper limbs being wanting, a basis, whereupon the arm might be articulated, was to be supplied by a detached ossification for the purpose.

OF THE JOINTS.

I. The above are a few examples of bones made remarkable by their configuration; but to almost all the bones belong *joints;* and in these, still more clearly than in the form or shape of the bones themselves, are seen both contrivance and contriving wisdom. Every joint is a curiosity, and is also strictly mechanical. There is the hinge-joint, and the mortise-and-tenon joint; each as manifestly such, and as accurately defined, as any which can be produced out of a cabinet-maker's shop; and one or the other prevails, as either is adapted to the motion which is wanted: for example, a mortise-and-tenon, or ball-and-socket joint, is not required at the knee, the leg standing in need only of a motion backward and forward in the same plane, for which a hinge-joint is sufficient; a mortise-and-tenon, or ball-and-socket joint is wanted at the hip, not only that the progressive step may be provided for, but that the interval between the limbs may be enlarged or contracted at pleasure. Now observe what would have been the inconveniency—that is, both the superfluity and the defect of articulation, if the case had been inverted—if the ball-and-socket joint had been at the knee, and the hinge-joint at the hip. The thighs must have been kept constantly together, and the legs had been loose and straddling. There would have been no use, that we know of, in being able to turn the calves of the legs before; and there would have been great confinement by restraining the motion of the thighs to one plane. The disadvantage would not have been less if the joints at the hip and the knee had been both of the same sort—both balls and sockets, or both hinges; yet why, independently of utility, and of a Creator who consulted that utility, should the same bone—the thigh-bone—be rounded at one end, and channelled at the other?

The *hinge-joint* is not formed by a bolt passing through the two parts of the hinge, and thus keeping them in their places, but by a different expedient. A strong, tough, parchment-like membrane, rising from the receiving bones, and inserted all round the received bones a little below their heads, encloses the joint on every side. This membrane ties, confines, and holds the ends of the bones together, keeping the corresponding parts of the joints—that is, the relative convexities and concavities—in close application to each other.

For the *ball-and-socket joint*, besides the membrane already described, there is in some important joints, as an additional security, a short, strong, yet flexible ligament, inserted by one end into the head of the ball, by the other, into the bottom of the cup; which ligament keeps the two parts of the joint so firmly in their place, that none of the motions which the limb naturally performs, none of the jerks and twists to which it is ordinarily liable, nothing less indeed than the utmost and the most unnatural violence, can pull them asunder. It is hardly imaginable how great a force is necessary even to stretch, still more to break, this ligament: yet so flexible is it, as to oppose no impediment to the suppleness of the joint. By its situation also, it is inaccessible to injury from sharp edges. As it cannot be ruptured, such is its strength, so it cannot be cut, except by an accident which would sever the limb. If I had been permitted to frame a proof of contrivance such as might satisfy the most distrustful inquirer, I know not whether I could have chosen an example of mechanism more unequivocal or more free from objection, than this ligament. Nothing can be more mechanical; nothing, however subservient to the safety, less capable of being generated by the action of the joint. I would particularly solicit the reader's attention to this provision, as it is found in the head of the *thigh-bone*—to its strength, its structure, and its use. It is an instance upon which I lay my hand. One single fact, weighed by a mind in earnest, leaves oftentimes the deepest impression. For the purpose of addressing different understandings and different apprehensions—for the purpose of sentiment—for the purpose of exciting admiration of the Creator's works, we diversify our views, and multiply our examples: but for the purpose of strict argument, one clear instance is sufficient; and not only sufficient, but capable perhaps of generating a firmer assurance than what can arise from a divided attention.

The *ginglymus*, or hinge-joint, does not, it is manifest, admit of a ligament of the same kind with that of the ball-and-socket joint; but it is always fortified by the species of ligament of which it does admit. The strong, firm, investing membrane above described accompanies it in every part; and in particular joints, this membrane, which is properly a ligament, is considerably stronger on the sides than either before or behind, in order that the convexities may play true in their concavities, and not be subject to slip sideways, which is the chief danger; for the muscular tendons generally restrain the parts from going further than they ought to go in the plane of their motion. In the *knee*, which is a joint of this form, and of great importance, there are superadded to the common provisions for the stability of the joint, two strong ligaments, which cross each other—and cross each other in such a manner as to secure the joint from being displaced in any assignable direction.* "I think," says Cheselden, "that the knee cannot be completely dislocated without breaking the *cross* ligaments."† We can hardly help comparing this with the binding up of a fracture, where the fillet is almost wholly strapped across, for the sake of giving firmness and strength to the bandage.

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* Plate II., Fig. 5. The *crucial* or *internal* ligaments of the knee-joints arise from each side of the depression between the condyles of the thigh-bone: the anterior is fixed into the centre, the posterior into the back of the articulation of the tibia. This structure properly limits the motions of the joints, and gives the firmness requisite for violent exertions. Viewing the form of the bones, we should consider it one of the weakest and most superficial joints; but the strength of its ligaments and of the tendons passing over it, renders it the most secure and the least liable to dislocation of any in the body.

† Cheselden's Anat., ed. 7th, p. 45.

Another no less important joint, and that also of the ginglymus sort, is the *ankle;* yet though important—in order, perhaps, to preserve the symmetry and lightness of the limb—*small,* and on that account more liable to injury. Now this joint is strengthened, that is, is defended from dislocation by two remarkable processes or prolongations of the bones of the leg, which processes form the protuberances that we call the inner and outer ankle. It is part of each bone going down lower than the other part, and thereby overlapping the joint: so that if the joint be in danger of slipping outward, it is curbed by the inner projection, that is, that of the tibia; if inward, by the outer projection, that is, that of the fibula. Between both, it is locked in its position. I know no account that can be given of this structure, except its utility. Why should the tibia terminate at its lower extremity with a double end, and the fibula the same, but to barricade the joint on both sides by a continuation of part of the thickest of the bone over it? The joint at the *shoulder,* compared with the joint at the *hip,* though both ball-and-socket joints, discovers a difference in their form and proportions, well suited to the different offices which the limbs have to execute. The cup or socket at the shoulder is much shallower and flatter than it is at the hip, and is also in part formed of cartilage set round the rim of the cup. The socket into which the head of the thigh-bone is inserted, is deeper, and made of more solid materials. This agrees with the duties assigned to each part. The arm is an instrument of motion principally, if not solely. Accordingly, the shallowness of the socket at the shoulder, and the yieldingness of the cartilaginous substance with which its edge is set round, and which in fact composes a considerable part of its concavity, are excellently adapted for the allowance of a free motion and a wide range, both which the arm wants. Whereas the lower limb forming a part of the column of the body—having to support the body, as well as to be the means of its locomotion—firmness was to be consulted as well as action With a capacity for motion in all directions indeed, as at the shoulder, but not in any direction to the same extent as in the arm, was to be united stability, or resistance to dislocation. Hence the deeper excavation of the socket, and the presence of a less proportion of cartilage upon the edge.

The suppleness and pliability of the joints we every moment experience; and the *firmness* of animal articulation, the property we have hitherto been considering, may be judged of from this single observation, that, at any given moment of time, there are millions of animal joints in complete repair and use, for one that is dislocated; and this, notwithstanding the contortions and wrenches to which the limbs of animals are continually subject.

II. The *joints*, or rather the ends of the bones which form them, display also, in their configuration, another use. The nerves, bloodvessels, and tendons, which are necessary to the life, or for the motion of the limbs, must, it is evident, in their way from the trunk of the body to the place of their destination, travel over the movable joints; and it is no less evident that, in this part of their course, they will have, from sudden motions, and from abrupt changes of curvature, to encounter the danger of compression, attrition, or laceration. To guard fibres so tender against consequences so injurious, their path is in those parts protected with peculiar care, and that by a provision in the figure of the bones themselves. The nerves which supply the *fore-arm*, especially the inferior cubital nerves, are at the elbow conducted, by a kind of covered way, between the condyles, or rather under the inner extuberances of the bone which composes the upper part of the arm.* At the *knee*, the extremity of the thigh-bone is divided by a sinus, or cliff, into two heads or protuberances; and these heads on the back part stand out beyond the cylinder of the bone. Through the hollow which lies between the hind parts of these two heads—that is to say, under the ham, between the hamstrings, and within the concave recess of the bone formed by the extuberances on each side—in a word, along a defile, between rocks, pass the great vessels and nerves which go to the leg.* Who led these vessels by a road so defended and secured? In the joint at the *shoulder*, in the edge of the cup which receives the head of the bone, is a *notch*, which is joined or covered at the top with a ligament. Through this hole, thus guarded, the bloodvessels steal to their destination in the arm, instead of mounting over the edge of the concavity.†

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* Cheselden's Anat., p. 255, ed. 7.

III. In all joints, the ends of the bones which work against each other, are tipped with *gristle*. In the ball-and-socket joint, the cup is lined and the ball capped with it. The smooth surface, the elastic and unfriable nature of cartilage, render it of all substances the most proper for the place and purpose. I should, therefore, have pointed this out among the foremost of the provisions which have been made in the joints for the facilitating of their action, had it not been alleged that cartilage in truth is only nascent or imperfect bone; and that the bone in these places is kept soft and imperfect, in consequence of a more complete and rigid ossification being prevented from taking place by the continual motion and rubbing of the surfaces; which being so, what we represent as a designed advantage is an unavoidable effect. I am far from being convinced that this is a true account of the fact; or that, if it were so, it answers the argument. To me the surmounting of the bones with gristle looks more like a plating with a different metal, than like the same metal kept in a different state by the action to which it is exposed. At all events, we have a great particular benefit, though arising from a general constitution; but this last, not being quite what my argument requires, lest I should seem by applying the instance to overrate its value, I have thought it fair to state the question which attends it.

IV. In some joints, very particularly in the knees, there are loose cartilages or gristles between the bones and within the joint, so that the ends of the bones, instead of working upon one another, work upon the intermediate cartilages. Cheselden has observed,* that the contrivance of a loose ring is practised by mechanics where the friction of the joints of any of their machines is great, as between the parts of crook-hinges of large gates, or under the head of the male screw of large vices. The cartilages of which we speak have very much of the form of these rings. The comparison, moreover, shows the reason why we find them in the knees rather than in other joints. It is an expedient, we have seen, which a mechanic resorts to only when some strong and heavy work is to be done. So here the thigh-bone has to achieve its motion at the knee, with the whole weight of the body pressing upon it, and often, as in rising from our seat, with the whole weight of the body to lift. It should seem also, from Cheselden's account, that the slipping and sliding of the loose cartilages, though it be probably a small and obscure change, humored the motion at the end of the thigh-bone, under the particular configuration which was necessary to be given to it for the commodious action of the tendons, and which configuration requires what he calls a variable socket, that is, a concavity, the lines of which assume a different curvature in different inclinations of the bones.

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* Ches. Anat., p. 35. † Ibid. p. 30.

V. We have now done with the configuration; but there is also in the joints, and that common to them all, another exquisite provision manifestly adapted to their use, and concerning which there can, I think, be no dispute, namely, the regular supply of a *mucilage*, more emollient and slippery than oil itself, which is constantly softening and lubricating the parts that rub upon each other, and thereby diminishing the effect of attrition in the highest possible degree. For the continual secretion of this important liniment, and for the feeding of the cavities of the joint with it, glands are fixed near each joint, the excretory ducts of which glands, dripping with their balsamic contents, hang loose like fringes within the cavity of the joints. A late improvement in what are called friction wheels, which consists of a mechanism so ordered as to be regularly dropping oil into a box which encloses the axis, the nave, and certain balls upon which the nave revolves, may be said, in some sort, to represent the contrivance in the animal joint, with this superiority, however, on the part of the joint, namely, that here the oil is not only dropped, but *made.*

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* Ches. Anat., p. 13, ed. 7.

In considering the joints, there is nothing, perhaps, which ought to move our gratitude more than the reflection, *how well they wear.* A limb shall swing upon its hinge, or play in its socket, many hundred times in an hour, for sixty years together, without diminution of its agility, which is a long time for any thing to last—for any thing so much worked and exercised as the joints are. This durability I should attribute in part to the provision which is made for the preventing of wear and tear, first by the polish of the cartilaginous surfaces; secondly, by the healing lubrication of the mucilage, and in part, to that astonishing property of animal constitutions, assimilation, by which, in every portion of the body, let it consist of what it will, substance is restored and waste repaired.

Movable joints, I think, compose the curiosity of bones; but their union, even where no motion is intended or wanted, carries marks of mechanism and of mechanical wisdom. The teeth, especially the front teeth, are one bone fixed in another, like a peg driven into a board. The sutures of the skull* are like the edges of two saws clapped together in such a manner as that the teeth of one enter the intervals of the other. We have sometimes one bone lapping over another, and planed down at the edges; sometimes also the thin lamella of one bone received into a narrow furrow of another. In all which varieties we seem to discover the same design, namely, firmness of juncture without clumsiness in the seam

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* PLATE II., FIG. 6. *a*, *a*, the coronal suture; *b*, the sagittal; *c*, *c*, the lambdoidal; *d*, an irregularity; and *e*, *e*, the squamous sutures.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE MUSCLES.

MUSCLES, with their tendons, are the instruments by which animal motion is performed. It will be our business to point out instances in which, and properties with respect to which, the disposition of these muscles is as strictly mechanical as that of the wires and strings of a puppet.

I. We may observe, what I believe is universal, an exact relation between the joint and the muscles which move it. Whatever motion the joint by its mechanical construction is capable of performing, that motion the annexed muscles by their position are capable of producing. For example, if there be, as at the knee and elbow, a hinge-joint, capable of motion only in the same plane, the leaders, as they are called, that is, the muscular tendons, are placed in directions parallel to the bone, so as, by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles to which they belong, to produce that motion and no other. If these joints were capable of a freer motion, there are no muscles to produce it. Whereas, at the shoulder and the hip, where the ball-and-socket joint allows by its construction of a rotary or sweeping motion, tendons are placed in such a position, and pull in such a direction, as to produce the motion of which the joint admits. For instance, the sartorius or tailor's muscle,* rising from the spine, running diagonally across the thigh, and taking hold of the inside of the main bone of the leg a little below the knee, enables us, by its contraction, to throw one leg and thigh over the other, giving effect at the same time to the ball-and-socket joint at the hip, and the hinge-joint at the knee. There is, as we have seen, a specific mechanism in the bones for the rotary motions of the head and hands: there is, also, in the oblique direction of the muscles belonging to them, a specific provision for the putting of this mechanism of the bones into action. And mark the consent of uses: the oblique muscles would have been inefficient without that particular articulation; that particular articulation would have been lost without the oblique muscles. It may be proper, however, to observe, with respect to the *head*, although I think it does not vary the case, that its oblique motions and inclinations are often motions in a *diagonal*, produced by the joint action of muscles lying in straight directions. But whether the pull be single or combined, the articulation is always such as to be capable of obeying the action of the muscles. The oblique muscles attached to the head are likewise so disposed as to be capable of steadying the globe, as well as of moving it. The head of a new-born infant is often obliged to be filleted up. After death, the head drops and rolls in every direction. So that it is by the equilibre of the muscles, by the aid of a considerable and equipollent muscular force in constant exertion, that the head maintains its erect posture. The muscles here supply what would otherwise be a great defect in the articulation; for the joint in the neck, although admirably adapted to the motion of the head, is insufficient for its support. It is not only by the means of a most curious structure of the bones that a man turns his head, but by virtue of an adjusted muscular power that he even holds it up.

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* PLATE III., FIG. 1 The *sartorius*, *a*, is the longest muscle of the human system. It is extended obliquely across the thigh from the fore part of the hip to the inner side of the tibia. Its office is to bend the knee and bring the leg inwards.

As another example of what we are illustrating, namely, conformity of use between the bones and the muscles, it has been observed of the different vertebræ, that their processes are exactly proportioned to the quantity of motion which the other bones allow of, and which the respective muscles are capable of producing.

II. A muscle acts only by contraction. Its force is exerted in no other way. When the exertion ceases, it relaxes itself; that is, it returns by relaxation to its former state, but without energy. This is the nature of the muscular fibre; and being so, it is evident that the reciprocal *energetic* motion of the limbs, by which we mean motion *with force* in opposite directions, can only be produced by the instrumentality of opposite or antagonist muscles—of flexors and extensors answering to each other. For instance, the biceps and brachialis *internus* muscles,[*] placed in the front part of the upper arm, by their contraction, bend the elbow, and with such degree of force as the case requires or the strength admits of. The relaxation of these muscles after the effort would merely let the fore-arm drop down. For the *back stroke*, therefore, and that the arm may not only bend at the elbow, but also extend and straighten itself with force, other muscles, the longus et brevis brachialis *externus*,[†] and the anconæus, placed on the hinder part of the arms, by their contractile twitch, fetch back the fore-arm into a straight line with the cubit, with no less force than that with which it was bent out of it. The same thing obtains in all the limbs, and in every movable part of the body. A finger is not bent and straightened without the *contraction* of two muscles taking place. It is evident, therefore, that the animal functions require that particular disposition of the muscles which we describe by the name of antagonist muscles. And they are accordingly so disposed. Every muscle is provided with an adversary. They act like two sawyers in a pit, by an opposite pull; and nothing, surely, can more strongly indicate design and attention to an end, than their being thus stationed, than this collocation. The nature of the muscular fibre being what it is, the purposes of the animal could be answered by no other. And not only the capacity for motion, but the aspect and symmetry of the body is preserved by the muscles being marshalled according to this order; for example, the mouth is holden in the middle of the face, and its angles kept in a state of exact correspondency, by two muscles drawing against and balancing each other. In a hemiplegia, when the muscle on one side is weakened, the muscle on the other side draws the mouth awry.

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[*] Plate III., Fig. 2. The biceps, *a*, arises by two portions from the scapula; these form a thick mass of flesh in the middle of the arm, which is finally indented into the upper end of the radius. The *brachiæus internus*, *b*, arises from the middle of the humerus, and is inserted into the ulna. Both these muscles bend the fore-arm.

[†] Plate III., Fig. 2. The long and the short *brachiæus internus*, or the *triceps extensor cubiti*, *c*, is attached to the inferior edge of the scapula and to the humerus by three distinct heads, which unite and invest the whole back part of the bone; it then becomes a strong tendon, and is implanted into the elbow. It is a powerful extensor of the fore-arm. The *anconæus*, *d*, is a small, triangular muscle, situated at the outer side of the elbow; it assists the muscle *c*.

III. Another property of the muscles, which could only be the result of care, is their being almost universally so disposed as not to obstruct or interfere with one another's action. I know but one instance in which this impediment is perceived. We cannot easily swallow while we gape. This, I understand, is owing to the muscles employed in the act of deglutition being so implicated with the muscles of the lower jaw, that while these last are contracted, the former cannot act with freedom. The obstruction is, in this instance, attended with little inconvenience; but it shows what the effect is where it does exist, and what loss of faculty there would be if it were more frequent. Now, when we reflect upon the number of muscles, not fewer than four hundred and forty-six in the human body, known and named,* how contiguous they lie to each other, in layers as it were, over one another, crossing one another, sometimes embedded in one another, sometimes perforating one another—an arrangement which leaves to each its liberty and its full play, must necessarily require meditation and counsel.

IV. The following is oftentimes the case with the muscles. Their action is wanted where their situation would be inconvenient. In which case the body of the muscle is placed in some commodious position at a distance, and made to communicate with the point of action by slender strings or wires. If the muscles which move the fingers had been placed in the palm or back of the hand, they would have swelled that part to an awkward and clumsy thickness. The beauty, the proportions of the part would have been destroyed. They are therefore disposed in the arm, and even up to the elbow, and act by long tendons strapped down at the wrist, and passing under the ligaments to the fingers,* and to the joints of the fingers which they are severally to move. In like manner, the muscles which move the toes and many of the joints of the foot, how gracefully are they disposed in the calf of the leg, instead of forming an unwieldy tumefaction in the foot itself. The observation may be repeated of the muscle which draws the nictitating membrane over the eye. Its office is in the front of the eye; but its body is lodged in the back part of the globe, where it lies safe, and where it encumbers nothing.

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* Keill's Anatomy, p. 295, ed. 3.

V. The great mechanical variety in the figure of the muscles may be thus stated. It appears to be a fixed law that the contraction of a muscle shall be towards its centre. Therefore the subject for mechanism on each occasion is, so to modify the figure and adjust the position of the muscle as to produce the motion required agreeably with this law. This can only be done by giving to different muscles a diversity of configuration suited to their several offices, and to their situation with respect to the work which they have to perform. On which account we find them under a multiplicity of forms and attitudes: sometimes with double, sometimes with treble tendons, sometimes with none; sometimes one tendon to several muscles, at other times one muscle to several tendons.† The shape of the organ is susceptible of an incalculable variety, while the original property of the muscle, the law and line of its contraction, remains the same, and is simple. Herein the muscular system may be said to bear a perfect resemblance to our works of art. An artist does not alter the native quality of his materials, or their laws of action. He takes these as he finds them. His skill and ingenuity are employed in turning them, such as they are, to his account, by giving to the parts of his machine a form and relation in which these unalterable properties may operate to the production of the effects intended.

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* See FIG. 2, where *e* is the annular ligament of the wrist, under which pass the tendons of the muscles of the fingers.

† PLATE III., FIG. 3, represents the *biceps* muscle of the arm; *a*, *a*, the tendons; *b*, *b*, the muscular fibres. The force which a muscle possesses is as the number of the muscular fibres; but a limited num-

VI. The ejaculations can never too often be repeated, How many things must go right for us to be an hour at ease; how many more for us to be vigorous and active! Yet vigor and activity are, in a vast plurality of instances, preserved in human bodies, notwithstanding that they depend upon so great a number of instruments of motion, and notwithstanding that the defect or disorder sometimes of a very small instrument, of a single pair, for instance, out of the four hundred and forty-six muscles which are employed, may be attended with grievous inconveniency. There is piety and good sense in the following observation taken out of the "Religious Philosopher:" "With much compassion," says the writer, "as well as astonishment at the goodness of our loving Creator, have I considered the sad state of a certain gentleman, who, as to the rest, was in pretty good health, but only wanted the use of these *two little muscles* that serve to lift the eyelids, and so had almost lost the use of his sight, being forced, as long as this defect lasted, to shove up his eyelids every moment with his own

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ber only of fibres can be affixed to any point of a bone which it is designed to move; it is therefore contrived to attach them to a cord, called a sinew or tendon, which can conveniently be conducted and fixed to the bone. If we wish to move a heavy weight, we attach a rope to it, that a greater number of men may apply their strength. So, the muscular fibres are the moving powers, and the tendon is like the rope attached to the point to be moved.

hands!"* In general we may remark in how small a degree those who enjoy the perfect use of their organs know the comprehensiveness of the blessing, the variety of their obligation. They perceive a result, but they think little of the multitude of concurrences and rectitudes which go to form it.

Besides these observations, which belong to the muscular organ as such, we may notice some advantages of structure which are more conspicuous in muscles of a certain class or description than in others. Thus,

I. The variety, quickness, and precision of which muscular motion is capable are seen, I think, in no part so remarkably as in the *tongue.* It is worth any man's while to watch the agility of his tongue, the wonderful promptitude with which it executes changes of position, and the perfect exactness. Each syllable of articulated sound requires for its utterance a specific action of the tongue, and of the parts adjacent to it. The disposition and configuration of the mouth appertaining to every letter and word is not only peculiar, but, if nicely and accurately attended to, perceptible to the sight; insomuch that curious persons have availed themselves of this circumstance to teach the deaf to speak, and to understand what is said by others. In the same person, and after his habit of speaking is formed, one, and only one position of the parts will produce a given articulate sound correctly. How instantaneously are these positions assumed and dismissed; how numerous are the permutations—how various, yet how infallible! Arbitrary and antic variety is not the thing we admire; but variety obeying a rule, conducing to an effect, and commensurate with exigencies infinitely diversified. I believe also that the anatomy of the tongue corresponds with these observations upon its activity. The muscles of the tongue are so numerous, and so implicated with one another, that they cannot be traced by the nicest dissection; nevertheless—which is a great perfection of the organ—neither the number nor the complexity, nor what might seem to be the entanglement of its fibres, in anywise impede its motion, or render the determination or success of its efforts uncertain.

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* PLATE III., FIG. 4. A profile of this muscle in its natural position. It arises within the orbit, and is inserted by a broad tendon into the upper eyelid, which it elevates.

I here entreat the reader's permission to step a little out of my way, to consider *the parts of the mouth* in some of their other properties. It has been said, and that by an eminent physiologist, that whenever nature attempts to work two or more purposes by one instrument, she does both or all imperfectly. Is this true of the tongue, regarded as an instrument of speech and of taste, or regarded as an instrument of speech, of taste, and of deglutition? So much otherwise, that many persons, that is to say, nine hundred and ninety-nine persons out of a thousand, by the instrumentality of this one organ, talk and taste and swallow very well. In fact, the constant warmth and moisture of the tongue, the thinness of the skin, the papillæ upon its surface, qualify this organ for its office of tasting, as much as its inextricable multiplicity of fibres do for the rapid movements which are necessary to speech. Animals which feed upon grass have their tongues covered with a perforated skin, so as to admit the dissolved food to the papillæ underneath, which in the mean time remain defended from the rough action of the unbruised spiculæ.

There are brought together within the cavity of the mouth more distinct uses, and parts executing more distinct offices, than I think can be found lying so near to one another, or within the same compass, in any other portion of the body: namely, teeth of different shape, first for cutting, secondly for grinding; muscles, most artificially disposed for carrying on the compound motion of the lower jaw, half lateral and half vertical, by which the mill is worked; fountains of saliva, springing up in different parts of the cavity for the moistening of the food while the mastication is going on; glands, to feed the fountains; a muscular constriction of a very peculiar kind in the back part of the cavity, for the guiding of the prepared aliment into its passage towards the stomach, and in many cases for carrying it along that passage; for, although we may imagine this to be done simply by the weight of the food itself, it in truth is not so, even in the upright posture of the human neck; and most evidently is not the case with quadrupeds—with a horse for instance, in which, when pasturing, the food is thrust up wards by muscular strength, instead of descending of its own accord.

In the mean time, and within the same cavity, is going on another business, altogether different from what is here described—that of respiration and speech. In addition therefore to all that has been mentioned, we have a passage opened from this cavity to the lungs for the admission of air exclusively of every other substance; we have muscles, some in the larynx, and without number in the tongue, for the purpose of modulating that air in its passage, with a variety, a compass, and precision, of which no other musical instrument is capable. And lastly, which, in my opinion, crowns the whole as a piece of machinery, we have a specific contrivance for dividing the pneumatic part from the mechanical, and for preventing one set of actions interfering with the other. Where various functions are united, the difficulty is to guard against the inconveniences of a too great complexity. In no apparatus put together by art and for the purposes of art, do I know such multifarious uses so aptly combined, as in the natural organization of the human mouth; or where the structure, compared with the uses, is so simple. The mouth, with all these intentions to serve, is a single cavity, is one machine, with its parts neither crowded nor confused, and each unembarrassed by the rest—each at least at liberty in a degree sufficient for the end to be attained. If we cannot eat and sing at the same moment. we can eat one moment and sing the next; the respiration proceeding freely all the while.

There is one case, however, of this double office, and that of the *earliest* necessity, which the mouth alone could not perform; and that is, carrying on together the two actions of sucking and breathing. Another route, therefore, is opened for the air—namely, through the nose—which lets the breath pass backward and forward, while the lips, in the act of sucking, are necessarily shut close upon the body from which the nutriment is drawn. This is a circumstance which always appeared to me worthy of notice. The nose would have been necessary, although it had not been the organ of smelling. The making it the seat of a sense was superadding a new use to a part already wanted—was taking a wise advantage of an antecedent and a constitutional necessity.

But to return to that which is the proper subject of the present section, the celerity and precision of muscular motion. These qualities may be particularly observed in the execution of many species of instrumental *music*, in which the changes produced by the hand of the musician are exceedingly rapid; are exactly measured, even when most minute; and display, on the part of the muscles, an obedience of action alike wonderful for its quickness and its correctness.

Or let a person only observe his own hand while he is *writing;* the number of muscles which are brought to bear upon the pen; how the joint and adjusted operation of several tendons is concerned in every stroke, yet that five hundred such strokes are drawn in a minute. Not a letter can be turned without more than one, or two, or three tendinous contractions, definite both as to the choice of the tendon and as to the space through which the contraction moves; yet how currently does the work proceed; and when we look at it, how faithful have the muscles been to their duty—how true to the order which endeavor or habit has inculcated!

For let it be remembered, that while a man's handwriting is the same, an exactitude of order is preserved, whether he write well or ill. These two instances of music and writing show not only the quickness and precision of muscular action, but the docility.*

II. Regarding the particular configuration of muscles, *sphincter* or circular muscles appear to be admirable pieces of mechanism.† It is the muscular power most happily applied—the same quality of the muscular substance, but under a new modification. The circular disposition of the fibres is strictly mechanical; but, though the most mechanical, is not the only thing in sphincters which deserves our notice. The regulated degree of contractile force with which they are endowed, sufficient for retention, yet vincible when requisite, together with their ordinary state of actual contraction, by means of which their dependence upon the will is not constant but occasional, gives to them a constitution of which the conveniency is inestimable. This their semi-voluntary character is exactly such as suits with the wants and functions of the animal.

III. We may also, upon the subject of muscles, observe, that many of our most important actions are achieved by the combined help of different muscles. Frequently a diagonal motion is produced by the contraction of tendons pulling in the direction of the sides of the parallelogram. This is the case, as has been already noticed, with some of the oblique nutations of the head. Sometimes the number of coöperating muscles is very great. Dr. Nieuentyt, in the Leipsic Transactions, reckons up a hundred muscles that are employed every time we breathe; yet we take in or let out our breath without reflecting what a work is thereby performed, what an apparatus is laid in of instruments for the service, and how many such contribute their assistance to the effect. Breathing with ease is a blessing of every moment, yet of all others it is that which we possess with the least consciousness. A man in an asthma is the only man who knows how to estimate it.

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* FIG. 5 exhibits the principal muscles of the palm of the hand: *a*, *a*, *a*, *a*, are small muscles indispensably necessary in rapid movements of the fingers; *c*, *d*, *e*, are muscles of the thumb; *f*, *g*, of the little finger.

† FIG. 6 exhibits examples of *sphincter* muscles: *a*, that encircling the eyelid, closing and compressing the eye; *b*, is the muscle surrounding the mouth, and contracting the lips.

IV. Mr. Home has observed,* that the most important and the most delicate actions are performed in the body by the smallest muscles; and he mentions, as his examples, the muscles which have been discovered in the iris of the eye and the drum of the ear. The tenuity of these muscles is astonishing: they are microscopic hairs; must be magnified to be visible; yet are they real, effective muscles, and not only such, but the grandest and most precious of our faculties, sight and hearing, depend upon their health and action.

V. The muscles act in the limbs with what is called a mechanical disadvantage. The muscle at the shoulder, by which the arm is raised, is fixed nearly in the same manner as the load is fixed upon a steelyard, within a few decimals, we will say, of an inch from the centre upon which the steelyard turns. In this situation, we find that a very heavy draught is no more than sufficient to countervail the force of a small lead plummet placed upon the long arm of the steelyard, at the distance of perhaps fifteen or twenty inches from the centre and on the other side of it. And this is the disadvantage which is meant; and an absolute disadvantage no doubt it would be, if the object were to spare the force of muscular contraction. But observe how conducive is this constitution to animal conveniency. Mechanism has always in view one or other of these two purposes—either to move a great weight slowly, and through a small space, or to move a light weight rapidly through a considerable sweep. For the former of these purposes a different species of lever, and a different collocation of the muscles, might be better than the present; but for the second, the present structure is the true one. Now it so happens that the second, and not the first, is that which the occasions of animal life principally call for. In what concerns the human body, it is of much more consequence to any man to be able to carry his hand to his head with due expedition, than it would be to have the power of raising from the ground a heavier load—of two or three more hundred weight, we will suppose—than he can lift at present.

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* Philosophical Transactions, part I., 1800, p. 8.

This last is a faculty which, on some extraordinary occasions, he may desire to possess; but the other is what he wants and uses every hour or minute. In like manner, a husbandman or a gardener will do more execution by being able to carry his scythe, his rake, or his flail with a sufficient dispatch through a sufficient space, than if, with greater strength, his motions were proportionably more confined and slow. It is the same with a mechanic in the use of his tools. It is the same also with other animals in the use of their limbs. In general, the vivacity of their motions would be ill exchanged for greater force under a clumsier structure.

We have offered our observations upon the structure of muscles in general; we have also noticed certain species of muscles; but there are also *single* muscles which bear marks of mechanical contrivance appropriate as well as particular. Out of many instances of this kind we select the following:

I. Of muscular actions, even of those which are well understood, some of the most curious are incapable of popular explanation; at least, without the aid of plates and figures. This is in a great measure the case with a very familiar, but at the same time a very complicated motion, that of the *lower jaw;* and with the muscular structure by which it is produced. One of the muscles concerned may, however, be described in such a manner as to be, I think, sufficiently comprehended for our present purpose. The problem is to pull the lower jaw *down*. The obvious method should seem to be, to place a straight muscle—namely, to fix a string from the chin to the breast, the contraction of which would open the mouth, and produce the motion required at once. But it is evident that the form and liberty of the neck forbid a muscle being laid in such a position; and that, consistently with the preservation of this form, the motion which we want must be effectuated by some muscular mechanism disposed further back in the jaw. The mechanism adopted is as follows: A certain muscle called the *digastric*, rises on the side of the face considerably *above* the insertion of the lower jaw, and comes down, being converted in its progress into a round tendon. Now it is manifest that the tendon, while it pursues a direction *descending* towards the jaw, must, by its contraction, pull the jaw up instead of down. What then was to be done? This, we find, is done: the descending tendon, when it is got low enough, is passed through a loop, or ring, or pully,* in the os hyoïdes, and then made to ascend; and having thus changed its line of direction, is inserted into the inner part of the chin: by which device, namely, the turn at the loop, the action of the muscle—which in all muscles is contraction—that before would have pulled the jaw up, now as necessarily draws it down. "The mouth," says Heister, "is opened by means of this trochlea in a most wonderful and elegant manner."

II. What contrivance can be more mechanical than the following, namely, a slit in one tendon to let another tendon pass through it? This structure is found in the tendons which move the toes and fingers.† The long tendon, as it is called, in the foot, which bends the first joint of the toe, passes *through* the short tendon which bends the second joint, which course allows to the sinew more liberty, and a more commodious action than it would otherwise have been capable of exerting.* There is nothing, I believe, in a silk or cotton mill, in the belts, or straps, or ropes, by which motion is communicated from one part of the machine to another, that is more artificial, or more evidently so, than this *perforation.*

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* See a similar contrivance in Plate II., Fig. 1.

† Plate IV., Fig. 1. *a*, is the tendon of the *long flexor of the toes*, which divides about the middle of the foot into four portions, which pass through the slits in *b*, the *short flexor* tendons.

III. The next circumstance which I shall mention under this head of muscular arrangement is so decisive a mark of intention, that it always appeared to me to supersede, in some measure, the necessity of seeking for any other observation upon the subject; and that circumstance is, the tendons which pass from the leg to the foot, being bound down by a ligament to the ankle. The foot is placed at a considerable angle with the leg. It is manifest, therefore, that flexible strings passing along the interior of the angle, if left to themselves, would, when stretched, start from it. The obvious preventive is to tie them down. And this is done in fact. Across the instep, or rather just above it, the anatomist finds a strong ligament, *under* which the tendons pass to the foot. The effect of the ligament as a bandage can be made evident to the senses; for if it be cut, the tendons start up. The simplicity, yet the clearness of this contrivance, its exact resemblance to established resources of art, place it among the most indubitable manifestations of design with which we are acquainted.

There is also a further use to be made of the present example, and that is, as it precisely contradicts the opinion that the parts of animals may have been all formed by what is called *appetency*, that is, endeavor perpetuated and imperceptibly working its effect through an incalculable series of generations. We have here no endeavor, but the reverse of it—a constant renitency and reluctance. The endeavor is all the other way. The pressure of the ligament constrains the tendons; the tendons reäct upon the pressure of the ligament. It is impossible that the ligament should ever have been generated by the exercise of the tendon or in the course of that exercise, forasmuch as the force of the tendon perpendicularly resists the fibre which confines it, and is constantly endeavoring, not to form, but to rupture and displace the threads of which the ligament is composed.

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* Ches. Anat., p. 119.

Keill has reckoned up in the human body four hundred and forty-six muscles, dissectible and describable; and hath assigned a use to every one of the number. This cannot be all imagination.

Bishop Wilkins has observed from Galen, that there are at least ten several qualifications to be attended to in each particular muscle: namely, its proper figure; its just magnitude; its fulcrum; its point of action, supposing the figure to be fixed; its collocation with respect to its two ends, the upper and the lower; the place; the position of the whole muscle; the introduction into it of nerves, arteries, veins. How are things including so many adjustments to be made; or, when made, how are they to be put together without intelligence?

I have sometimes wondered why we are not struck with mechanism in animal bodies as readily and as strongly as we are struck with it, at first sight, in a watch or a mill. One reason of the difference may be, that animal bodies are, in a great measure, made up of soft flabby substances, such as muscles and membranes; whereas we have been accustomed to trace mechanism in sharp lines, in the configuration of hard materials, in the moulding, chiselling, and filing into shapes of such articles as metals or wood. There is something, therefore, of habit in the case; but it is sufficiently evident that there can be no proper reason for any distinction of the sort. Mechanism may be displayed in the one kind of substance as well as in the other.

Although the few instances we have selected, even as they stand in our description, are nothing short perhaps of logical proofs of design, yet it must not be forgotten, that in every part of anatomy, description is a poor substitute for inspection. It is well said by an able anatomist,* and said in reference to the very part of the subject which we have been treating of, "Imperfecta hæc musculorum descriptio non minùs arida est legentibus quàm inspectantibus fuerit jucunda eorundem præparatio. Elegantissima enim mechanicês artificia, creberrimè in illis obvia, verbis nonnisi obscurè exprimuntur: carnium autem ductu, tendinum colore, insertionum proportione, et trochlearium distributione, oculis exposita, omnem superant admirationem."†

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* Steno, in Blas. Anat. Animal, p. 2, c. 4.

† "This imperfect description of the muscles is no less dry to our readers, than the preparation of the same has been delightful to us as students. Because these exquisite mechanical contrivances we so often meet with in the muscles, can only obscurely be described in words; whereas, when displayed to the eye—with the conformation of the fleshy parts, the color of the tendons, the proportionate distances of the insertions, and the distribution of the pulleys—they surpass all admiration."

CHAPTER X.

OF THE VESSELS OF ANIMAL BODIES.

The circulation of the *blood* through the bodies of men and quadrupeds, and the apparatus by which it is carried on, compose a system, and testify a contrivance, perhaps the best understood of any part of the animal frame. The lymphatic system, or the nervous system, may be more subtle and intricate—nay, it is possible that in their structure they may be even more artificial than the sanguiferous—but we do not know so much about them.

The utility of the circulation of the blood I assume as an acknowledged point. One grand purpose is plainly answered by it—the distributing to every part, every extremity, every nook and corner of the body, the nourishment which is received into it by one aperture. What enters at the mouth finds its way to the fingers' ends. A more difficult mechanical problem could hardly, I think, be proposed, than to discover a method of constantly repairing the waste, and of supplying an accession of substance to every part of a complicated machine at the same time.

This system presents itself under two views: first, the disposition of the bloodvessels, that is, the laying of the pipes; and secondly, the construction of the engine at the centre, namely, the heart, for driving the blood through them.

I. The disposition of the bloodvessels, as far as regards the supply of the body, is like that of the water-pipes in a city, namely, large and main trunks branching off by smaller pipes, and these again by still narrower tubes, in every direction and towards every part in which the fluid which they convey can be wanted. So far the water-pipes which serve a town may represent the vessels which carry the blood from the heart. But there is another thing necessary to the blood, which is not wanted for the water; and that is, the carrying of it back again to its source. For this office a reversed system of vessels is prepared, which, uniting at their extremities with the extremities of the first system, collect the divided and subdivided streamlets, first, by capillary ramifications into larger branches, secondly, by these branches into trunks; and thus return the blood—almost exactly inverting the order in which it went out—to the fountain whence its motion proceeded. All which is evident mechanism.

The body, therefore, contains two systems of bloodvessels, arteries and veins. Between the constitution of the systems there are also two differences, suited to the functions which the systems have to execute. The blood, in going out, passing always from wider into narrower tubes, and in coming back, from narrower into wider, it is evident that the impulse and pressure upon the sides of the bloodvessels will be much greater in one case than the other. Accordingly the arteries, which carry out the blood, are formed of much tougher and stronger coats than the veins, which bring it back. That is one difference; the other is still more artificial, or, if I may so speak, indicates still more clearly the care and anxiety of the Artificer. Forasmuch as, in the arteries, by reason of the greater force with which the blood is urged along them, a wound or rupture would be more dangerous than in the veins, these vessels are defended from injury, not only by their texture, but by their situation, and by every advantage of situation which can be given to them. They are buried in sinuses, or they creep along grooves made for them in the bones; for instance, the under edge of the ribs is sloped and furrowed solely for the passage of these vessels. Sometimes they proceed in channels, protected by stout parapets on each side; which last description is remarkable in the bones of the fingers, these being hollowed out on the under side like a scoop, and with such a concavity that the finger may be cut across to the bone without hurting the artery which runs along it. At other times the arteries pass in canals wrought in the substance, and in the very middle of the substance of the bone. This takes place in the lower jaw, and is found where there would otherwise be danger of compression by sudden curvature. All this care is wonderful, yet not more than what the importance of the case required. To those who venture their lives in a ship, it has been often said, that there is only an inch-board between them and death ; but in the body itself, especially in the arterial system, there is, in many parts, only a membrane, a skin, a thread. For which reason, this system lies deep under the integuments ; whereas the veins, in which the mischief that ensues from injuring the coats is much less, lie in general above the arteries, come nearer to the surface, and are more exposed.

It may be further observed concerning the two systems taken together, that though the arterial, with its trunk and branches and small twigs, may be imagined to issue or proceed, in other words, to *grow* from the heart, like a plant from its root, or the fibres of a leaf from its footstalk—which, however, were it so, would be only to resolve one mechanism into another—yet the venal, the returning system, can never be formed in this manner. The arteries might go on shooting out from their extremities, that is, lengthening and subdividing indefinitely ; but an inverted system, continually uniting its streams instead of dividing, and thus carrying back what the other system carried out, could not be referred to the same process.

II. The next thing to be considered is the engine which works this machinery, namely, the *heart.* For our purpose it is unnecessary to ascertain the principle upon which the heart acts. Whether it be irritation excited by the contact of the blood, by the influx of the nervous fluid, or whatever else be the cause of its motion, it is something which is capable of producing, in a living muscular fibre, reciprocal contraction and relaxation. This is the power we have to work with ; and the inquiry is, how this power is applied in the instance before us. There is provided, in the central part of the body, a hollow muscle, invested with spiral fibres running in both directions, the layers intersecting one another; in some animals, however, appearing to be semicircular rather than spiral. By the contraction of these fibres, the sides of the muscular cavities are necessarily squeezed together, so as to force out from them any fluid which they may at that time contain: by the relaxation of the same fibres, the cavities are in their turn dilated, and of course prepared to admit every fluid which may be poured into them. Into these cavities are inserted the great trunks, both of the arteries which carry out the blood, and of the veins which bring it back. This is a general account of the apparatus; and the simplest idea of its action is, that by each contraction a portion of blood is forced by a syringe into the arteries, and at each dilatation an equal portion is received from the veins. This produces at each pulse a motion, and change in the mass of blood, to the amount of what the cavity contains, which, in a full-grown human heart, I understand is about an ounce, or two table-spoonfuls. How quickly these changes succeed one another, and by this succession how sufficient they are to support a stream or circulation throughout the system, may be understood by the following computation, abridged from Keill's Anatomy, p. 117, ed. 3: "Each ventricle will at least contain one ounce of blood. The heart contracts four thousand times in one hour; from which it follows, that there pass through the heart, every hour, four thousand ounces, or three hundred and fifty pounds of blood. Now the whole mass of blood is said to be about twenty-five pounds; so that a quantity of blood equal to the whole mass of blood passes through the heart fourteen times in one hour, which is about once in every four minutes."

Consider what an affair this is, when we come to very large animals. The aörta of a whale is larger in the bore than the main pipe of the water-works at London bridge; and the water roaring in its passage through that pipe is inferior, in impetus and velocity, to the blood gushing from the whale's heart. Hear Dr. Hunter's account of the dissection of a whale: "The aörta measured a foot in diameter. Ten or fifteen gallons of blood are thrown out of the heart at a stroke with an immense velocity, through a tube of a foot diameter. The whole idea fills the mind with wonder."*

The account which we have here stated of the injection of blood into the arteries by the contraction, and of the corresponding reception of it from the veins by the dilatation of the cavities of the heart, and of the circulation being thereby maintained through the bloodvessels of the body, is true, but imperfect. The heart performs this office, but it is in conjunction with another of equal curiosity and importance. It was necessary that the blood should be successively brought into contact, or contiguity, or proximity with the *air*. I do not know that the chemical reason upon which this necessity is founded, has been yet sufficiently explored. It seems to be made apparent, that the atmosphere which we breathe is a mixture of two kinds of air—one pure and vital, the other, for the purposes of life, effete, foul, and noxious; that when we have drawn in our breath, the blood in the lungs imbibes from the air thus brought into contiguity with it a portion of its pure ingredient, and at the same time gives out the effete or corrupt air which it contained, and which is carried away, along with the halitus, every time we expire. At least, by comparing the air which is breathed from the lungs with the air which enters the lungs, it is found to have lost some of its pure part, and to have brought away with it an addition of its impure part. Whether these experiments satisfy the question as to the need which the blood stands in of being visited by continual accesses of air, is not for us to inquire into, nor material to our argument; it is sufficient to know, that in the constitution of most animals such a necessity exists, and that the air, by some means or other, *must* be introduced into a near com-

* Hunter's Account of the Dissection of a Whale. Phil. Trans.

munication with the blood. The lungs of animals are constructed for this purpose. They consist of bloodvessels and air-vessels, lying close to each other; and whenever there is a branch of the trachea or windpipe, there is a branch accompanying it of the vein and artery, and the air-vessel is always in the middle between the bloodvessels.* The internal surface of these vessels, upon which the application of the air to the blood depends, would, if collected and expanded, be, in a man, equal to a superficies of fifteen feet square. Now, in order to give the blood in its course the benefit of this organization—and this is the part of the subject with which we are chiefly concerned—the following operation takes place. As soon as the blood is received by the heart from the veins of the body, and *before* that is sent out again into its arteries, it is carried, by the force of the contraction of the heart, and by means of a separate and supplementary artery, to the lungs, and made to enter the vessels of the lungs; from which, after it has undergone the action, whatever it be, ot that viscus, it is brought back by a large vein once more to the heart, in order, when thus concocted and prepared, to be thence distributed anew into the system. This assigns to the heart a double office. The pulmonary circulation is a system within a system; and one action of the heart is the origin of both.

For this complicated function four cavities become necessary, and four are accordingly provided: two called ventricles, which *send out* the blood—namely, one into the lungs, in the first instance; the other into the mass, after it has returned from the lungs: two others also, called auricles, which *receive* the blood from the veins—namely, one, as it comes immediately from the body; the other, as the same blood comes a second time, after its circulation through the lungs. So that there are two receiving cavities, and two forcing cavities. The structure of the heart has reference to the lungs; for without the lungs, one of each would have been sufficient. The translation of the blood in the heart itself is after this manner. The receiving cavities respectively communicate with the forcing cavities, and, by their contraction, unload the received blood into them. The forcing cavities, when it is their turn to contract, compel the same blood into the mouths of the arteries.

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* Keill's Anatomy, p. 121.

The account here given will not convey to a reader ignorant of anatomy any thing like an accurate notion of the form, action, or use of the parts—nor can any short and popular account do this—but it is abundantly sufficient to testify contrivance; and although imperfect, being true as far as it goes, may be relied upon for the only purpose for which we offer it—the purpose of this conclusion.

"The wisdom of the Creator," says Hamburgher, "is in nothing seen more gloriously than in the heart." And how well does it execute its office. An anatomist, who understood the structure of the heart, might say beforehand that it would play; but he would expect, I think, from the complexity of its mechanism, and the delicacy of many of its parts, that it should always be liable to derangement, or that it would soon work itself out. Yet shall this wonderful machine go, night and day, for eighty years together, at the rate of a hundred thousand strokes every twenty-four hours, having, at every stroke, a great resistance to overcome; and shall continue this action for this length of time without disorder and without weariness!

But further, from the account which has been given of the mechanism of the heart, it is evident that it must require the interposition of *valves*—that the success indeed of its action must depend upon these; for when any one of its cavities contracts, the necessary tendency of the force will be to drive the enclosed blood not only into the mouth of the artery where it ought to go, but also back again into the mouth of the vein from which it flowed. In like manner, when by the relaxation of the fibres the same cavity is dilated, the blood would not only run into it from the vein, which was the course intended, but back from the artery, through which it ought to be moving forward. The way of preventing a reflux of the fluid in both these cases, is to fix valves, which, like floodgates, may open a way to the stream in one direction, and shut up the passage against it in another. The heart, constituted as it is, can no more work without valves than a pump can. When the piston descends in a pump, if it were not for the stoppage by the valve beneath, the motion would only thrust down the water which it had before drawn up. A similar consequence would frustrate the action of the heart. Valves therefore, properly disposed, that is, properly with respect to the course of the blood which it is necessary to promote, are essential to the contrivance; *and valves so disposed are accordingly provided.* A valve is placed in the communication between each auricle and its ventricle, lest, when the ventricle contracts, part of the blood should get back again into the auricle, instead of the whole entering, as it ought to do, the mouth of the artery. A valve is also fixed at the mouth of each of the great arteries which take the blood from the heart—leaving the passage free so long as the blood holds its proper course forward; closing it whenever the blood, in consequence of the relaxation of the ventricle, would attempt to flow back. There is some variety in the construction of these valves, though all the valves of the body act nearly upon the same principle, and are destined to the same use. In general they consist of a thin membrane, lying close to the side of the vessel, and consequently allowing an open passage while the stream runs one way, but thrust out from the side by the fluid getting behind it, and opposing the passage of the blood when it would flow the other way. Where more than one membrane is employed, the different membranes only compose one valve. Their joint action fulfils the office of a valve: for instance, over the entrance of the right auricle of the heart into the right ventricle, three of these skins or membranes are fixed, of a triangular figure, the bases of the triangles fastened to the flesh, the sides and summits loose; but, though loose, connected by threads of a determinate length, with certain small fleshy prominences adjoining. The effect of this construction is, that when the ventricle contracts, the blood endeavoring to escape in all directions, and among other directions pressing upwards, gets *between* these membranes and the sides of the passage, and thereby forces them up into such a position, as that together they constitute, when raised, a hollow cone—the strings before spoken of hindering them from proceeding or separating further; which cone entirely occupying the passage, prevents the return of the blood into the auricle. A shorter account of the matter may be this: so long as the blood proceeds in its proper course, the membranes which compose the valve are pressed close to the side of the vessel, and occasion no impediment to the circulation: when the blood would regurgitate, they are raised from the side of the vessel, and meeting in the middle of its cavity, shut up the channel. Can any one doubt of contrivance here, or is it possible to shut our eyes against the proof of it?

This valve, also, is not more curious in its structure, than it is important in its office. Upon the play of the valve, even upon the proportional length of the strings or fibres which check the ascent of the membranes, depends, as it should seem, nothing less than the life itself of the animal. We may here likewise repeat, what we before observed concerning some of the ligaments of the body, that they could not be formed by any action of the parts themselves. There are cases in which, although good uses appear to arise from the shape or configuration of a part, yet that shape or configuration itself may seem to be produced by the action of the part, or by the action or pressure of adjoining parts. Thus the bend and the internal smooth concavity of the ribs may be attributed to the equal pressure of the soft bowels; the particular shape of some bones and joints, to the traction of the annexed muscles, or to the position of contiguous muscles. But valves could not be so formed. Action and pressure are all against them. The blood, in its proper course, has no tendency to produce such things; and in its improper or reflected current, has a tendency to prevent their production. While we see, therefore, the use and necessity of this machinery, we can look to no other account of its origin or formation than the intending mind of a Creator. Nor can we without admiration reflect, that such thin membranes, such weak and tender instruments as these valves are, should be able to hold out for seventy or eighty years.

Here also we cannot consider but with gratitude, how happy it is that our vital motions are *involuntary*. We should have enough to do, if we had to keep our hearts beating and our stomachs at work. Did these things depend, we will not say upon our effort, but upon our bidding, our care, or our attention, they would leave us leisure for nothing else. We must have been continually upon the watch, and continually in fear; nor would this constitution have allowed of sleep.

It might perhaps be expected that an organ so precious, of such central and primary importance as the heart is, should be defended by a *case*. The fact is, that a membranous purse or bag, made of strong, tough materials, is provided for it; holding the heart within its cavity; sitting loosely and easily about it; guarding its substance, without confining its motion; and containing likewise a spoonful or two of water, just sufficient to keep the surface of the heart in a state of suppleness and moisture. How should such a loose covering be generated by the action of the heart? Does not the enclosing of it in a sack, answering no other purpose but that enclosure, show the care that has been taken of its preservation?

One use of the circulation of the blood probably, among other uses, is, to distribute nourishment to the different parts of the body. How minute and multiplied the ramifications of the bloodvessels for that purpose are, and how thickly spread over at least the superficies of the body, is proved by the single observation, that we cannot prick the point of a pin into the flesh without drawing blood, that is, without finding a bloodvessel. Nor, internally, is their diffusion less universal. Bloodvessels run along the surface of membranes, pervade the substance of muscles, penetrate the bones. Even into every tooth, we trace, through a small hole in the root, an artery to feed the bone, as well as a vein to bring back the spare blood from it; both which, with the addition of an accompanying nerve, form a thread only a little thicker than a horsehair.

Wherefore, when the nourishment taken in at the mouth has once reached and mixed itself with the blood, every part of the body is in the way of being supplied with it. And this introduces another grand topic, namely, the manner in which the aliment gets into the *blood;* which is a subject distinct from the preceding, and brings us to the consideration of another entire system of vessels.

III. For this necessary part of the animal economy, an apparatus is provided in a great measure capable of being what anatomists call demonstrated, that is, shown in the dead body; and a line or course of conveyance, which we can pursue by our examinations.

First, the food descends by a wide passage into the intestines, undergoing two great preparations on its way: one in the mouth, by mastication and moisture—can it be doubted with what design the teeth were placed in the road to the stomach, or that there was choice in fixing them in this situation?—the other by digestion in the stomach itself. Of this last surprising dissolution I say nothing, because it is chemistry, and I am endeavoring to display mechanism. The figure and position of the stomach—I speak all along with a reference to the human organ—are calculated for detaining the food long enough for the action of its digestive juice. It has the shape of the pouch of a bagpipe; lies across the body; and the pylorus, or passage by which the food leaves it, is somewhat higher in the body than the cardia or orifice by which it enters; so that it is by the contraction of the muscular coat of the stomach that the contents, after having undergone the application of the gastric menstruum, are gradually pressed out. In dogs and cats, this action of the coats of the stomach has been displayed to the eye. It is a slow and gentle undulation, propagated from one orifice of the stomach to the other. For the same reason that I omitted, for the present, offering any observation upon the digestive fluid, I shall say nothing concerning the bile or the pancreatic juice, further than to observe upon the mechanism, namely, that from the glands in which these secretions are elaborated, pipes are laid into the first of the intestines, through which pipes the product of each gland flows into that bowel, and is there mixed with the aliment as soon almost as it passes the stomach; adding also, as a remark, how grievously this same bile offends the stomach itself, yet cherishes the vessel that lies next to it.

Secondly, we have now the aliment in the intestines converted into pulp; and though lately consisting of ten different viands, reduced to nearly a uniform substance, and to a state fitted for yielding its essence, which is called chyle, but which is milk, or more nearly resembling milk than any other liquor with which it can be compared. For the straining off this fluid from the digested aliment in the course of its long progress through the body, myriads of capillary tubes, that is, pipes as small as hairs, open their orifices into the cavity of every part of the intestines. These tubes, which are so fine and slender as not to be visible unless when distended with chyle, soon unite into larger branches. The pipes formed by this union terminate in glands, from which other pipes, of a still larger diameter, arising, carry the chyle from all parts into a common reservoir or *receptacle.* This receptacle is a bag of size enough to hold about two table-spoonfuls; and from this vessel a duct or main pipe proceeds, climbing up the back part of the chest, and afterwards creeping along the gullet till it reach the neck.

Here it meets the river—here it discharges itself into a large vein, which soon conveys the chyle, now flowing along with the old blood, to the heart. This whole route can be exhibited to the eye; nothing is left to be supplied by imagination or conjecture. Now, besides the subserviency of this structure, collectively considered, to a manifest and necessary purpose, we may remark two or three separate particulars in it, which show, not only the contrivance, but the perfection of it. We may remark, first, the length of the intestines, which, in the human subject, is six times that of the body. Simply for a passage, these voluminous bowels, this prolixity of gut, seems in nowise necessary; but in order to allow time and space for the successive extraction of the chyle from the digested aliment, namely, that the chyle which escapes the lacteals of one part of the guts may be taken up by those of some other part, the length of the canal is of evident use and conduciveness. Secondly, we must also remark their peristaltic motion, which is made up of contractions following one another like waves upon the surface of a fluid, and not unlike what we observe in the body of an earthworm crawling along the ground, and which is effected by the joint action of longitudinal and of spiral, or rather perhaps of a great number of separate semicircular fibres. This curious action pushes forward the grosser part of the aliment, at the same time that the more subtle parts, which we call chyle, are by a series of gentle compressions squeezed into the narrow orifices of the lacteal veins. Thirdly, it was necessary that these tubes, which we denominate lacteals, or their mouths at least, should be made as narrow as possible, in order to deny admission into the blood to any particle which is of size enough to make a lodgment afterwards in the small arteries, and thereby to obstruct the circulation; and it was also necessary that this extreme tenuity should be compensated by multitude; for a large quantity of chyle—in ordinary constitutions not less, it has been computed, than two or three quarts in a day—is, by some means or other, to be passed through them. Accordingly, we find the number of the lacteals exceeding all powers of computation, and their pipes so fine and slender as not to be visible, unless filled, to the naked eye, and their orifices, which open into the intestines, so small as not to be discernible even by the best microscope. Fourthly, the main pipe, which carries the chyle from the reservoir to the blood, namely, the thoracic duct, being fixed in an almost upright position, and wanting that advantage of propulsion which the arteries possess, is furnished with a succession of valves to check the ascending fluid, when once it has passed them, from falling back. The valves look upwards, so as to leave the ascent free, but to prevent the return of the chyle, if, for want of sufficient force to push it on, its weight should at any time cause it to descend. Fifthly, the chyle enters the blood in an odd place, but perhaps the most commodious place possible, namely, at a large vein in the neck, so situated with respect to the circulation as speedily to bring the mixture to the heart. And this seems to be a circumstance of great moment; for had the chyle entered the blood at an artery, or at a distant vein, the fluid composed of the old and the new materials must have performed a considerable part of the circulation before it received that churning in the lungs which is probably necessary for the intimate and perfect union of the old blood with the recent chyle. Who could have dreamed of a communication between the cavity of the intestines and the left great vein of the *neck?* Who could have suspected that this communication should be the medium through which all nourishment is derived to the body, or this the place where, by a side inlet, the important junction is formed between the blood and the material which feeds it?

We postponed the consideration of *digestion*, lest it should interrupt us in tracing the course of the food to the blood; but in treating of the alimentary system, so principal a part of the process cannot be omitted.

Of the gastric juice, the immediate agent by which that change which food undergoes in our stomachs is effected, we shall take our account from the numerous careful and varied experiments of the Abbé Spallanzani.

1. It is not a simple diluent, but a real solvent. A quarter of an ounce of beef had scarcely touched the stomach of a crow, when the solution began.

2. It has not the nature of saliva; it has not the nature of bile; but is distinct from both. By experiments out of the body, it appears that neither of these secretions acts upon alimentary substances in the same manner as the gastric juice acts.

3. Digestion is not *putrefaction*, for the digesting fluid resists putrefaction most pertinaciously; nay, not only checks its further progress, but restores putrid substances.

4. It is not a *fermentative* process, for the solution begins at the surface, and proceeds towards the centre, contrary to the order in which fermentation acts and spreads.

5. It is not the digestion *of heat*, for the cold maw of a cod or sturgeon will dissolve the shells of crabs or lobsters, harder than the sides of the stomach which contains them.

In a word, animal digestion carries about it the marks of being a power and a process completely *sui generis*, distinct from every other, at least from every chemical process with which we are acquainted. And the most wonderful thing about it is its appropriation—its subserviency to the particular economy of each animal. The gastric juice of an owl, falcon, or kite will not touch grain; no, not even to finish the macerated and half-digested pulse which is left in the crops of the sparrows that the bird devours. In poultry, the trituration of the gizzard, and the gastric juice, conspire in the work of digestion. The gastric juice will not dissolve the grain while it is whole. Entire grains of barley, enclosed in tubes or spherules, are not affected by it. But if the same grain be by any means broken or ground, the gastric juice immediately lays hold of it. Here then is wanted, and here we find, a combination of mechanism and chemistry. For the preparatory grinding, the gizzard lends its mill; and as all mill-work should be strong, its structure is so beyond that of any other muscle belonging to the animal. The internal coat also, or lining of the gizzard, is, for the same purpose, hard and cartilaginous. But, forasmuch as this is not the sort of animal substance suited for the reception of glands, or for secretion, the gastric juice, in this family, is not supplied, as in membranous stomachs, by the stomach itself, but by the gullet, in which the feeding-glands are placed, and from which it trickles down into the stomach.

In sheep, the gastric fluid has no effect in digesting plants, *unless they have been previously masticated.* It only produces a slight maceration, nearly such as common water would produce, in a degree of heat somewhat exceeding the medium temperature of the atmosphere. But, provided that the plant has been reduced to pieces by chewing, the gastric juice then proceeds with it, first, by softening its substance; next, by destroying its natural consistency; and, lastly, by dissolving it so completely as not even to spare the toughest and most stringy parts, such as the nerves of the leaves.

So far our accurate and indefatigable abbé. Dr. Stevens of Edinburgh, in 1777, found, by experiments tried with perforated balls, that the gastric juice of the sheep and the ox speedily dissolved vegetables, but made no impression upon beef, mutton, and other animal bodies. Mr. Hunter discovered a property of this fluid of a most curious kind, namely, that in the stomach of animals which feed upon flesh, irresistibly as this fluid acts upon animal substances, it is only upon the *dead* substance that it operates at all The *living* fibre suffers no injury from lying in contact with it. Worms and insects are found alive in the stomachs of such animals. The coats of the human stomach, in a healthy state, are insensible to its presence; yet in cases of sudden death—wherein the gastric juice, not having been weakened by disease, retains its activity—it has been known to eat a hole through the bowel which contains it.* How nice is this discrimination of action, yet how necessary.

But to return to our hydraulics.

IV. The gall-bladder is a very remarkable contrivance. It is the reservoir of a canal. It does not form the channel itself, that is, the direct communication between the liver and the intestine, which is by another passage, namely, the ductus hepaticus, continued under the name of the ductus communis; but it lies adjacent to this channel, joining it by a duct of its own, the ductus cysticus: by which structure it is enabled, as occasion may require, to add its contents to and increase the flow of bile into the duodenum. And the position of the gall-bladder is such as to apply this structure to the best advantage. In its natural situation, it touches the exterior surface of the stomach, and consequently is compressed by the distention of that vessel; the effect of which compression is to force out from the bag, and send into the duodenum, an extraordinary quantity of bile, to meet the extraordinary demand which the repletion of the stomach by food is about to occasion.† Cheselden describes‡ the gall-bladder as seated against the duodenum, and thereby liable to have its fluid pressed out by the passage of the aliment through that cavity, which likewise will have the effect of causing it to be received into the intestine at a right time and in a due proportion.

There may be other purposes answered by this contrivance, and it is probable that there are. The contents of the gall-bladder are not exactly of the same kind as what passes from the liver through the direct passage.§ It is possible that the gall may be changed, and for some purposes meliorated, by keeping.

The entrance of the gall-duct into the duodenum furnishes another observation. Whenever either smaller tubes are inserted into larger tubes, or tubes into vessels and cavities, such receiving tubes, vessels, or cavities being subject to muscular constriction, we always find a contrivance to prevent *regurgitation.* In some cases valves are used; in other cases, among which is that now before us, a different expedient is resorted to, which may be thus described: the gall-duct enters the duodenum obliquely; after it has pierced the first coat, it runs near two finger's breadth *between* the coats before it opens into the cavity of the intestine.* The same contrivance is used in another part, where there is exactly the same occasion for it, namely, in the insertion of the ureters in the bladder. These enter the bladder near its neck, running for the space of an inch between its coats.† It is, in both cases, sufficiently evident that this structure has a necessary mechanical tendency to resist regurgitation; for whatever force acts in such a direction as to urge the fluid back into the orifices of the tubes, must, at the same time, stretch the coats of the vessels, and thereby compress that part of the tube which is included between them.

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* Phil. Trans., vol. 62, p. 447. † Keill's Anat., p. 64.

‡ Anat., p. 164. § Keill, (from Malpighius,) p. 63.

V. Among the *vessels* of the human body, the pipe which conveys the saliva from the place where it is made to the place where it is wanted, deserves to be reckoned among the most intelligible pieces of mechanism with which we are acquainted. The saliva, we all know, is used in the mouth; but much of it is produced on the outside of the cheek by the parotid gland, which lies between the ear and the angle of the lower jaw. In order to carry the secreted juice to its destination, there is laid from the gland on the outside a pipe about the thickness of a wheat straw, and about three finger's breadth in length, which, after riding over the masseter muscle, bores for itself a hole through the very middle of the cheek, enters by that hole, which is a complete perforation of the buccinator muscle, into the mouth, and there discharges its fluid very copiously.

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* Keill's Anat., p. 62. † Ches. Anat., p. 260.

VI. Another exquisite structure, differing, indeed, from the four preceding instances, in that it does not relate to the conveyance of fluids, but still belonging, like these, to the class of pipes or conduits of the body, is seen in the *larynx*. We all know that there go down the throat two pipes, one leading to the stomach, the other to the lungs—the one being the passage for the food, the other for the breath and voice: we know also, that both these passages open into the bottom of the mouth—the gullet, necessarily, for the conveyance of food, and the windpipe, for speech and the modulation of sound, not much less so: therefore the difficulty was, the passages being so contiguous, to prevent the food, especially the liquids, which we swallow into the stomach, from entering the windpipe, that is, the road to the lungs—the consequence of which error, when it does happen, is perceived by the convulsive throes that are instantly produced. This business, which is very nice, is managed in this manner. The gullet, the passage for food, opens into the mouth like the cone or upper part of a funnel, the capacity of which forms indeed the bottom of the mouth. Into the side of this funnel, at the part which lies the lowest, enters the windpipe by a chink or slit, with a lid or flap like a little tongue, accurately fitted to the orifice. The solids or liquids which we swallow pass over this lid or flap as they descend by the funnel into the gullet. Both the weight of the food and the action of the muscles concerned in swallowing contribute to keep the lid close down upon the aperture while any thing is passing; whereas, by means of its natural cartilaginous spring, it raises itself a little as soon as the food is passed, thereby allowing a free inlet and outlet for the respiration of air by the lungs. Such is its structure; and we may here remark the almost complete success of the expedient, namely, how seldom it fails of its purpose compared with the number of instances in which it fulfils it. Reflect how frequently we swallow, how constantly we breathe. In a city feast, for example, what deglutition, what anhelation! yet does this little cartilage, the epiglottis, so effectually interpose its office, so securely guard the entrance of the windpipe, that while morsel after morsel, draught after draught, are coursing one another over it, an accident of a crumb or a drop slipping into this passage—which nevertheless must be opened for the breath every second of time—excites in the whole company not only alarm by its danger, but surprise by its novelty. Not two guests are choked in a century.

There is no room for pretending that the action of the parts may have gradually formed the epiglottis: I do not mean in the same individual, but in a succession of generations. Not only the action of the parts has no such tendency, but the animal could not live, nor consequently the parts act, either without it or with it in a half-formed state. The species was not to wait for the gradual formation or expansion of a part which was from the first necessary to the life of the individual.

Not only is the larynx curious, but the whole windpipe possesses a structure adapted to its peculiar office. It is made up—as any one may perceive by putting his fingers to his throat—of stout cartilaginous ringlets, placed at small and equal distances from one another. Now this is not the case with any other of the numerous conduits of the body. The use of these cartilages is to keep the passage for the air *constantly* open, which they do mechanically. A pipe with soft membranous coats, liable to collapse and close when empty, would not have answered here; although this be the general vascular structure, and a structure which serves very well for those tubes which are kept in a state of perpetual distention by the fluid they enclose, or which afford a passage to solid and protruding substances.

Nevertheless—which is another particularity well worthy of notice—these rings are not complete, that is, are not cartilaginous and stiff all round; but their hinder part, which is contiguous to the gullet, is membranous and soft, easily yielding to the distentions of that organ occasioned by the descent of solid food. The same rings are also bevelled off at the upper and lower edges, the better to close upon one another when the trachea is compressed or shortened.

The constitution of the trachea may suggest likewise another reflection. The membrane which lines its inside is perhaps the most sensible, irritable membrane of the body. It rejects the touch of a crumb of bread, or a drop of water, with a spasm which convulses the whole frame; yet, left to itself and its proper office, the intromission of air alone, nothing can be so quiet. It does not even make itself felt; a man does not know that he has a trachea. This capacity of perceiving with such acuteness, this impatience of offence, yet perfect rest and ease when let alone, are properties, one would have thought, not likely to reside in the same subject. It is to the junction, however, of these almost inconsistent qualities, in this, as well as in some other delicate parts of the body, that we owe our safety and our comfort—our safety to their sensibility, our comfort to their repose.

The larynx, or rather the whole windpipe taken together—for the larynx is only the upper part of the windpipe—besides its other uses, is also a musical instrument, that is to say, it is *mechanism* expressly adapted to the modulation of sound; for it has been found upon trial, that by relaxing or tightening the tendinous bands at the extremity of the windpipe, and blowing in at the other end, all the cries and notes might be produced of which the living animal was capable. It can be sounded just as a pipe or flute is sounded.

Birds, says Bonnet, have at the lower end of the windpipe a conformation like the reed of a hautboy, for the modulation of their notes. A tuneful bird is a ventriloquist. The seat of the song is in the breast.

The use of the lungs *in* the system has been said to be obscure; one use, however, is plain, though in some sense external to the system, and that is, the formation, in conjunction with the larynx, of voice and speech. They are, to animal utterance, what the bellows are to the organ.

For the sake of method, we have considered animal bodies under three divisions—their bones, their muscles, and their vessels; and we have stated our observations upon these parts separately. But this is to diminish the strength of the argument. The wisdom of the Creator is seen, not in their separate but their collective action—in their mutual subserviency and dependence—in their contributing *together* to one effect and one use. It has been said, that a man cannot lift his hand to his head without finding enough to convince him of the existence of a God. And it is well said; for he has only to reflect, familiar as this action is, and simple as it seems to be, how many things are requisite for the performing of it—how many things which we understand, to say nothing of many more, probably, which we do not: namely, first, a long, hard, strong cylinder, in order to give to the arm its firmness and tension; but which, being rigid, and in its substance inflexible, can only turn upon joints: secondly, therefore, joints for this purpose, one at the shoulder to raise the arm, another at the elbow to bend it; these joints continually fed with a soft mucilage to make the parts slip easily upon one another, and holden together by strong braces to keep them in their position: then, thirdly, strings and wires, that is, muscles and tendons, artificially inserted, for the purpose of drawing the bones in the directions in which the joints allow them to move. Hitherto we seem to understand the mechanism pretty well; and understanding this, we possess enough for our conclusion. Nevertheless, we have hitherto only a machine standing still—a dead organization—an apparatus. To put the system in a state of activity, to set it at work, a further provision is necessary, namely, a communication with the brain by means of nerves. We know the existence of this communication, because we can see the communicating threads, and can trace them to the brain; its necessity we also know, because if the thread be cut, if the communication be intercepted, the muscle becomes paralytic; but beyond this we know little, the organization being too minute and subtile for our inspection.

To what has been enumerated, as officiating in the single act of a man's raising his hand to his head, must be added likewise all that is necessary and all that contributes to the growth, nourishment, and sustentation of the limb, the repair of its waste, the preservation of its health: such as the circulation of the blood through every part of it; its lymphatics, exhalents, absorbents; its excretions and integuments. All these share in the result—join in the effect; and how all these, or any of them, come together without a designing, disposing intelligence, it is impossible to conceive.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE ANIMAL STRUCTURE REGARDED AS A MASS.

Contemplating *an animal body* in its collective capacity, we cannot forget to notice what a number of instruments are brought together, and often within how small a compass. It is a cluster of contrivances. In a canary-bird, for instance, and in the single ounce of matter which composes his body—but which seems to be all employed—we have instruments for eating, for digesting, for nourishment, for breathing, for generation, for running, for flying, for seeing, for hearing, for smelling: each appropriate—each entirely different from all the rest.

The human or indeed the animal frame, considered as a mass or assemblage, exhibits in its composition three properties, which have long struck my mind as indubitable evidences not only of design, but of a great deal of attention and accuracy in prosecuting the design.

I. The first is, the exact correspondency of the two sides of the same animal: the right hand answering to the left, leg to leg, eye to eye, one side of the countenance to the other; and with a precision, to imitate which in any tolerable degree, forms one of the difficulties of statuary, and requires, on the part of the artist, a constant attention to this property of his work distinct from every other.

It is the most difficult thing that can be to get a wig made even; yet how seldom is the *face* awry. And what care is taken that it should not be so, the anatomy of its bones demonstrates. The upper part of the face is composed of thirteen bones, six on each side, answering each to each, and the thirteenth, without a fellow, in the middle. The lower part of the face is in like manner composed of six bones, three on each side, respectively corresponding, and the lower jaw in the centre. In building an arch, could more be done in order to make the curve *true*, that is, the parts equidistant from the middle, alike in figure and position?

The exact resemblance of the *eyes*, considering how compounded this organ is in its structure, how various and how delicate are the shades of color with which its iris is tinged; how differently, as to effect upon appearance, the eye may be mounted in its socket, and how differently in different heads eyes actually are set—is a property of animal bodies much to be admired. Of ten thousand eyes, I do not know that it would be possible to match one, except with its own fellow; or to distribute them into suitable pairs by any other selection than that which obtains.

This regularity of the animal structure is rendered more remarkable by the three following considerations:

1. The limbs, *separately* taken, have not this correlation of parts, but the contrary of it. A knife drawn down the chine cuts the human body into two parts, externally equal and alike; you cannot draw a straight line which will divide a hand, a foot, the leg, the thigh, the cheek, the eye, the ear, into two parts equal and alike. Those parts which are placed upon the middle or partition line of the body, or which traverse that line—as the nose, the tongue, and the lips—may be so divided, or more properly speaking, are double organs; but other parts cannot. This shows that the correspondency which we have been describing does not arise by any necessity in the nature of the subject; for, if necessary, it would be universal; whereas it is observed only in the system or assemblage. It is not true of the separate parts: that is to say, it is found where it conduces to beauty or utility; it is not found where it would subsist at the expense of both. The two wings of a bird always correspond; the two sides of a feather frequently do not. In centipedes, millepedes, and the whole tribe of insects, no two legs on the same side are alike; yet there is the most exact parity between the legs opposite to one another.

2. The next circumstance to be remarked is, that while the cavities of the body are so configurated as *externally* to exhibit the most exact correspondency of the opposite sides, the contents of these cavities have no such correspondency. A line drawn down the middle of the breast divides the thorax into two sides exactly similar; yet these two sides enclose very different contents. The heart lies on the left side, a lobe of the lungs on the right; balancing each other neither in size nor shape. The same thing holds of the abdomen. The liver lies on the right side, without any similar viscus opposed to it on the left. The spleen indeed is situated over against the liver; but agreeing with the liver neither in bulk nor form. There is no equipollency between these. The stomach is a vessel both irregular in its shape and oblique in its position. The foldings and doublings of the intestines do not present a parity of sides. Yet that symmetry which depends upon the correlation of the sides is externally preserved throughout the whole trunk, and is the more remarkable in the lower parts of it, as the integuments are soft, and the shape, consequently, is not, as the thorax is, by its ribs, reduced by natural stays. It is evident, therefore, that the external proportion does not arise from any equality in the shape or pressure of the internal contents. What is it, indeed, but a correction of inequalities; an adjustment, by mutual compensation, of anomalous forms into a regular congeries; the effect, in a word, of artful, and if we might be permitted so to speak, of studied collocation?

3. Similar also to this is the third observation: that an internal inequality in the feeding vessel is so managed as to produce no inequality of parts which were intended to correspond. The right arm answers accurately to the left, both in size and shape; but the arterial branches which supply the two arms do not go off from their trunk in a pair, in the same manner, at the same place, or at the same angle. Under which want of similitude, it is very difficult to con-

ceive how the same quantity of blood should be pushed through each artery; yet the result is right: the two limbs which are nourished by them perceive no difference of supply—no effects of excess or deficiency.

Concerning the difference of manner in which the subclavian and carotid arteries, upon the different sides of the body, separate themselves from the aörta, Cheselden seems to have thought, that the advantage which the left gain by going off at an angle much more acute than the right, is made up to the right by their going off together in one branch.* It is very possible that this may be the compensating contrivance; and if it be so, how curious—how hydrostatical!

II. Another perfection of the animal mass is the *package.* I know nothing which is so surprising. Examine the contents of the trunk of any large animal. Take notice how soft, how tender, how intricate they are; how constantly in action, how necessary to life! Reflect upon the danger of any injury to their substance, any derangement to their position, any obstruction to their office. Observe the heart pumping at the centre, at the rate of eighty strokes in a minute; one set of pipes carrying the stream away from it, another set bringing, in its course, the fluid back to it again; the lungs performing their elaborate office, namely, distending and contracting their many thousand vesicles by a reciprocation which cannot cease for a minute; the stomach exercising its powerful chemistry; the bowels silently propelling the changed aliment—collecting from it, as it proceeds, and transmitting to the blood an incessant supply of prepared and assimilated nourishment; that blood pursuing its course; the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas, the parotid, with many other known and distinguishable glands, drawing off from it, all the while, their proper secretions. These several operations, together with others more subtile but less capable of being investigated, are going on within us at one and the same time. Think of this; and then observe how the body itself, the case which holds this machinery, is rolled, and jolted, and tossed about, the mechanism remaining unhurt, and with very little molestation even of its nicest motions. Observe a rope-dancer, a tumbler, or a monkey—the sudden inversions and contortions which the internal parts sustain by the postures into which their bodies are thrown; or rather observe the shocks which these parts, even in ordinary subjects, sometimes receive from falls and bruises, or by abrupt jerks and twists, without sensible or with soon recovered damage. Observe this, and then reflect how firmly every part must be secured, how carefully surrounded, how well tied down and packed together.

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* Ches. Anat., p. 184, ed. 7.

This property of animal bodies has never, I think, been considered under a distinct head, or so fully as it deserves. I may be allowed therefore, in order to verify my observation concerning it, to set forth a short anatomical detail, though it oblige me to use more technical language than I should wish to introduce into a work of this kind.

1. The *heart*—such care is taken of the centre of life—is placed between two soft lobes of the lungs; is *tied* to the mediastinum and to the pericardium; which pericardium is not only itself an exceedingly strong membrane, but *adheres* firmly to the duplicature of the mediastinum, and by its point, to the middle tendon of the diaphragm. The heart is also *sustained* in its place by the great bloodvessels which issue from it.*

2. The *lungs* are *tied* to the sternum by the mediastinum before; to the vertebræ, by the pleura behind. It seems indeed to be the very use of the mediastinum—which is a membrane that goes straight through the middle of the thorax, from the breast to the back—to keep the contents of the thorax in their places; in particular to hinder one lobe of the lungs from incommoding another, or the parts of the lungs from pressing upon each other when we lie on one side.†

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* Keill's Anat., p. 107, ed. 3.

† Ib., p. 119, ed. 3.

3. The *liver* is fastened in the body by two ligaments: the first, which is large and strong, comes from the covering of the diaphragm, and penetrates the substance of the liver; the second is the umbilical vein, which, after birth, degenerates into a ligament. The first, which is the principal, fixes the liver in its situation while the body holds an erect posture; the second prevents it from pressing upon the diaphragm when we lie down; and both together *sling* or suspend the liver when we lie upon our backs, so that it may not compress or obstruct the ascending vena cava,* to which belongs the important office of returning the blood from the body to the heart.

4. The *bladder* is tied to the navel by the urachus, transformed into a ligament: thus, what was a passage for urine to the fœtus, becomes, after birth, a support or stay to the bladder. The peritoneum also keeps the viscera from confounding themselves with, or pressing irregularly upon the bladder; for the kidneys and bladder are contained in a distinct duplicature of that membrane, being thereby partitioned off from the other contents of the abdomen.

5. The *kidneys* are lodged in a bed of fat.

6. The *pancreas*, or sweetbread, is strongly tied to the peritoneum, which is the great wrapping-sheet that encloses all the bowels contained in the lower belly.†

7. The *spleen* also is confined to its place by an adhesion to the peritoneum and diaphragm, and by a connection with the omentum.‡ It is possible, in my opinion, that the spleen may be merely a *stuffing*, a soft cushion to fill up a vacancy or hollow, which, unless occupied, would leave the package loose and unsteady; for, supposing that it answers no other purpose than this, it must be vascular, and admit of a circulation through it, in order to be kept alive, or be a part of a living body.

8. The *omentum*, epiplöon, or caul, is an apron tucked

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* Ches. Anat., p. 162.

† Keill's Anat., p. 57

‡ Ches. Anat., p. 167.

up, or doubling upon itself, at its lowest part. The upper edge is tied to the bottom of the stomach, to the spleen, as has already been observed, and to part of the duodenum. The reflected edge also, after forming the doubling, comes up behind the front flap, and is tied to the colon and adjoining viscera.*

9. The septa of the brain probably prevent one part of the organ from pressing with too great a weight upon another part. The processes of the dura mater divide the cavity of the skull, like so many inner partition walls, and thereby confine each hemisphere and lobe of the brain to the chamber which is assigned to it, without its being liable to rest upon or intermix with the neighboring parts. The great art and caution of packing is to prevent one thing hurting another. This, in the head, the chest, and the abdomen of an animal body is, among other methods, provided for by membranous partitions and wrappings, which keep the parts separate.

The above may serve as a short account of the manner in which the principal viscera are sustained in their places. But of the provisions for this purpose, by far, in my opinion, the most curious, and where also such a provision was most wanted, is in the *guts.* It is pretty evident that a long narrow tube—in man, about five times the length of the body—laid from side to side in folds upon one another, winding in oblique and circuitous directions, composed also of a soft and yielding substance, must, without some extraordinary precaution for its safety, be continually displaced by the various, sudden, and abrupt motions of the body which contains it. I should expect that, if not bruised or wounded by every fall, or leap, or twist, it would be entangled, or be involved with itself; or, at the least, slipped and shaken out of the order in which it is disposed, and which order is necessary to be preserved for the carrying on of the important functions which it has to execute in the animal economy. Let us see, therefore, how a danger so serious, and yet so natural to the length, narrowness, and tubular form of the part, is provided against. The expedient is admirable, and it is this. The intestinal canal, throughout its whole process, is knit to the edge of a broad fat membrane called the mesentery. It forms the margin of this mesentery, being stitched and fastened to it like the edging of a ruffle; being four times as long as the mesentery itself, it is what a seamstress would call "puckered or gathered on" to it. This is the nature of the connection of the gut with the mesentery; and being thus joined to, or rather made a part of the mesentery, it is folded and wrapped up together with it. Now the mesentery having a considerable dimension in breadth, being in its substance withal both thick and suety, is capable of a close and safe folding, in comparison of what the intestinal tube would admit of, if it had remained loose. The mesentery likewise not only keeps the intestinal canal in its proper place and position under all the turns and windings of its course, but sustains the numberless small vessels, the arteries, the veins, the lympheducts, and above all, the lacteals, which lead from or to almost every point of its coats and cavity. This membrane, which appears to be the great support and security of the alimentary apparatus, is itself strongly tied to the first three vertebræ of the loins.*

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* Ches. Anat., p. 167.

III. A third general property of animal forms is *beauty.* I do not mean relative beauty, or that of one individual above another of the same species, or of one species compared with another species; but I mean, generally, the provision which is made in the body of almost every animal to adapt its appearance to the perception of the animals with which it converses. In our own species, for example, only consider what the parts and materials are of which the fairest body is composed; and no further observation will be necessary to show how well these things are wrapped up, so as to form a mass which shall be capable of symmetry in its proportion, and of beauty in its aspect; how the bones are covered, the bowels concealed, the roughnesses of the muscle smoothed and softened; and how over the whole is drawn an integument which converts the disgusting materials of a dissecting-room into an object of attraction to the sight, or one upon which it rests at least with ease and satisfaction. Much of this effect is to be attributed to the intervention of the cellular or adipose membrane, which lies immediately under the skin; is a kind of lining to it; is moist, soft, slippery, and compressible; everywhere filling up the interstices of the muscles, and forming thereby their roundness and flowing line, as well as the evenness and polish of the whole surface.

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* Keill's Anatomy, p. 45.

All which seems to be a strong indication of design, and of a design studiously directed to this purpose. And it being once allowed that such a purpose existed with respect to *any* of the productions of nature, we may refer, with a considerable degree of probability, other particulars to the same intention; such as the tints of flowers, the plumage of birds, the furs of beasts, the bright scales of fishes, the painted wings of butterflies and beetles, the rich colors and spotted lustre of many tribes of insects.

There are parts also of animals ornamental, and the properties by which they are so, not subservient, that we know of, to any other purpose. The *irides* of most animals are very beautiful, without conducing at all, by their beauty, to the perfection of vision; and nature could in no part have employed her pencil to so much advantage, because no part presents itself so conspicuously to the observer, or communicates so great an effect to the whole aspect.

In plants, especially in the flowers of plants, the principle of beauty holds a still more considerable place in their composition—is still more confessed than in animals. Why, for one instance out of a thousand, does the corolla of the tulip, when advanced to its size and maturity, change its color? The purposes, so far as we can see, of vegetable nutrition might have been carried on as well by its continuing green. Or, if this could not be, consistently with the progress of vegetable life, why break into such a variety of colors? This is no proper effect of age, or of declension in the ascent of the sap; for that, like the autumnal tints, would have produced one color on one leaf, with marks of fading and withering. It seems a lame account to call it, as it has been called, a disease of the plant. Is it not more probable that this property, which is independent, as it should seem, of the wants and utilities of the plant, was calculated for beauty, intended for display?

A ground, I know, of objection has been taken against the whole topic of argument, namely, that there is no such thing as beauty at all: in other words, that whatever is useful and familiar comes of course to be thought beautiful; and that things appear to be so, only by their alliance with these qualities. Our idea of beauty is capable of being in so great a degree modified by habit, by fashion, by the experience of advantage or pleasure, and by associations arising out of that experience, that a question has been made whether it be not altogether generated by these causes, or would have any proper existence without them. It seems, however, a carrying of the conclusion too far, to deny the existence of the principle, namely, a native capacity of perceiving beauty, on account of an influence, or of varieties proceeding from that influence, to which it is subject, seeing that principles the most acknowledged are liable to be affected in the same manner. I should rather argue thus: The question respects objects of sight. Now every other sense has its distinction of agreeable and disagreeable. Some tastes offend the palate, others gratify it. In brutes and insects, this distinction is stronger and more regular than in man. Every horse, ox, sheep, swine, when at liberty to choose, and when in a natural state, that is, when not vitiated by habits forced upon it, eats and rejects the same plants. Many insects which feed upon particular plants, will rather die than change their appropriate leaf. All this looks like a determination in the sense itself to particular tastes. In like manner, smells affect the nose with sensations pleasurable or disgusting. Some sounds, or compositions of sound, delight the ear; others torture it. Habit can do much in all these cases—and it is well for us that it can, for it is this power which reconciles us to many necessities; but has the distinction, in the mean time, of agreeable and disagreeable no foundation in the sense itself? What is true of the other senses is most probably true of the eye—the analogy is irresistible—namely, that there belongs to it an original constitution, fitted to receive pleasure from some impressions, and pain from others.

I do not, however, know that the argument which alleges beauty as a final cause rests upon this concession. We possess a sense of beauty, however we come by it. It in fact exists. Things are not indifferent to this sense; all objects do not suit it: many, which we see, are agreeable to it; many others disagreeable. It is certainly not the effect of habit upon the particular object, because the most agreeable objects are often the most rare; many which are very common, continue to be offensive. If they be made supportable by habit, it is all which habit can do; they never become agreeable. If this sense, therefore, be acquired, it is a result—the produce of numerous and complicated actions of external objects upon the senses, and of the mind upon its sensations. With this *result* there must be a certain congruity, to enable any particular object to please: and that congruity, we contend, is consulted in the *aspect* which is given to animal and vegetable bodies.

IV. The skin and covering of animals is that upon which their appearance chiefly depends; and it is that part which, perhaps, in all animals, is most decorated, and most free from impurities. But were beauty or agreeableness of aspect entirely out of the question, there is another purpose answered by this integument, and by the collocation of the parts of the body beneath it, which is of still greater importance; and that purpose is *concealment.* Were it possible to view through the skin the mechanism of our bodies, the sight would frighten us out of our wits. "Durst we make a single movement," asks a lively French writer, "or stir a step from the place we were in, if we *saw* our blood circulating, the tendons pulling, the lungs blowing, the humors filtrating, and all the incomprehensible assemblage of fibres, tubes, pumps, valves, currents, pivots, which sustain an existence at once so frail and so presumptuous?"

V. Of animal bodies, considered as masses, there is another property more curious than it is generally thought to be, which is the faculty of *standing;* and it is more remarkable in two-legged animals than in quadrupeds, and most of all, as being the tallest and resting upon the smallest base, in man. There is more, I think, in the matter than we are aware of. The statue of a man placed loosely upon a pedestal, would not be secure of standing half an hour. You are obliged to fix its feet to the block by bolts and solder, or the first shake, the first gust of wind, is sure to throw it down. Yet this statue shall express all the mechanical proportions of a living model. It is not therefore the mere figure, or merely placing the centre of gravity within the base, that is sufficient. Either the law of gravitation is suspended in favor of living substances, or something more is done for them, in order to enable them to uphold their posture. There is no reason whatever to doubt, but that their parts descend by gravitation in the same manner as those of dead matter. The gift therefore appears to me to consist in a faculty of perpetually shifting the centre of gravity, by a set of obscure, indeed, but of quick-balancing actions, so as to keep the line of direction, which is a line drawn from that centre to the ground, within its prescribed limits.

Of these actions it may be observed, first, that they in part constitute what we call strength. The dead body drops down. The mere adjustment therefore of weight and pressure, which may be the same the moment after death as the moment before, does not support the column. In cases also of extreme weakness, the patient cannot stand upright. Secondly, that these actions are only in a small degree voluntary. A man is seldom conscious of his voluntary powers in keeping himself upon his legs. A child learning to walk is the greatest posture-master in the world; but art, if it may be so called, sinks into habit, and he is soon able to poise himself in a great variety of attitudes, without being sensible either of caution or effort. But still there must be an aptitude of parts, upon which habit can thus attach—a previous capacity of motions which the animal is thus taught to exercise; and the facility with which this exercise is acquired, forms one object of our admiration. What parts are principally employed, or in what manner each contributes to its office, is, as has already been confessed, difficult to explain. Perhaps the obscure motion of the bones of the feet may have their share in this effect. They are put in action by every slip or vacillation of the body, and seem to assist in restoring its balance. Certain it is, that this circumstance in the structure of the foot, namely, its being composed of many small bones, applied to and articulating with one another by diversely shaped surfaces, instead of being made of one piece, like the last of a shoe, is very remarkable.

I suppose also, that it would be difficult to stand firmly upon stilts or wooden legs, though their base exactly imitated the figure and dimensions of the sole of the foot. The alternation of the joints, the knee-joint bending backward, the hip-joint forward; the flexibility, in every direction, of the spine, especially in the loins and neck, appear to be of great moment in preserving the equilibrium of the body. With respect to this last circumstance, it is observable that the vertebræ are so confined by ligaments as to allow no more slipping upon their bases than what is just sufficient to break the shock which any violent motion may occasion to the body. A certain degree also of tension of the sinews appears to be essential to an erect posture; for it is by the loss of this that the dead or paralytic body drops down.

The whole is a wonderful result of combined powers and of very complicated operations. Indeed, that *standing* is not so simple a business as we imagine it to be, is evident from the strange gesticulations of a drunken man, who has lost the government of the centre of gravity.

We have said that this property is the most worthy of observation in the *human* body; but a *bird* resting upon its perch, or hopping upon a spray, affords no mean specimen of the same faculty. A chicken runs off as soon as it is hatched from the egg; yet a chicken, considered geometrically, and with relation to its centre of gravity, its line of direction, and its equilibrium, is a very irregular solid. Is this gift, therefore, or instruction? May it not be said to be with great attention that nature has balanced the body upon its pivots?

I observe also in the same *bird* a piece of useful mechanism of this kind. In the trussing of a fowl, upon bending the legs and thighs up towards the body, the cook finds that the claws close of their own accord. Now let it be remembered, that this is the position of the limbs in which the bird rests upon its perch. And in this position it sleeps in safety; for the claws do their office in keeping hold of the support, not by any exertion of voluntary power which sleep might suspend, but by the traction of the tendons in consequence of the attitude which the legs and thighs take by the bird sitting down, and to which the mere weight of the body gives the force that is necessary.

VI. Regarding the human body as a mass; regarding the general conformations which obtain in it; regarding also particular parts in respect to those conformations, we shall be led to observe what I call "interrupted analogies." The following are examples of what I mean by these terms; and

I do not know how such critical deviations can, by any possible hypothesis, be accounted for without design.

1. All the bones of the body are covered with a *periosteum* except the teeth, where it ceases; and an enamel of ivory, which saws and files will hardly touch, comes into its place. No one can doubt of the use and propriety of this difference—of the "analogy" being thus "interrupted"—of the rule which belongs to the conformation of the bones stopping where it does stop; for, had so exquisitely sensible a membrane as the periosteum invested the teeth as it invests every other bone of the body, their action, necessary exposure, and irritation, would have subjected the animal to continual pain. General as it is, it was not the sort of integument which suited the teeth: what they stood in need of was a strong, hard, insensible, defensive coat; and exactly such a covering is given to them in the ivory enamel which adheres to their surface.

2. The scarfskin, which clothes all the rest of the body, gives way, at the extremities of the toes and fingers, to *nails*. A man has only to look at his hand, to observe with what nicety and precision that covering, which extends over every other part, is here superseded by a different substance and a different texture. Now, if either the rule had been necessary, or the deviation from it accidental, this effect would not be seen. When I speak of the rule being necessary, I mean the formation of the skin upon the surface being produced by a set of causes constituted without design, and acting, as all ignorant causes must act, by a general operation. Were this the case, no account could be given of the operation being suspended at the fingers' ends, or on the back part of the fingers, and not on the fore part. On the other hand, if the deviation were accidental, an error, an anomalism—were it any thing else than settled by intention—we should meet with nails upon other parts of the body; they would be scattered over the surface, like warts or pimples.

3. All the great cavities of the body are enclosed by mem-

branes, except the *skull.* Why should not the brain be content with the same covering as that which serves for the other principal organs of the body? The heart, the lungs, the liver, the stomach, the bowels, have all soft integuments, and nothing else. The muscular coats are all soft and membranous. I can see a reason for this distinction in the final cause, but in no other. The importance of the brain to life—which experience proves to be immediate—and the extreme tenderness of its substance, make a solid case more necessary for it than for any other part; and such a case the hardness of the skull supplies. When the smallest portion of this natural casket is lost, how carefully, yet how imperfectly, is it replaced by a plate of metal. If an anatomist should say that this bony protection is not confined to the brain, but is extended along the course of the spine, I answer that he adds strength to the argument. If he remark that the chest also is fortified by bones, I reply that I should have alleged this instance myself, if the ribs had not appeared subservient to the purpose of motion as well as of defence. What distinguishes the skull from every other cavity is, that the bony covering completely surrounds its contents, and is calculated, not for motion, but solely for defence. Those hollows, likewise, and inequalities which we observe in the inside of the skull, and which exactly fit the folds of the brain, answer the important design of keeping the substance of the brain steady, and of guarding it against concussions.

CHAPTER XII.

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY.

Whenever we find a general plan pursued, yet with such variations in it as are, in each case, required by the particular exigency of the subject to which it is applied, we possess, in such a plan and such adaptation, the strongest evidence that can be afforded of intelligence and design—an evidence which the most completely excludes every other hypothesis. If the general plan proceeded from any fixed necessity in the nature of things, how could it accommodate itself to the various wants and uses which it had to serve under different circumstances and on different occasions? Arkwright's mill was invented for the spinning of cotton. We see it employed for the spinning of wool, flax, and hemp, with such modifications of the original principle, such variety in the same plan, as the texture of those different materials rendered necessary. Of the machine's being put together with design, if it were possible to doubt while we saw it only under one mode, and in one form, when we came to observe it in its different applications, with such changes of structure, such additions and supplements, as the special and particular use in each case demanded, we could not refuse any longer our assent to the proposition, "that intelligence, properly and strictly so called—including, under that name, foresight, consideration, reference to utility—had been employed, as well in the primitive plan as in the several changes and accommodations which it is made to undergo."

Very much of this reasoning is applicable to what has been called *comparative anatomy.* In their general economy, in the outlines of the plan, in the construction as well as offices of their principal parts, there exists between all large terrestrial animals a close resemblance. In all, life is sustained, and the body nourished, by nearly the same apparatus. The heart, the lungs, the stomach, the liver, the kidneys, are much alike in all. The same fluid—for no distinction of blood has been observed—circulates through their vessels, and nearly in the same order. The same cause, therefore, whatever that cause was, has been concerned in the origin, has governed the production of these different animal forms.

When we pass on to smaller animals, or to the inhabitants of a different element, the resemblance becomes more distant and more obscure; but still the plan accompanies us.

And, what we can never enough commend, and which it is our business at present to exemplify, the plan is attended, through all its varieties and deflections, by subserviences to special occasions and utilities.

1. The *covering* of different animals—though whether I am correct in classing this under their anatomy, I do not know—is the first thing which presents itself to our observation; and is, in truth, both for its variety and its suitableness to their several natures, as much to be admired as any part of their structure. We have bristles, hair, wool, furs, feathers, quills, prickles, scales; yet in this diversity both of material and form, we cannot change one animal's coat for another without evidently changing it for the worse; taking care, however, to remark, that these coverings are, in many cases, armor as well as clothing; intended for protection as well as warmth.

The *human* animal is the only one which is naked, and the only one which can clothe itself. This is one of the properties which renders him an animal of all climates, and of all seasons. He can adapt the warmth or lightness of his covering to the temperature of his habitation. Had he been born with a fleece upon his back, although he might have been comforted by its warmth in high latitudes, it would have oppressed him by its weight and heat, as the species spread towards the equator.

What art, however, does for men, nature has, in many instances, done for those animals which are incapable of art. Their clothing, of its own accord, changes with their necessities. This is particularly the case with that large tribe of quadrupeds which are covered with *furs*. Every dealer in hare-skins and rabbit-skins knows how much the fur is thickened by the approach of winter. It seems to be a part of the same constitution and the same design, that wool, in hot countries, degenerates, as it is called, but in truth—most happily for the animal's ease—passes into hair; while, on the contrary, that hair, in the dogs of the polar regions, is turned into wool, or something very like it. To which may be referred, what naturalists have remarked, that bears, wolves, foxes, hares, which do not take the water, have the fur much thicker on the back than the belly; whereas in the beaver it is the thickest upon the belly, as are the feathers in water-fowl. We know the final cause of all this, and we know no other.

The *covering of birds* cannot escape the most vulgar observation; its lightness, its smoothness, its warmth—the disposition of the feathers all inclined backward, the down about their stem, the overlapping of their tips, their different configuration in different parts, not to mention the variety of their colors, constitute a vestment for the body so beautiful, and so appropriate to the life which the animal is to lead, as that, I think, we should have had no conception of any thing equally perfect, if we had never seen it, or can now imagine any thing more so. Let us suppose—what is possible only in supposition—a person who had never seen a bird, to be presented with a plucked pheasant, and bid to set his wits to work how to contrive for it a covering which shall unite the qualities of warmth, levity, and least resistance to the air, and the highest degree of each; giving it also as much of beauty and ornament as he could afford. He is the person to behold the work of the Deity, in this part of his creation, with the sentiments which are due to it.

The commendation which the general aspect of the feathered world seldom fails of exciting, will be increased by further examination. It is one of those cases in which the philosopher has more to admire than the common observer. Every *feather* is a mechanical wonder. If we look at the quill, we find properties not easily brought together—strength and lightness. I know few things more remarkable than the strength and lightness of the very pen with which I am writing. If we cast our eye to the upper part of the stem, we see a material made for the purpose, used in no other class of animals, and in no other part of birds; tough, light, pliant, elastic. The pith also, which feeds the feathers, is, among animal substances, *sui generis*—neither bone, flesh, membrane, nor tendon.*

But the artificial part of a feather is the *beard*, or, as it is sometimes, I believe, called, the vane. By the beards are meant what are fastened on each side of the stem, and what constitute the breadth of the feather—what we usually strip off from one side or both, when we make a pen. The separate pieces, or laminæ, of which the beard is composed, are called threads, sometimes filaments or rays. Now, the first thing which an attentive observer will remark is, how much stronger the beard of the feather shows itself to be when pressed in a direction perpendicular to its plane, than when rubbed, either up or down, in the line of the stem; and he will soon discover the structure which occasions this difference, namely, that the laminæ whereof these beards are composed are flat, and placed with their flat sides towards each other; by which means, while they *easily* bend for the approaching of each other, as any one may perceive by drawing his finger ever so lightly upwards, they are much harder to bend out of their plane, which is the direction in which they have to encounter the impulse and pressure of the air, and in which their strength is wanted and put to the trial.

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* The quill part of a feather is composed of circular and longitudinal fibres. In making a pen, you must scrape off the coat of circular fibres, or the quill will split in a ragged, jagged manner, making what boys call *cat's teeth*.

This is one particularity in the structure of a feather; a second is still more extraordinary. Whoever examines a feather cannot help taking notice, that the threads or laminæ of which we have been speaking, in their natural state *unite*—that their union is something more than the mere apposition of loose surfaces—that they are not parted asunder without some degree of force—that nevertheless there is no glutinous cohesion between them—that therefore, by some mechanical means or other, they catch or clasp among themselves, thereby giving to the beard or vane its closeness and compactness of texture. Nor is this all: when two laminæ which have been separated by accident or force are brought together again, they immediately *reclasp;* the connection, whatever it was, is perfectly recovered, and the beard of the feather becomes as smooth and firm as if nothing had happened to it. Draw your finger down the feather, which is against the grain, and you break probably the junction of some of the contiguous threads; draw your finger up the feather, and you restore all things to their former state. This is no common contrivance: and now for the mechanism by which it is effected. The threads or laminæ above mentioned are *interlaced* with one another; and the interlacing is performed by means of a vast number of fibres or teeth, which the laminæ shoot forth *on each side*, and which hook and grapple together. A friend of mine counted fifty of these fibres in one-twentieth of an inch. These fibres are crooked, but curved after a different manner: for those which proceed from the thread on the side towards the extremity of the feather, are longer, more flexible, and bent downwards; whereas those which proceed from the side towards the beginning or quill end of the feather, are shorter, firmer, and turn upwards. The process, then, which takes place is as follows: when two laminæ are pressed together, so that these long fibres are forced far enough over the short ones, their crooked parts fall into the cavity made by the crooked parts of the others; just as the latch that is fastened to a door enters into the cavity of the catch fixed to the door-post, and there hooking itself, fastens the door; for it is properly in this manner that one thread of a feather is fastened to the other.

This admirable structure of the feather, which it is easy to see with the microscope, succeeds perfectly for the use to which nature has designed it; which use was, not only that the laminæ might be united, but that when one thread or lamina has been separated from another by some external violence, it might be reclasped with sufficient facility and expedition.*

In the *ostrich*, this apparatus of crotchets and fibres, of hooks and teeth, is wanting; and we see the consequence of the want. The filaments hang loose and separate from one another, forming only a kind of down; which constitution of the feathers, however it may fit them for the flowing honors of a lady's headdress, may be reckoned an imperfection in the bird, inasmuch as wings composed of these feathers, although they may greatly assist it in running, do not serve for flight.

But under the present division of our subject, our business with feathers is as they are the *covering* of the bird. And herein a singular circumstance occurs. In the small order of birds which winter with us, from a snipe downwards, let the external color of the feathers be what it will, their Creator has universally given them a bed of *black* down next their bodies. Black, we know, is the warmest color; and the purpose here is, to *keep in* the heat arising from the heart and circulation of the blood. It is further likewise remarkable, that this is not found in larger birds; for which there is also a reason. Small birds are much more exposed to the cold than large ones, forasmuch as they present, in proportion to their bulk, a much larger surface to the air. If a turkey were divided into a number of wrens—supposing the shape of the turkey and the wren to be similar—the surface of all the wrens would exceed the surface of the turkey in the proportion of the length, breadth, or of any homologous line, of a turkey to that of a wren, which would be, perhaps, a proportion of ten to one. It was necessary, therefore, that small birds should be more warmly clad than large ones; and this seems to be the expedient by which that exigency is provided for.

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* The above account is taken from Memoirs for a Natural History of Animals, by the Royal Academy of Paris, published in 1701, p. 219.

II. In comparing different animals, I know no part of their structure which exhibits greater variety, or, in that variety, a nicer accommodation to their respective conveniency than that which is seen in the different formations of their *mouths*. Whether the purpose be the reception of aliment merely, or the catching of prey, the picking up of seeds, the cropping of herbage, the extraction of juices, the suction of liquids, the breaking and grinding of food, the taste of that food, together with the respiration of air, and in conjunction with it, the utterance of sound, these various offices are assigned to this one part, and, in different species, provided for as they are wanted by its different constitution. In the human species, forasmuch as there are hands to convey the food to the mouth, the mouth is flat, and by reason of its flatness, fitted only for *reception;* whereas the projecting jaws, the wide rictus, the pointed teeth of the dog and his affinities, enable them to apply their mouths to *snatch and seize* the objects of their pursuit. The full lips, the rough tongue, the corrugated cartilaginous palate, the broad cutting teeth of the ox, the deer, the horse, and the sheep, qualify this tribe for *browsing* upon their pasture; either gathering large mouthfuls at once, where the grass is long, which is the case with the ox in particular, or biting close where it is short, which the horse and the sheep are able to do in a degree that one could hardly expect. The retired under-jaw of the swine *works in the ground*, after the protruding snout, like a prong or ploughshare, has made its way to the roots upon which it feeds. A conformation so happy was not the gift of chance.

In *birds*, this organ assumes a new character—new both in substance and in form, but in both wonderfully adapted to the wants and uses of a distinct mode of existence. We have no longer the fleshy lips, the teeth of enamelled bone; but we have, in the place of these two parts, and to perform the office of both, a hard substance—of the same nature with that which composes the nails, claws, and hoofs of quadrupeds—cut out into proper shapes, and mechanically suited to the actions which are wanted. The sharp edge and tempered point of the *sparrow's* bill picks almost every kind of seed from its concealment in the plant; and not only so, but hulls the grain, breaks and shatters the coats of the seed, in order to get at the kernel. The hooked beak of the hawk tribe separates the flesh from the bones of the animals which it feeds upon, almost with the cleanness and precision of a dissector's knife. The butcher-bird transfixes its prey upon the spike of a thorn while it picks its bones. In some birds of this class we have the *cross*-bill, that is, both the upper and lower bill hooked, and their tips crossing. The *spoon*-bill enables the goose to graze, to collect its food from the bottom of pools, or to seek it amidst the soft or liquid substances with which it is mixed. The *long* tapering bill of the snipe and woodcock penetrate still deeper into moist earth, which is the bed in which the food of that species is lodged. This is exactly the instrument which the animal wanted. It did not want strength in its bill, which was inconsistent with the slender form of the animal's neck, as well as unnecessary for the kind of aliment upon which it subsists; but it wanted length to reach its object.

But the species of bill which belongs to the birds that live by *suction*, deserves to be described in its relation to that office. They are what naturalists call serrated or dentated bills; the inside of them, towards the edge, being thickly set with parallel or concentric rows of short, strong, sharp pointed prickles. These, though they should be called teeth, are not for the purpose of mastication, like the teeth of quadrupeds; nor yet, as in fish, for the seizing and retaining of their prey; but for a quite different use. They form a filter. The *duck* by means of them discusses the mud; examining with great accuracy the puddle, the brake, every mixture which is likely to contain her food. The operation is thus carried on: the liquid or semiliquid substances in which the animal has plunged her bill, she draws, by the action of her lungs, through the narrow interstices which lie between these teeth, catching, as the stream passes across her beak, whatever it may happen to bring along with it that proves agreeable to her choice, and easily dismissing all the rest. Now, suppose the purpose to have been, out of a mass of confused and heterogeneous substances, to separate for the use of the animal, or rather to enable the animal to separate for its own, those few particles which suited its taste and digestion; what more artificial or more commodious instrument of selection could have been given to it, than this natural filter? It has been observed also—what must enable the bird to choose and distinguish with greater acuteness, as well probably as what greatly increases its luxury—that the bills of this species are furnished with large nerves, that they are covered with a skin, and that the nerves run down to the very extremity. In the curlew, woodcock, and snipe, there are *three pairs* of nerves, equal almost to the optic nerve in thickness, which pass first along the roof of the mouth, and then along the upper chap down to the point of the bill, long as the bill is.

But to return to the train of our observations. The similitude between the bills of birds and the mouths of quadrupeds is exactly such as, for the sake of the argument, might be wished for. It is near enough to show the continuation of the same plan; it is remote enough to exclude the supposition of the difference being produced by action or use. A more prominent contour, or a wider gap, might be resolved into the effect of continued efforts, on the part of the species, to thrust out the mouth or open it to the stretch. But by what course of action, or exercise, or endeavor, shall we get rid of the lips, the gums, the teeth, and acquire in the place of them pincers of horn? By what habit shall we so completely change, not only the shape of the part, but the substance of which it is composed? The truth is, if we had seen no other than the mouths of quadrupeds, we should have thought no other could have been formed: little could we have supposed that all the purposes of a mouth furnished with lips and armed with teeth could be answered by an instrument which had none of these—could be supplied, and that with many additional advantages, by the hardness and sharpness and figure of the bills of birds. Every thing about the animal *mouth* is mechanical. The teeth of fish have their points turned backward, like the teeth of a wool or cotton card. The teeth of lobsters work one against another, like the sides of a pair of shears. In many insects, the mouth is converted into a pump or sucker, fitted at the end sometimes with a wimble, sometimes with a forceps; by which double provision, namely, of the tube and the penetrating form of the point, the insect first bores through the integuments of its prey, and then extracts the juices. And what is most extraordinary of all, one sort of mouth, as the occasion requires, shall be changed into another sort. The caterpillar could not live without teeth; in several species, the butterfly formed from it could not use them. The old teeth, therefore, are cast off with the exuviæ of the grub; a new and totally different apparatus assumes their place in the fly. Amid these novelties of form, we sometimes forget that it is all the while the animal's *mouth*—that whether it be lips, or teeth, or bill, or beak, or shears, or pump, it is the same part diversified; and it is also remarkable, that under all the varieties of configuration with which we are acquainted, and which are very great, the organs of taste and smelling are situated near each other.

III. To the mouth adjoins the gullet: in this part also, comparative anatomy discovers a difference of structure, adapted to the different necessities of the animal. In brutes, because the posture of their neck conduces little to the passage of the aliment, the fibres of the gullet which act in this business run in two close spiral lines, crossing each other; in men, these fibres run only a little obliquely from the upper end of the œsophagus to the stomach, into which, by a gentle contraction, they easily transmit the descending morsels: that is to say, for the more laborious deglutition of animals which thrust their food *up* instead of *down*, and also through a longer passage, a proportionably more powerful apparatus of muscles is provided—more powerful, not merely by the strength of the fibres, which might be attributed to the greater exercise of their force, but in their collocation, which is a determinate circumstance, and must have been original.

IV. The gullet leads to the *intestines:* here, likewise, as before, comparing quadrupeds with man, under a general similitude we meet with appropriate differences. The *valvulæ conniventes*, or, as they are by some called, the semilunar valves, found in the human intestine, are wanting in that of brutes. These are wrinkles or plates of the innermost coat of the guts, the effect of which is to retard the progress of the food through the alimentary canal. It is easy to understand how much more necessary such a provision may be to the body of an animal of an erect posture, and in which, consequently, the weight of the food is added to the action of the intestine, than in that of a quadruped, in which the course of the food, from its entrance to its exit, is nearly horizontal; but it is impossible to assign any cause except the final cause, for this distinction actually taking place. So far as depends upon the action of the part, this structure was more to be expected in a quadruped than in a man. In truth, it must in both have been formed, not by action, but in direct opposition to action and to pressure; but the opposition which would arise from pressure is greater in the upright trunk than in any other. That theory, therefore, is pointedly contradicted by the example before us. The structure is found where its generation, according to the method by which the theorist would have it generated, is the most difficult; but observe, it is found where its effect is most useful.

The different length of the intestines in carnivorous and herbivorous animals has been noticed on a former occasion. The shortest, I believe, is that of some birds of prey, in which the intestinal canal is little more than a straight passage from the mouth to the vent. The longest is in the deer kind. The intestines of a Canadian stag, four feet high, measured ninety-six feet.* The intestines of a sheep, unravelled, measured thirty times the length of the body. The intestines of a wild cat are only three times the length of the body. Universally, where the substance upon which the animal feeds is of slow concoction, or yields its chyle with more difficulty, there the passage is circuitous and dilatory, that time and space may be allowed for the change and the absorption which are necessary. Where the food is soon dissolved, or already half assimilated, an unnecessary or perhaps hurtful detention is avoided, by giving to it a shorter and a readier route.

V. In comparing the *bones* of different animals, we are struck, in the bones of birds, with a *propriety* which could only proceed from the wisdom of an intelligent and designing Creator. In the bones of an animal which is to fly, the two qualities required are strength and lightness. Wherein, therefore, do the bones of birds—I speak of the cylindrical bones—differ in these respects from the bones of quadrupeds? In three properties: first, their cavities are much larger in proportion to the weight of the bone, than in those of quadrupeds; secondly, these cavities are empty; thirdly, the shell is of a firmer texture than is the substance of other bones. It is easy to observe these particulars even in picking the wing or leg of a chicken. Now, the weight being the same, the diameter, it is evident, will be greater in a hollow bone than in a solid one; and with the diameter, as every mathematician can prove, is increased, *cæteris paribus*, the strength of the cylinder, or its resistance to breaking. In a word, a bone of the *same weight* would not have been so strong in any other form; and to have made it heavier, would have incommoded the animal's flight. Yet this form could not be acquired by use, or the bone become hollow or tubular by exercise. What appetency could excavate a bone?

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* Mem. Acad. Paris, 1701, p. 170.

VI. The *lungs* also of birds, as compared with the lungs of quadrupeds, contain in them a provision distinguishingly calculated for this same purpose of levitation, namely, a communication—not found in other kinds of animals—between the air-vessels of the lungs and the cavities of the body; so that, by the intromission of air from one to the other—at the will, as it should seem, of the animal—its body can be occasionally puffed out, and its tendency to descend in the air, or its specific gravity, made less. The bodies of birds are blown up from their lungs—which no other animal bodies are—and thus rendered buoyant.

VII. All birds are *oviparous*. This likewise carries on the work of gestation with as little increase as possible of the weight of the body. A gravid uterus would have been a troublesome burden to a bird in its flight. The advantage in this respect of an oviparous procreation is, that while the whole brood are hatched together, the eggs are excluded singly, and at considerable intervals. Ten, fifteen, or twenty young birds may be produced in one cletch or covey, yet the parent bird have never been encumbered by the load of more than one full-grown egg at one time.

VIII. A principal topic of comparison between animals, is in their *instruments of motion.* These come before us under three divisions—feet, wings, and fins. I desire any man to say which of the three is best fitted for its use; or whether the same consummate art be not conspicuous in them all. The constitution of the elements in which the motion is to be performed is very different. The animal action must necessarily follow that constitution. The Creator, therefore, if we might so speak, had to prepare for different situations, for different difficulties; yet the purpose is accomplished not less successfully in one case than in the other; and as between *wings* and the corresponding limbs of quadrupeds, it is accomplished without deserting the general idea. The idea is modified, not deserted. Strip a wing of its feathers, and it bears no obscure resemblance to the fore-leg of a quadruped. The articulations at the shoulder and the cubitus are much alike; and, what is a closer circumstance, in both cases the upper part of the limb consists of a single bone, the lower part of two.

But, fitted up with its furniture of feathers and quills, it becomes a wonderful instrument, more artificial than its first appearance indicates, though that be very striking: at least, the use which the bird makes of its wings in flying is more complicated and more curious than is generally known. One thing is certain, that if the flapping of the wings in flight were no more than the reciprocal motion of the same surface in opposite directions, either upwards and downwards, or estimated in any oblique line, the bird would lose as much by one motion as she gained by another. The skylark could never ascend by such an action as this; for, though the stroke upon the air by the underside of her wing would carry her up, the stroke from the upper side, when she raised her wing again, would bring her down. In order, therefore, to account for the advantage which the bird derives from her wing, it is necessary to suppose that the surface of the wing, measured upon the same plane, is contracted while the wing is drawn up, and let out to its full expansion when it descends upon the air for the purpose of moving the body by the reäction of that element. Now, the form and structure of the wing, its external convexity, the disposition and particularly the overlapping of its larger feathers, the action of the muscles and joints of the pinions, are all adapted to this alternate adjustment of its shape and dimensions. Such a twist, for instance, or semirotary motion, is given to the great feathers of the wing, that they strike the air with their flat side, but rise from the stroke slantwise. The turning of the oar in rowing, while the rower advances his hand for a new stroke, is a similar operation to that of the feather, and takes its name from the resemblance. I believe that this faculty is not found in the great feathers of the tail. This is the place also for observing, that the pinions are so set upon the body as to bring down the wings not vertically, but in a direction obliquely tending towards the tail; which motion, by virtue of the common resolution of forces, does two things at the same time—supports the body in the air, and carries it forward. The *steerage* of a bird in its flight is effected partly by the wings, but in a principal degree by the tail. And herein we meet with a circumstance not a little remarkable. Birds with long legs have short tails, and in their flight place their legs close to their bodies, at the same time stretching them out backwards as far as they can. In this position the legs extend beyond the rump, and become the rudder; supplying that steerage which the tail could not.

From the *wings* of birds, the transition is easy to the *fins* of fish. They are both, to their respective tribes, the instruments of their motion; but, in the work which they have to do, there is a considerable difference, founded in this circumstance.

Fish, unlike birds, have very nearly the same specific gravity with the element in which they move. In the case of fish, therefore, there is little or no weight to bear up; what is wanted is only an impulse sufficient to carry the body through a resisting medium, or to maintain the posture, or to support or restore the balance of the body, which is always the most unsteady where there is no weight to sink it. For these offices the fins are as large as necessary, though much smaller than wings, their action mechanical, their position and the muscles by which they are moved in the highest degree convenient. The following short account of some experiments upon fish, made for the purpose of ascertaining the use of their fins, will be the best confirmation of what we assert. In most fish, besides the great fin, the tail, we find two pairs of fins upon the sides, two single fins upon the back, and one upon the belly, or rather between the belly and the tail. The *balancing* use of these organs is proved in this manner. Of the large-headed fish, if you cut off the pectoral fins, that is, the pair which lies close behind the gills, the head falls prone to the bottom; if the right pectoral fin only be cut off, the fish leans to that side; if the ventral fin on the same side be cut away, then it loses its equilibrium entirely; if the dorsal and ventral fins be cut off, the fish reels to the right and left. When the fish dies, that is, when the fins cease to play, the belly turns upwards. The use of the same parts for *motion* is seen in the following observation upon them when put in action. The pectoral, and more particularly the ventral fins, serve to *raise and depress* the fish: when the fish desires to have a *retrograde* motion, a stroke forward with the pectoral fin effectually produces it; if the fish desires to *turn* either way, a single blow with the tail the opposite way sends it round at once; if the tail strike both ways, the motion produced by the double lash is *progressive*, and enables the fish to dart forward with an astonishing velocity.* The result is not only in some cases the most rapid, but in all cases the most gentle, pliant, easy animal motion with which we are acquainted. However, when the tail is cut off, the fish loses all motion, and gives itself up to where the water impels it.

* Goldsmith, History of Animated Nature, vol. 6, p. 154.

The rest of the fins, therefore, so far as respects motion, seem to be merely subsidiary to this. In their mechanical use, the anal fin may be reckoned the keel; the ventral fins, outriggers; the pectoral muscles, the oars: and if there be any similitude between these parts of a boat and a fish, observe, that it is not the resemblance of imitation, but the likeness which arises from applying similar mechanical means to the same purpose.

We have seen that the *tail* in the fish is the great instrument of motion. Now, in cetaceous or warm-blooded fish, which are obliged to rise every two or three minutes to the surface to take breath, the tail, unlike what it is in other fish, is horizontal; its stroke, consequently, perpendicular to the horizon, which is the right direction for sending the fish to the top, or carrying it down to the bottom.

Regarding animals in their instruments of motion, we have only followed the comparison through the first great division of animals into beasts, birds, and fish. If it were our intention to pursue the consideration farther, I should take in that generic distinction among birds, the *web-foot* of water-fowl. It is an instance which may be pointed out to a child. The utility of the web to water-fowl, the inutility to land-fowl, are so obvious, that it seems impossible to notice the difference without acknowledging the design. I am at a loss to know how those who deny the agency of an intelligent Creator dispose of this example. There is nothing in the action of swimming, as carried on by a bird upon the surface of the water, that should generate a membrane between the toes. As to that membrane, it is an exercise of constant resistance. The only supposition I can think of is, that all birds have been originally water-fowl and web-footed; that sparrows, hawks, linnets, etc., which frequent the land, have, in process of time, and in the course of many generations, had this part worn away by treading upon hard ground. To such evasive assumptions must atheism always have recourse! And after all, it confesses that the structure of the feet of birds, in their original form, was critically adapted to their original destination! The web-feet of amphibious quadrupeds, seals, otters, etc., fall under the same observation.

IX. The *five senses* are common to most large animals; nor have we much difference to remark in their constitution, or much, however, which is referable to mechanism.

The superior sagacity of animals which hunt their prey and which, consequently, depend for their livelihood upon their *nose*, is well known in its use; but not at all known in the organization which produces it.

The external *ears* of beasts of prey, of lions, tigers, wolves, have their trumpet-part, or concavity, standing forward, to seize the sounds which are before them, namely, the sounds of the animals which they pursue or watch. The ears of animals of flight are turned backward, to give notice of the approach of their enemy from behind, whence he may steal upon them unseen. This is a critical distinction, and is mechanical; but it may be suggested, and I think not without probability, that it is the effect of continual habit.

The *eyes* of animals which follow their prey by night, as cats, owls, etc., possess a faculty not given to those of other species, namely, of closing the pupil *entirely*. The final cause of which seems to be this: it was necessary for such animals to be able to descry objects with very small degrees of light. This capacity depended upon the superior sensibility of the retina; that is, upon its being affected by the most feeble impulses. But that tenderness of structure which rendered the membrane thus exquisitely sensible, rendered it also liable to be offended by the access of stronger degrees of light. The contractile range, therefore, of the pupil is increased in these animals, so as to enable them to close the aperture entirely, which includes the power of diminishing it in every degree; whereby at all times such portions, and only such portions of light are admitted, as may be received without injury to the sense.

There appears to be also in the figure, and in some properties of the pupil of the eye, an appropriate relation to the wants of different animals. In horses, oxen, goats, and sheep, the pupil of the eye is elliptical—the transverse axis being horizontal; by which structure, although the eye be placed on the side of the head, the anterior elongation of the pupil catches the forward rays, or those which come from objects immediately in front of the animal's face.

CHAPTER XIII.

PECULIAR ORGANIZATIONS.

I BELIEVE that all the instances which I shall collect under this title might, consistently enough with technical language, have been placed under the head of *comparative anatomy*. But there appears to me an impropriety in the use which that term has obtained; it being, in some sort, absurd to call that a case of comparative anatomy in which there is nothing to "compare"—in which a conformation is found in one animal which hath nothing properly answering to it in another. Of this kind are the examples which I have to propose in the present chapter; and the reader will see that, though some of them be the strongest, perhaps, he will meet with under any division of our subject, they must necessarily be of an unconnected and miscellaneous nature. To dispose them, however, into some sort of order, we will notice, first, particularities of structure which belong to quadrupeds, birds, and fish, as such, or to many of the kinds included in these classes of animals; and then, such particularities as are confined to one or two species.

I. Along each side of the neck of large *quadrupeds* runs a stiff robust cartilage, which butchers call the pax-wax. No person can carve the upper end of a crop of beef without driving his knife against it. It is a tough, strong, tendinous substance, braced from the head to the middle of the back: its office is to assist in supporting the weight of the head. It is a mechanical provision, of which this is the undisputed use; and it is sufficient, and not more than sufficient for the purpose which it has to execute. The head of an ox or a horse is a heavy weight, acting at the end of a long lever—consequently with a great purchase—and in a direction nearly perpendicular to the joints of the supporting neck. From such a force, so advantageously applied, the bones of the neck would be in constant danger of dislocation, if they were not fortified by this strong tape. No such organ is found in the human subject, because, from the erect position of the head—the pressure of it acting nearly in the direction of the spine—the junction of the vertebræ appears to be sufficiently secure without it. This cautionary expedient, therefore, is limited to quadrupeds: the care of the Creator is seen where it is wanted.

II. The oil with which *birds* preen their feathers, and the organ which supplies it, is a specific provision for the winged creation. · On each side of the rump of birds is observed a small nipple, yielding upon pressure a butter-like substance, which the bird extracts by pinching the pap with its bill. With this oil or ointment, thus procured, the bird dresses his coat; and repeats the action as often as its own sensations teach it that it is in any part wanted, or as the excretion may be sufficient for the expense. The gland, the pap, the nature and quality of the excreted substance, the manner of obtaining it from its lodgment in the body, the application of it when obtained, form collectively an evidence of intention which it is not easy to withstand. Nothing similar to it is found in unfeathered animals. What blind *conatus* of nature should produce it in birds; should not produce it in beasts?

III. The air-bladder also of a *fish* affords a plain and direct instance, not only of contrivance, but strictly of that species of contrivance which we denominate mechanical. It is a philosophical apparatus in the body of an animal. The principle of the contrivance is clear; the application of the principle is also clear. The use of the organ to sustain, and, at will, also to elevate the body of the fish in the water, is proved by observing what has been tried, that when the bladder is burst the fish grovels at the bottom; and also, that flounders, soles, skates, which are without the air-bladder, seldom rise in the water, and that with effort. The manner in which the purpose is attained, and the suitableness of the means to the end, are not difficult to be apprehended. The rising and sinking of a fish in water, so far as it is independent of the stroke of the fins and tail, can only be regulated by the specific gravity of the body. When the bladder contained in the body of a fish is contracted, which the fish probably possesses a muscular power of doing, the bulk of the fish is contracted along with it ; whereby, since the absolute weight remains the same, the specific gravity, which is the sinking force, is increased, and the fish descends : on the contrary, when, in consequence of the relaxation of the muscles, the elasticity of the enclosed and now compressed air restores the dimensions of the bladder, the tendency downwards becomes proportionably less than it was before, or is turned into a contrary tendency. These are known properties of bodies immersed in a fluid. The enamelled figures, or little glass bubbles, in a jar of water, are made to rise and fall by the same artifice. A diving-machine might be made to ascend and descend upon the like principle ; namely, by introducing into the inside of it an air-vessel, which by its contraction would diminish, and by its distention enlarge the bulk of the machine itself, and thus render it specifically heavier or specifically lighter than the water which surrounds it. Suppose this to be done, and the artist to solicit a patent for his invention : the inspectors of the model, whatever they might think of the use or value of the contrivance, could by no possibility entertain a question in their minds, whether it were a contrivance or not. No reason has ever been assigned, no reason can be assigned, why the conclusion is not as certain in the fish as it is in the machine—why the argument is not as firm in one case as the other.

It would be very worthy of inquiry, if it were possible to discover, by what method an animal which lives constantly in water is able to supply a repository of air. The expedient, whatever it be, forms part, and perhaps the most curious part of the provision. Nothing similar to the air-bladder is found in land-animals; and a life in the water has no natural tendency to produce a bag of air. Nothing can be further from an acquired organization than this is.

These examples mark the attention of the Creator to the three great kingdoms of his animal creation, and to their constitution as such. The example which stands next in point of generality, belonging to a large tribe of animals, or rather to various species of that tribe, is the poisonous tooth of serpents.

I. The *fang of a viper** is a clear and curious example of mechanical contrivance. It is a perforated tooth, loose at the root; in its quiet state lying down flat upon the jaw, but furnished with a muscle, which, with a jerk, and by the pluck as it were of a string, suddenly erects it. Under the tooth, close to its root, and communicating with the perforation, lies a small bag containing the venom. When the fang is raised, the closing of the jaw presses its root against the bag underneath; and the force of this compression sends out the fluid with a considerable impetus through the tube in the middle of the tooth. What more unequivocal or effectual apparatus could be devised for the double purpose of at once inflicting the wound and injecting the poison? Yet, though lodged in the mouth, it is so constituted, as, in its inoffensive and quiescent state, not to interfere with the animal's ordinary office of receiving its food. It has been observed also, that none of the harmless serpents, the black snake, the blind worm, etc., have these fangs, but teeth of an equal size: not movable as this is, but fixed into the jaw.

II. In being the property of several different species, the preceding example is resembled by that which I shall next mention, which is the *bag of the opossum*.† This is a mechanical contrivance, most properly so called. The simplicity of the expedient renders the contrivance more obvious than many others, and by no means less certain. A false skin under the belly of the animal forms a pouch, into which the young litter are received at their birth; where they have an easy and constant access to the teats; in which they are transported by the dam from place to place; where they are at liberty to run in and out; and where they find a refuge from surprise and danger. It is their cradle, their asylum, and the machine for their conveyance. Can the use of this structure be doubted of? Nor is it a mere doubling of the skin; but is a new organ, furnished with bones and muscles of its own. Two bones are placed before the os pubis, and joined to that bone as their base. These support and give a fixture to the muscles which serve to open the bag. To these muscles there are antagonists, which serve in the same manner to shut it; and this office they perform so exactly, that, in the living animal, the opening can scarcely be discerned, except when the sides are forcibly drawn asunder.* Is there any action in this part of the animal, any process arising from that action, by which these members could be formed; any account to be given of the formation, except design?

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* Plate IV., Fig. 2, and 3.

† Plate IV., Fig. 4.

III. As a particularity, yet appertaining to more species than one, and also as strictly mechanical, we may notice a circumstance in the structure of the *claws* of certain birds. The middle claw of the heron and cormorant is toothed and notched like a saw. These birds are great fishers, and these notches assist them in holding their slippery prey. The use is evident; but the structure such as cannot at all be accounted for by the effort of the animal, or the exercise of the part. Some other fishing birds have these notches in their *bills;* and for the same purpose. The gannet, or Soland goose,† has the side of its bill irregularly jagged, that it may hold its prey the faster. Nor can the structure in this, more than in the former case, arise from the manner of employing the part. The smooth surfaces, and soft flesh of fish, were less likely to notch the bills of birds, than the hard bodies upon which many other species feed.

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* Goldsmith, Nat. Hist., vol. 4, p. 244.

† Plate V., Fig. 1.

We now come to particularities strictly so called, as being limited to a single species of animal. Of these, I shall take one from a quadruped, and one from a bird.

I. The *stomach of the camel* is well known to retain large quantities of water, and to retain it unchanged for a considerable length of time. This property qualifies it for living in the desert. Let us see, therefore, what is the internal organization upon which a faculty so rare and so beneficial depends. A number of distinct sacs or bags—in a dromedary thirty of these have been counted—are observed to lie between the membranes of the second stomach, and to open into the stomach near the top by small square apertures. Through these orifices, after the stomach is full, the annexed bags are filled from it: and the water so deposited is, in the first place, not liable to pass into the intestines; in the second place, is kept separate from the solid aliment; and in the third place, is out of the reach of the digestive action of the stomach, or of mixture with the gastric juice. It appears probable, or rather certain, that the animal, by the conformation of its muscles, possesses the power of squeezing back this water from the adjacent bags into the stomach, whenever thirst excites it to put this power in action.

II. The *tongue of the woodpecker* is one of those singularities which nature presents us with when a singular purpose is to be answered. It is a particular instrument for a particular use; and what, except design, ever produces such? The woodpecker lives chiefly upon insects lodged in the bodies of decayed or decaying trees. For the purpose of boring into the wood, it is furnished with a bill straight, hard, angular, and sharp. When, by means of this piercer, it has reached the cells of the insects, then comes the office of its tongue; which tongue is, first, of such a length that the bird can dart it out three or four inches from the bill—in this respect differing greatly from every other species of bird; in the second place, it is tipped with a stiff, sharp, bony thorn; and, in the third place—which appears to me the most remarkable property of all—this tip is dentated on both sides like the beard of an arrow or the barb of a hook.* The description of the part declares its uses. The bird, having exposed the retreats of the insects by the assistance of its bill, with a motion inconceivably quick, launches out at them this long tongue, transfixes them upon the barbed needle at the end of it, and thus draws its prey within its mouth. If this be not mechanism, what is? Should it be said, that by continual endeavors to shoot out the tongue to the stretch, the woodpecker species may by degrees have lengthened the organ itself beyond that of other birds, what account can be given of its form, of its tip? how, in particular, did it get its barb, its dentation? These barbs, in my opinion, wherever they occur, are decisive proofs of mechanical contrivance.

III. I shall add one more example, for the sake of its novelty. It is always an agreeable discovery, when, having remarked in an animal an extraordinary structure, we come at length to find out an unexpected use for it. The following narrative furnishes an instance of this kind. The babyroussa, or Indian hog, a species of wild boar, found in the East Indies, has two *bent* teeth, more than half a yard long, growing upwards, and—which is the singularity—from the upper-jaw. These instruments are not wanted for offence; that service being provided for by two tusks issuing from the under-jaw, and resembling those of the common boar: nor does the animal use them for defence. They might seem, therefore, to be both a superfluity and an incumbrance. But observe the event: the animal sleeps standing; and in order to support its head, hooks its upper tusks upon the branches of trees.

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* See Plate V., Fig. 2.

CHAPTER XIV.

PROSPECTIVE CONTRIVANCES.

I CAN hardly imagine to myself a more distinguishing mark, and consequently a more certain proof of design, than *preparation*, that is, the providing of things beforehand, which are not to be used until a considerable time afterwards; for this implies a contemplation of the future, which belongs only to intelligence.

Of these *prospective* contrivances the bodies of animals furnish various examples.

I. The human teeth afford an instance, not only of prospective contrivance, but of the completion of the contrivance being designedly suspended. They are formed within the gums, and there they stop; the fact being, that their farther advance to maturity would not only be useless to the new-born animal, but extremely in its way; as it is evident that the act of *sucking*, by which it is for some time to be nourished, will be performed with more ease both to the nurse and to the infant, while the inside of the mouth and edges of the gums are smooth and soft, than if set with hard-pointed bones. By the time they are wanted the teeth are ready. They have been lodged within the gums for some months past, but detained as it were in their sockets, so long as their farther protrusion would interfere with the office to which the mouth is destined. Nature, namely, that intelligence which was employed in creation, looked beyond the first year of the infant's life; yet, while she was providing for functions which were after that term to become necessary, was careful not to incommode those which preceded them. What renders it more probable that this is the effect of design, is, that the teeth are imperfect, while all other parts of the mouth are perfect. The lips are perfect, the tongue is perfect; the cheeks, the jaws, the palate, the pharynx, the larynx, are all perfect: the teeth alone are not so. This is the fact with respect to the human mouth: the fact also is, that the parts above enumerated are called into use from the beginning; whereas the teeth would be only so many obstacles and annoyances if they were there. When a contrary order is necessary, a contrary order prevails. In the worm of the beetle, as hatched from the egg, the teeth are the first things which arrive at perfection. The insect begins to gnaw as soon as it escapes from the shell, though its other parts be only gradually advancing to their maturity.

What has been observed of the teeth, is true of the *horns* of animals; and for the same reason. The horn of a calf or a lamb does not bud, or at least does not sprout to any considerable length, until the animal be capable of browsing upon its pasture, because such a substance upon the forehead of the young animal would very much incommode the teat of the dam in the office of giving suck.

But in the case of the *teeth*, of the human teeth at least, the prospective contrivance looks still further. A succession of crops is provided, and provided from the beginning—a second tier being originally formed beneath the first, which do not come into use till several years afterwards. And this double or supplementary provision meets a difficulty in the mechanism of the mouth, which would have appeared almost insurmountable. The expansion of the jaw—the consequence of the proportionable growth of the animal and of its skull—necessarily separates the teeth of the first set, however compactly disposed, to a distance from one another, which would be very inconvenient. In due time, therefore, that is, when the jaw has attained a great part of its dimensions, a new set of teeth springs up—loosening and pushing out the old ones before them—more exactly fitted to the space which they are to occupy, and rising also in such close ranks as to allow for any extension of line which the subsequent enlargement of the head may occasion.

II. It is not very easy to conceive a more evidently prospective contrivance than that which, in all viviparous animals, is found in the *milk* of the female parent. At the moment the young animal enters the world there is its maintenance ready for it. The particulars to be remarked in this economy are neither few nor slight. We have, first, the nutritious quality of the fluid, unlike, in this respect, every other excretion of the body; and in which nature hitherto remains unimitated, neither cookery nor chemistry having been able to make milk out of grass: we have, secondly, the organ for its reception and retention: we have, thirdly, the excretory duct annexed to that organ; and we have, lastly, the determination of the milk to the breast at the particular juncture when it is about to be wanted. We have all these properties in the subject before us; and they are all indications of design. The last circumstance is the strongest of any. If I had been to guess beforehand, I should have conjectured, that at the time when there was an extraordinary demand for nourishment in one part of the system, there would be the least likelihood of a redundancy to supply another part. The advanced pregnancy of the female has no intelligible tendency to fill the breasts with milk. The lacteal system is a constant wonder; and it adds to other causes of our admiration, that the number of the teats or paps in each species is found to bear a proportion to the number of the young. In the sow, the bitch, the rabbit, the cat, the rat, which have numerous litters, the paps are numerous, and are disposed along the whole length of the belly; in the cow and mare, they are few. The most simple account of this is to refer it to a designing Creator.

But in the argument before us, we are entitled to consider not only animal bodies when framed, but the circumstance under which they are framed; and in this view of the subject, the constitution of many of their parts is most strictly prospective.

III. The eye is of no use at the time when it is formed. It is an optical instrument made in a dungeon; constructed for the refraction of light to a focus, and perfect for its purpose before a ray of light has had access to it ; geometrically adapted to the properties and action of an element with which it has no communication. It is about indeed to enter into that communication; and this is precisely the thing which evidences intention. It is *providing* for the *future* in the closest sense which can be given to these terms ; for it is providing for a future change, not for the then subsisting condition of the animal, not for any gradual progress or advance in that same condition, but for a new state, the consequence of a great and sudden alteration which the animal is to undergo at its birth. Is it to be believed that the eye was formed, or which is the same thing, that the series of causes was fixed by which the eye is formed, without a view to this change ; without a prospect of that condition, in which its fabric, of no use at present, is about to be of the greatest ; without a consideration of the qualities of that element, hitherto entirely excluded, but with which it was hereafter to hold so intimate a relation ? A young man makes a pair of spectacles for himself against he grows old ; for which spectacles he has no want or use whatever at the time he makes them. Could this be done without knowing and considering the defect of vision to which advanced age is subject ? Would not the precise suitableness of the instrument to its purpose, of the remedy to the defect, of the convex lens to the flattened eye, establish the certainty of the conclusion, that the case afterwards to arise had been considered beforehand, speculated upon, provided for ? all which are exclusively the acts of a reasoning mind. The eye formed in one state, for use only in another state, and in a different state, affords a proof no less clear of destination to a future purpose ; and a proof proportionably stronger, as the machinery is more complicated and the adaptation more exact.

IV. What has been said of the eye, holds equally true of the lungs. Composed of air-vessels, where there is no air ;

elaborately constructed for the alternate admission and expulsion of an elastic fluid, where no such fluid exists; this great organ, with the whole apparatus belonging to it, lies collapsed in the fœtal thorax; yet in order, and in readiness for action, the first moment that the occasion requires its service. This is having a machine locked up in store for future use, which incontestably proves that the case was expected to occur in which this use might be experienced; but expectation is the proper act of intelligence. Considering the state in which an animal exists before its birth, I should look for nothing less in its body than a system of lungs. It is like finding a pair of bellows in the bottom of the sea; of no sort of use in the situation in which they are found; formed for an action which was impossible to be exerted; holding no relation or fitness to the element which surrounds them, but both to another element in another place.

As part and parcel of the same plan, ought to be mentioned, in speaking of the lungs, the provisionary contrivances of the *foramen ovale* and *ductus arteriosus.* In the fœtus, pipes are laid for the passage of the blood through the lungs; but until the lungs be inflated by the inspiration of air, that passage is impervious, or in a great degree obstructed. What then is to be done? What would an artist, what would a master do upon the occasion? He would endeavor, most probably, to provide a *temporary* passage, which might carry on the communication required, until the other was open. Now this is the thing which is actually done in the heart. Instead of the circuitous route through the lungs which the blood afterwards takes before it gets from one auricle of the heart to the other, a portion of the blood passes immediately from the right auricle to the left, through a hole placed in the partition which separates these cavities. This hole anatomists call the *foramen ovale.* There is likewise another cross-cut, answering the same purpose, by what is called the *ductus arteriosus,* lying between the pulmonary artery and the aörta. But both expedients are so strictly temporary, that after birth the one passage is closed, and the tube which forms the other shrivelled up into a ligament. If this be not contrivance, what is?

But, forasmuch as the action of the air upon the blood in the lungs appears to be necessary to the perfect concoction of that fluid, that is, to the life and health of the animal—otherwise the shortest route might still be the best—how comes it to pass that the *fœtus* lives and grows and thrives without it? The answer is, that the blood of the fœtus is the mother's; that it has undergone that action in her habit; that one pair of lungs serves for both. When the animals are separated, a new necessity arises; and to meet this necessity as soon as it occurs, an organization is prepared. It is ready for its purpose; it only waits for the atmosphere; it begins to play the moment the air is admitted to it.

CHAPTER XV.

RELATIONS.

When several different parts contribute to one effect, or, which is the same thing, when an effect is produced by the joint action of different instruments, the fitness of such parts or instruments to one another for the purpose of producing, by their united action, the effect, is what I call *relation;* and wherever this is observed in the works of nature or of man, it appears to me to carry along with it decisive evidence of understanding, intention, art. In examining, for instance, the several parts of a *watch*, the spring, the barrel, the chain, the fusee, the balance, the wheels of various sizes, forms, and positions, what is it which would take an observer's attention as most plainly evincing a construction directed by thought, deliberation, and contrivance? It is the suitableness of these parts to one another: first, in the succession and order in which they act; and, secondly, with a view to the effect finally produced. Thus, referring the spring to the wheels, our observer sees in it that which originates and upholds *their* motion; in the chain, that which transmits the motion to the fusee; in the fusee, that which communicates it to the wheels; in the conical figure of the fusee, if he refer to the spring, he sees that which corrects the inequality of its force. Referring the wheels to one another, he notices, first, their teeth, which would have been without use or meaning if there had been only one wheel, or if the wheels had had no connection between themselves, or common bearing upon some joint effect; secondly, the correspondency of their position, so that the teeth of one wheel catch into the teeth of another; thirdly, the proportion observed in the number of teeth in each wheel, which determines the rate of going. Referring the balance to the rest of the works, he saw, when he came to understand its action, that which rendered their motions equable. Lastly, in looking upon the index and face of the watch, he saw the use and conclusion of the mechanism, namely, marking the succession of minutes and hours; but all depending upon the motions within, all upon the system of intermediate actions between the spring and the pointer. What thus struck his attention in the several parts of the watch, he might probably designate by one general name of "relation;" and observing with respect to all cases whatever, in which the origin and formation of a thing could be ascertained by evidence, that these relations were found in things produced by art and design, and in no other things, he would rightly deem of them as characteristic of such productions. To apply the reasoning here described to the works of nature.

The animal economy is full, is made up of these *relations.*

1. There are, first, what in one form or other belong to all animals, the parts and powers which successively act upon their *food*. Compare this action with the process of a manufactory. In men and quadrupeds the aliment is first broken and bruised by mechanical instruments of mastication, namely, sharp spikes or hard knobs, pressing against or rubbing upon one another: thus ground and comminuted, it is carried by a pipe into the stomach, where it waits to undergo a great chemical action, which we call digestion; when digested, it is delivered through an orifice, which opens and shuts, as there is occasion, into the first intestine; there, after being mixed with certain proper ingredients, poured through a hole in the side of the vessel, it is further dissolved; in this state the milk, chyle, or part which is wanted, and which is suited for animal nourishment, is strained off by the mouths of very small tubes opening into the cavity of the intestines: thus freed from its grosser parts, the percolated fluid is carried by a long, winding, but traceable course, into the main stream of the old circulation, which conveys it in its progress to every part of the body. Now I say

again, compare this with the process of a manufactory—with the making of cider, for example; with the bruising of the apples in the mill, the squeezing of them when so bruised in the press, the fermentation in the vat, the bestowing of the liquor thus fermented in the hogsheads, the drawing off into bottles, the pouring out for use into the glass. Let any one show me any difference between these two cases as to the point of contrivance. That which is at present under our consideration, the "relation" of the parts successively employed, is not more clear in the last case than in the first. The aptness of the jaws and teeth to prepare the food for the stomach is, at least, as manifest as that of the cider-mill to crush the apples for the press. The concoction of the food in the stomach is as necessary for its future use, as the fermentation of the stum in the vat is to the perfection of the liquor. The disposal of the aliment afterwards, the action and change which it undergoes, the route which it is made to take, in order that, and until that, it arrives at its destination, is more complex indeed and intricate, but, in the midst of complication and intricacy, as evident and certain as is the apparatus of cocks, pipes, tunnels, for transferring the cider from one vessel to another; of barrels and bottles for preserving it till fit for use, or of cups and glasses for bringing it when wanted to the lip of the consumer. The character of the machinery is in both cases this—that one part answers to another part, and every part to the final result.

This parallel between the alimentary operation and some of the processes of art might be carried further into detail. Spallanzani has remarked* a circumstantial resemblance between the stomachs of gallinaceous fowls and the structure of *corn-mills*. While the two sides of the gizzard perform the office of the mill-stones, the craw or crop supplies the place of the *hopper*.

When our fowls are abundantly supplied with meat, they soon fill their craw; but it does not immediately pass thence into the gizzard: it always enters in very small quantities, in proportion to the progress of trituration; in like manner as, in a mill, a receiver is fixed above the two large stones which serve for grinding the corn; which receiver, although the corn be put into it in bushels, allows the grain to dribble only in small quantities into the central hole in the upper mill-stone.

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* Disc. 1, sec. 54.

But we have not done with the alimentary history. There subsists a general *relation* between the external organs of an animal by which it procures its food, and the internal powers by which it digests it. Birds of prey, by their talons and beaks, are qualified to seize and devour many species both of other birds and of quadrupeds. The constitution of the stomach agrees exactly with the form of the members. The gastric juice of a bird of prey, of an owl, a falcon, or a kite, acts upon the animal fibre alone; it will not act upon seeds or grasses at all. On the other hand, the conformation of the mouth of the sheep or the ox is suited for browsing upon herbage. Nothing about these animals is fitted for the pursuit of living prey. Accordingly it has been found, by experiments tried not many years ago, with perforated balls, that the gastric juice of ruminating animals, such as the sheep and the ox, speedily dissolves vegetables, but makes no impression upon animal bodies. This accordancy is still more particular. The gastric juice even of granivorous birds, will not act upon the grain while whole and entire. In performing the experiment of digesting with the gastric juice in vessels, the grain must be crushed and bruised before it be submitted to the menstruum; that is to say, must undergo by art, without the body, the preparatory action which the gizzard exerts upon it within the body, or no digestion will take place. So strict, in this case, is the relation between the offices assigned to the digestive organ—between the mechanical operation and the chemical process.

II The relation of the kidneys to the bladder, and of the ureters to both, that is, of the secreting organ to the vessel receiving the secreted liquor, and the pipe laid from one to the other for the purpose of conveying it from one to the other, is as manifest as it is among the different vessels employed in a distillery, or in the communications between them. The animal structure, in this case, being simple, and the parts easily separated, it forms an instance of correlation which may be presented by dissection to every eye, or which indeed without dissection is capable of being apprehended by every understanding. This correlation of instruments to one another fixes intention somewhere; especially when every other solution is negatived by the conformation. If the bladder had been merely an expansion of the ureter, produced by retention of the fluid, there ought to have been a bladder for each ureter. One receptacle fed by two pipes issuing from different sides of the body, yet from both conveying the same fluid, is not to be accounted for by any such supposition as this.

III. Relation of parts to one another accompanies us throughout the whole animal economy. Can any relation be more simple, yet more convincing than this, that the eyes are so placed as to look in the direction in which the legs move and the hands work? It might have happened very differently if it had been left to chance. There were at least three quarters of the compass out of four to have erred in. Any considerable alteration in the position of the eye or the figure of the joints would have disturbed the line and destroyed the alliance between the sense and the limbs.

IV. But relation, perhaps, is never so striking as when it subsists, not between different parts of the same thing, but between different things. The relation between a lock and a key is more obvious than it is between different parts of the lock. A bow was designed for an arrow, and an arrow for a bow; and the design is more evident for their being separate implements.

Nor do the works of the Deity want this clearest species of relation. The *sexes* are manifestly made for each other. They form the grand relation of animated nature: universal, organic, mechanical; subsisting, like the clearest relations of art, in different individuals, unequivocal, inexplicable without design.

So much so, that were every other proof of contrivance in nature dubious or obscure, this alone would be sufficient. The example is complete. Nothing is wanting to the argument. I see no way whatever of getting over it.

V. The teats of animals which give suck bear a relation to the mouth of the suckling progeny, particularly to the lips and tongue. Here also, as before, is a correspondency of parts; which parts subsist in different individuals.

These are *general* relations, or the relations of parts which are found either in all animals or in large classes and descriptions of animals. *Particular* relations, or the relations which subsist between the particular configuration of one or more parts of certain species of animals, and the particular configuration of one or more other parts of the same animal—which is the sort of relation that is, perhaps, most striking—are such as the following:

I. In the *swan*, the web-foot, the spoon-bill, the long neck, the thick down, the graminivorous stomach, bear all a relation to one another, inasmuch as they all concur in one design, that of supplying the occasions of an aquatic fowl floating upon the surface of shallow pools of water, and seeking its food at the bottom. Begin with any one of these particularities of structure, and observe how the rest follow it. The web-foot qualifies the bird for swimming; the spoon-bill enables it to graze. But how is an animal floating upon the surface of pools of water to graze at the bottom, except by the mediation of a long neck? A long neck accordingly is given to it. Again, a warm-blooded animal which was to pass its life upon water, required a defence against the coldness of that element. Such a defence is furnished to the swan in the muff in which its body is wrapped. But all this outward apparatus would have been in vain if the intestinal system had not been suited to the digestion of vegetable substances. I say suited to the digestion of vegetable substances, for it is well known that there are two intestinal systems found in birds: one with a membranous stomach and a gastric juice capable of dissolving animal substances alone; the other with a crop and gizzard calculated for the moistening, bruising, and afterwards digesting of vegetable aliment.

Or set off with any other distinctive part in the body of the swan; for instance, with the long neck. The long neck without the web-foot would have been an encumbrance to the bird; yet there is no necessary connection between a long neck and a web-foot. In fact they do not usually go together. How happens it, therefore, that they meet only when a particular design demands the aid of both?

II. This mutual relation arising from a subserviency to a common purpose, is very observable also in the parts of a *mole.* The strong short legs of that animal, the palmated feet armed with sharp nails, the pig-like nose, the teeth, the velvet coat, the small external ear, the sagacious smell, the sunk protected eye, all conduce to the utilities or to the safety of its under-ground life. It is a special purpose, specially consulted throughout. The form of the feet fixes the character of the animal. They are so many shovels; they determine its action to that of rooting in the ground; and every thing about its body agrees with its destination. The cylindrical figure of the mole, as well as the compactness of its form, arising from the terseness of its limbs, proportionably lessens its labor; because, according to its bulk, it thereby requires the least possible quantity of earth to be removed for its progress. It has nearly the same structure of the face and jaws as a swine, and the same office for them. The nose is sharp, slender, tendinous, strong, with a pair of nerves going down to the end of it. The plush covering which, by the smoothness, closeness, and polish of the short piles that compose it, rejects the adhesion of almost every species of earth, defends the animal from cold and wet, and from the impediment which it would experience by the mould sticking to its body. From soils of all kinds the little pioneer comes forth bright and clean. Inhabiting dirt, it is of all animals the neatest.

But what I have always most admired in the mole is its *eyes*. This animal occasionally visiting the surface, and wanting, for its safety and direction, to be informed when it does so, or when it approaches it, a perception of light was necessary. I do not know that the clearness of sight depends at all upon the size of the organ. What is gained by the largeness or prominence of the globe of the eye, is width in the field of vision. Such a capacity would be of no use to an animal which was to seek its food in the dark. The mole did not want to look about it; nor would a large advanced eye have been easily defended from the annoyance to which the life of the animal must constantly expose it. How indeed was the mole, working its way under ground, to guard its eyes at all? In order to meet this difficulty, the eyes are made scarcely larger than the head of a corking-pin; and these minute globules are sunk so deeply in the skull, and lie so sheltered within the velvet of its covering, as that any contraction of what may be called the eyebrows, not only closes up the apertures which lead to the eyes, but presents a cushion, as it were, to any sharp or protruding substance which might push against them. This aperture, even in its ordinary state, is like a pin-hole in a piece of velvet, scarcely pervious to loose particles of earth.

Observe, then, in this structure, that which we call relation. There is no natural connection between a small sunk eye and a shovel palmated foot. Palmated feet might have been joined with goggle eyes; or small eyes might have been joined with feet of any other form. What was it, therefore, which brought them together in the mole? That which brought together the barrel, the chain, and the fusee in a watch—design; and design in both cases inferred from the relation which the parts bear to one another in the prosecution of a common purpose. As has already been observved, there are different ways of stating the relation, according as we set out from a different part. In the instance before us, we may either consider the shape of the feet, as qualifying the animal for that mode of life and inhabitation to which the structure of its eyes confines it; or we may consider the structure of the eye, as the only one which would have suited with the action to which the feet are adapted. The relation is manifest, whichever of the parts related we place first in the order of our consideration. In a word, the feet of the mole are made for digging; the neck, nose, eyes, ears, and skin, are peculiarly adapted to an under-ground life; and this is what I call relation.

CHAPTER XVI.

COMPENSATION.

Compensation is a species of relation. It is relation when the *defects* of one part, or of one organ, are supplied by the structure of another part, or of another organ. Thus,

I. The short unbending neck of the *elephant** is compensated by the length and flexibility of his *proboscis.* He could not have reached the ground without it; or, if it be supposed that he might have fed upon the fruit, leaves, or branches of trees, how was he to drink? Should it be asked, Why is the elephant's neck so short? it may be answered, that the weight of a head so heavy could not have been supported at the end of a longer lever. To a form, therefore, in some respects necessary, but in some respects also inadequate to the occasion of the animal, a supplement is added which exactly makes up the deficiency under which he labored.

If it be suggested that this proboscis may have been produced, in a long course of generations, by the constant endeavor of the elephant to thrust out its nose—which is the general hypothesis by which it has lately been attempted to account for the forms of animated nature—I would ask, How was the animal to subsist in the mean time, during the process, *until* this prolongation of snout were completed? What was to become of the individual while the species was perfecting?

Our business at present is, simply to point out the relation which this organ bears to the peculiar figure of the animal to which it belongs. And herein all things correspond. The necessity of the elephant's proboscis arises from the shortness of his neck; the shortness of the neck is rendered necessary by the weight of the head. Were we to enter into an examination of the structure and anatomy of the proboscis itself, we should see in it one of the most curious of all examples of animal mechanism. The disposition of the ringlets and fibres, for the purpose, first, of forming a long cartilaginous pipe; secondly, of contracting and lengthening that pipe; thirdly, of turning it in every direction at the will of the animal; with the superaddition at the end of a fleshy production,* of about the length and thickness of a finger, and performing the office of a finger, so as to pick up a straw from the ground: these properties of the same organ, taken together, exhibit a specimen not only of design—which is attested by the advantage—but of consummate art, and as I may say, of elaborate preparation, in accomplishing that design.

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* Plate V., Fig. 4.

II. The hook in the wing of a *bat* is strictly a mechanical, and also a *compensating* contrivance. At the angle of its wing there is a bent claw, exactly in the form of a hook, by which the bat attaches itself to the sides of rocks, caves, and buildings, laying hold of crevices, joinings, chinks, and roughnesses. It hooks itself by this claw; remains suspended by this hold; takes its flight from this position: which operations compensate for the decrepitude of its legs and feet. Without her hook the bat would be the most helpless of all animals. She can neither run upon her feet, nor raise herself from the ground. These inabilities are made up to her by the contrivance in her wing; and in placing a claw on that part, the Creator has deviated from the analogy observed in winged animals. A singular defect required a singular substitute.

III. The *crane* kind are to live and seek their food among the waters; yet having no web-foot, are incapable of swimming. To make up for this deficiency, they are furnished with long legs for wading, or long bills for groping, or usually with both. This is *compensation*. But I think the true reflection upon the present instance is, how every part of nature is tenanted by appropriate inhabitants. Not only is the surface of deep waters peopled by numerous tribes of birds that swim, but marshes and shallow pools are furnished with hardly less numerous tribes of birds that wade.

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* See Fig. 5.

IV. The common *parrot* has, in the structure of its beak, both an inconveniency and a *compensation* for it. When I speak of an inconveniency, I have a view to a dilemma which frequently occurs in the works of nature, namely, that the peculiarity of structure by which an organ is made to answer one purpose, necessarily unfits it for some other purpose. This is the case before us. The upper bill of the parrot is so much hooked, and so much overlaps the lower, that if, as in other birds, the lower chap alone had motion, the bird could scarcely gape wide enough to receive its food; yet this hook and overlapping of the bill could not be spared, for it forms the very instrument by which the bird climbs, to say nothing of the use which it makes of it in breaking nuts and the hard substances upon which it feeds. How, therefore, has nature provided for the opening of this occluded mouth? By making the upper chap movable, as well as the lower. In most birds, the upper chap is connected, and makes but one piece with the skull; but in the parrot, the upper chap is joined to the bone of the head by a strong membrane placed on each side of it, which lifts and depresses it at pleasure.*

V. The *spider's web* is a *compensating* contrivance. The spider lives upon flies, without wings to pursue them—a case, one would have thought, of great difficulty, yet provided for, and provided for by a resource which no stratagem, no effort of the animal, could have produced, had not both its external and internal structure been specifically adapted to the operation.

VI. In many species of insects the eye is fixed, and consequently without the power of turning the pupil to the object. This great defect is, however, perfectly *compensated*, and by a mechanism which we should not suspect. The eye is a multiplying-glass, with a lens looking in every direction and catching every object. By which means, although the orb of the eye be stationary, the field of vision is as ample as that of other animals, and is commanded on every side. When this lattice-work was first observed, the multiplicity and minuteness of the surfaces must have added to the surprise of the discovery. Adams tells us that fourteen hundred of these reticulations have been counted in the two eyes of a drone-bee.

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* Goldsmith's Nat. Hist., vol. 5, p. 274.

In other cases, the *compensation* is effected by the number and position of the eyes themselves. The spider has eight eyes, mounted upon different parts of the head; two in front, two in the top of the head, two on each side. These eyes are without motion, but by their situation suited to comprehend every view which the wants or safety of the animal rendered it necessary for it to take.

VII. The Memoirs for the Natural History of Animals, published by the French Academy, A. D. 1687, furnish us with some curious particulars in the eye of a chameleon. Instead of two eyelids, it is covered by an eyelid with a hole in it. This singular structure appears to be *compensatory*. and to answer to some other singularities in the shape of the animal. The neck of the chameleon is inflexible. To make up for this, the eye is so prominent as that more than half of the ball stands out of the head, by means of which extraordinary projection the pupil of the eye can be carried by the muscles in every direction, and is capable of being pointed towards every object. But then so unusual an exposure of the globe of the eye requires for its lubricity and defence a more than ordinary protection of eyelid, as well as a more than ordinary supply of moisture; yet the motion of an eyelid, formed according to the common construction, would be impeded, as it should seem, by the convexity of the organ. The aperture in the lid meets this difficulty. It enables the animal to keep the principal part of the surface of the eye under cover, and to preserve it in a due state of humidity without shutting out the light, or without performing every moment a nictitation which it is probable would be more laborious to this animal than to others.

VIII. In another animal, and in another part of the animal economy, the same memoirs describe a most remarkable *substitution*. The reader will remember what we have already observed concerning the *intestinal* canal—that its length, so many times exceeding that of the body, promotes the extraction of the chyle from the aliment, by giving room for the lacteal vessels to act upon it through a greater space. This long intestine, wherever it occurs, is, in other animals, disposed in the abdomen from side to side in returning folds. But in the animal now under our notice, the matter is managed otherwise. The same intention is mechanically effectuated, but by a mechanism of a different kind. The animal of which I speak is an amphibious quadruped, which our authors call the alopecias, or sea-fox. The intestine is straight from one end to the other; but in this straight and consequently short intestine, is a winding, corkscrew, spiral passage, through which the food, not without several circumvolutions, and in fact by a long route, is conducted to its exit. Here the shortness of the gut is *compensated* by the obliquity of the perforation.

IX. But the works of the Deity are known by expedients. Where we should look for absolute destitution, where we can reckon up nothing but wants, some contrivance always comes in to supply the privation. A *snail*, without wings, feet, or thread, climbs up the stalks of plants by the sole aid of a viscid humor discharged from her skin. She adheres to the stems, leaves, and fruits of plants by means of a sticking-plaster. A *mussel*, which might seem by its helplessness to lie at the mercy of every wave that went over it, has the singular power of spinning strong tendinous threads, by which she moors her shell to rocks and timbers. A *cockle*, on the contrary, by means of its stiff tongue, works for itself a shelter in the sand. The provisions of nature extend to cases the most desperate. A *lobster* has in its constitution a difficulty so great, that one could hardly conjecture beforehand how nature would dispose of it. In most animals, the skin grows with their growth. If, instead of a soft skin, there be a shell, still it admits of a gradual enlargement. If the shell, as in the tortoise, consist of several pieces, the accession of substance is made at the sutures. Bivalve shells grow bigger by receiving an accretion at their edge; it is the same with spiral shells at their mouth. The simplicity of their form admits of this. But the lobster's shell being applied to the limbs of the body, as well as to the body itself, allows not of either of the modes of growth which are observed to take place in other shells. Its hardness resists expansion, and its complexity renders it incapable of increasing its size by addition of substance to its edge. How then was the growth of the lobster to be provided for? Was room to be made for it in the old shell, or was it to be successively fitted with new ones? If a change of shell became necessary, how was the lobster to extricate himself from his present confinement; how was he to uncase his buckler, or draw his legs out of his boots? The process which fishermen have observed to take place is as follows: at certain seasons the shell of the lobster grows soft; the animal swells its body; the seams open, and the claws burst at the joints. When the shell has thus become loose upon the body, the animal makes a second effort, and by a tremulous, spasmodic motion casts it off. In this state, the liberated but defenceless fish retires into holes in the rock. The released body now suddenly pushes its growth. In about eight and forty hours a fresh concretion of humor upon the surface, that is, a new shell, is formed, adapted in every part to the increased dimensions of the animal. This wonderful mutation is repeated every year.

If there be imputed defects without compensation, I should suspect that they were defects only in appearance.

Thus, the body of the *sloth* has often been reproached for the slowness of its motions, which has been attributed to an imperfection in the formation of its limbs. But it ought to be observed, that it is this slowness which alone suspends the voracity of the animal. He fasts during his migration from one tree to another; and this fast may be necessary for the relief of his overcharged vessels, as well as to allow time for the concoction of the mass of coarse and hard food which he has taken into his stomach. The tardiness of his pace seems to have reference to the capacity of his organs, and to his propensities with respect to food; that is, is calculated to counteract the effects of repletion.

Or there may be cases in which a defect is artificial, and compensated by the very cause which produces it. Thus the *sheep*, in the domesticated state in which we see it, is destitute of the ordinary means of defence or escape—is incapable either of resistance or flight. But this is not so with the wild animal. The natural sheep is swift and active; and if it lose these qualities when it comes under the subjection of man, the loss is compensated by his protection. Perhaps there is no species of quadruped whatever which suffers so little as this does from the depredation of animals of prey.

For the sake of making our meaning better understood, we have considered this business of compensation under certain *particularities* of constitution in which it appears to be most conspicuous. This view of the subject necessarily limits the instances to single species of animals. But there are compensations, perhaps not less certain, which extend over large classes and to large portions of living nature.

I. In quadrupeds, the deficiency of teeth is usually *compensated* by the faculty of rumination. The sheep, deer, and ox tribe are without fore-teeth in the upper jaw. These ruminate. The horse and ass are furnished with teeth in the upper jaw, and do not ruminate. In the former class, the grass and hay descend into the stomach nearly in the state in which they are cropped from the pasture or gathered from the bundle. In the stomach they are softened by the gastric juice, which in these animals is unusually copious. Thus softened and rendered tender, they are returned a second time to the action of the mouth, where the grinding teeth complete at their leisure the trituration which is necessary but which was before left imperfect: I say the trituration which is necessary, for it appears from experiments that the gastric fluid of sheep, for example, has no effect in digesting plants unless they have been previously masticated; that it only produces a slight maceration, nearly as common water would do in a like degree of heat; but that when once vegetables are reduced to pieces by mastication, the fluid then exerts upon them its specific operation. Its first effect is to soften them, and to destroy their natural consistency; it then goes on to dissolve them, not sparing even the toughest parts, such as the nerves of the leaves.*

I think it very probable that the gratification also of the animal is renewed and prolonged by this faculty. Sheep, deer, and oxen appear to be in a state of enjoyment while they are chewing the cud; it is then, perhaps, that they best relish their food.

II. In birds, the *compensation* is still more striking. They have no teeth at all. What have they then to make up for this severe want? I speak of granivorous and herbivorous birds, such as common fowls, turkeys, ducks, geese, pigeons, etc.; for it is concerning these alone that the question need be asked. All these are furnished with a peculiar and most powerful muscle, called the *gizzard;* the inner coat of which is fitted up with rough plaits, which, by a strong friction against one another, break and grind the hard aliment as effectually, and by the same mechanical action, as a coffee-mill would do. It has been proved by the most correct experiments, that the gastric juice of these birds will not operate upon the *entire* grain; not even when softened by water or macerated in the crop. Therefore, without a grinding machine within its body, without the trituration of the gizzard, a chicken would have starved upon a heap of corn. Yet, why should a bill and a gizzard go together? Why should a gizzard never be found where there are teeth?

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* Spallanzani, disc. 3, sec. 140.

Nor does the gizzard belong to birds as such. A gizzard is not found in birds of prey; *their* food requires not to be ground down in a mill. The compensatory contrivance goes no further than the necessity. In both classes of birds, however, the digestive organ within the body bears a strict and mechanical relation to the external instruments for procuring food. The soft membranous stomach accompanies a hooked, notched beak; short, muscular legs; strong, sharp, crooked talons: the cartilaginous stomach attends that conformation of bill and toes which restrains the bird to the picking of seeds or the cropping of plants.

III. But to proceed with our *compensations.* A very numerous and comprehensive tribe of terrestrial animals are entirely without feet; yet locomotive, and in a very considerable degree swift in their motion. How is the *want of feet* compensated? It is done by the disposition of the muscles and fibres of the trunk. In consequence of the just collocation and by means of the joint action of longitudinal and annular fibres, that is to say, of strings and rings, the body and train of reptiles are capable of being reciprocally shortened and lengthened, drawn up and stretched out. The result of this action is a progressive, and in some cases a rapid movement of the whole body, in any direction to which the will of the animal determines it. The meanest creature is a collection of wonders. The play of the rings in an *earthworm,* as it crawls, the undulatory motion propagated along the body, the beards or prickles with which the annuli are armed, and which the animal can either shut up close to its body, or let out to lay hold of the roughness of the surface upon which it creeps, and the power arising from all these, of changing its place and position, afford, when compared with the provisions for motion in other animals, proofs of new and appropriate mechanism. Suppose that we had never seen an animal move upon the ground without feet, and that the problem was—muscular action, that is, reciprocal contraction and relaxation being given—to describe how such an animal might be constructed capable of voluntarily changing place. Something, perhaps, like the organization of reptiles might have been hit upon by the ingenuity of an artist; or might have been exhibited in an automaton, by the combination of springs, spiral wires, and ringlets; but to the solution of the problem would not be denied, surely, the praise of invention and of successful thought: least of all, could it ever be questioned whether intelligence had been employed about it or not.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE RELATION OF ANIMATED BODIES TO INANIMATE NATURE.

We have already considered *relation*, and under different views; but it was the relation of parts to parts, of the parts of an animal to other parts of the same animal, or of another individual of the same species.

But the bodies of animals hold, in their constitution and properties, a close and important relation to natures altogether external to their own—to inanimate substances, and to the specific qualities of these; for example, *they hold a strict relation to the* ELEMENTS *by which they are surrounded.*

I. Can it be doubted whether the *wings of birds* bear a relation to air, and the *fins of fish* to water? They are instruments of motion, severally suited to the properties of the medium in which the motion is to be performed; which properties are different. Was not this difference contemplated when the instruments were differently constituted?

II. The structure of the animal *ear* depends for its use, not simply upon being surrounded by a fluid, but upon the specific nature of that fluid. Every fluid would not serve: its particles must repel one another; it must form an elastic medium: for it is by the successive pulses of *such* a medium that the undulations excited by the surrounding body are carried to the organ—that a communication is formed between the object and the sense; which must be done before the internal machinery of the ear, subtile as it is, can act at all.

III. The organs of *voice* and *respiration* are, no less than the ear, indebted, for the success of their operation, to the peculiar qualities of the fluid in which the animal is immersed. They, therefore, as well as the ear, are constituted upon the supposition of such a fluid, that is, of a fluid with such particular properties, being always present. Change the properties of the fluid, and the organ cannot act; change the organ, and the properties of the fluid would be lost. The structure, therefore, of our organs, and the properties of our atmosphere, are made for one another. Nor does it alter the relation, whether you allege the organ to be made for the element—which seems the most natural way of considering it—or the element as prepared for the organ.

IV. But there is another fluid with which we have to do, with properties of its own—with laws of acting, and of being acted upon, totally different from those of air and water: and that is *light*. To this new, this singular element—to qualities perfectly peculiar, perfectly distinct and remote from the qualities of any other substance with which we are acquainted—an organ is adapted, an instrument is correctly adjusted, not less peculiar among the parts of the body, not less singular in its form and in the substance of which it is composed, not less remote from the materials, the model, and the analogy of any other part of the animal frame, than the element to which it relates is specific amidst the substances with which we converse. If this does not prove appropriation, I desire to know what would prove it.

Yet the element of light and the organ of vision, however related in their office and use, have no connection whatever in their original. The action of rays of light upon the surfaces of animals has no tendency to breed eyes in their heads. The sun might shine for ever upon living bodies without the smallest approach towards producing the sense of sight. On the other hand also, the animal eye does not generate or emit light.

V. Throughout the universe there is a wonderful *proportioning* of one thing to another. The size of animals, the human animal especially, when considered with respect to other animals, or to the plants which grow around him, is such as a regard to his conveniency would have pointed out. A giant or a pigmy could not have milked goats, reaped corn, or mowed grass; we may add, could not have rode a horse, trained a vine, shorn a sheep, with the same bodily ease as we do, if at all. A pigmy would have been lost among rushes, or carried off by birds of prey.

It may be mentioned, likewise, that the model and the materials of the human body being what they are, a much greater bulk would have broken down by its own weight. The persons of men who much exceed the ordinary stature betray this tendency.

VI. Again—and which includes a vast variety of particulars, and those of the greatest importance—how close is the *suitableness* of the earth and sea to their several inhabitants, and of these inhabitants to the places of their appointed residence!

Take the *earth* as it is, and consider the correspondency of the powers of its inhabitants with the properties and condition of the soil which they tread. Take the inhabitants as they are, and consider the substances which the earth yields for their use. They can scratch its surface, and its surface supplies all which they want. This is the length of their faculties; and such is the constitution of the globe, and their own, that this is sufficient for all their occasions.

When we pass from the earth to the *sea*, from land to water, we pass through a great change; but an adequate change accompanies us, of animal forms and functions, of animal capacities and wants, so that *correspondency* remains. The earth in its nature is very different from the sea, and the sea from the earth, but one accords with its inhabitants as exactly as the other.

VII. The last relation of this kind which I shall mention is that of *sleep* to *night*, and it appears to me to be a relation which was expressly intended. Two points are manifest: first, that the animal frame requires sleep; secondly, that night brings with it a silence and a cessation of activity, which allows of sleep being taken without interruption and without loss. Animal existence is made up of action and slumber; nature has provided a season for each.

An animal which stood not in need of rest, would always live in daylight. An animal which, though made for action and delighting in action, must have its strength repaired by sleep, meets, by its constitution, the returns of day and night. In the human species, for instance, were the bustle, the labor, the motion of life upheld by the constant presence of light, sleep could not be enjoyed without being disturbed by noise, and without expense of that time which the eagerness of private interest would not contentedly resign. It is happy, therefore, for this part of the creation—I mean that it is conformable to the frame and wants of their constitution, that nature, by the very disposition of her elements, has commanded, as it were, and imposed upon them, at moderate intervals, a general intermission of their toils, their occupations, and pursuits.

But it is not for man, either solely or principally, that night is made. Inferior but less perverted natures taste its solace, and expect its return with greater exactness and advantage than he does. I have often observed, and never observed but to admire, the satisfaction, no less than the regularity, with which the greatest part of the irrational world yield to this soft necessity, this grateful vicissitude: how comfortably the birds of the air, for example, address themselves to the repose of the evening; with what alertness they resume the activity of the day.

Nor does it disturb our argument to confess that certain species of animals are in motion during the night, and at rest in the day. With respect even to them, it is still true that there is a change of condition in the animal, and an external change corresponding with it. There is still the relation, though inverted. The fact is, that the repose of other animals sets these at liberty, and invites them to their food or their sport.

If the relation of *sleep* to *night*, and in some instances, its converse, be real, we cannot reflect without amazement upon the extent to which it carries us. Day and night are things close to us; the change applies immediately to our sensations: of all the phenomena of nature, it is the most obvious and the most familiar to our experience; but, in its cause, it belongs to the great motions which are passing in the heavens. While the earth glides round her axle, she ministers to the alternate necessities of the animals dwelling upon her surface, at the same time that she obeys the influence of those attractions which regulate the order of many thousand worlds. The relation, therefore, of sleep to night is the relation of the inhabitants of the earth to the rotation of their globe; probably it is more: it is a relation to the system of which that globe is a part; and still further, to the congregation of systems of which theirs is only one. If this account be true, it connects the meanest individual with the universe itself—a chicken roosting upon its perch, with the spheres revolving in the firmament.

VIII. But if any one object to our representation, that the succession of day and night, or the rotation of the earth upon which it depends, is not resolvable into central attraction, we will refer him to that which certainly is—to the change of the seasons. Now the constitution of animals susceptible of torpor bears a relation to winter, similar to that which sleep bears to night. Against not only the cold, but the want of food, which the approach of winter induces, the Preserver of the world has provided in many animals by migration, in many others by torpor. As one example out of a thousand, the bat, if it did not sleep through the winter, must have starved, as the moths and flying insects upon which it feeds disappear. But the transition from summer to winter carries us into the very midst of physical astronomy; that is to say, into the midst of those laws which govern the solar system at least, and probably all the heavenly bodies.

CHAPTER XVIII.

INSTINCTS.

The order may not be very obvious by which I place *instincts* next to relations. But I consider them as a species of relation. They contribute, along with the animal organization, to a joint effect, in which view they are related to that organization. In many cases, they refer from one animal to another animal; and when this is the case, become strictly relations in a second point of view.

An INSTINCT is a propensity prior to experience and independent of instruction. We contend that it is by *instinct* that the sexes of animals seek each other; that animals cherish their offspring; that the young quadruped is directed to the teat of its dam; that birds build their nests and brood with so much patience upon their eggs; that insects which do not sit upon their eggs, deposit them in those particular situations in which the young when hatched find their appropriate food; that it is instinct which carries the salmon, and some other fish, out of the sea into rivers, for the purpose of shedding their spawn in fresh water.

We may select out of *this* catalogue the incubation of eggs. I entertain no doubt but that a couple of sparrows hatched in an oven, and kept separate from the rest of their species, would proceed as other sparrows do in every office which related to the production and preservation of their brood. Assuming this fact, the thing is inexplicable upon any other hypothesis than that of an instinct impressed upon the constitution of the animal. For, first, what should induce the female bird to prepare a nest before she lays her eggs? It is in vain to suppose her to be possessed of the faculty of reasoning; for no reasoning will reach the case. The fulness or distention which she might feel in a particular part of the body, from the growth and solidity of the egg within her, could not possibly inform her that she was about to produce something which, when produced, was to be preserved and taken care of. Prior to experience, there was nothing to lead to this inference, or to this suspicion. The analogy was *all* against it; for, in every other instance, what issued from the body was cast out and rejected.

But, secondly, let us suppose the egg to be produced into day; how should birds know that their eggs contain their young? There is nothing either in the aspect or in the internal composition of an egg which could lead even the most daring imagination to conjecture that it was hereafter to turn out from under its shell a living, perfect bird. The form of the egg bears not the rudiments of a resemblance to that of the bird. Inspecting its contents, we find still less reason, if possible, to look for the result which actually takes place. If we should go so far as, from the appearance of order and distinction in the disposition of the liquid substances which we noticed in the egg, to guess that it might be designed for the abode and nutriment of an animal—which would be a very bold hypothesis—we should expect a tadpole dabbling in the slime, much rather than a dry, winged, feathered creature, a compound of parts and properties impossible to be used in a state of confinement in the egg, and bearing no conceivable relation, either in quality or material, to any thing observed in it. From the white of an egg, would any one look for the feather of a goldfinch; or expect from a simple uniform mucilage the most complicated of all machines, the most diversified of all collections of substances? Nor would the process of incubation, for some time at least, lead us to suspect the event. Who that saw red streaks shooting in the fine membrane which divides the white from the yolk, would suppose that these were about to become bones and limbs? Who that espied two discolored points first making their appearance in the cicatrix, would have had the courage to predict that these points were to grow into the heart and head of a bird? It is difficult to strip the mind of its experience. It is difficult to resuscitate surprise when familiarity has once laid the sentiment asleep. But could we forget all that we know, and which our sparrows never knew, about oviparous generation—could we divest ourselves of every information but what we derived from reasoning upon the appearances or quality discovered in the objects presented to us, I am convinced that harlequin coming out of an egg upon the stage is not more astonishing to a child, than the hatching of a chicken both would be, and ought to be, to a philosopher.

But admit the sparrow by some means to know that within that egg was concealed the principle of a future bird; from what chemist was she to learn that *warmth* was necessary to bring it to maturity, or that the degree of warmth imparted by the temperature of her own body was the degree required?

To suppose, therefore, that the female bird acts in this process from a sagacity and reason of her own, is to suppose her to arrive at conclusions which there are no premises to justify. If our sparrow, sitting upon her eggs, expect young sparrows to come out of them, she forms, I will venture to say, a wild and extravagant expectation, in opposition to present appearances and to probability. She must have penetrated into the order of nature further than any faculties of ours will carry us; and it has been well observed, that this deep sagacity, if it be sagacity, subsists in conjunction with great stupidity, even in relation to the same subject. "A chemical operation," says Addison, "could not be followed with greater art or diligence than is seen in hatching a chicken; yet is the process carried on without the least glimmering of thought or common-sense. The hen will mistake a piece of chalk for an egg—is insensible of the increase or diminution of their number—does not distinguish between her own and those of another species—is frightened when her supposititious breed of ducklings take the water."

But it will be said, that what reason could not do for the bird, observation, or instruction, or tradition might. Now if it be true that a couple of sparrows, brought up from the first in a state of separation from all other birds, would build their nest, and brood upon their eggs, then there is an end of this solution. What can be the traditionary knowledge of a chicken hatched in an oven?

Of young birds taken in their nests, a few species breed when kept in cages; and they which do so, build their nests nearly in the same manner as in the wild state, and sit upon their eggs. This is sufficient to prove an instinct, without having recourse to experiments upon birds hatched by artificial heat, and deprived from their birth of all communication with their species; for we can hardly bring ourselves to believe that the parent bird informed her unfledged pupil of the history of her gestation, her timely preparation of a nest, her exclusion of the eggs, her long incubation, and of the joyful eruption at last of her expected offspring; all which the bird in the cage must have learnt in her infancy, if we resolve her conduct into *institution.*

Unless we will rather suppose that she remembers her own escape from the egg, had attentively observed the conformation of the nest in which she was nurtured, and had treasured up her remarks for future imitation; which is not only extremely improbable—for who that sees a brood of callow birds in their nest can believe that they are taking a plan of their habitation?—but leaves unaccounted for one principal part of the difficulty, "the preparation of the nest before the laying of the egg." This she could not gain from observation in her infancy.

It is remarkable also, that the hen sits upon eggs which she has laid without any communication with the male, and which are therefore necessarily unfruitful. That secret she is not let into. Yet if incubation had been a subject of instruction or of tradition, it should seem that this distinction would have formed part of the lesson; whereas the instinct of nature is calculated for a state of nature—the exception here alluded to taking place chiefly, if not solely, among domesticated fowls, in which nature is forced out of her course.

There is another case of oviparous economy, which is still less likely to be the effect of education than it is even in birds, namely, that of *moths* and *butterflies*, which deposit their eggs in the precise substance, that of a cabbage for example, from which, not the butterfly herself, but the caterpillar which is to issue from her egg, draws its appropriate food. The butterfly cannot taste the cabbage—cabbage is no food for her; yet in the cabbage, not by chance, but studiously and electively, she lays her eggs. There are, among many other kinds, the willow-caterpillar and the cabbage-caterpillar; but we never find upon a willow the caterpillar which eats the cabbage, nor the converse. This choice, as appears to me, cannot in the butterfly proceed from instruction. She had no teacher in her caterpillar state. She never knew her parent. I do not see, therefore, how knowledge acquired by experience, if it ever were such, could be transmitted from one generation to another. There is no opportunity either for instruction or imitation. The parent race is gone before the new brood is hatched. And if it be original reasoning in the butterfly, it is profound reasoning indeed. She must remember her caterpillar state, its tastes and habits, of which memory she shows no signs whatever. She must conclude from analogy, for here her recollection cannot serve her, that the little round body which drops from her abdomen will at a future period produce a living creature, not like herself, but like the caterpillar which she remembers herself once to have been. Under the influence of these reflections, she goes about to make provision for an order of things which she concludes will some time or other take place. And it is to be observed, that not a few out of many, but that all butterflies argue thus; all draw this conclusion; all act upon it.

But suppose the address, and the selection, and the plan, which we perceive in the preparations which many irrational animals make for their young, to be traced to some probable origin, still there is left to be accounted for that which is the source and foundation of these phenomena, that which sets the whole at work, the *στοργη*, the parental affection, which I contend to be inexplicable upon any other hypothesis than that of instinct.

For we shall hardly, I imagine, in brutes, refer their conduct towards their offspring to a sense of duty or of decency, a care of reputation, a compliance with public manners, with public laws, or with rules of life built upon a long experience of their utility. And all attempts to account for the parental affection from association, I think, fail. With what is it associated? Most immediately with the throes of parturition, that is, with pain, and terror, and disease. The more remote, but not less strong association, that which depends upon analogy, is all against it. Every thing else which proceeds from the body is cast away and rejected. In birds, is it the egg which the hen loves; or is it the expectation which she cherishes of a future progeny, that keeps her upon her nest? What cause has she to expect delight from her progeny? Can any rational answer be given to the question, why, prior to experience, the brooding hen should look for pleasure from her chickens? It does not, I think, appear that the cuckoo ever knows her young; yet, in her way, she is as careful in making provision for them as any other bird. She does not leave her egg in every hole.

The salmon suffers no surmountable obstacle to oppose her progress up the stream of fresh rivers. And what does she do there? She sheds a spawn, which she immediately quits in order to return to the sea; and this issue of her body she never afterwards recognizes in any shape whatever. Where shall we find a motive for her efforts and her perseverance? Shall we seek it in argumentation, or in instinct? The violet crab of Jamaica performs a fatiguing march of some months' continuance from the mountains to the seaside. When she reaches the coast, she casts her spawn into the open sea, and sets out upon her return home.

Moths and butterflies, as has already been observed, seek out for their eggs those precise situations and substances in which the offspring caterpillar will find its appropriate food. That dear caterpillar the parent butterfly must never see There are no experiments to prove that she would retain any knowledge of it, if she did. How shall we account for her conduct? I do not mean for her art and judgment in selecting and securing a maintenance for her young, but for the impulse upon which she acts. What should induce her to exert any art, or judgment, or choice, about the matter? The undisclosed grub, the animal which she is destined not to know, can hardly be the object of a particular affection, if we deny the influence of instinct. There is nothing therefore left to her, but that of which her nature seems incapable, an abstract anxiety for the general preservation of the species—a kind of patriotism—a solicitude lest the butterfly race should cease from the creation.

Lastly, the principle of association will not explain the discontinuance of the affection when the young animal is grown up. Association operating in its usual way, would rather produce a contrary effect. The object would become more necessary by habits of society; whereas birds and beasts, after a certain time, banish their offspring, disown their acquaintance, seem to have even no knowledge of the objects which so lately engrossed the attention of their minds, and occupied the industry and labor of their bodies. This change, in different animals, takes place at different distances of time from the birth; but the time always corresponds with the ability of the young animal to maintain itself, never anticipates it. In the sparrow tribe, when it is perceived that the young brood can fly and shift for themselves, then the parents forsake them for ever; and though they continue to live together, pay them no more attention than they do to other birds in the same flock.* I believe the same thing is true of all gregarious quadrupeds.

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* Goldsmith's Natural History, vol. iv., p. 244.

In this part of the case, the variety of resources, expedients, and materials which animals of the same species are said to have recourse to under different circumstances, and when differently supplied, makes nothing against the doctrine of instincts. The thing which we want to account for is the propensity. The propensity being there, it is probable enough that it may put the animal upon different actions according to different exigencies. And this adaptation of resources may look like the effect of art and consideration rather than of instinct; but still the propensity is instinctive. For instance, suppose what is related of the woodpecker to be true, that in Europe she deposits her eggs in cavities which she scoops out in the trunks of soft or decayed trees, and in which cavities the eggs lie concealed from the eye, and in some sort safe from the hand of man; but that in the forests of Guinea and the Brazils, which man seldom frequents, the same bird hangs her nest on the twigs of tall trees, thereby placing them out of the reach of *monkeys* and *snakes;* that is, that in each situation she prepares against the danger which she has most occasion to apprehend. Suppose, I say, this to be true, and to be alleged, on the part of the bird that builds these nests, as evidence of a reasoning and distinguishing precaution; still the question returns, whence the propensity to build at all?

Nor does parental affection accompany generation by any universal law of animal organization, if such a thing were intelligible. Some animals cherish their progeny with the most ardent fondness and the most assiduous attention; others entirely neglect them; and this distinction always meets the constitution of the young animal with respect to its wants and capacities. In many, the parental care extends to the young animal; in others, as in all oviparous fish, it is confined to the egg, and even as to that, to the disposal of it in its proper element. Also, as there is generation without parental affection, so is there parental instinct, or what exactly resembles it, without generation. In the bee tribe, the grub is nurtured neither by the father nor the mother, but by the neutral bee. Probably the case is the same with ants.

I am not ignorant of the theory which resolves instinct into sensation, which asserts that what appears to have a view and relation to the future, is the result only of the present disposition of the animal's body, and of pleasure or pain experienced *at the time.* Thus the incubation of eggs is accounted for by the pleasure which the bird is supposed to receive from the pressure of the smooth convex surface of the shells against the abdomen, or by the relief which the mild temperature of the egg may afford to the heat of the lower part of the body, which is observed at this time to be increased beyond its usual state. This present gratification is the only motive with the hen for sitting upon her nest; the hatching of the chickens is, with respect to her, an accidental consequence. The affection of viviparous animals for their young is in like manner solved by the relief, and perhaps the pleasure, which they perceive from giving suck. The young animal's seeking, in so many instances, the teat of its dam, is explained from its sense of smell, which is attracted by the odor of milk. The salmon's urging its way up the stream of fresh-water rivers, is attributed to some gratification or refreshment which, in this particular state of the fish's body, she receives from the change of element. Now of this theory it may be said,

First, that of the cases which require solution, there are few to which it can be applied with tolerable probability; that there are none to which it can be applied without strong objections, furnished by the circumstances of the case. The attention of the cow to its calf, and of the ewe to its lamb, appear to be prior to their sucking. The attraction of the calf or lamb to the teat of the dam, is not explained by simply referring it to the sense of smell. What made the scent of milk so agreeable to the lamb that it should follow it up with its nose, or seek with its mouth the place from which it proceeded? No observation, no experience, no argument could teach the new-dropped animal that the substance from which the scent issued was the material of its food. It had never tasted milk before its birth. None of the animals which are not designed for that nourishment ever offer to suck, or to seek out any such food. What is the conclusion, but that the sugescent parts of animals are fitted for their use, and the knowledge of that use put into them?

We assert, secondly, that even as to the cases in which the hypothesis has the fairest claim to consideration, it does not at all lessen the force of the argument for intention and design. The doctrine of instinct is that of appetencies, *superadded* to the constitution of an animal, for the effectuating of a purpose beneficial to the species. The above-stated solution would derive these appetencies from organization; but then this organization is not less specifically, not less precisely, and therefore not less evidently adapted to the same ends, than the appetencies themselves would be upon the old hypothesis. In this way of considering the subject, sensation supplies the place of foresight; but this is the effect of contrivance on the part of the Creator. Let it be allowed, for example, that the hen is induced to brood upon her eggs by the enjoyment or relief which, in the heated state of her abdomen, she experiences from the pressure of round smooth surfaces, or from the application of a temperate warmth. How comes this extraordinary heat or itching, or call it what you will, which you suppose to be the cause of the bird's inclination, to be felt just at the time when the inclination itself is wanted; when it tallies so exactly with the internal constitution of the egg, and with the help which that constitution requires in order to bring it to maturity? In my opinion, this solution, if it be accepted as to the fact, ought to increase, rather than otherwise, our admiration of the contrivance. A gardener lighting up his stoves just when he wants to force his fruit, and when his trees require the heat, gives not a more certain evidence of design. So again, when a male and female sparrow come together, they do not meet to confer upon the expediency of perpetuating their species. As an abstract proposition, they care not the value of a barley-corn whether the species be perpetuated or not: they follow their sensations, and all those consequences ensue which the wisest counsels could have dictated, which the most solicitous care of futurity, which the most anxious concern for the sparrow-world could have produced. But how do these consequences ensue? The sensations, and the constitution upon which they depend, are as manifestly directed to the purpose which we see fulfilled by them; and the train of intermediate effects as manifestly laid and planned with a view to that purpose; that is to say, design is as completely evinced by the phenomena, as it would be even if we suppose the operations to begin or to be carried on from what some will allow to be alone properly called instincts, that is, from desires directed to a future end, and having no accomplishment or gratification distinct from the attainment of that end.

In a word, I should say to the patrons of this opinion, Be it so; be it that those actions of animals which we refer to instinct are not gone about with any view to their consequences, but that they are attended in the animal with a present gratification, and are pursued for the sake of that gratification alone; what does all this prove, but that the *prospection*, which must be somewhere, is not in the animal, but in the Creator?

In treating of the parental affection in brutes, our business lies rather with the origin of the principle, than with the effects and expressions of it. Writers recount these with pleasure and admiration. The conduct of many kinds of animals towards their young has escaped no observer, no historian of nature. "How will they caress them," says Derham, "with their affectionate notes; lull and quiet them with their tender parental voice; put food into their mouths; cherish and keep them warm; teach them to pick, and eat, and gather food for themselves; and, in a word, perform the part of so many nurses, deputed by the Sovereign Lord and Preserver of the world to help such young and shiftless creatures!" Neither ought it, under this head, to be forgotten, how much the instinct *costs* the animal which feels it; how much a bird, for example, gives up by sitting upon her nest; how repugnant it is to her organization, her habits, and her pleasures. An animal, formed for liberty, submits to confinement in the very season when every thing invites her abroad: what is more, an animal delighting in motion, made for motion, all whose motions are so easy, and so free, hardly a moment, at other times, at rest, is, for many hours of many days together, fixed to her nest as close as if her limbs were tied down by pins and wires. For my part, I never see a bird in that situation but I recognize an invisible hand detaining the contented prisoner from her fields and groves, for the purpose, as the event proves, the most worthy of the sacrifice, the most important, the most beneficial.

But the loss of liberty is not the whole of what the procreant bird suffers. Harvey tells us that he has often found the female wasted to skin and bone by sitting upon her eggs.

One observation more, and I will dismiss the subject. The *pairing* of birds, and the *non-pairing* of beasts, forms a distinction between the two classes, which shows that the conjugal instinct is modified with a reference to utility founded on the condition of the offspring. In quadrupeds, the young animal draws its nutriment from the body of the dam. The male parent neither does, nor can contribute any part to its sustentation. In the winged race, the young bird is supplied by an importation of food, to procure and bring home which, in a sufficient quantity for the demand of a numerous brood, requires the industry of both parents. In this difference, we see a reason for the vagrant instinct of the quadruped, and for the faithful love of the feathered mate.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF INSECTS.

We are not writing a system of natural history; therefore we have not attended to the classes into which the subjects of that science are distributed. What we had to observe concerning different species of animals, fell easily, for the most part, within the divisions which the course of our argument led us to adopt. There remain, however, some remarks upon the *insect* tribe which could not properly be introduced under any of these heads; and which therefore we have collected into a chapter by themselves.

The structure, and the use of the parts of insects, are less understood than that of quadrupeds and birds, not only by reason of their minuteness, or the minuteness of their parts—for that minuteness we can, in some measure, follow with glasses—but also by reason of the remoteness of their manners and modes of life from those of larger animals. For instance, insects, under all their varieties of form, are endowed with *antennæ*, which is the name given to those long feelers that rise from each side of the head: but to what common use or want of the insect kind a provision so universal is subservient, has not yet been ascertained; and it has not been ascertained, because it admits not of a clear, or very probable comparison with any organs which we possess ourselves, or with the organs of animals which resemble ourselves in their functions and faculties, or with which we are better acquainted than we are with insects. We want a ground of analogy. This difficulty stands in our way as to some particulars in the insect constitution which we might wish to be acquainted with. Nevertheless, there are many contrivances in the bodies of insects, neither dubious in their use, nor obscure in their structure, and most properly mechanical. These form parts of our argument.

I. The *elytra*, or scaly wings of the genus of scarabæus or beetle, furnish an example of this kind. The true wing of the animal is a light, transparent membrane, finer than the finest gauze, and not unlike it. It is also, when expanded, in proportion to the size of the animal, very large. In order to protect this delicate structure, and perhaps, also, to preserve it in a due state of suppleness and humidity, a strong, hard case is given to it in the shape of the horny wing which we call the elytron. When the animal is at rest, the gauze wings lie folded up under this impenetrable shield. When the beetle prepares for flying, he raises the integument, and spreads out his thin membrane to the air.* And it cannot be observed without admiration, what a tissue of cordage, that is, of muscular tendons, must run in various and complicated, but determinate directions, along this fine surface, in order to enable the animal either to gather it up into a certain precise form, whenever it desires to place its wings under the shelter which nature has given to them, or to expand again their folds when wanted for action.

In some insects, the elytra cover the whole body; in others, half; in others, only a small part of it; but in all, they completely hide and cover the true wings. Also,

Many or most of the beetle species lodge in holes in the earth, environed by hard, rough substances, and have frequently to squeeze their way through narrow passages; in which situation, wings so tender, and so large, could scarcely have escaped injury, without both a firm covering to defend them, and the capacity of collecting themselves up under its protection.

II. Another contrivance, equally mechanical and equally clear, is the *awl*, or borer, fixed at the tails of various species of flies; and with which they pierce, in some cases, plants; in others, wood; in others, the skin and flesh of animals; in others, the coat of the chrysalis of insects of a different species from their own; and in others, even lime, mortar, and stone. I need not add, that having pierced the substance, they deposit their eggs in the hole. The descriptions which naturalists give of this organ are such as the following: It is a sharp-pointed instrument, which, in its inactive state, lies concealed in the extremity of the abdomen, and which the animal draws out at pleasure, for the purpose of making a puncture in the leaves, stem, or bark of the particular plant which is suited to the nourishment of its young. In a sheath, which divides and opens whenever the organ is used, there is inclosed a compact, solid, dentated stem, along which runs a *gutter* or *groove*, by which groove, after the penetration is effected, the egg, assisted in some cases by a peristaltic motion, passes to its destined lodgement. In the œstrus or gad-fly, the wimble *draws out* like the pieces of a spy-glass: the last piece is armed with three hooks, and is able to bore through the hide of an ox. Can any thing more be necessary to display the mechanism, than to relate the fact?

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* PLATE V., FIG. 6. *a*, *a*, the elytra; *b*, *b*, the true wings.

III. The *stings* of insects, though for a different purpose, are, in their structure, not unlike the piercer. The sharpness to which the point in all of them is wrought; the temper and firmness of the substance of which it is composed; the strength of the muscles by which it is darted out, compared with the smallness and weakness of the insect, and with the soft and friable texture of the rest of the body, are properties of the sting to be noticed, and not a little to be admired. The sting of a *bee* will pierce through a goat-skin glove. It penetrates the human flesh more readily than the finest point of a needle. The *action* of the sting affords an example of the union of chemistry and mechanism, such as, if it be not a proof of contrivance, nothing is. First, as to the chemistry, how highly concentrated must be the *venom*, which, in so small a quantity, can produce such powerful effects! And in the bee we may observe that this venom is made from *honey*, the only food of the insect, but the last material from which I should have expected that an exalted poison could, by any process or digestion whatsoever, have been prepared. In the next place, with respect to the mechanism, the sting is not a simple, but a compound instrument. The visible sting,* though drawn to a point exquisitely sharp, is in strictness only a sheath, for, near to the extremity, may be perceived by the microscope two minute orifices, from which orifices, in the act of stinging, and, as it should seem, after the point of the main sting has buried itself in the flesh, are launched out two subtile rays, which may be called the true or proper stings, as being those through which the poison is infused into the puncture already made by the exterior sting. I have said that chemistry and mechanism are here *united;* by which observation I meant, that all this machinery would have been useless, *telum imbelle*, if a supply of poison, intense in proportion to the smallness of the drop, had not been furnished to it by the chemical elaboration which was carried on in the insect's body; and that, on the other hand, the poison, the result of this process, could not have attained its effect, or reached its enemy, if, when it was collected at the extremity of the abdomen, it had not found there a machinery fitted to conduct it to the situations in which it was to operate—namely, an awl to bore a hole, and a syringe to inject the fluid. Yet these attributes, though combined in their action, are independent in their origin. The venom does not breed the sting; nor does the sting concoct the venom.

IV. The *proboscis*, with which many insects are endowed, comes next in order to be considered. It is a tube attached to the head of the animal. In the bee, it is composed of two pieces, connected by a joint; for, if it were constantly extended, it would be too much exposed to accidental injuries; therefore, in its indolent state, it is doubled up by means of the joint, and in that position lies secure under a scaly penthouse. In many species of the butterfly, the proboscis, when not in use, is coiled up like a watch-spring. In the same bee, the proboscis serves the office of the mouth, the insect having no other; and how much better adapted it is than a mouth would be, for the collecting of the proper nourishment of the animal, is sufficiently evident. The food of the bee is the nectar of flowers; a drop of syrup, lodged deep in the bottom of the corollæ, in the recesses of the petals, or down the neck of a monopetalous glove. Into these cells the bee thrusts its long narrow pump, through the cavity of which it sucks up this precious fluid, inaccessible to every other approach. It is observable also, that the plant is not the worse for what the bee does to it. The harmless plunderer rifles the sweets, but leaves the flower uninjured. The ringlets of which the proboscis of the bee is composed, the muscles by which it is extended and contracted, form so many microscopical wonders. The agility also with which it is moved can hardly fail to excite admiration. But it is enough for our purpose to observe in general, the suitableness of the structure to the use, of the means to the end, and especially the wisdom by which nature has departed from its most general analogy—for animals being furnished with mouths are such—when the purpose could be better answered by the deviation.

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* Plate V., Fig. 7. A sting magnified; *a*, *a*, muscles that project it; *b*, the tube; *c*, the sheath; *d*, the true sting; *e*, the poison-bag.

In some insects, the proboscis, or tongue, or trunk is shut up in a sharp-pointed sheath; which sheath being of a much firmer texture than the proboscis itself, as well as sharpened at the point, pierces the substance which contains the food, and then *opens within the wound*, to allow the inclosed tube, through which the juice is extracted, to perform its office. Can any mechanism be plainer than this is, or surpass this?

V. The *metamorphosis* of insects from grubs into moths and flies, is an astonishing process. A hairy caterpillar is transformed into a butterfly. Observe the change. We have four beautiful wings where there were none before; a tubular proboscis in the place of a mouth with jaws and teeth; six long legs instead of fourteen feet. In another case we see a white, smooth, soft worm turned into a black, hard, crustaceous beetle with gauze wings. These, as I said, are astonishing processes, and must require, as it should seem, a proportionably artificial apparatus. The hypothesis which appears to me most probable is, that in the grub there exist at the same time three animals, one within another, all nourished by the same digestion, and by a communicating circulation, but in different stages of maturity. The latest discoveries made by naturalists seem to favor this supposition. The insect already equipped with wings, is descried under the membranes both of the worm and nymph. In some species, the proboscis, the antennæ, the limbs, and wings of the fly, have been observed to be folded up within the body of the caterpillar, and with such nicety as to occupy a small space only under the two first wings. This being so, the outermost animal, which, besides its own proper character, serves as an integument to the other two, being the farthest advanced, dies, as we suppose, and drops off first. The second, the pupa or chrysalis, then offers itself to observation. This also, in its turn, dies; its dead and brittle husk falls to pieces, and makes way for the appearance of the fly or moth. Now if this be the case, or indeed whatever explication be adopted, we have a prospective contrivance of the most curious kind; we have organizations *three deep*, yet a vascular system which supplies nutrition, growth, and life, to all of them together.

VI. Almost all insects are oviparous. Nature keeps her butterflies, moths, and caterpillars locked up during the winter in their egg-state; and we have to admire the various devices to which, if we may so speak, the same nature has resorted for the *security* of the egg. Many insects inclose their eggs in a silken web; others cover them with a coat of hair torn from their own bodies; some glue them together, and others, like the moth of the silk-worm, glue them to the leaves upon which they are deposited, that they may not be shaken off by the wind, or washed away by rain. Some, again, make incisions into leaves, and hide an egg in each incision; while some envelope their eggs with a soft substance, which forms the first aliment of the young animal; and some, again, make a hole in the earth, and having stored it with a quantity of proper food, deposit their eggs in it. In all which we are to observe, that the expedient depends not so much upon the address of the animal, as upon the physical resources of his constitution.

The art also with which the young insect is *coiled up* in the egg presents, where it can be examined, a subject of great curiosity. The insect, furnished with all the members which it ought to have, is rolled up into a form which seems to contract it into the least possible space; by which contraction, notwithstanding the smallness of the egg, it has room enough in its apartment, and to spare. This folding of the limbs appears to me to indicate a special direction; for if it were merely the effect of compression, the collocation of the parts would be more various than it is. In the same species, I believe, it is always the same.

These observations belong to the whole insect tribe, or to a great part of them. Other observations are limited to fewer species, but not perhaps less important or satisfactory.

I. The organization in the abdomen of the *silk-worm* or *spider*, whereby these insects form their *thread*, is as incontestably mechanical as a wire-drawer's mill. In the body of the silk-worm are two bags, remarkable for their form, position, and use. They wind round the intestine; when drawn out they are ten inches in length, though the animal itself be only two. Within these bags is collected a glue; and communicating with the bags are two paps or outlets, perforated like a grater by a number of small holes. The glue or gum being passed through these minute apertures, forms hairs of almost imperceptible fineness; and these hairs, when joined, compose the silk which we wind off from the cone in which the silk-worm has wrapped itself up: in the spider, the web is formed from this thread. In both cases, the extremity of the thread, by means of its adhesive quality, is first attached by the animal to some external hold; and the end being now fastened to a point, the insect, by turning round its body, or by receding from that point, draws out the thread through the holes above described, by an operation, as has been observed, exactly similar to the drawing of wire. The thread, like the wire, is formed by the hole through which it passes. In one respect there is a difference. The wire is the metal unaltered, except in figure. In the animal process, the nature of the substance is somewhat changed as well as the form; for as it exists within the insect, it is a soft, clammy gum or glue. The thread acquires, it is probable, its firmness and tenacity from the action of the air upon its surface in the moment of exposure; and a thread so fine is almost all surface. This property, however, of the paste is part of the contrivance.

The mechanism itself consists of the bags or reservoirs into which the glue is collected, and of the external holes communicating with these bags; and the action of the machine is seen in the forming of a thread, as wire is formed, by forcing the material already prepared through holes of proper dimensions. The secretion is an act too subtile for our discernment, except as we perceive it by the produce. But one thing answers to another—the secretory glands to the quality and consistence required in the secreted substance, the bag to its reception. The outlets and orifices are constructed not merely for relieving the reservoirs of their burden, but for manufacturing the contents into a form and texture of great external use, or rather, indeed, of future necessity to the life and functions of the insect.

II. *Bees*, under one character or other, have furnished every naturalist with a set of observations. I shall in this place confine myself to one, and that is the *relation* which obtains between the wax and the honey. No person who has inspected a beehive can forbear remarking how commodiously the honey is bestowed in the comb, and among other advantages, how effectually the fermentation of the honey is prevented by distributing it into small cells. The fact is, that when the honey is separated from the comb and put into jars, it runs into fermentation with a much less degree of heat than what takes place in a hive. This may be reckoned a nicety; but independently of any nicety in the matter, I would ask, what could the bee do with the honey if it had not the wax; how, at least, could it store it up for winter? The wax, therefore, answers a purpose with respect to the honey, and the honey constitutes that purpose with respect to the wax. This is the relation between them. But the two substances, though together of the greatest use, and without each other of little, come from a different origin. The bee finds the honey, but makes the wax. The honey is lodged in the nectaria of flowers, and probably undergoes little alteration—is merely collected; whereas the wax is a ductile, tenacious paste, made out of a dry powder, not simply by kneading it with a liquid, but by a digestive process in the body of the bee. What account can be rendered of facts so circumstanced, but that the animal being intended to feed upon honey, was by a peculiar external configuration enabled to procure it? That, moreover, wanting the honey when it could not be procured at all, it was farther endued with the no less necessary faculty of constructing repositories for its preservation? Which faculty, it is evident, must depend primarily upon the capacity of providing suitable materials. Two distinct functions go to make up the ability. First, the power in the bee, with respect to wax, of loading the farina of flowers upon its thighs. Microscopic observers speak of the spoon-shaped appendages with which the thighs of bees are beset for this very purpose; but inasmuch as the art and will of the bee may be supposed to be concerned in this operation, there is, secondly, that which does not rest in art or will—a digestive faculty, which converts the loose powder into a stiff substance. This is a just account of the honey and the honeycomb; and this account, through every part, carries a creative intelligence along with it.

The *sting* also of the bee has this relation to the honey, that it is necessary for the protection of a treasure which invites so many robbers.

III. Our business is with mechanism. In the *panorpa* tribe of insects, there is a forceps in the tail of the male insect, with which he catches and holds the female. Are a pair of pincers more mechanical than this provision in its structure; or is any structure more clear and certain in its design?

IV. St. Pierre tells us,* that in a fly with six feet—I do not remember that he describes the species—the pair next the head and the pair next the tail have brushes at their extremities, with which the fly dresses, as there may be occasion, the anterior or the posterior part of its body; but that the middle pair have no such brushes, the situation of these legs not admitting of the brushes, if they were there, being converted to the same use. This is a very exact mechanical distinction.

V. If the reader, looking to our distributions of science, wish to contemplate the chemistry as well as the mechanism of nature, the insect creation will afford him an example. I refer to the light in the tail of a *glowworm.* Two points seem to be agreed upon by naturalists concerning it: first, that it is phosphoric; secondly, that its use is to attract the male insect. The only thing to be inquired after is the singularity, if any such there be, in the natural history of this animal, which should render a provision of this kind more necessary for it than for other insects. That singularity seems to be the difference which subsists between the male and the female, which difference is greater than what we find in any other species of animal whatever. The glowworm is a female *caterpillar*, the male of which is a *fly*, lively, comparatively small, dissimilar to the female in appearance, probably also as distinguished from her in habits, pursuits, and manners, as he is unlike in form and external constitution. Here then is the diversity of the case. The caterpillar cannot meet her companion in the air. The winged rover disdains the ground. They might never therefore be brought together, did not this radiant torch direct the volatile mate to his sedentary female.

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* Vol. I., p. 342.

In this example we also see the resources of art anticipated. One grand operation of chemistry is the making of phosphorus; and it was thought an ingenious device to make phosphoric matches supply the place of lighted tapers. Now this very thing is done in the body of the glowworm. The phosphorus is not only made, but kindled, and caused to emit a steady and genial beam, for the purpose which is here stated, and which I believe to be the true one.

VI. Nor is the last the only instance that entomology affords, in which our discoveries, or rather our projects, turn out to be imitations of nature. Some years ago a plan was suggested of producing propulsion by reäction in this way: by the force of a steam-engine, a stream of water was to be shot out of the stern of a boat, the impulse of which stream upon the water in the river was to push the boat itself forward; it is in truth the principle by which skyrockets ascend in the air. Of the use or practicability of the plan I am not speaking; nor is it my concern to praise its ingenuity; but it is certainly a contrivance. Now, if naturalists are to be believed, it is exactly the device which nature has made use of for the motion of some species of aquatic insects. The larva of the *dragonfly*, according to Adams, swims by ejecting water from its tail—is driven forward by the reäction of water in the pool upon the current issuing in a direction backward from its body.

VII. Again, Europe has lately been surprised by the elevation of bodies in the air by means of a balloon. The discovery consisted in finding out a manageable substance, which was, bulk for bulk, lighter than air; and the application of the discovery was to make a body composed of this substance bear up, along with its own weight, some heavier body which was attached to it. This expedient, so new to us, proves to be no other than what the Author of nature has employed in the *gossamer spider*. We frequently see this spider's thread floating in the air, and extended from hedge to hedge, across a road or brook of four or five yards width. The animal which forms the thread has no wings wherewith to fly from one extremity to the other of this line, nor muscles to enable it to spring or dart to so great a distance; yet its Creator has laid for it a path in the atmosphere, and after this manner. Though the animal itself be heavier than air, the thread which it spins from its bowels is specifically lighter. This is its *balloon*. The spider, left to itself, would drop to the ground; but being tied to its thread, both are supported. We have here a very peculiar provision; and to a contemplative eye it is a gratifying spectacle to see this insect wafted on her thread, sustained by a levity not her own, and traversing regions which, if we examined only the body of the animal, might seem to have been forbidden to its nature.

I must now crave the reader's permission to introduce into this place, for want of a better, an observation or two upon the tribe of animals, whether belonging to land or water, which are covered by *shells*.

I. The *shells* of *snails* are a wonderful, a mechanical, and, if one might so speak concerning the works of nature, an original contrivance. Other animals have their proper retreats, their hybernacula also, or winter-quarters, but the snail carries these about with him. He travels with his tent; and this tent, though, as was necessary, both light and thin, is completely impervious either to moisture or air. The young snail comes out of its egg with the shell upon its back; and the gradual enlargement which the shell receives, is derived from the slime excreted by the animal's skin. Now the aptness of this excretion to the purpose, its property of hardening into a shell, and the action, whatever it be, of the animal, whereby it avails itself of its gift, and of the constitution of its glands—to say nothing of the work being commenced before the animal is born—are things which can, with no probability, be referred to any other cause than to express design; and that not on the part of the animal alone—in which design, though it might build the house, it could not have supplied the material. The will of the animal could not determine the quality of the excretion. Add to which, that the shell of the snail, with its pillar and convolution, is a very artificial fabric; while a snail, as it should seem, is the most numb and unprovided of all artificers. In the midst of variety, there is likewise a regularity which could hardly be expected. In the same species of snail, the number of turns is usually, if not always, the same. The sealing up of the mouth of the shell by the snail, is also well calculated for its warmth and security; but the cerate is not of the same substance with the shell.

II. Much of what has been observed of snails belongs to *shell-fish* and their *shells*, particularly to those of the univalve kind, with the addition of two remarks, one of which is upon the great strength and hardness of most of these shells. I do not know whether, the weight being given, art can produce so strong a case as are some of these shells; which defensive strength suits well with the life of an animal that has often to sustain the dangers of a stormy element and a rocky bottom, as well as the attacks of voracious fish. The other remark is upon the property, in the animal excretion, not only of congealing, but of congealing—or, as a builder would call it, *setting*—in water, and into a cretaceous substance, firm and hard. This property is much more extraordinary, and, chemically speaking, more specific, than that of hardening in the air, which may be reckoned a kind of exsiccation, like the drying of clay into bricks.

III. In the *bivalve* order of shell-fish, cockles, muscles, oysters, etc., what contrivance can be so simple or so clear as the insertion, at the back, of a tough tendinous substance, that becomes at once the ligament which binds the two shells together, and the *hinge* upon which they open and shut?

IV. The shell of a lobster's tail, in its articulations and overlappings, represents the jointed part of a coat of mail; or rather, which I believe to be the truth, a coat of mail is an imitation of a lobster's shell. The same end is to be answered by both; the same properties, therefore, are required in both, namely, hardness and flexibility—a covering which may guard the part without obstructing its motion. For this double purpose, the art of man, expressly exercised upon the subject, has not been able to devise any thing better than what nature presents to his observation. Is not this therefore mechanism, which the mechanic, having a similar purpose in view, adopts? Is the structure of a coat of mail to be referred to art? Is the same structure of the lobster, conducing to the same use, to be referred to any thing less than art?

Some who may acknowledge the imitation, and assent to the inference which we draw from it in the instance before us, may be disposed, possibly, to ask, why such imitations are not more frequent than they are, if it be true, as we allege, that the same principle of intelligence, design, and mechanical contrivance was exerted in the formation of natural bodies as we employ in the making of the various instruments by which our purposes are served? The answers to this question, are, first, that it seldom happens that precisely the same purpose, and no other, is pursued in any works which we compare of nature and of art; secondly, that it still more seldom happens that we *can* imitate nature, if we would. Our materials and our workmanship are equally deficient. Springs and wires, and cork and leather, produce a poor substitute for an arm or a hand. In the example which we have selected, I mean a lobster's shell compared with a coat of mail, these difficulties stand less in the way than in almost any other that can be assigned; and the consequence is, as we have seen, that art gladly borrows from nature her contrivance, and imitates it closely.

But to return to insects. I think it is in this class of animals, above all others, especially when we take in the multitude of species which the microscope discovers, that we are struck with what Cicero has called "the *insatiable* variety of nature." There are said by St. Pierre to be six thousand species of flies; seven hundred and sixty butterflies; each different from all the rest. The same writer tells us, from his own observation, that thirty-seven species of winged insects, with distinctions well expressed, visited a single strawberry-plant in the course of three weeks.* Ray observed, within the compass of a mile or two of his own house, two hundred kinds of butterflies, nocturnal and diurnal. He likewise asserts, but I think without any grounds of exact computation, that the number of species of insects, reckoning all sorts of them, may not be short of ten thousand.† And in this vast variety of animal forms—for the observation is not confined to insects, though more applicable perhaps to them than to any other class—we are sometimes led to take notice of the different methods, or rather of the studiously diversified methods, by which one and the same purpose is attained. In the article of breathing, for example, which was to be provided for in some way or other, besides the ordinary varieties of lungs, gills, and breathing-holes—for insects in general respire, not by the mouth, but through holes in the sides—the nymphæ of gnats have an apparatus to raise their *backs* to the top of the water, and so take breath. The hydrocanthari do the like by thrusting their *tails* out of the water.‡ The maggot of the eruca labra has a long tail, one part sheathed within another—but which it can draw out at pleasure—with a starry tuft at the end; by which *tuft*, when expanded upon the surface, the insect both supports itself in the water, and draws in the air which is necessary. In the article of natural clothing, we have the skins of animals invested with scales, hair, feathers, mucus, froth, or itself turned into a shell or crust. In the no less necessary article of offence and defence, we have teeth, talons, beaks, horns, stings, prickles, with—the most singular expedient for the same purpose—the power of giving the electric shock, and, as is credibly related of some animals, of driving away their pursuers by an intolerable fœtor, or of blackening the water through which they are pursued. The consideration of these appearances might induce us to believe that *variety* itself, distinct from every other reason, was a motive in the mind of the Creator, or with the agents of his will.

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* Vol. 1, p. 3. † Wisdom of God, p. 23. ‡ Derham, p. 7.

To this great variety in organized life the Deity has given, or perhaps there arises out of it, a corresponding variety of animal *appetites*. For the final cause of this we have not far to seek. Did all animals covet the same element, retreat, or food, it is evident how much fewer could be supplied and accommodated than what at present live conveniently together, and find a plentiful subsistence. What one nature rejects, another delights in. Food which is nauseous to one tribe of animals becomes, by that very property which makes it nauseous, an alluring dainty to another tribe. Carrion is a treat to dogs, ravens, vultures, fish. The exhalations of corrupted substances attract flies by crowds. Maggots revel in putrefaction

CHAPTER XX.

OF PLANTS.

I THINK a designed and studied mechanism to be in general more evident in animals than in *plants;* and it is unnecessary to dwell upon a weaker argument where a stronger is at hand. There are, however, a few observations upon the vegetable kingdom which lie so directly in our way, that it would be improper to pass by them without notice.

The one great intention of nature in the structure of plants, seems to be the perfecting of the *seed*, and, what is part of the same intention, the preserving of it until it be *perfected.* This intention shows itself, in the first place, by the care which appears to be taken to protect and ripen, by every advantage which can be given to them of situation in the plant, those parts which most immediately contribute to fructification, namely, the antheræ, the stamina, and the stigmata. These parts are usually lodged in the centre, the recesses, or the labyrinths of the flower; during their tender and immature state, are shut up in the stalk, or sheltered in the bud; as soon as they have acquired firmness of texture sufficient to bear exposure, and are ready to perform the important office which is assigned to them, they are disclosed to the light and air by the bursting of the stem or the expansion of the petals, after which they have, in many cases, by the very form of the flower during its blow, the light and warmth reflected upon them from the concave side of the cup. What is called also the *sleep* of plants, is the leaves or petals disposing themselves in such a manner as to shelter the young stems, buds, or fruit. They turn up, or they fall down, according as this purpose renders either change of position requisite. In the growth of corn, whenever the plant begins to shoot, the two upper leaves of the stalk join together, embrace the ear, and protect it till the pulp has acquired a certain degree of consistency. In some water-plants, the flowering and fecundation are carried on *within* the stem, which afterwards opens to let loose the impregnated seed.* The *pea*, or papilionaceous tribe, inclose the parts of fructification within a beautiful folding of the internal blossom, sometimes called, from its shape, the boat or keel—itself also protected under a penthouse formed by the external petals. This structure is very artificial; and what adds to the value of it, though it may diminish the curiosity, very general. It has also this further advantage—and it is an advantage strictly mechanical—that all the blossoms turn their *backs* to the wind whenever the gale blows strong enough to endanger the delicate parts upon which the seed depends. I have observed this a hundred times in a field of peas in blossom. It is an aptitude which results from the figure of the flower, and, as we have said, is strictly mechanical, as much so as the turning of a weather-board or tin cap upon the top of a chimney. Of the *poppy*, and of many similar species of flowers, the head while it is growing hangs down, a rigid curvature in the upper part of the stem giving to it that position; and in that position it is impenetrable by rain or moisture. When the head has acquired its size and is ready to open, the stalk *erects* itself for the purpose, as it should seem, of presenting the flower, and with the flower the instruments of fructification, to the genial influence of the sun's rays. This always struck me as a curious property, and specifically as well as originally provided for in the constitution of the plant; for if the stem be only bent by the weight of the head, how comes it to straighten itself when the head is the heaviest? These instances show the attention of nature to this principal object, the safety and maturation of the parts upon which the seed depends.

In *trees*, especially in those which are natives of colder climates, this point is taken up earlier. Many of these trees—observe in particular the *ash* and the *horsechest-*

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* Philosophical Transactions, part II., 1796, p. 502.

nut—produce the embryos of the leaves and flowers in one year, and bring them to perfection the following. There is a winter, therefore, to be gotten over. Now, what we are to remark is, how nature has prepared for the trials and severities of that season. These tender embryos are in the first place wrapped up with a compactness which no art can imitate; in which state they compose what we call the bud. This is not all. The bud itself is inclosed in scales, which scales are formed from the remains of past leaves and the rudiments of future ones. Neither is this the whole. In the coldest climates, a third preservative is added, by the bud having a *coat* of gum or resin, which being congealed, resists the strongest frosts. On the approach of warm weather, this gum is softened, and ceases to be a hinderance to the expansion of the leaves and flowers. All this care is part of that system of provisions which has for its object and consummation the production and perfecting of the seeds.

The SEEDS themselves are packed up in a *capsule*, a vessel composed of coats which, compared with the rest of the flower, are strong and tough. From this vessel projects a tube, through which tube the farina, or some subtile fecundating effluvium that issues from it, is admitted to the seed. And here also occurs a mechanical variety, accommodated to the different circumstances under which the same purpose is to be accomplished. In flowers which are erect, the pistil is shorter than the stamina; and the pollen, shed from the antheræ into the cup of the flower, is caught in its descent by the head of the pistil, called the stigma. But how is this managed when the flowers hang down, as does the crown-imperial, for instance, and in which position the farina, in its fall, would be carried from the stigma, and not towards it? The relative length of the parts is now inverted. The pistil in these flowers is usually longer, instead of shorter, than the stamina, that its protruding summit may receive the pollen as it drops to the ground. In some cases, as in the *nigella*, where the shafts of the pistils or styles are disproportionably long, they bend down their extremities upon the antheræ, that the necessary approximation may be effected.

But, to pursue this great work in its progress, the impregnation, to which all this machinery relates, being completed, the other parts of the flower fade and drop off, while the *gravid seed-vessel*, on the contrary, proceeds to increase its bulk, always to a great, and in some species—in the gourd, for example, and melon—to a surprising comparative size; assuming in different plants an incalculable variety of forms, but all evidently conducing to the security of the seed. By virtue of this process, so necessary, but so diversified, we have the seed at length in stone-fruits and nuts encased in a strong shell, the shell itself inclosed in a pulp or husk, by which the seed within is or has been fed; or more generally, as in grapes, oranges, and the numerous kinds of berries, plunged overhead in a glutinous syrup contained within a skin or bladder; at other times, as in apples and pears, embedded in the heart of a firm, fleshy substance, or, as in strawberries, pricked into the surface of a soft pulp.

These and many more varieties exist in what we call *fruits*.* In pulse and grain and grasses, in trees and shrubs and flowers, the variety of the seed-vessels is incomputable. We have the seeds, as in the pea tribe, regularly disposed in parchment pods, which, though soft and membranous, completely exclude the wet, even in the heaviest rains; the pod also, not seldom, as in the bean, lined with a fine down; at other times, as in the senna, distended like a blown bladder; or we have the seed enveloped in wool, as in the cotton-plant, lodged, as in pines, between the hard and compact scales of a cone, or barricaded, as in the artichoke and thistle, with spikes and prickles; in mushrooms, placed under a penthouse; in ferns, within slits in the back part of the leaf; or, which is the most general organization of all, we find them covered by strong, close tunicles, and attached to the stem according to an order appropriated to each plant, as is seen in the several kinds of grains and of grasses.

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* From the conformation of fruits alone, one might be led, even without experience, to suppose that part of this provision was destined for the utilities of animals. As limited to the plant, the provision itself seems to go beyond its object. The flesh of an apple, the pulp of an orange, the meat of a plum, the fatness of the olive, appear to be *more* than sufficient for the nourishing of the seed or kernel. The event shows that this redundancy, if it be one, ministers to the support and gratification of animal natures; and when we observe a provision to be more than sufficient for one purpose, yet wanted for another purpose, it is not unfair to conclude that both purposes were contemplated together. It favors this view of the subject to remark, that fruits are not, which they might have been, ready all together, but that they ripen in succession throughout a great part of the year; some in summer, some in autumn; that some require the slow maturation of the winter, and supply the spring; also, that the coldest

In which enumeration, what we have first to notice is, unity of purpose under variety of expedients. Nothing can be more *single* than the design, more *diversified* than the means. Pellicles, shells, pulps, pods, husks, skin, scales armed with thorns, are all employed in prosecuting the same intention. Secondly, we may observe, that in all these

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fruits grow in the hottest places. Cucumbers, pineapples, melons, are the natural produce of warm climates, and contribute greatly, by their coolness, to the refreshment of the inhabitants of those countries.

I will add to this note the following observation, communicated to me by Mr. Brinkley.

"The eatable part of the cherry or peach first serves the purposes of perfecting the seed or kernel, by means of vessels passing through the stone, and which are very visible in a peach-stone. After the kernel is perfected, the stone becomes hard, and the vessels cease their functions; but the substance surrounding the stone is not then thrown away as useless. That which was before only an instrument for perfecting the kernel, now receives and retains to itself the whole of the sun's influence, and thereby becomes a grateful food to man. Also, what an evident mark of design is the stone protecting the kernel. The intervention of the stone prevents the second use from interfering with the first."

cases the purpose is fulfilled within a just and *limited* degree. We can perceive, that if the seeds of plants were more strongly guarded than they are, their greater security would interfere with other uses. Many species of animals would suffer, and many perish, if they could not obtain access to them. The plant would overrun the soil, or the seed be wasted for want of room to sow itself. It is sometimes as necessary to destroy particular species of plants, as it is at other times to encourage their growth. Here, as in many cases, a balance is to be maintained between opposite uses. The provisions for the preservation of seeds appear to be directed chiefly against the inconstancy of the elements, or the sweeping destruction of inclement seasons. The depredation of animals and the injuries of accidental violence are allowed for in the abundance of the increase. The result is, that out of the many thousand different plants which cover the earth, not a single species, perhaps, has been lost since the creation.

When nature has perfected her seeds, her next care is to disperse them. The seed cannot answer its purpose while it remains confined in the capsule. After the seeds therefore are ripened, the pericarpium opens to let them out; and the opening is not like an accidental bursting, but for the most part, is according to a certain rule in each plant. What I have always thought very extraordinary, nuts and shells which we can hardly crack with our teeth, divide and make way for the little tender sprout which proceeds from the kernel. Handling the nut, I could hardly conceive how the plantule was ever to get out of it. There are cases, it is said, in which the seed-vessel, by an elastic jerk at the moment of its explosion, casts the seeds to a distance. We all however know, that many seeds—those of most composite flowers, as of the thistle, dandelion, etc.—are endowed with what are not improperly called *wings;* that is, downy appendages, by which they are enabled to float in the air, and are carried oftentimes by the wind to great distances from the plant which produces them. It is the swelling also of this downy tuft within the seed-vessel, that seems to overcome the resistance of its coats, and to open a passage for the seed to escape.

But the *constitution* of seeds is still more admirable than either their preservation or their dispersion. In the body of the seed of every species of plant, or nearly of every one, provision is made for two grand purposes: first, for the safety of the *germ;* secondly, for the temporary support of the future plant. The sprout, as folded up in the seed, is delicate and brittle beyond any other substance. It cannot be touched without being broken. Yet in beans, pease, grass-seeds, grain, fruits, it is so fenced on all sides, so shut up and protected, that while the seed itself is rudely handled, tossed into sacks, shovelled into heaps, the sacred particle, the miniature plant, remains unhurt. It is wonderful how long many kinds of seeds, by the help of their integuments, and perhaps of their oils, stand out against decay. A grain of mustard-seed has been known to lie in the earth for a hundred years; and as soon as it had acquired a favorable situation, to shoot as vigorously as if just gathered from the plant. Then as to the second point, the temporary support of the future plant, the matter stands thus. In grain and pulse, and kernels and pippins, the germ composes a very small part of the seed. The rest consists of a nutritious substance, from which the sprout draws its aliment for some considerable time after it is put forth, namely, until the fibres shot out from the other end of the seed are able to imbibe juices from the earth in a sufficient quantity for its demand. It is owing to this constitution that we see seeds sprout, and the sprouts make a considerable progress without any earth at all. It is an economy also, in which we remark a close analogy between the seeds of plants and the eggs of animals. The same point is provided for in the same manner in both. In the egg, the residence of the living principle, the cicatrix, forms a very minute part of the contents. The white, and the white only, is expended in the formation of the chicken. The yolk, very little altered or diminished, is wrapped up in the abdomen of the young bird when it quits the shell, and serves for its nourishment till it has learned to pick its own food. This perfectly resembles the first nutrition of a plant. In the plant, as well as in the animal, the structure has every character of contrivance belonging to it: in both, it breaks the transition from prepared to unprepared aliment; in both, it is prospective and compensatory. In animals which suck, this intermediate nourishment is supplied by a different source.

In all subjects the most common observations are the best, when it is their truth and strength which have made them common. There are, of this sort, *two* concerning plants, which it falls within our plan to notice. The *first* relates to what has already been touched upon, their germination. When a grain of corn is cast into the ground, this is the change which takes place. From one end of the grain issues a green sprout; from the other, a number of white fibrous threads. How can this be explained? Why not sprouts from both ends; why not fibrous threads from both ends? To what is the difference to be referred, but to design; to the different uses which the parts are thereafter to serve—uses which discover themselves in the sequel of the process? The sprout, or plumule, struggles into the air, and becomes the plant, of which from the first it contained the rudiments; the fibres shoot into the earth, and thereby both fix the plant to the ground, and collect nourishment from the soil for its support. Now, what is not a little remarkable, the parts issuing from the seed take their respective directions into whatever position the seed itself happens to be cast. If the seed be thrown into the wrongest possible position, that is, if the ends point in the ground the reverse of what they ought to do, every thing nevertheless goes on right. The sprout, after being pushed down a little way, makes a bend, and turns upwards; the fibres, on the contrary, after shooting at first upwards, turn down. Of this extraordinary vegetable fact, an account has lately been attempted to be given. "The plumule," it is said, "is stimulated by the *air* into action, and elongates itself when it is thus most excited; the radicle is stimulated by *moisture*, and elongates itself when *it* is thus most excited. Whence one of these grows upward in quest of its adapted object, and the other downward."* Were this account better verified by experiment than it is, it only shifts the contrivance. It does not disprove the contrivance; it only removes it a little further back. Who, to use our author's own language, "*adapted* the objects?" Who gave such a quality to these connate parts, as to be susceptible of *different* "stimulation;" as to be "excited" each only by its own element, and precisely by that which the success of the vegetation requires? I say, "which the success of the vegetation requres," for the toil of the husbandman would have been in vain, his laborious and expensive preparation of the ground in vain, if the event must, after all, depend upon the position in which the scattered seed was sown. Not one seed out of a hundred would fall in a right direction.

Our *second* observation is upon a general property of climbing plants, which is strictly mechanical. In these plants, from each knot or joint, or as botanists call it, axilla, of the plant, issue, close to each other, two shoots, one bearing the flower and fruit, the other drawn out into a wire, a long, tapering, spiral tendril, that twists itself round any thing which lies within its reach. Considering that in this class two purposes are to be provided for, and together—fructification and support, the fruitage of the plant and the sustentation of the stalk—what means could be used more effectual, or, as I have said, more mechanical, than what this structure presents to our eyes? Why, or how, without a view to this double purpose, do two shoots, of such different and appropriate forms, spring from the same joint, from contiguous points of the same stalk? It never happens thus in robust plants, or in trees. "We see not," says Ray, "so much as one tree, or shrub, or herb, that has a firm and strong stem, and that is able to mount up and stand alone without assistance, *furnished with these tendrils*." Make only so simple a comparison as that between a pea and a bean. Why does the pea put forth tendrils, the bean not, but because the stalk of the pea cannot support itself, the stalk of the bean can? We may add also, as a circumstance not to be overlooked, that, in the pea tribe, these clasps do not make their appearance till they are wanted—till the plant has grown to a height to stand in need of support.

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* Darwin's Phytologia, p. 144.

This word "support" suggests to us a reflection upon a property of grasses, of corn, and canes. The hollow stems of these classes of plants are set at certain intervals with joints. These joints are not found in the trunks of trees, or in the solid stalks of plants. There may be other uses of these joints; but the fact is, and it appears to be at least one purpose designed by them, that they *corroborate* the stem, which by its length and hollowness would otherwise be too liable to break or bend.

Grasses are Nature's care. With these she clothes the earth; with these she sustains its inhabitants. Cattle feed upon their leaves; birds upon their smaller seeds; men upon the larger; for few readers need be told that the plants which produce our bread-corn belong to this class. In those tribes which are more generally considered as grasses, their extraordinary means and powers of preservation and increase, their hardiness, their almost unconquerable disposition to spread, their faculties of reviviscence, coincide with the intention of nature concerning them. They thrive under a treatment by which other plants are destroyed. The more their leaves are consumed, the more their roots increase. The more they are trampled upon, the thicker they grow. Many of the seemingly dry and dead leaves of grasses revive, and renew their verdure in the spring. In lofty mountains, where the summer heats are not sufficient to ripen the seeds, grasses abound which are viviparous, and consequently able to propagate themselves without seed. It is an observation, likewise, which has often been made, that herbivorous animals attach themselves to the leaves of grasses; and if at liberty in their pastures to range and choose, leave untouched the straws which support the flowers.*

The GENERAL properties of vegetable nature, or properties common to large portions of that kingdom, are almost all which the compass of our argument allows us to bring forward. It is impossible to follow plants into their several species. We may be allowed, however, to single out three or four of these species as worthy of a particular notice, either by some singular mechanism, or by some peculiar provision, or by both.

I. In Dr. Darwin's Botanic Garden, vol. 1, p. 395, note, is the following account of the *vallisneria*, as it has been observed in the river Rhone. "They have roots at the bottom of the Rhone. The flowers of the *female plant* float on the surface of the water, and are furnished with an *elastic spiral stalk*, which extends or contracts as the water rises or falls; this rise or fall, from the torrents which flow into the river, often amounting to many feet in a few hours. The flowers of the *male plant* are produced under water; and as soon as the fecundating farina is mature, they separate themselves from the plant, rise to the surface, and are wafted by the air, or borne by the currents, to the female flowers." Our attention in this narrative will be directed to two particulars: first, to the mechanism, the "elastic spiral stalk," which lengthens or contracts itself according as the water rises or falls; secondly, to the provision which is made for bringing the male flower, which is produced *under* water, to the female flower, which floats upon the surface.

* Withering's Botanical Arrangement, vol. I., p. 28, edit. 2.

II. My second example I take from Withering's Arrangement, vol. 2, p. 209, edit. 3. "The *cuscuta europæa* is a parasitical plant. The seed opens and puts forth a *little spiral body*, which does not seek the earth to take root, but *climbs* in a spiral direction, from right to left, up other plants, from which, by means of vessels, it draws its nourishment." The "little spiral body" proceeding from the seed, is to be compared with the fibres which seeds send out in ordinary cases; and the comparison ought to regard both the form of the threads and the direction. They are straight, this is spiral. They shoot downwards, this points upwards. In the rule and in the exception we equally perceive design.

III. A better known parasitical plant is the evergreen shrub called the *mistletoe*. What we have to remark in it is a singular instance of *compensation*. No art has yet made these plants take root in the earth. Here, therefore, might seem to be a mortal defect in their constitution. Let us examine how this defect is made up to them. The seeds are endued with an adhesive quality so tenacious, that if they be rubbed upon the smooth bark of almost any tree, they will stick to it. And then what follows? Roots, springing from these seeds, insinuate their fibres into the woody substance of the tree; and the event is, that a mistletoe plant is produced next winter.* Of no other plant do the roots refuse to shoot in the ground—of no other plant do the seeds possess this adhesive, generative quality, when applied to the bark of trees.

IV. Another instance of the *compensatory* system is in the autumnal crocus or meadow-saffron, *colchicum autumnale*. I have pitied this poor plant a thousand times. Its blossom rises out of the ground in the most forlorn condition possible, without a sheath, a fence, a calyx, or even a leaf to protect it; and that not in the spring, not to be visited by summer suns, but under all the disadvantages of the declining year. When we come, however, to look more closely into the structure of this plant, we find that, instead of its being neglected, nature has gone out of her course to provide for its security, and to make up to it for all its defects. The seed-vessel, which in other plants is situated within the cup of the flower, or just beneath it, in this plant lies buried ten or twelve inches under ground, within the bulbous root. The tube of the flower, which is seldom more than a few tenths of an inch long, in this plant extends down to the root. The styles in all cases reach the seed-vessel; but it is in this, by an elongation unknown to any other plant. All these singularities contribute to one end. "As this plant blossoms late in the year, and probably would not have time to ripen its seeds before the access of winter, which would destroy them, Providence has contrived its structure such, that this important office may be performed at a depth in the earth out of reach of the usual effects of frost."* That is to say, in the autumn nothing is done above ground but the business of impregnation; which is an affair between the antheræ and the stigmata, and is probably soon over. The maturation of the impregnated seed, which in other plants proceeds within a capsule, exposed together with the rest of the flower to the open air, is here carried on, and during the whole winter, within the heart, as we may say, of the earth, that is, "out of the reach of the usual effects of frost." But then a new difficulty presents itself. Seeds, though perfected, are known not to vegetate at this depth in the earth. Our seeds, therefore, though so safely lodged, would, after all, be lost to the purpose for which all seeds are intended. Lest this should be the case, "a second admirable provision is made to raise them above the surface when they are perfected, and to sow them at a proper distance," namely, the germ grows up *in the spring*, upon a fruit-stalk, accompanied with leaves. The seeds now, in common with those of other plants, have the benefit of the summer, and are sown upon the surface. The order of vegetation externally is this: the plant produces its flowers in September; its leaves and fruits in the spring following.

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* Withering's Botan. Arr., vol. I., p. 203, edit. 2.

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* Withering's Botan. Arr., vol. I., p. 360.

V. I give the account of the *dionœa muscipula*, an extraordinary American plant, as some late authors have related it; but whether we be yet enough acquainted with the plant to bring every part of this account to the test of repeated and familiar observation, I am unable to say. "Its leaves are jointed, and furnished with two rows of strong prickles; their surfaces covered with a number of minute glands, which secrete a sweet liquor that allures the approach of flies. When these parts are touched by the legs of flies, the two lobes of the leaf instantly spring up, the rows of prickles lock themselves fast together, and squeeze the unwary animal to death."* Here, under a new model, we recognize the ancient plan of nature, namely, the relation of parts and provisions to one another, to a common office, and to the utility of the organized body to which they belong. The attracting syrup, the rows of strong prickles, their position so as to interlock the joints of the leaves, and, what is more than the rest, that singular irritability of their surfaces, by which they close at a touch, all bear a contributory part in producing an effect, connected either with the defence or with the nutrition of the plant.

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* Smellie's Philosophy of Natural History, vol. I., p. 5.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE ELEMENTS.

When we come to the elements we take leave of our mechanics, because we come to those things, of the organization of which, if they be organized, we are confessedly ignorant. This ignorance is implied by their name. To say the truth, our investigations are stopped long before we arrive at this point. But then it is for our comfort to find that a knowledge of the constitution of the elements is not necessary for us. For instance, as Addison has well observed, "We know *water* sufficiently, when we know how to boil, how to freeze, how to evaporate, how to make it fresh, how to make it run or spout out in what quantity and direction we please, without knowing what water is." The observation of this excellent writer has more propriety in it now, than it had at the time it was made; for the constitution and the constituent parts of water appear in some measure to have been lately discovered; yet it does not, I think, appear that we can make any better or greater use of water since the discovery, than we did before it.

We can never think of the elements without reflecting upon the number of distinct uses which are *consolidated* in the same substance. The *air* supplies the lungs, supports fire, conveys sound, reflects light, diffuses smells, gives rain, wafts ships, bears up birds. 'Eξ *ὑδατος τα παντα*: *water*, besides maintaining its own inhabitants, is the universal nourisher of plants, and through them of terrestrial animals; is the basis of their juices and fluids; dilutes their food; quenches their thirst; floats their burdens. *Fire* warms, dissolves, enlightens; is the great promoter of vegetation and life, if not necessary to the support of both.

We might enlarge, to almost any length we please, upon each of these uses; but it appears to me sufficient to state them. The few remarks which I judge it necessary to add, are

I. Air is essentially different from earth. There appears to be no necessity for an atmosphere's investing our globe, yet it does invest it; and we see how many, how various, and how important are the purposes which it answers to every order of animated, not to say of organized beings, which are placed upon the terrestrial surface. I think that every one of these uses will be understood upon the first mention of them, except it be that of *reflecting* light, which may be explained thus: If I had the power of seeing only by means of rays coming directly from the sun, whenever I turned my back upon the luminary I should find myself in darkness. If I had the power of seeing by reflected light, yet by means only of light reflected from solid masses, these masses would shine indeed, and glisten, but it would be in the dark. The hemisphere, the sky, the world, could only be *illuminated*, as it is illuminated, by the light of the sun being from all sides, and in every direction, reflected to the eye by particles as numerous, as thickly scattered, and as widely diffused, as are those of the air.

Another general quality of the atmosphere is the power of evaporating fluids. The adjustment of this quality to our use is seen in its action upon the sea. In the sea, water and salt are mixed together most intimately; yet the atmosphere raises the water and leaves the salt. Pure and fresh as drops of rain descend, they are collected from brine. If evaporation be solution—which seems to be probable—then the air dissolves the water, and not the salt. Upon whatever it be founded, the distinction is critical: so much so, that when we attempt to imitate the process by art, we must regulate our distillation with great care and nicety, or, together with the water, we get the bitterness, or at least the distastefulness of the marine substance; and, after all, it is owing to this original elective power in the air, that we can effect the separation which we wish, by any art or means whatever.

By evaporation, water is carried up into the air; by the converse of evaporation, it falls down upon the earth. And how does it fall? Not by the clouds being all at once reconverted into water, and descending like a sheet; not in rushing down in columns from a spout; but in moderate drops, as from a colander. Our watering-pots are made to imitate showers of rain. Yet, *a priori*, I should have thought either of the two former methods more likely to have taken place than the last.

By respiration, flame, putrefaction, air is rendered unfit for the support of animal life. By the constant operation of these corrupting principles, the whole atmosphere, if there were no restoring causes, would come at length to be deprived of its necessary degree of purity. Some of these causes seem to have been discovered, and their efficacy ascertained by experiment; and so far as the discovery has proceeded, it opens to us a beautiful and a wonderful economy. *Vegetation* proves to be one of them. A sprig of mint, corked up with a small portion of foul air and placed in the light, renders it again capable of supporting light or flame. Here, therefore, is a constant circulation of benefits maintained between the two great provinces of organized nature. The plant purifies what the animal has poisoned; in return, the contaminated air is more than ordinarily nutritious to the plant. *Agitation with water* turns out to be another of these restoratives. The foulest air, shaken in a bottle with water for a sufficient length of time, recovers a great degree of its purity. Here then, again, allowing for the scale upon which nature works, we see the salutary effects of *storms* and *tempests*. The yeasty waves which confound the heaven and the sea, are doing the very thing which was done in the bottle. Nothing can be of greater importance to the living creation, than the salubrity of their atmosphere. It ought to reconcile us, therefore, to these agitations of the elements, of which we sometimes deplore the consequences, to know that they tend powerfully to restore to the air that purity which so many causes are constantly impairing.

II. In water, what ought not a little to be admired, are those negative qualities which constitute its *purity*. Had it been vinous, or oleaginous, or acid—had the sea been filled, or the rivers flowed with wine or milk, fish, constituted as they are, must have died; plants, constituted as they are, would have withered; the lives of animals which feed upon plants must have perished. Its very *insipidity*, which is one of those negative qualities, renders it the best of all menstrua. Having no taste of its own, it becomes the sincere vehicle of every other. Had there been a taste in water, be it what it might, it would have infected every thing we ate or drank, with an importunate repetition of the same flavor.

Another thing in this element not less to be admired, is the constant *round* which it travels; and by which, without suffering either adulteration or waste, it is continually offering itself to the wants of the habitable globe. From the sea are exhaled those vapors which form the clouds: these clouds descend in showers, which penetrating into the crevices of the hills, supply springs; which springs flow in little streams into the valleys, and there uniting, become rivers; which rivers, in return, feed the ocean. So there is an incessant circulation of the same fluid; and not one drop probably more or less now than there was at the creation. A particle of water takes its departure from the surface of the sea, in order to fulfil certain important offices to the earth; and having executed the service which was assigned to it, returns to the bosom which it left.

Some have thought that we have too much water upon the globe, the sea occupying above three-quarters of its whole surface. But the expanse of ocean, immense as it is, may be no more than sufficient to fertilize the earth. Or, independently of this reason, I know not why the sea may not have as good a right to its place as the land. It may proportionably support as many inhabitants—minister to as large an aggregate of enjoyment. The land only affords a habitable surface; the sea is habitable to a great depth.

III. Of fire, we have said that it *dissolves*. The only idea probably which this term raised in the reader's mind, was that of fire melting metals, resins, and some other substances, fluxing ores, running glass, and assisting us in many of our operations, chemical or culinary. Now these are only uses of an occasional kind, and give us a very imperfect notion of what fire does for us. The grand importance of this dissolving power, the great office indeed of fire in the economy of nature, is keeping things in a state of solution, that is to say, in a state of fluidity. Were it not for the presence of heat, or of a certain degree of it, all fluids would be frozen. The ocean itself would be a quarry of ice; universal nature stiff and dead.

We see, therefore, that the elements bear not only a strict relation to the constitution of organized bodies, but a relation to each other. Water could not perform its office to the earth without air; nor exist as water, without fire.

IV. Of light, whether we regard it as of the same substance with fire, or as a different substance, it is altogether superfluous to expatiate upon the use. No man disputes it. The observations, therefore, which I shall offer, respect that little which we seem to know of its constitution.

Light travels from the sun at the rate of twelve millions of miles in a minute. Urged by such a velocity, with what *force* must its particles drive against—I will not say the eye, the tenderest of animal substances—but every substance, animate or inanimate, which stands in its way! It might seem to be a force sufficient to shatter to atoms the hardest bodies.

How then is this effect, the consequence of such prodigious velocity, guarded against? By a proportionable *minuteness* of the particles of which light is composed. It is impossible for the human mind to imagine to itself any thing so small as a particle of light. But this extreme exility, though difficult to conceive, it is easy to prove. A drop of tallow, expended in the wick of a farthing candle, shall send forth rays sufficient to fill a hemisphere of a mile diameter; and to fill it so full of these rays, that an aperture not larger than the pupil of an eye, wherever it be placed within the hemisphere, shall be sure to receive some of them. What floods of light are continually poured from the sun, we cannot estimate: but the immensity of the sphere which is filled with particles, even if it reached no further than the orbit of the earth, we can in some sort compute; and we have reason to believe, that throughout this whole region, the particles of light lie, in latitude at least, near to one another. The spissitude of the sun's rays at the earth is such, that the number which falls upon a burning-glass of an inch diameter is sufficient, when concentrated, to set wood on fire.

The tenuity and the velocity of particles of light, as ascertained by separate observations, may be said to be proportioned to each other; both surpassing our utmost stretch of comprehension, but proportioned. And it is this proportion alone which converts a tremendous element into a welcome visitor.

It has been observed to me by a learned friend, as having often struck his mind, that if light had been made by a common artist, it would have been of one uniform *color;* whereas, by its present composition, we have that variety of colors which is of such infinite use to us for the distinguishing of objects—which adds so much to the beauty of the earth, and augments the stock of our innocent pleasures.

With which may be joined another reflection, namely, that considering light as compounded of rays of seven different colors—of which there can be no doubt, because it can be resolved into these rays by simply passing it through a prism—the constituent parts must be well mixed and blended together to produce a fluid so clear and colorless as a beam of light is, when received from the sun.

CHAPTER XXII.

ASTRONOMY.*

My opinion of Astronomy has always been, that it is not the best medium through which to prove the agency of an intelligent Creator; but that, this being proved, it shows, beyond all other sciences, the magnificence of his operations. The mind which is once convinced, it raises to sublimer views of the Deity than any other subject affords; but it is not so well adapted as some other subjects are to the purpose of argument. We are destitute of the means of examining the constitution of the heavenly bodies. The very simplicity of their appearance is against them. We see nothing but bright points, luminous circles, or the phases of spheres reflecting the light which falls upon them. Now we deduce design from relation, aptitude, and correspondence of *parts*. Some degree, therefore, of *complexity* is necessary to render a subject fit for this species of argument. But the heavenly bodies do not, except perhaps in the instance of Saturn's ring, present themselves to our observation as compounded of parts at all. This, which may be a perfection in them, is a disadvantage to us as inquirers after their nature. They do not come within our mechanics.

And what we say of their forms, is true of their *motions*. Their motions are carried on without any sensible intermediate apparatus; whereby we are cut off from one principal ground of argumentation—analogy. We have nothing wherewith to compare them—no invention, no discovery, no operation or resource of art, which, in this respect, resembles them. Even those things which are made to imitate and represent them, such as orreries, planetaria, celestial globes, etc., bear no affinity to them, in the cause and principle by which their motions are actuated. I can assign for this difference a reason of utility, namely, a reason why, though the action of *terrestrial* bodies upon each other be, in almost all cases, through the intervention of solid or fluid substances, yet central attraction does not operate in this manner. It was necessary that the intervals between the planetary orbs should be devoid of any *inert* matter, either fluid or solid, because such an intervening substance would, by its resistance, destroy those very motions which attraction is employed to preserve. This may be a final cause of the difference; but still the difference destroys the analogy.

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* For the articles of this chapter marked with an asterisk, I am indebted to some obliging communications received, through the hands of the Lord Bishop of Elphin, from the Rev. J. Brinkley, M. A., Andrews Professor of Astronomy in the University of Dublin.

Our ignorance, moreover, of the *sensitive* natures by which other planets are inhabited, necessarily keeps from us the knowledge of numberless utilities, relations, and subserviences, which we perceive upon our own globe.

After all, the real subject of admiration is, that we understand so much of astronomy as we do. That an animal confined to the surface of one of the planets, bearing a less proportion to it than the smallest microscopic insect does to the plant it lives upon—that this little, busy, inquisitive creature, by the use of senses which were given to it for its domestic necessities, and by means of the assistance of those senses which it has had the art to procure, should have been enabled to observe the whole system of worlds to which its own belongs and the changes of place of the immense globes which compose it, and with such accuracy as to mark out beforehand the situation in the heavens in which they will be found at any future point of time; and that these bodies, after sailing through regions of void and trackless space, should arrive at the place where they were expected, not within a minute, but within a few seconds of a minute, of the time prefixed and predicted: all this is wonderful, whether we refer our admiration to the constancy of the heavenly motions themselves, or to the perspicacity and precision with which they have been noticed by mankind.

Nor is this the whole, nor indeed the chief part of what astronomy teaches. By bringing reason to bear upon observation, the acutest reasoning upon the exactest observation, the astronomer has been able, out of the "mystic dance," and the confusion—for such it is—under which the motions of the heavenly bodies present themselves to the eye of a mere gazer upon the skies, to elicit their order and their real paths.

Our knowledge, therefore, of astronomy is admirable, though imperfect; and, amid the confessed desiderata and desideranda which impede our investigation of the wisdom of the Deity in these the grandest of his works, there are to be found, in the phenomena, ascertained circumstances and laws sufficient to indicate an intellectual agency in three of its principal operations, namely, in choosing, in determining, in regulating: in *choosing*, out of a boundless variety of suppositions which were equally possible, that which is beneficial; in *determining* what, left to itself, had a thousand chances against conveniency, for one in its favor; in *regulating* subjects, as to quantity and degree, which, by their nature, were unlimited with respect to either. It will be our business to offer, under each of these heads, a few instances, such as best admit of a popular explication.

I. Among proofs of choice, one is, fixing the source of light and heat in the *centre* of the system. The sun is ignited and luminous; the planets, which move round him, are cold and dark. There seems to be no antecedent necessity for this order. The sun might have been an opaque mass; some one, or two, or more, or any, or all the planets, globes of fire. There is nothing in the nature of the heavenly bodies which requires that those which are stationary should be on fire, that those which move should be cold; for, in fact, comets are bodies on fire, or at least capable of the most intense heat, yet revolve round a centre; nor does this order obtain between the primary planets and their secondaries, which are all opaque. When we consider, there fore, that the sun is one; that the planets going round it are at least seven; that it is indifferent to their nature which are luminous and which are opaque; and also in what order, with respect to each other, these two kinds of bodies are disposed, we may judge of the improbability of the present arrangement taking place by chance.

If, by way of accounting for the state in which we find the solar system, it be alleged—and this is one among the guesses of those who reject an intelligent Creator—that the planets themselves are only cooled or cooling masses, and were once like the sun, many thousand times hotter than red hot iron; then it follows, that the sun also himself must be in his progress towards growing cold, which puts an end to the possibility of his having existed as he is from eternity. This consequence arises out of the hypothesis with still more certainty, if we make a part of it what the philosophers who maintain it have usually taught, that the planets were originally masses of matter, struck off in a state of fusion from the body of the sun by the percussion of a comet, or by a shock from some other cause with which we are not acquainted; for if these masses, partaking of the nature and substance of the sun's body, have in process of time lost their heat, that body itself, in time likewise, no matter in how much longer time, must lose its heat also, and therefore be incapable of an eternal duration in the state in which we see it, either for the time to come, or the time past.

The preference of the present to any other mode of distributing luminous and opaque bodies, I take to be evident. It requires more astronomy than I am able to lay before the reader to show, in its particulars, what would be the effect to the system, of a dark body at the centre and one of the planets being luminous; but I think it manifest, without either plates or calculation, first, that supposing the necessary proportion of magnitude between the central and the revolving bodies to be preserved, the ignited planet would not be sufficient to illuminate and warm the rest of the system; secondly, that its light and heat would be imparted to the other planets much more irregularly than light and heat are now received from the sun.

(*) II. Another thing, in which a choice appears to be exercised, and in which, among the possibilities out of which the choice was to be made, the number of those which were wrong bore an infinite proportion to the number of those which were right, is in what geometricians call the *axis of rotation*. This matter I will endeavor to explain. The earth, it is well known, is not an exact globe, but an oblate spheroid, something like an orange. Now the axes of rotation, or the diameters upon which such a body may be made to turn round, are as many as can be drawn through its centre to opposite points upon its whole surface; but of these axes none are *permanent*, except either its shortest diameter, that is, that which passes through the heart of the orange from the place where the stalk is inserted into it, and which is but one; or its longest diameters, at right angles with the former, which must all terminate in the single circumference which goes round the thickest part of the orange. The shortest diameter is that upon which in fact the earth turns, and it is, as the reader sees, what it ought to be, a permanent axis; whereas, had blind chance, had a casual impulse, had a stroke or push at random set the earth a spinning, the odds were infinite but that they had sent it round upon a wrong axis. And what would have been the consequence? The difference between a permanent axis and another axis is this: when a spheroid in a state of rotatory motion gets upon a permanent axis, it keeps there; it remains steady and faithful to its position; its poles preserve their direction with respect to the plane and to the centre of its orbit; but while it turns upon an axis which is *not* permanent—and the number of those we have seen infinitely exceeds the number of the other—it is always liable to shift and vacillate from one axis to another, with a corresponding change in the inclination of its poles. Therefore, if a planet once set off revolving upon any other than its shortest, or one of its longest axes, the poles on its surface would keep perpetually changing, and it never would attain a permanent axis of rotation. The effect of this unfixedness and instability would be, that the equatorial parts of the earth might become the polar, or the polar the equatorial, to the utter destruction of plants and animals which are not capable of interchanging their situations, but are respectively adapted to their own. As to ourselves, instead of rejoicing in our temperate zone, and annually preparing for the moderate vicissitude, or rather the agreeable succession of seasons which we experience and expect, we might come to be locked up in the ice and darkness of the arctic circle, with bodies neither inured to its rigors, nor provided with shelter or defence against them. Nor would it be much better if the trepidation of our pole, taking an opposite course, should place us under the heats of a vertical sun. But if it would fare so ill with the human inhabitant, who can live under greater varieties of latitude than any other animal, still more noxious would this translation of climate have proved to life in the rest of the creation, and most perhaps of all in plants. The habitable earth and its beautiful variety might have been destroyed by a simple mischance in the axis of rotation.

(*) III. All this, however, proceeds upon a supposition of the earth having been formed at first an oblate spheroid. There is another supposition; and perhaps our limited information will not enable us to decide between them. The second supposition is, that the earth, being a mixed mass somewhat fluid, took, as it might do, its present form by the joint action of the mutual gravitation of its parts and its rotatory motion. This, as we have said, is a point in the history of the earth which our observations are not sufficient to determine. For a very small depth below the surface, but extremely small—less, perhaps, than an eight-thousandth part, compared with the depth of the centre, we find vestiges of ancient fluidity. But this fluidity must have gone down many hundred times further than we can penetrate, to enable the earth to take its present oblate form; and whether any traces of this kind exist to that depth, we are ignorant. Calculations were made a few years ago, of the mean density of the earth, by comparing the force of its attraction with the force of attraction of a rock of granite, the bulk of which could be ascertained; and the upshot of the calculation was, that the earth upon an average, through its whole sphere, has twice the density of granite, or above five times that of water. Therefore it cannot be a hollow shell, as some have formerly supposed; nor can its internal parts be occupied by central fire, or by water. The solid parts must greatly exceed the fluid parts; and the probability is, that it is a solid mass throughout, composed of substances more ponderous the deeper we go. Nevertheless, we may conceive the present face of the earth to have originated from the revolution of a sphere covered by a surface of a compound mixture; the fluid and solid parts separating, as the surface becomes quiescent. Here then comes in the *moderating* hand of the Creator. If the water had exceeded its present proportion, even but by a trifling quantity, compared with the whole globe, all the land would have been covered; had there been much less than there is, there would not have been enough to fertilize the continent. Had the exsiccation been progressive, such as we may suppose to have been produced by an evaporating heat, how came it to stop at the point at which we see it? Why did it not stop sooner; why at all? The mandate of the Deity will account for this; nothing else will.

IV. Of centripetal forces. By virtue of the simplest law that can be imagined, namely, that a body *continues* in the state in which it is, whether of motion or rest; and, if in motion, goes on in the line in which it was proceeding, and with the same velocity, *unless* there be some cause for change: by virtue, I say, of this law, it comes to pass—what may appear to be a strange consequence—that cases arise in which attraction, incessantly drawing a body towards a centre, never brings, nor ever will bring, the body to that centre, but keep it in eternal circulation round it. If it were possible to fire off a cannon-ball with a velocity of five miles in a second, and the resistance of the air could be taken away, the cannon-ball would for ever wheel round the earth instead of falling down upon it. This is the principle which sustains the heavenly motions. The Deity having appointed this law to matter—than which, as we have said before, no law could be more simple—has turned it to a wonderful account in constructing planetary systems.

The actuating cause in these systems, is an attraction which varies reciprocally as the square of the distance : that is, at double the distance it has a quarter of the force ; at half the distance, four times the strength, and so on. Now, concerning this law of variation, we have three things to observe : first, that attraction, for any thing we know about it, was just as capable of one law of variation as of another ; secondly, that out of an infinite number of possible laws, those which were admissible for the purpose of supporting the heavenly motions, lay within certain narrow limits ; thirdly, that of the admissible laws, or those which come within the limits prescribed, the law that actually prevails is the most beneficial. So far as these propositions can be made out, we may be said, I think, to prove *choice* and *regulation :* choice, out of boundless variety ; and regulation of that which, by its own nature, was, in respect of the property regulated, indifferent and indefinite.

I. First, then, attraction, for any thing we know about it, was originally indifferent to all laws of variation depending upon change of distance, that is, just as susceptible of one law as of another. It might have been the same at all distances ; it might have increased as the distance increased ; or it might have diminished with the increase of the distance, yet in ten thousand different proportions from the present; it might have followed no stated law at all. If attraction be what Cotes, with many other Newtonians, thought it to be, a primordial property of matter, not dependent upon or traceable to any other material cause; then, by the very nature and definition of a primordial property, it stood indifferent to all laws. If it be the agency of something immaterial, then also, for any thing we know of it, it was indifferent to all laws. If the revolution of bodies round a centre depend upon vortices, neither are these limited to one law more than another.

There is, I know, an account given of attraction which should seem, in its very cause, to assign to it the law which we find it to observe; and which, therefore, makes that law a law not of choice, but of necessity: and it is the account which ascribes attraction to an *emanation* from the attracting body. It is probable that the influence of such an emanation will be proportioned to the spissitude of the rays of which it is composed; which spissitude, supposing the rays to issue in right lines on all sides from a point, will be reciprocally as the square of the distance. The mathematics of this solution we do not call in question: the question with us is, whether there be any sufficient reason for believing that attraction is produced by an emanation. For my part, I am totally at a loss to comprehend how particles streaming *from* a centre should draw a body *towards* it. The impulse, if impulse it be, is all the other way. Nor shall we find less difficulty in conceiving a conflux of particles, incessantly flowing to a centre, and carrying down all bodies along with it, that centre also itself being in a state of rapid motion through absolute space; for by what source is the stream fed, or what becomes of the accumulation? Add to which, that it seems to imply a contrariety of properties, to suppose an ethereal fluid to *act*, but not to *resist*; powerful enough to carry down bodies with great force towards a centre, yet, inconsistently with the nature of inert matter, powerless and perfectly yielding with respect to the motions which result from the projectile impulse. By calculations drawn from ancient notices of eclipses of the moon, we can prove that, if such a fluid exist at all, its resistance has had no sensible effect upon the moon's motion for two thousand five hundred years. The truth is, that except this one circumstance of the variation of the attracting force at different distances agreeing with the variation of the spissitude, there is no reason whatever to support the hypothesis of an emanation; and there are, as it seems to me, almost insuperable reasons against it.

(*) II. Our second proposition is, that while the possible laws of variation were infinite, the *admissible* laws, or the laws compatible with the preservation of the system, lie within narrow limits. If the attracting force had varied according to any *direct* law of the distance, let it have been what it would, great destruction and confusion would have taken place. The direct simple proportion of the distance would, it is true, have produced an ellipse; but the perturbing forces would have acted with so much advantage as to be continually changing the dimensions of the ellipse in a manner inconsistent with our terrestrial creation. For instance, if the planet Saturn, so large and so remote, had attracted the earth, both in proportion to the quantity of matter contained in it, which it does, and also in any proportion to its distance, that is, if it had pulled the harder for being the further off, instead of the reverse of it, it would have dragged out of its course the globe which we inhabit, and have perplexed its motions to a degree incompatible with our security, our enjoyments, and probably our existence. Of the *inverse* laws, if the centripetal force had changed as the cube of the distance, or in any higher proportion; that is—for I speak to the unlearned—if, at double the distance, the attractive force had been diminished to an eighth part, or to less than that, the consequence would have been, that the planets, if they once began to approach the sun, would have fallen into his body; if they once, though by ever so little, increased their distance from the centre, would for ever have receded from it. The laws, therefore, of attraction, by which a system of revolving bodies could be upholden in their motions, lie within narrow limits, compared with the possible laws. I much underrate the restriction, when I say that, in a scale of a mile, they are confined to an inch. All direct ratios of the distance are excluded, on account of danger from perturbing forces; all reciprocal ratios, except what lie beneath the cube of the distance, by the demonstrable consequence, that every the least change of distance would, under the operation of such laws, have been fatal to the repose and order of the system. We do not know, that is, we seldom reflect, how interested we are in this matter. Small irregularities may be endured; but changes within these limits being allowed for, the permanency of our ellipse is a question of life and death to our whole sensitive world.

(*) III. That the subsisting law of attraction falls within the limits which utility requires, when these limits bear so small a proportion to the range of possibilities upon which chance might equally have cast it, is not, with any appearance of reason, to be accounted for by any other cause than a regulation proceeding from a designing mind. But our next proposition carries the matter somewhat further. We say, in the third place, that out of the different laws which lie within the limits of admissible laws, the *best* is made choice of; that there are advantages in this particular law which cannot be demonstrated to belong to any other law; and concerning some of which, it can be demonstrated that they do not belong to any other.

(*) 1. While this law prevails between all particles of matter, the *united* attraction of a sphere composed of that matter observes the same law. This property of the law is necessary to render it applicable to a system composed of spheres, but it is a property which belongs to no other law of attraction that is admissible. The law of variation of the united attraction is in no other case the same as the law of attraction of each particle, one case excepted, and that is of the attraction varying directly as the distance; the inconveniency of which law, in other respects, we have already noticed.

We may follow this regulation somewhat further, and still more strikingly perceive that it proceeded from a designing mind. A law both admissible and convenient was requisite. In what way is the law of the attracting globes obtained? Astronomical observations and terrestrial experiments show that the attraction of the globes of the system is made up of the attraction of their parts; the attraction of each globe being compounded of the attractions of its parts. Now the admissible and convenient law which exists could not be obtained in a system of bodies gravitating by the united gravitation of their parts, unless each particle of matter were attracted by a force varying by one particular law, namely, varying inversely as the square of the distance; for, if the action of the particles be according to any other law whatever, the admissible and convenient law which is adopted could not be obtained. Here, then, are clearly shown regulation and design. A law both admissible and convenient was to be obtained; the mode chosen for obtaining that law was by making *each* particle of matter act. After this choice was made, then further attention was to be given to each particle of matter, and one, and one only particular law of action to be assigned to it. No other law would have answered the purpose intended.

(*) 2. All systems must be liable to *perturbations.* And therefore, to guard against these perturbations, or rather to guard against their running to destructive lengths, is perhaps the strongest evidence of care and foresight that can be given. Now we are able to demonstrate of our law of attraction—what can be demonstrated of no other, and what qualifies the dangers which arise from cross but unavoidable influences—that the action of the parts of our system upon one another will not cause permanently increasing irregularities, but merely periodical or vibratory ones: that is, they will come to a limit and then go back again. This we can demonstrate only of a system in which the following properties concur, namely, that the force shall be inversely as the square of the distance; the masses of the revolving bodies small, compared with that of the body at the centre; the orbits not much inclined to one another; and their eccentricity little. In such a system the grand points are secure. The mean distances and periodic times, upon which depend our temperature and the regularity of our year, are constant. The eccentricities, it is true, will still vary; but so slowly, and to so small an extent, as to produce no inconveniency from fluctuation of temperature and season. The same as to the obliquity of the planes of the orbits. For instance, the inclination of the ecliptic to the equator will never change above two degrees, out of ninety, and that will require many thousand years in performing.

It has been rightly also remarked, that if the great planets Jupiter and Saturn had moved in lower spheres, their influences would have had much more effect as to disturbing the planetary motions than they now have. While they revolve at so great distances from the rest, they act almost equally on the sun and on the inferior planets; which has nearly the same consequence as not acting at all upon either.

If it be said, that the planets might have been sent round the sun in exact circles, in which case, no change of distance from the centre taking place, the law of variation of the attracting power would have never come in question, one law would have served as well as another; an answer to the scheme may be drawn from the consideration of these same perturbing forces. The system retaining in other respects its present constitution, though the planets had been at first sent round in exact circular orbits, they could not have kept them; and if the law of attraction had not been what it is, or at least, if the prevailing law had transgressed the limits above assigned, every evagation would have been fatal: the planet once drawn, as drawn it necessarily must have been, out of its course, would have wandered in endless error.

(*) V. What we have seen in the law of the centripetal force, namely, a choice guided by views of utility, and a choice of one law out of thousands which might equally have taken place, we see no less in the *figures* of the planetary orbits. It was not enough to fix the law of the centripetal force, though by the wisest choice; for even under that law, it was still competent to the planets to have moved in paths possessing so great a degree of eccentricity as, in the course of every revolution, to be brought very near to the sun, and carried away to immense distances from him. The comets actually move in orbits of this sort; and had the planets done so, instead of going round in orbits nearly circular, the change from one extremity of temperature to another must, in ours at least, have destroyed every animal and plant upon its surface. Now, the distance from the centre at which a planet sets off and the absolute force of attraction at that distance being fixed, the figure of its orbit—it being a circle, or nearer to, or further off from a circle, namely, a rounder or a longer oval—depends upon two things, the velocity with which, and the direction in which the planet is projected. And these, in order to produce a right result, must be both brought within certain narrow limits. One, and only one velocity, united with one and only one direction, will produce a perfect circle. And the velocity must be near to this velocity, and the direction also near to this direction, to produce orbits such as the planetary orbits are, nearly circular; that is, ellipses with small eccentricities. The velocity and the direction must *both* be right. If the velocity be wrong, no direction will cure the error; if the direction be in any considerable degree oblique, no velocity will produce the orbit required. Take, for example, the attraction of gravity at the surface of the earth. The force of that attraction being what it is, out of all the degrees of velocity, swift and slow, with which a ball might be shot off, none would answer the purpose of which we are speaking but what was nearly that of five miles in a second. If it were less than that, the body would not get round at all, but would come to the ground; if it were in any considerable degree more than that, the body would take one of those eccentric courses, those long ellipses, of which we have noticed the inconveniency. If the velocity reached the rate of seven miles in a second, or went beyond that, the ball would fly off from the earth and never be heard of more. In like manner with respect to the *direction:* out of the innumerable angles in which the ball might be sent off—I mean angles formed with a line drawn to the centre—none would serve but what was nearly a right one. Out of the various directions in which the cannon might be pointed, upwards and downwards, every one would fail but what was exactly or nearly horizontal. The same thing holds true of the planets; of our own among the rest. We are entitled therefore to ask, and to urge the question, Why did the projectile velocity and projectile direction of the earth happen to be nearly those which would retain it in a *circular* form? Why not one of the infinite number of velocities, one of the infinite number of directions, which would have made it approach much nearer to, or recede much further from the sun?

The planets going round, all in the same direction, and all nearly in the same plane, afforded to Buffon a ground for asserting, that they had all been shivered from the sun by the same stroke of a comet, and by that stroke projected into their present orbits. Now, besides that this is to attribute to chance the fortunate concurrence of velocity and direction which we have been here noticing, the hypothesis, as I apprehend, is inconsistent with the physical laws by which the heavenly motions are governed. If the planets were struck off from the surface of the sun, they would return to the surface of the sun again. Nor will this difficulty be got rid of by supposing that the same violent blow which shattered the sun's surface, and separated large fragments from it, pushed the sun himself out of his place; for the consequence of this would be, that the sun and system of shattered fragments would have a progressive motion, which indeed may possibly be the case with our system; but then each fragment would, in every revolution, return to the surface of the sun again. The hypothesis is also contradicted by the vast difference which subsists between the *diameters* of the planetary orbits. The distance of Saturn from the sun, to say nothing of the Georgium Sidus, is nearly five-and-twenty times that of Mercury; a disparity which it seems impossible to reconcile with Buffon's scheme. Bodies starting from the same place, with whatever difference of direction or velocity they set off, could not have been found at these different distances from the centre, still retaining their nearly circular orbits. They must have been carried to their proper distances before they were projected.*

To conclude—in astronomy, the great thing is to raise the imagination to the subject, and that oftentimes in opposition to the impression made upon the senses. An illusion, for example, must be gotten over, arising from the distance at which we view the heavenly bodies; namely, the apparent *slowness* of their motions. The moon shall take some hours in getting half a yard from a star which it touched. A motion so deliberate, we may think easily guided. But what is the fact? The moon, in fact, is all this while driving through the heavens at the rate of considerably more than two thousand miles in an hour; which is more than double that with which a ball is shot off from the mouth of a cannon. Yet is this prodigious rapidity as much under government as if the planet proceeded ever so slowly, or were conducted in its course inch by inch. It is also difficult to bring the imagination to conceive—what yet, to judge tolerably of the matter, it is necessary to conceive—how *loose*, if we may so express it, the heavenly bodies are. Enormous globes held by nothing, confined by nothing, are turned into free and boundless space, each to seek its course by the virtue of an invisible principle; but a principle, one, common, and the same in all, and ascertainable. To preserve such bodies from being lost, from running together in heaps, from hindering and distracting one another's motions, in a degree inconsistent with any continuing order; that is, to cause them to form planetary systems—systems that, when formed, can be upheld; and more especially, systems accommodated to the organized and sensitive natures which the planets sustain, as we know to be the case, where alone we can know what the case is, upon our earth: all this requires an intelligent interposition, because it can be demonstrated concerning it, that it requires an adjustment of force, distance, direction, and velocity, out of the reach of chance to have produced—an adjustment, in its view to utility, similar to that which we see in ten thousand subjects of nature which are nearer to us, but in power, and in the extent of space through which that power is exerted, stupendous.

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* "If we suppose the matter of the system to be accumulated in the centre by its gravity, *no* mechanical principles, with the assistance of this power of gravity, could separate the vast mass into such parts as the sun and planets; and after carrying them to their different distances, project them in their several directions, preserving still the quality of action and reäction, or the state of the centre of gravity of the system. Such an exquisite structure of things could only arise from the contrivance and powerful influences of an intelligent, free, and most potent agent. The same powers, therefore, which at present govern the material universe, and conduct its various motions, are *very different* from those which were necessary to have produced it from nothing, or to have disposed it in the admirable form in which it now proceeds."—MACLAURIN'S *Account of Newton's Philosophy*, p. 407, edit. 3.

But many of the heavenly bodies, as the sun and fixed stars, are *stationary*. Their rest must be the effect of an absence or of an equilibrium of attractions. It proves also, that a projectile impulse was originally given to some of the heavenly bodies, and not to others. But further, if attraction act at all distances, there can only be one quiescent centre of gravity in the universe; and all bodies whatever must be approaching this centre, or revolving round it. According to the first of these suppositions, if the duration of the world had been long enough to allow of it, all its parts, all the great bodies of which it is composed, must have been gathered together in a heap round this point. No changes, however, which have been observed, afford us the smallest reason for believing that either the one supposition or the other is true; and then it will follow, that attraction itself is controlled or suspended by a superior agent—that there is a power above the highest of the powers of material nature—a will which restrains and circumscribes the operations of the most extensive.*

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* It must here, however, be stated, that many astronomers deny that any of the heavenly bodies are absolutely stationary. Some of the brightest of the fixed stars have certainly small motions; and of the rest the distance is too great, and the intervals of our observation too short, to enable us to pronounce with certainty that they may not have the same. The motions in the fixed stars which have been observed, are considered either as proper to each of them, or as compounded of the motion of our system and of motions proper to each star. By a comparison of these motions, a motion in our system is supposed to be discovered. By continuing this analogy to other and to all systems, it is possible to suppose that attraction is unlimited, and that the whole material universe is revolving round some fixed point within its containing sphere or space.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE PERSONALITY OF THE DEITY

Contrivance, if established, appears to me to prove every thing which we wish to prove. Among other things, it proves the *personality* of the Deity, as distinguished from what is sometimes called nature, sometimes called a principle: which terms, in the mouths of those who use them philosophically, seem to be intended to admit and to express an efficacy, but to exclude and to deny a personal agent. Now, that which can contrive, which can design, must be a person. These capacities constitute personality, for they imply consciousness and thought. They require that which can perceive an end or purpose, as well as the power of providing means and directing them to their end.* They require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from which volitions flow; which is mind. The acts of a mind prove the existence of a mind; and in whatever a mind resides, is a person. The seat of intellect is a person. We have no authority to limit the properties of mind to any particular corporeal form, or to any particular circumscription of space. These properties subsist, in created nature, under a great variety of sensible forms. Also, every animated being has its *sensorium;* that is, a certain portion of space, within which perception and volition are exerted. This sphere may be enlarged to an indefinite extent—may comprehend the universe; and being so imagined, may serve to furnish us with as good a notion as we are capable of forming, of the *immensity* of the divine nature, that is, of a Being, infinite, as well in essence as in power, yet nevertheless a person.

"No man hath seen God at any time." And this, I believe, makes the great difficulty. Now, it is a difficulty which chiefly arises from our not duly estimating the state of our faculties. The Deity, it is true, is the object of none of our senses; but reflect what limited capacities animal senses are. Many animals seem to have but one sense, or perhaps two at the most—touch and taste. Ought such an animal to conclude against the existence of odors, sounds, and colors? To another species is given the sense of smelling. This is an advance in the knowledge of the powers and properties of nature; but if this favored animal should infer from its superiority over the class last described, that it perceived every thing which was perceptible in nature, it is known to us, though perhaps not suspected by the animal itself, that it proceeded upon a false and presumptuous estimate of its faculties. To another is added the sense of hearing; which lets in a class of sensations entirely unconceived by the animal before spoken of, not only distinct, but remote from any which *it* had ever experienced, and greatly superior to them. Yet this last animal has no more ground for believing that its senses comprehend all things, and all properties of things which exist, than might have been claimed by the tribes of animals beneath it; for we know that it is still possible to possess another sense, that of sight, which shall disclose to the percipient a new world. This fifth sense makes the animal what the human animal is; but to infer that possibility stops here, that either this fifth sense is the last sense, or that the five comprehend all existence, is just as unwarrantable a conclusion as that which might have been made by any of the different species which possessed fewer, or even by that, if such there be, which possessed only one. The conclusion of the one-sense animal and the conclusion of the five-sense animal stand upon the same authority. There may be more and other senses than those which we have. There may be senses suited to the perception of the powers, properties, and substance of spirits. These may belong to higher orders of rational agents; for there is not the smallest reason for supposing that we are the highest, or that the scale of creation stops with us.

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* Priestley's Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever, p. 153, edit. 2

The great *energies* of nature are known to us only by their effects. The substances which produce them are as much concealed from our senses as the divine essence itself. *Gravitation*, though constantly present, though constantly exerting its influence, though everywhere around us, near us, and within us—though diffused throughout all space, and penetrating the texture of all bodies with which we are acquainted, depends, if upon a fluid, upon a fluid which, though both powerful and universal in its operation, is no object of sense to us ; if upon any other kind of substance or action, upon a substance and action from which *we* receive no distinguishable impressions. Is it then to be wondered at, that it should in some measure be the same with the divine nature?

Of this, however, we are certain, that whatever the Deity be, neither the *universe*, nor any part of it which we see, can be He. The universe itself is merely a collective name; its parts are all which are real, or which are *things*. Now inert matter is out of the question ; and organized substances include marks of contrivance. But whatever includes marks of contrivance, whatever in its constitution testifies design, necessarily carries us to something beyond itself, to some other being, to a designer prior to and out of itself. No animal, for instance, can have contrived its own limbs and senses—can have been the author to itself of the design with which they were constructed. That supposition involves all the absurdity of self-creation, that is, of acting without existing. Nothing can be God, which is ordered by a wisdom and a will which itself is void of—which is indebted for any of its properties to contrivance *ab extra*. The *not* having that in his nature which requires the exertion of another prior being—which property is sometimes called self-sufficiency, and sometimes self-comprehension—appertains to the Deity, as his essential distinction, and removes his nature from that of all things which we see : which consideration contains the answer to a question that has sometimes been asked, namely, Why, since some other thing must have existed from eternity, may not the present universe be that something? The contrivance perceived in it proves that to be impossible. Nothing contrived can, in a strict and proper sense, be eternal, forasmuch as the contriver must have existed before the contrivance.

Wherever we see marks of contrivance, we are led for its cause to an *intelligent* author. And this transition of the understanding is founded upon uniform experience. We see intelligence constantly contriving; that is, we see intelligence constantly producing effects, marked and distinguished by certain properties—not certain particular properties, but by a kind and class of properties, such as relation to an end, relation of parts to one another and to a common purpose. We see, wherever we are witnesses to the actual formation of things, nothing except intelligence producing effects so marked and distinguished. Furnished with this experience, we view the productions of nature. We observe *them* also marked and distinguished in the same manner. We wish to account for their origin. Our experience suggests a cause perfectly adequate to this account. No experience, no single instance or example, can be offered in favor of any other. In this cause, therefore, we ought to rest; in this cause the common-sense of mankind has, in fact, rested, because it agrees with that which in all cases is the foundation of knowledge—the undeviating course of their experience. The reasoning is the same as that by which we conclude any ancient appearances to have been the effects of volcanoes or inundations, namely, because they resemble the effects which fire and water produce before our eyes, and because we have never known these effects to result from any other operation. And this resemblance may subsist in so many circumstances as not to leave us under the smallest doubt in forming our opinion. Men are not deceived by this reasoning; for whenever it happens, as it sometimes does happen, that the truth comes to be known by direct information, it turns out to be what was expected. In like manner and upon the same foundation—which in truth is that of experience—we conclude that the works of nature proceed from intelligence and design; because, in the properties of relation to a purpose, subserviency to a use, they resemble what intelligence and design are constantly producing, and what nothing except intelligence and design ever produce at all. Of every argument which would raise a question as to the safety of this reasoning, it may be observed, that if such argument be listened to, it leads to the inference, not only that the present order of nature is insufficient to prove the existence of an intelligent Creator, but that no imaginable order would be sufficient to prove it—that *no* contrivance, were it ever so mechanical, ever so precise, ever so clear, ever so perfectly like those which we ourselves employ, would support this conclusion: a doctrine to which I conceive no sound mind can assent.

The force, however, of the reasoning is sometimes sunk by our taking up with mere names. We have already noticed,* and we must here notice again, the misapplication of the term "law," and the mistake concerning the idea which that term expresses in physics, whenever such idea is made to take the place of power, and still more of an intelligent power, and, as such, to be assigned for the cause of any thing, or of any property of any thing that exists. This is what we are secretly apt to do, when we speak of organized bodies—plants, for instance, or animals—owing their production, their form, their growth, their qualities, their beauty, their use, to any law or laws of nature; and when we are contented to sit down with that answer to our inquiries concerning them. I say once more, that it is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent, for it is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power, for it is the order according to which that power acts.

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* Chap. I., sect. 7.

Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the "law" does nothing, is nothing.

What has been said concerning "law," holds true of *mechanism.* Mechanism is not itself power. Mechanism without power can do nothing. Let a watch be contrived and constructed ever so ingeniously—be its parts ever so many, ever so complicated, ever so finely wrought or artificially put together, it cannot *go* without a weight or spring; that is, without a force independent of, and ulterior to its mechanism. The spring, acting at the centre, will produce different motions and different results, according to the variety of the intermediate mechanism. One and the selfsame spring, acting in one and the same manner, namely, by simply expanding itself, may be the cause of a hundred different and all useful movements, if a hundred different and well-devised sets of wheels be placed between it and the final effect: for example, may point out the hour of the day, the day of the month, the age of the moon, the position of the planets, the cycle of the years, and many other serviceable notices; and these movements may fulfil their purposes with more or less perfection, according as the mechanism is better or worse contrived, or better or worse executed, or in a better or worse state of repair; *but in all cases it is necessary that the spring act at the centre.* The course of our reasoning upon such a subject would be this: by inspecting the watch, even when standing still, we get a proof of contrivance, and of a contriving mind having been employed about it. In the form and obvious relation of its parts, we see enough to convince us of this. If we pull the works in pieces, for the purpose of a closer examination, we are still more fully convinced. But when we see the watch *going*, we see proof of another point, namely, that there is a power somewhere, and somehow or other applied to it—a power in action; that there is more in the subject than the mere wheels of the machine; that there is a secret spring, or a gravitating plummet; in a word, that there is force and energy as well as mechanism.

So, then, the watch in motion establishes to the observer two conclusions: one, that thought, contrivance, and design have been employed in the forming, proportioning, and arranging of its parts; and that whoever or wherever he be, or were, such a contriver there is, or was; the other, that force or power, distinct from mechanism, is at this present time acting upon it. If I saw a hand-mill even at rest, I should see contrivance; but if I saw it grinding, I should be assured that a hand was at the windlass, though in another room. It is the same in nature. In the works of nature we trace mechanism, and this alone proves contrivance; but living, active, moving, productive nature proves also the exertion of a power at the centre; for wherever the power resides may be denominated the centre.

The intervention and disposition of what are called "*second causes*," fall under the same observation. This disposition is or is not mechanism, according as we can or can not trace it by our senses and means of examination. That is all the difference there is; and it is a difference which respects our faculties, not the things themselves. Now, where the order of second causes is mechanical, what is here said of mechanism strictly applies to it. But it would be always mechanism—natural chemistry, for instance, would be mechanism—if our senses were acute enough to descry it. Neither mechanism, therefore, in the works of nature, nor the intervention of what are called second causes—for I think that they are the same thing—excuses the necessity of an agent distinct from both.

If, in tracing these causes, it be said that we find certain general properties of matter which have nothing in them that bespeaks intelligence, I answer, that still the *managing* of these properties, the pointing and directing them to the uses which we see made of them, demands intelligence in the highest degree. For example, suppose animal secretions to be elective attractions, and that such and such attractions universally belong to such and such substances—

in all which there is no intellect concerned; still, the choice and collocation of these substances, the fixing upon right substances, and disposing them in right places, must be an act of intelligence. What mischief would follow were there a single transposition of the secretory organs; a single mistake in arranging the glands which compose them!

There may be many second causes, and many courses of second causes, one behind another, between what we observe of nature and the Deity, but there must be intelligence somewhere—there must be more in nature than what we see; and, among the things unseen, there must be an intelligent, designing author. The philosopher beholds with astonishment the production of things around him. Unconscious particles of matter take their stations, and severally range themselves in an order, so as to become collectively plants or animals, that is, organized bodies, with parts bearing strict and evident relation to one another, and to the utility of the whole; and it should seem that these particles could not move in any other way than as they do, for they testify not the smallest sign of choice, or liberty, or discretion. There may be particular intelligent beings guiding these motions in each case; or they may be the result of trains of mechanical dispositions, fixed beforehand by an intelligent appointment, and kept in action by a power at the centre. But, in either case, there must be intelligence.

The minds of most men are fond of what they call a *principle*, and of the appearance of simplicity, in accounting for phenomena. Yet this principle, this simplicity, resides merely in the *name;* which name, after all, comprises perhaps under it a diversified, multifarious, or progressive operation, distinguishable into parts. The power in organized bodies, of producing bodies like themselves, is one of these principles. Give a philosopher this, and he can get on. But he does not reflect what this mode of production, this principle—if such he choose to call it—requires; how much it presupposes; what an apparatus of instruments, some of which are strictly mechanical, is necessary to its success; what a train it includes of operations and changes, one succeeding another, one related to another, one ministering to another; all advancing by intermediate, and frequently by sensible steps, to their ultimate result. Yet, because the whole of this complicated action is wrapped up in a single term, *generation*, we are to set it down as an elementary principle; and to suppose, that when we have resolved the things which we see into this principle, we have sufficiently accounted for their origin, without the necessity of a designing, intelligent Creator. The truth is, generation is not a principle, but a *process*. We might as well call the casting of metals a principle; we might, so far as appears to me, as well call spinning and weaving principles; and then, referring the texture of cloths, the fabric of muslins and calicoes, the patterns of diapers and damasks, to these, as principles, pretend to dispense with intention, thought, and contrivance on the part of the artist; or to dispense, indeed, with the necessity of any artist at all, either in the manufacturing of the article, or in the fabrication of the machinery by which the manufacture was carried on.

And, after all, how, or in what sense is it true, that animals produce their *like?* A butterfly with a proboscis instead of a mouth, with four wings and six legs, produces a hairy caterpillar with jaws and teeth, and fourteen feet. A frog produces a tadpole. A black beetle with gauze wings and a crusty covering, produces a white, smooth, soft worm; an ephemeron fly, a cod-bait maggot. These, by a progress through different stages of life and action and enjoyment—and, in each state, provided with implements and organs appropriated to the temporary nature which they bear—arrive at last at the form and fashion of the parent animal. But all this is process, not principle; and proves, moreover, that the property of animated bodies of producing their like belongs to them, not as a primordial property, not by any blind necessity in the nature of things, but as the effect of economy, wisdom, and design; because the property itself assumes diversities, and submits to deviations dictated by intelligible utilities, and serving distinct purposes of animal happiness.

The opinion which would consider "generation" as a *principle* in nature, and which would assign this principle as the cause, or endeavor to satisfy our minds with such a cause of the existence of organized bodies, is confuted, in my judgment, not only by every mark of contrivance discoverable in those bodies, for which it gives us no contriver, offers no account whatever, but also by the further consideration, that things generated possess a clear relation to things *not* generated. If it were merely one part of a generated body bearing a relation to another part of the same body, as the mouth of an animal to the throat, the throat to the stomach, the stomach to the intestines, those to the recruiting of the blood, and, by means of the blood, to the nourishment of the whole frame; or if it were only one generated body bearing a relation to another generated body, as the sexes of the same species to each other, animals of prey to their prey, herbivorous and granivorous animals to the plants or seeds upon which they feed, it might be contended that the whole of this correspondency was attributable to generation, the common origin from which these substances proceeded. But what shall we say to agreements which exist between things generated and things *not generated?* Can it be doubted, was it ever doubted, but that the *lungs* of animals bear a relation to the *air*, as a permanently elastic fluid? They act in it and by it; they cannot act without it. Now, if generation produced the animal, it did not produce the air; yet their properties correspond. The *eye* is made for *light,* and light for the eye. The eye would be of no use without light, and light perhaps of little without eyes; yet one is produced by generation, the other not. The *ear* depends upon *undulations* of air. Here are two sets of motions: first, of the pulses of the air; secondly, of the drum, bones, and nerves of the ear—sets of motions bearing an evident reference to each other; yet the one, and the apparatus for the one, produced by the intervention of generation; the other altogether independent of it.

If it be said that the air, the light, the elements, the world itself is *generated*, I answer, that I do not comprehend the proposition. If the term mean any thing similar to what it means when applied to plants or animals, the proposition is certainly without proof, and I think draws as near to absurdity as any proposition can do which does not include a contradiction in its terms. I am at a loss to conceive how the formation of the world can be compared to the generation of an animal. If the term generation signify something quite different from what it signifies on ordinary occasions, it may, by the same latitude, signify any thing. In which case, a word or phrase taken from the language of Otaheite would convey as much theory concerning the origin of the universe, as it does to talk of its being generated.

We know a cause—intelligence—adequate to the appearances which we wish to account for; we have this cause continually producing similar appearances; yet, rejecting this cause, the sufficiency of which we know, and the action of which is constantly before our eyes, we are invited to resort to suppositions destitute of a single fact for their support, and confirmed by no analogy with which we are acquainted. Were it necessary to inquire into the *motives* of men's opinions, I mean their motives separate from their arguments, I should almost suspect, that because the proof of a Deity drawn from the constitution of nature is not only popular, but vulgar—which may arise from the cogency of the proof, and be indeed its highest recommendation—and because it is a species almost of *puerility* to take up with it; for these reasons, minds which are habitually in search of invention and originality, feel a resistless inclination to strike off into other solutions and other expositions. The truth is, that many minds are not so indisposed to any thing which can be offered to them, as they are to the *flatness* of being content with common reasons, and, what is most to be lamented, minds conscious of superiority are the most liable to this repugnancy.

The "suppositions" here alluded to, all agree in one character: they all endeavor to dispense with the necessity in nature of a particular, personal intelligence; that is to say, with the exertion of an intending, contriving mind, in the structure and formation of the organized constitutions which the world contains. They would resolve all productions into *unconscious* energies, of a like kind, in that respect, with attraction, magnetism, electricity, etc., without any thing further.

In this, the old system of atheism and the new agree And I much doubt whether the new schemes have advanced any thing upon the old, or done more than changed the terms of the nomenclature. For instance, I could never see the difference between the antiquated system of atoms, and Buffon's organic molecules. This philosopher, having made a planet by knocking off from the sun a piece of melted glass, in consequence of the stroke of a comet, and having set it in motion by the same stroke, both round its own axis and the sun, finds his next difficulty to be, how to bring plants and animals upon it. In order to solve this difficulty, we are to suppose the universe replenished with particles endowed with life, but without organization or senses of their own; and endowed also with a tendency to marshal themselves into organized forms. The concourse of these particles, by virtue of this tendency, but without intelligence, will, or direction—for I do not find that any of these qualities are ascribed to them—has produced the living forms which we now see.

Very few of the conjectures which philosophers hazard upon these subjects have more of pretension in them, than the challenging you to show the direct impossibility of the hypothesis. In the present example, there seemed to be a positive objection to the whole scheme upon the very face of it; which was, that if the case were as here represented, *new* combinations ought to be perpetually taking place; new plants and animals, or organized bodies which were neither, ought to be starting up before our eyes every day. For this, however, our philosopher has an answer. While so many forms of plants and animals are already in existence, and consequently so many "internal moulds," as he calls them, are prepared and at hand, the organic particles run into these moulds, and are employed in supplying an accession of substance to them, as well for their growth as for their propagation. By which means things keep their ancient course. But, says the same philosopher, should any general loss or destruction of the present constitution of organized bodies take place, the particles, for want of "moulds" into which they might enter, would run into different combinations, and replenish the waste with new species of organized substances.

Is there any history to countenance this notion? Is it known that any destruction has been so repaired; any desert thus repeopled?

So far as I remember, the only natural appearance mentioned by our author, by way of fact whereon to build his hypothesis, is the formation of *worms* in the intestines of animals, which is here ascribed to the coalition of superabundant organic particles floating about in the first passages; and which have combined themselves into these simple animal forms for want of internal moulds, or of vacancies in those moulds, into which they might be received. The thing referred to is rather a species of facts, than a single fact: as some other cases may, with equal reason, be included under it. But to make it a fact at all, or in any sort applicable to the question, we must begin with asserting an *equivocal* generation, contrary to analogy, and without necessity: contrary to an analogy which accompanies us to the very limits of our knowledge or inquiries; for wherever, either in plants or animals, we are able to examine the subject, we find procreation from a parent form: without necessity, for I apprehend that it is seldom difficult to suggest methods by which the eggs, or spawn, or yet invisible rudiments of these vermin may have obtained a passage into the cavities in which they are found.* Add to this, that their *constancy to their species*, which I believe is as regular in these as in the other vermes, decides the question against our philosopher, if in truth any question remained upon the subject.

Lastly, these wonder-working instruments, these "internal moulds," what are they after all; what, when examined, but a name without signification; unintelligible, if not self-contradictory; at the best, differing in nothing from the "essential forms" of the Greek philosophy? One short sentence of Buffon's work exhibits his scheme as follows: "When this nutritious and prolific matter, which is diffused throughout all nature, passes through the *internal mould* of an animal or vegetable, and finds a proper matrix or receptacle, it gives rise to an animal or vegetable of the same species." Does any reader annex a meaning to the expression "internal mould," in this sentence? Ought it then to be said, that though we have little notion of an internal mould, we have not much more of a designing mind? The very contrary of this assertion is the truth. When we speak of an artificer or an architect, we talk of what is comprehensible to our understanding and familiar to our experience. We use no other terms than what refer us for their meaning to our consciousness and observation—what express the constant objects of both; whereas names like that we have mentioned refer us to nothing, excite no idea; they convey a sound to the ear, but I think do no more.

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* I trust I may be excused for not citing, as another fact which is to confirm the hypothesis, a grave assertion of this writer, that the branches of trees upon which the stag feeds break out again in his horns. Such *facts* merit no discussion.

Another system which has lately been brought forward, and with much ingenuity, is that of *appetencies*. The principle and the short account of the theory is this. Pieces of soft, ductile matter, being endued with propensities or appetencies for particular actions, would, by continual endeavors, carried on through a long series of generations, work themselves gradually into suitable forms; and at length acquire, though perhaps by obscure and almost imperceptible improvements, an organization fitted to the action which their respective propensities led them to exert. A piece of animated matter, for example, that was endued with a propensity to *fly*, though ever so shapeless, though no other we will suppose than a round ball to begin with, would, in a course of ages, if not in a million of years, perhaps in a hundred millions of years—for our theorists, having eternity to dispose of, are never sparing in time—acquire *wings*. The same tendency to locomotion in an aquatic animal, or rather in an animated lump, which might happen to be surrounded by water, would end in the production of *fins;* in a living substance confined to the solid earth, would put out *legs* and *feet;* or, if it took a different turn, would break the body into ringlets, and conclude by *crawling* upon the ground.

Although I have introduced the mention of this theory into this place, I am unwilling to give to it the name of an *atheistic* scheme, for two reasons: first, because, so far as I am able to understand it, the original propensities and the numberless varieties of them—so different, in this respect, from the laws of mechanical nature, which are few and simple—are, in the plan itself attributed to the ordination and appointment of an intelligent and designing Creator; secondly, because, likewise, that large postulatum, which is all along assumed and presupposed, the faculty in living bodies of producing other bodies organized like themselves, seems to be referred to the same cause; at least, is not attempted to be accounted for by any other. In one important respect, however, the theory before us coincides with atheistic systems, namely, in that, in the formation of plants and animals, in the structure and use of their parts, it does away final causes. Instead of the parts of a plant or animal, or the particular structure of the parts, having been intended for the action or the use to which we see them applied, according to this theory they have themselves grown out of that action, sprung from that use. The theory, therefore, dispenses with that which we insist upon, the necessity, in each particular case, of an intelligent, designing mind, for the contriving and determining of the forms which organized bodies bear. Give our philosopher these appetencies; give him a portion of living irritable matter—a nerve, or the clipping of a nerve—to work upon; give also to his incipient or progressive forms the power, in every stage of their alteration, of propagating their like; and, if he is to be believed, he could replenish the world with all the vegetable and animal productions which we at present see in it.

The scheme under consideration is open to the same objection with other conjectures of a similar tendency, namely, a total defect of evidence. No changes like those which the theory requires, have ever been observed. All the changes in Ovid's Metamorphoses might have been effected by these appetencies, if the theory were true; yet not an example, nor the pretence of an example, is offered of a single change being known to have taken place. Nor is the order of generation obedient to the principle upon which this theory is built. The mammæ* of the male have not vanished by inusitation; *nec curtorum, per multa sæcula, Judæorum propagini deest præputium.* It is easy to say, and it has been said, that the alterative process is too slow to be perceived; that it has been carried on through tracts of immeasurable time; and that the present order of things is the result of a gradation of which no human records can trace the steps. It is easy to say this; and yet it is still true, that the hypothesis remains destitute of evidence.

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* I confess myself totally at a loss to guess at the reason, either final or efficient, for this part of the animal frame; unless there be some foundation for an opinion, of which I draw the hint from a paper of Mr. Everard Home, Phil. Transact. 1799, pt. 2, namely, that the mammæ of the fœtus may be formed before the sex is determined.

The *analogies* which have been alleged are of the following kind. The *bunch* of a camel is said to be no other than the effect of carrying burdens; a service in which the species has been employed from the most ancient times of the world. The first race, by the daily loading of the back, would probably find a small grumous tumor to be formed in the flesh of that part. The next progeny would bring this tumor into the world with them. The life to which they were destined would increase it. The cause which first generated the tubercle being continued, it would go on, through every succession, to augment its size, till it attained the form and the bulk under which it now appears. This may serve for one instance: another, and that also of the passive sort, is taken from certain species of birds. Birds of the *crane* kind, as the crane itself, the heron, bittern, stork, have, in general, their thighs bare of feathers. This privation is accounted for from the habit of wading in water, and from the effect of that element to check the growth of feathers upon these parts; in consequence of which, the health and vegetation of the feathers declined through each generation of the animal; the tender down, exposed to cold and wetness, became weak, and thin, and rare, till the deterioration ended in the result which we see, of absolute nakedness. I will mention a third instance, because it is drawn from an active habit, as the two last were from passive habits; and that is the *pouch* of the pelican. The description which naturalists give of this organ is as follows: "From the lower edges of the under chap hangs a bag, reaching from the whole length of the bill to the neck, which is said to be capable of containing fifteen quarts of water. This bag the bird has a power of wrinkling up into the hollow of the under chap. When the bag is empty, it is not seen; but when the bird has fished with success, it is incredible to what an extent it is often dilated. The first thing the pelican does in fishing, is to fill the bag; and then it returns to digest its burden at leisure. The bird preys upon the large fishes, and hides them by dozens in its pouch. When the bill is opened to its widest extent, a person may run his head into the bird's mouth, and conceal it in this monstrous pouch, thus adapted for very singular purposes."* Now this extraordinary conformation is nothing more, say our philosophers, than the result of habit—not of the habit or effort of a single pelican, or of a single race of pelicans, but of a habit perpetuated through a long series of generations. The pelican soon found the conveniency of reserving in its mouth, when its appetite was glutted, the remainder of its prey, which is fish. The fulness produced by this attempt of course stretched the skin which lies between the under chaps, as being the most yielding part of the mouth. Every distention increased the cavity. The original bird, and many generations which succeeded him, might find difficulty enough in making the pouch answer this purpose; but future pelicans, entering upon life with a pouch derived from their progenitors, of considerable capacity, would more readily accelerate its advance to perfection, by frequently pressing down the sack with the weight of fish which it might now be made to contain.

These, or of this kind, are the analogies relied upon. Now, in the first place, the instances themselves are unauthenticated by testimony; and in theory, to say the least of them, open to great objections. Who ever read of camels without bunches, or with bunches less than those with which they are at present usually formed? A bunch not unlike the camel's is found between the shoulders of the buffalo, of the origin of which it is impossible to give the account

* Goldsmith, vol. 6, p. 52.

here given. In the second example, why should the application of water, which appears to promote and thicken the growth of feathers upon the bodies and breasts of geese and swans, and other water-fowls, have divested of this covering the thighs of cranes? The third instance, which appears to me as plausible as any that can be produced, has this against it, that it is a singularity restricted to the species; whereas, if it had its commencement in the cause and manner which have been assigned, the like conformation might be expected to take place in other birds which feed upon fish. How comes it to pass, that the pelican alone was the inventress, and her descendants the only inheritors of this curious resource?

But it is the less necessary to controvert the instances themselves, as it is a straining of analogy beyond all limits of reason and credibility, to assert that birds and beasts and fish, with all their variety and complexity of organization, have been brought into their forms, and distinguished into their several kinds and natures, by the same process—even if that process could be demonstrated, or had it ever been actually noticed—as might seem to serve for the gradual generation of a camel's bunch or a pelican's pouch.

The solution, when applied to the works of nature *generally*, is contradicted by many of the phenomena, and totally inadequate to others. The *ligaments* or strictures by which the tendons are tied down at the angles of the joints, could by no possibility be formed by the motion or exercise of the tendons themselves, by an appetency exciting these parts into action, or by any tendency arising therefrom. The tendency is all the other way—the *conatus* in constant opposition to them. Length of time does not help the case at all, but the reverse. The *valves* also in the bloodvessels could never be formed in the manner which our theorist proposes. The blood, in its right and natural course, has no tendency to form them. When obstructed or refluent, it has the contrary. These parts could not grow out of their use, though they had eternity to grow in.

The *senses* of animals appear to me altogether incapable of receiving the explanation of their origin which this theory affords. Including under the word "sense" the organ and the perception, we have no account of either. How will our philosopher get at *vision*, or make an eye? How should the blind animal affect sight, of which blind animals we know have neither conception nor desire? Affecting it, by what operation of its will, by what endeavor to see, could it so determine the fluids of its body as to inchoate the formation of an eye? Or suppose the eye formed, would the perception follow? The same of the other senses. And this objection holds its force, ascribe what you will to the hand of time, to the power of habit, to changes too slow to be observed by man, or brought within any comparison which he is able to make of past things with the present: concede what you please to these arbitrary and unattested suppositions, how will they help you? Here is no inception. No laws, no course, no powers of nature which prevail at present, nor any analogous to these, would give commencement to a new sense. And it is in vain to inquire how that might proceed which could never *begin*.

I think the senses to be the most inconsistent with the hypothesis before us, of any part of the animal frame. But other parts are sufficiently so. The solution does not apply to the parts of animals which have little in them of motion. If we could suppose joints and muscles to be gradually formed by action and exercise, what action or exercise could form a skull, and fill it with brains? No effort of the animal could determine the clothing of its skin. What *conatus* could give prickles to the porcupine or hedgehog, or to the sheep its fleece?

In the last place, what do these appetencies mean when applied to plants? I am not able to give a signification to the term which can be transferred from animals to plants;

or which is common to both. Yet a no less successful organization is found in plants, than what obtains in animals. A solution is wanted for one as well as the other.

Upon the whole, after all the schemes and struggles of a reluctant philosophy, the necessary resort is to a Deity. The marks of *design* are too strong to be gotten over. Design must have had a designer. That designer must have been a person. That person is GOD.

CHAPTER XXIV.

OF THE NATURAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY.

It is an immense conclusion, that there is a God—a perceiving, intelligent, designing Being, at the head of creation, and from whose will it proceeded. The *attributes* of such a Being, suppose his reality to be proved, must be adequate to the magnitude, extent, and multiplicity of his operations; which are not only vast beyond comparison with those performed by any other power, but so far as respects our conceptions of them, infinite, because they are unlimited on all sides.

Yet the contemplation of a nature so exalted, however surely we arrive at the proof of its existence, overwhelms our faculties. The mind feels its powers sink under the subject. One consequence of which is, that from painful abstraction the thoughts seek relief in sensible images; whence may be deduced the ancient and almost universal propensity to idolatrous substitutions. They are the resources of a laboring imagination. False religions usually fall in with the natural propensity; true religions, or such as have derived themselves from the true, resist it.

It is one of the advantages of the revelations which we acknowledge, that while they reject idolatry with its many pernicious accompaniments, they introduce the Deity to human apprehension under an idea more personal, more determinate, more within its compass, than the theology of nature can do. And this they do by representing him exclusively under the relation in which he stands to ourselves; and for the most part, under some precise character, resulting from that relation or from the history of his providences; which method suits the span of our intellects much better than the universality which enters into the idea of God, as deduced from the views of nature. When, therefore, these representations are well founded in point of authority—for all depends upon that—they afford a condescension to the state of our faculties, of which they who have most reflected on the subject will be the first to acknowledge the want and the value.

Nevertheless, if we be careful to imitate the documents of our religion by confining our explanations to what concerns ourselves, and do not affect more precision in our ideas than the subject allows of, the several terms which are employed to denote the attributes of the Deity may be made, even in natural religion, to bear a sense consistent with truth and reason, and not surpassing our comprehension.

These terms are, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, eternity, self-existence, necessary existence, spirituality.

"Omnipotence," "omniscience," "infinite" power, "infinite" knowledge, are *superlatives*, expressing our conception of these attributes in the strongest and most elevated terms which language supplies. We ascribe power to the Deity under the name of "omnipotence," the strict and correct conclusion being, that a power which could create such a world as this is, must be, beyond all comparison, greater than any which we experience in ourselves, than any which we observe in other visible agents; greater also than any which we can want, for our individual protection and preservation, in the Being upon whom we depend. It is a power likewise, to which we are not authorized, by our observation or knowledge, to assign any limits of space or duration.

Very much of the same sort of remark is applicable to the term "omniscience," infinite knowledge, or infinite wisdom. In strictness of language, there is a difference between knowledge and wisdom; wisdom always supposing action, and action directed by it. With respect to the first, namely, *knowledge*, the Creator must know intimately the constitution and properties of the things which he created; which seems also to imply a foreknowledge of their action upon one another, and of their changes; at least, so far as the same result from trains of physical and necessary causes. His omniscience also, as far as respects things present, is deducible from his nature, as an intelligent being, joined with the extent, or rather the universality of his operations. Where he acts, he is; and where he is, he perceives. The *wisdom* of the Deity, as testified in the works of creation, surpasses all idea we have of wisdom drawn from the highest intellectual operations of the highest class of intelligent beings with whom we are acquainted; and, which is of the chief importance to us, whatever be its compass or extent, which it is evidently impossible that we should be able to determine, it must be adequate to the conduct of that order of things under which we live. And this is enough. It is of very inferior consequence by what terms we express our notion, or rather our admiration of this attribute. The terms which the piety and the usage of language have rendered habitual to us, may be as proper as any other. We can trace this attribute much beyond what is necessary for any conclusion to which we have occasion to apply it. The degree of knowledge and power requisite for the formation of created nature cannot, with respect to us, be distinguished from infinite.

The divine "omnipresence" stands, in natural theology, upon this foundation: in every part and place of the universe with which we are acquainted, we perceive the exertion of a power which we believe, mediately or immediately, to proceed from the Deity. For instance, in what part or point of space that has ever been explored, do we not discover attraction? In what regions do we not find light? In what accessible portion of our globe do we not meet with gravity, magnetism, electricity, together with the properties also and powers of organized substances, of vegetable or of animated nature? Nay, further, we may ask, What kingdom is there of nature, what corner of space, in which there is any thing that can be examined by us, where we do not fall upon contrivance and design? The only reflection perhaps, which arises in our minds from this view of the world around us, is, that the laws of nature everywhere prevail; that they are uniform and universal. But what do you mean by the laws of nature, or by any law? Effects are produced by power, not by laws. A law cannot execute itself. A law refers us to an agent. Now, an agency so general as that we cannot discover its absence, or assign the place in which some effect of its continued energy is not found, may, in popular language at least, and perhaps without much deviation from philosophical strictness, be called universal; and with not quite the same, but with no inconsiderable propriety, the person or being in whom that power resides, or from whom it is derived, may be taken to be *omnipresent*. He who upholds all things by his power, may be said to be everywhere present.

This is called a virtual presence. There is also what metaphysicians denominate an essential ubiquity, and which idea the language of Scripture seems to favor; but the former, I think, goes as far as natural theology carries us.

"Eternity" is a negative idea, clothed with a positive name. It supposes, in that to which it is applied, a present existence, and is the negation of a beginning or an end of that existence. As applied to the Deity, it has not been controverted by those who acknowledge a Deity at all. Most assuredly, there never was a time in which nothing existed, because that condition must have continued. The universal *blank* must have remained; nothing could rise up out of it; nothing could ever have existed since; nothing could exist now. In strictness, however, we have no concern with duration prior to that of the visible world. Upon this article, therefore, of theology, it is sufficient to know that the contriver necessarily existed before the contrivance.

"Self-existence" is another negative idea, namely, the negation of a preceding cause, as of a progenitor, a maker, an author, a creator.

"Necessary existence" means demonstrable existence.

"Spirituality" expresses an idea made up of a negative part and of a positive part. The negative part consists in the exclusion of some of the known properties of matter, especially of solidity, of the *vis inertiæ*, and of gravitation. The positive part comprises perception, thought, will, power, *action;* by which last term is meant, the origination of motion, the quality, perhaps, in which resides the essential superiority of spirit over matter, "which cannot move, unless it be moved; and cannot but move, when impelled by another."* I apprehend that there can be no difficulty in applying to the Deity both parts of this idea.

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* Bishop Wilkins' Principles of Natural Religion, p. 106.

CHAPTER XXV.

OF THE UNITY OF THE DEITY.

Of the "unity of the Deity," the proof is, the *uniformity* of plan observable in the universe. The universe itself is a system; each part either depending upon other parts, or being connected with other parts by some common law of motion, or by the presence of some common substance. One principle of gravitation causes a stone to drop towards the earth, and the moon to wheel round it. One law of attraction carries all the different planets about the sun. This philosophers demonstrate. There are also other points of agreement among them, which may be considered as marks of the identity of their origin and of their intelligent Author. In all are found the conveniency and stability derived from gravitation. They all experience vicissitudes of days and nights, and changes of season. They all, at least Jupiter, Mars, and Venus, have the same advantages from their atmosphere as we have. In all the planets, the axes of rotation are permanent. Nothing is more probable than that the same attracting influence, acting according to the same rule, reaches to the fixed stars; but if this be only probable, another thing is certain, namely, that the same element of light does. The light from a fixed star affects our eyes in the same manner, is refracted and reflected according to the same laws, as the light of a candle. The velocity of the light of the fixed stars is also the same as the velocity of the light of the sun, reflected from the satellites of Jupiter. The heat of the sun in kind differs nothing from the heat of a coal fire.

In our own globe the case is clearer. New countries are continually discovered, but the old laws of nature are always found in them; new plants perhaps, or animals, but always in company with plants and animals which we already know, and always possessing many of the same general properties. We never get among such original, or totally different modes of existence, as to indicate that we are come into the province of a different Creator, or under the direction of a different will. In truth, the same order of things attends us wherever we go. The elements act upon one another, electricity operates, the tides rise and fall, the magnetic needle elects its position in one region of the earth and sea as well as in another. One atmosphere invests all parts of the globe, and connects all; one sun illuminates, one moon exerts its specific attraction upon all parts. If there be a variety in natural effects, as, for example, in the tides of different seas, that very variety is the result of the same cause acting under different circumstances. In many cases this is proved; in all, is probable.

The inspection and comparison of *living* forms add to this argument examples without number. Of all large terrestrial animals, the structure is very much alike; their senses nearly the same; their natural functions and passions nearly the same; their viscera nearly the same, both in substance, shape, and office; digestion, nutrition, circulation, secretion go on in a similar manner in all; the great circulating fluid is the same, for I think no difference has been discovered in the properties of *blood*, from whatever animal it be drawn. The experiment of transfusion proves that the blood of one animal will serve for another. The *skeletons* also of the larger terrestrial animals show particular varieties, but still under a great general affinity. The resemblance is somewhat less, yet sufficiently evident, between quadrupeds and birds. They are all alike in five respects, for one in which they differ.

In *fish*, which belong to another department as it were of nature, the points of comparison become fewer. But we never lose sight of our analogy: for example, we still meet with a stomach, a liver, a spine; with bile and blood; with teeth; with eyes—which eyes are only slightly varied from our own, and which variation, in truth, demonstrates, not an interruption, but a continuance of the same exquisite plan; for it is the adaptation of the organ to the element, namely, to the different refraction of light passing into the eye out of a denser medium. The provinces, also, themselves of water and earth, are connected by the species of animals which inhabit both; and also by a large tribe of aquatic animals, which closely resemble the terrestrial in their internal structure: I mean the cetaceous tribe, which have hot blood, respiring lungs, bowels, and other essential parts, like those of land-animals. This similitude surely bespeaks the same creation and the same Creator.

Insects and *shell-fish* appear to me to differ from other classes of animals the most widely of any. Yet even here, besides many points of particular resemblance, there exists a general relation of a peculiar kind. It is the relation of inversion—the law of contrariety: namely, that whereas, in other animals, the bones, to which the muscles are attached, lie *within* the body, in insects and shell-fish they lie on the *outside* of it. The shell of a lobster performs to the animal the office of a *bone*, by furnishing to the tendons that fixed basis or immovable fulcrum, without which, mechanically, they could not act. The crust of an insect is its shell, and answers the like purpose. The shell also of an oyster stands in the place of a *bone;* the bases of the muscles being fixed to it in the same manner as, in other animals, they are fixed to the bones. All which, under wonderful varieties indeed, and adaptations of form, confesses an imitation, a remembrance, a carrying on of the same plan.

The observations here made are equally applicable to plants; but, I think, unnecessary to be pursued. It is a very striking circumstance, and also sufficient to prove all which we contend for, that, in this part likewise of organized nature, we perceive a continuation of the *sexual* system.

Certain however it is, that the whole argument for the divine unity goes no further than to a unity of counsel.

It may likewise be acknowledged, that no arguments which we are in possession of exclude the ministry of subordinate agents. If such there be, they act under a presiding, a controlling will, because they act according to certain general restrictions, by certain common rules, and, as it should seem, upon a general plan; but still such agents, and different ranks and classes and degrees of them, may be employed.

CHAPTER XXVI.

OF THE GOODNESS OF THE DEITY.

The proof of the *divine goodness* rests upon two propositions; each, as we contend, capable of being made out by observations drawn from the appearances of nature.

The first is, "that in a vast plurality of instances in which contrivance is perceived, the design of the contrivance is *beneficial*."

The second, "that the Deity has superadded *pleasure* to animal sensations beyond what was necessary for any other purpose, or when the purpose, so far as it was necessary, might have been effected by the operation of pain."

First, "in a vast plurality of instances in which contrivance is perceived, the design of the contrivance is *beneficial*."

No productions of nature display contrivance so manifestly as the parts of animals; and the parts of animals have all of them, I believe, a real, and with very few exceptions, all of them a known and intelligible subserviency to the use of the animal. Now, when the multitude of animals is considered, the number of parts in each, their figure and fitness, the faculties depending upon them, the variety of species, the complexity of structure, the success, in so many cases, and felicity of the result, we can never reflect without the profoundest adoration, upon the character of that Being from whom all these things have proceeded; we cannot help acknowledging what an exertion of benevolence creation was—of a benevolence how minute in its care, how vast in its comprehension!

When we appeal to the parts and faculties of animals, and to the limbs and senses of animals in particular, we state, I conceive, the proper medium of proof for the conclusion which we wish to establish. I will not say that the insensible parts of nature are made solely for the sensitive parts; but this I say, that when we consider the benevolence of the Deity, we can only consider it in relation to sensitive being. Without this reference, or referred to any thing else, the attribute has no object, the term has no meaning. Dead matter is nothing. The parts, therefore, especially the limbs and senses of animals, although they constitute, in mass and quantity, a small portion of the material creation, yet, since they alone are instruments of perception, they compose what may be called the whole of visible nature, estimated with a view to the disposition of its author. Consequently, it is in *these* that we are to seek his character. It is by these that we are to prove that the world was made with a benevolent design.

Nor is the design abortive. It is a happy world after all. The air, the earth, the water, teem with delighted existence. In a spring noon, or a summer evening, on whichever side I turn my eyes, myriads of happy beings crowd upon my view. "The insect youth are on the wing." Swarms of new-born *flies* are trying their pinions in the air. Their sportive motions, their wanton mazes, their gratuitous activity, their continual change of place without use or purpose, testify their joy, and the exultation which they feel in their lately discovered faculties. A *bee* among the flowers in spring, is one of the most cheerful objects that can be looked upon. Its life appears to be all enjoyment; so busy, and so pleased: yet it is only a specimen of insect life with which, by reason of the animal being half domesticated, we happen to be better acquainted than we are with that of others. The *whole-winged* insect tribe, it is probable, are equally intent upon their proper employments, and, under every variety of constitution, gratified, and perhaps equally gratified, by the offices which the Author of their nature has assigned to them. But the atmosphere is not the only scene of enjoyment for the insect race. Plants are covered with aphides greedily sucking their juices, and constantly, as it should seem, in the act of sucking. It cannot be doubted but that this is a state of gratification. What else should fix them so close to the operation, and so long? Other species are *running about*, with an alacrity in their motions which carries with it every mark of pleasure. Large patches of ground are sometimes half covered with these brisk and sprightly natures. If we look to what the *waters* produce, shoals of the fry of fish frequent the margins of rivers, of lakes, and of the sea itself. These are so happy that they know not what to do with themselves. Their attitudes, their vivacity, their leaps out of the water, their frolics in it, which I have noticed a thousand times with equal attention and amusement, all conduce to show their excess of spirits, and are simply the effects of that excess. Walking by the sea-side in a calm evening, upon a sandy shore, and with an ebbing tide, I have frequently remarked the appearance of a dark cloud, or rather a very thick mist, hanging over the edge of the water, to the height perhaps of half a yard, and of the breadth of two or three yards, stretching along the coast as far as the eye could reach, and always retiring with the water. When this cloud came to be examined, it proved to be nothing else than so much space filled with young *shrimps* in the act of bounding into the air from the shallow margin of the water, or from the wet sand. If any motion of a mute animal could express delight, it was this; if they had meant to make signs of their happiness, they could not have done it more intelligibly. Suppose, then, what I have no doubt of, each individual of this number to be in a state of positive enjoyment; what a sum, collectively, of gratification and pleasure have we here before our view!

The *young* of all animals appear to me to receive pleasure simply from the exercise of their limbs and bodily faculties, without reference to any end to be attained, or any use to be answered by the exertion. A child, without knowing any thing of the use of language, is in a high degree delighted with being able to speak. Its incessant repetition of a few articulate sounds, or perhaps of the single word which it has learnt to pronounce, proves this point clearly. Nor is it less pleased with its first successful endeavors to walk, or rather to run—which precedes walking—although entirely ignorant of the importance of the attainment to its future life, and even without applying it to any present purpose. A child is delighted with speaking, without having any thing to say, and with walking, without knowing where to go. And, prior to both these, I am disposed to believe that the waking hours of infancy are agreeably taken up with the exercise of vision, or perhaps, more properly speaking, with learning to see.

But it is not for youth alone that the great Parent of creation has provided. Happiness is found with the purring cat, no less than with the playful kitten—in the arm-chair of dozing age, as well as in either the sprightliness of the dance, or the animation of the chase. To novelty, to acuteness of sensation, to hope, to ardor of pursuit, succeeds what is, in no inconsiderable degree, an equivalent for them all, "perception of ease." Herein is the exact difference between the young and the old. The young are not happy but when enjoying pleasure; the old are happy when free from pain. And this constitution suits with the degrees of animal power which they respectively possess. The vigor of youth was to be stimulated to action by impatience of rest; while, to the imbecility of age, quietness and repose become positive gratifications. In one important respect, the advantage is with the old. A state of ease is, generally speaking, more attainable than a state of pleasure. A constitution, therefore, which can enjoy ease, is preferable to that which can taste only pleasure. This same perception of ease oftentimes renders old-age a condition of great comfort; especially when riding at its anchor after a busy or tempestuous life. It is well described by Rousseau, to be the interval of repose and enjoyment between the hurry and the end of life. How far the same cause extends to other animal natures, cannot be judged of with certainty. The appearance of satisfaction with which most animals, as their activity subsides, seek and enjoy rest, affords reason to believe that this source of gratification is appointed to advanced life, under all, or most of its various forms. In the species with which we are best acquainted, namely, our own, I am far, even as an observer of human life, from thinking that youth is its happiest season, much less the only happy one: as a Christian, I am willing to believe that there is a great deal of truth in the following representation given by a very pious writer as well as excellent man:* "To the intelligent and virtuous, old-age presents a scene of tranquil enjoyments, of obedient appetite, of well-regulated affections, of maturity in knowledge, and of calm preparation for immortality. In this serene and dignified state, placed as it were on the confines of two worlds, the mind of a good man reviews what is past with the complacency of an approving conscience; and looks forward with humble confidence in the mercy of God, and with devout aspirations towards his eternal and ever-increasing favor."

What is seen in different stages of the same life, is still more exemplified in the lives of different animals. Animal enjoyments are infinitely *diversified*. The modes of life to which the organization of different animals respectively determines them, are not only of various, but of opposite kinds. Yet each is happy in its own. For instance, animals of prey live much alone; animals of a milder constitution, in society. Yet the herring which lives in shoals, and the sheep which lives in flocks, are not more happy in a crowd, or more contented among their companions, than is the pike or the lion with the deep solitudes of the pool or the forest.

But it will be said, that the instances which we have here brought forward, whether of vivacity or repose, or of apparent enjoyment derived from either, are picked and favorable instances. We answer, first, that they are instances, nevertheless, which comprise large provinces of sensitive existence; that every case which we have described is the case of millions. At this moment, in every given moment of time, how many myriads of animals are eating their food, gratifying their appetites, ruminating in their holes, accomplishing their wishes, pursuing their pleasures, taking their pastimes! In each individual, how many things must go right for it to be at ease, yet how large a proportion out of every species is so in every assignable instant. Secondly, we contend, in the terms of our original proposition, that throughout the whole of life, as it is diffused in nature, and as far as we are acquainted with it, looking to the average of sensations, the plurality and the preponderancy is in favor of happiness by a vast excess. In our own species, in which perhaps the assertion may be more questionable than any other, the prepollency of good over evil, of health, for example, and ease, over pain and distress, is evinced by the very notice which calamities excite. What inquiries does the sickness of our friends produce; what conversation, their misfortunes. This shows that the common course of things is in favor of happiness; that happiness is the rule, misery the exception. Were the order reversed, our attention would be called to examples of health and competency, instead of disease and want.

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* Father's Instructions; by Dr. Percival, of Manchester, p. 317.

One great cause of our insensibility to the goodness of the Creator, is the very *extensiveness* of his bounty. We prize but little what we share only in common with the rest, or with the generality of our species. When we hear of blessings we think forthwith of successes, of prosperous fortunes, of honors, riches, preferments, that is, of those advantages and superiorities over others which we happen either to possess, or to be in pursuit of, or to covet. The common benefits of our nature entirely escape us. Yet these are the great things. These constitute what most properly ought to be accounted blessings of Providence—what alone, if we might so speak, are worthy of its care. Nightly rest and daily bread, the ordinary use of our limbs and senses and understandings, are gifts which admit of no comparison with any other. Yet because almost every man we meet with possesses these, we leave them out of our enumeration. They raise no sentiment, they move no gratitude. Now, herein is our judgment perverted by our selfishness. A blessing ought in truth to be the *more* satisfactory, the bounty at least of the donor is rendered more conspicuous, by its very diffusion, its commonness, its cheapness—by its falling to the lot, and forming the happiness of the great bulk and body of our species, as well as of ourselves. Nay, even when we do not possess it, it ought to be matter of thankfulness that others do. But we have a different way of thinking. We court distinction. That is not the worst: we *see* nothing but what has distinction to recommend it. This necessarily contracts our views of the Creator's beneficence within a narrow compass, and most unjustly. It is in those things which are so common as to be no distinction, that the amplitude of the divine benignity is perceived.

But pain, no doubt, and privations exist in numerous instances and to a great degree, which collectively would be very great, if they were compared with any other thing than with the mass of animal fruition. For the application, therefore, of our proposition to that *mixed* state of things which these exceptions induce, two rules are necessary, and both, I think, just and fair rules. One is, that we regard those effects alone which are accompanied with proofs of intention; the other, that when we cannot resolve all appearances into benevolence of design, we make the few give place to the many, the little to the great—that we take our judgment from a large and decided preponderancy, if there be one.

I crave leave to transcribe into this place what I have said upon this subject in my Moral Philosophy.

"When God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about either.

"If he had wished our misery, he might have made sure of his purpose, by forming our senses to be so many sores and pains to us, as they are now instruments of gratification and enjoyment; or by placing us amid objects so ill-suited to our perceptions as to have continually offended us, instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight. He might have made, for example, every thing we tasted, bitter; every thing we saw, loathsome; every thing we touched, a sting; every smell, a stench; and every sound, a discord.

"If he had been indifferent about our happiness or misery, we must impute to our good fortune—as all design by this supposition is excluded—both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted to produce it.

"But either of these, and still more, both of them, being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but the first supposition, that God, when he created the human species, wished their happiness, and made for them the provision which he has made, with that view and for that purpose.

"The same argument may be proposed in different terms, *thus:* contrivance proves design; and the predominant tendency of the contrivance indicates the disposition of the designer. The world abounds with contrivances; and all the contrivances which we are acquainted with are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil, no doubt, exists, but is never, that we can perceive, the *object* of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inseparable from it: or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but it is not the object of it. This is a distinction which well deserves to be attended to. In describing implements of husbandry, you would hardly say of the sickle, that it is made to cut the reaper's hand; though from the construction of the instrument, and the manner of using it, this mischief often follows. But if you had occasion to describe instruments of torture, or execution, this engine, you would say, is to extend the sinews, this to dislocate the joints, this to break the bones, this to scorch the soles of the feet. Here, pain and misery are the very objects of the contrivance. Now nothing of this sort is to be found in the works of nature. We never discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. No anatomist ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease; or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said, this is to irritate, this to inflame, this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys, this gland to secrete the humor which forms the gout: if by chance he come at a part of which he knows not the use, the most he can say is, that it is useless; no one ever suspects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or to torment."

The TWO CASES which appear to me to have the most difficulty in them, as forming the most of the appearance of exception to the representation here given, are those of *venomous* animals, and of animals *preying* upon one another. These properties of animals, wherever they are found, must, I think, be referred to design, because there is in all cases of the first, and in most cases of the second, an express and distinct organization provided for the producing of them. Under the first head, the fangs of vipers, the stings of wasps and scorpions, are as clearly intended for their purpose, as any animal structure is for any purpose the most incontestably beneficial. And the same thing must, under the second head, be acknowledged of the talons and beaks of birds, of the tusks, teeth, and claws of beasts of prey—of the shark's mouth, of the spider's web, and of numberless weapons of offence belonging to different tribes of voracious insects. We cannot, therefore, avoid the difficulty by saying that the effect was not intended. The only question open to us is, whether it be ultimately evil. From the confessed and felt imperfection of our knowledge, we ought to presume that there may be consequences of this economy which are hidden from us: from the benevolence which pervades the general designs of nature, we ought also to presume that these consequences, if they could enter into our calculation, would turn the balance on the favorable side. Both these I contend to be reasonable presumptions. Not reasonable presumptions if these two cases were the only cases which nature presented to our observation; but reasonable presumptions, under the reflection, that the cases in question are combined with a multitude of intentions, all proceeding from the same author, and all, except these, directed to ends of undisputed utility. Of the vindications, however, of this economy, which we are able to assign, such as most extenuate the difficulty, are the following.

With respect to *venomous* bites and stings, it may be observed,

1. That, the animal itself being regarded, the faculty complained of is *good:* being conducive, in all cases, to the defence of the animal; in some cases, to the subduing of its prey; and in some, probably, to the killing of it, when caught, by a mortal wound, inflicted in the passage to the stomach, which may be no less merciful to the victim than salutary to the devourer. In the viper, for instance, the poisonous fang may do that which, in other animals of prey, is done by the crush of the teeth. Frogs and mice might be swallowed alive without it.

2. But it will be said, that this provision, when it comes to the case of bites, deadly even to human bodies, and to those of large quadrupeds, is greatly *overdone;* that it might have fulfilled its use, and yet have been much less deleterious than it is. Now I believe the case of bites which produce death in large animals—of stings I think there are none—to be very few. The experiments of the Abbé Fontana, which were numerous, go strongly to the proof of this point. He found that it required the action of five exasperated vipers to kill a dog of a moderate size; but that to the killing of a mouse or a frog, a single bite was sufficient;

which agrees with the use which we assign to the faculty. The abbé seemed to be of opinion, that the bite even of the rattlesnake would not usually be mortal; allowing, however, that in certain particularly unfortunate cases, as when the puncture had touched some very tender part, pricked a principal nerve, for instance, or, as it is said, some more considerable lymphatic vessel, death might speedily ensue.

3. It has been, I think, very justly remarked concerning serpents, that while only a few species possess the venomous property, that property guards the whole tribe. The most innocuous snake is avoided with as much care as a viper. Now the terror with which large animals regard this class of reptiles is its protection; and this terror is founded on the formidable revenge which a few of the number, compared with the whole, are capable of taking. The species of serpents described by Linnæus, amount to two hundred and eighteen, of which thirty-two only are poisonous.

4. It seems to me, that animal constitutions are provided not only for each element, but for each state of the elements, that is, for every climate, and for every temperature; and that part of the mischief complained of, arises from animals—the human animal most especially—occupying situations upon the earth which do not belong to them, nor were ever intended for their habitation. The folly and wickedness of mankind, and necessities proceeding from these causes, have driven multitudes of the species to seek a refuge among burning sands, while countries blessed with hospitable skies, and with the most fertile soils, remain almost without a human tenant. We invade the territories of wild beasts and venomous reptiles, and then complain that we are infested by their bites and stings. Some accounts of Africa place this observation in a strong point of view. "The deserts," says Adamson, "are entirely barren, except where they are found to produce serpents; and in such quantities, that some extensive plains are almost entirely covered with them." These are the natures appropriated to the sit-

uation. Let them enjoy their existence; let them have their country. Surface enough will be left to man, though his numbers were increased a hundred-fold, and left to him where he might live exempt from these annoyances.

The SECOND CASE, namely, that of animals *devouring* one another, furnishes a consideration of much larger extent. To judge whether, as a general provision, this can be deemed an *evil*, even so far as we understand its consequences, which, probably, is a partial understanding, the following reflections are fit to be attended to.

1. Immortality upon this earth is out of the question. Without death there could be no generation, no sexes, no parental relation, that is, as things are constituted, no animal happiness. The particular duration of life assigned to different animals can form no part of the objection; because, whatever that duration be, while it remains finite and limited, it may always be asked why it is no longer. The natural age of different animals varies from a single day to a century of years. No account can be given of this; nor could any be given, whatever other proportion of life had obtained among them.

The term then of life in different animals being the same as it is, the question is, what mode of taking it away is the best even for the animal itself?

Now, according to the established order of nature—which we must suppose to prevail, or we cannot reason at all upon the subject—the three methods by which life is usually put an end to, are acute diseases, decay, and violence. The simple and natural life of *brutes* is not often visited by acute distempers; nor could it be deemed an improvement of their lot if they were. Let it be considered, therefore, in what a condition of suffering and misery a brute animal is placed which is left to perish by *decay*. In human sickness or infirmity, there is the assistance of man's rational fellow-creatures, if not to alleviate his pains, at least to minister to his necessities, and to supply the place of his own activity. A brute, in his wild and natural state, does every thing for himself. When his strength, therefore, or his speed, or his limbs, or his senses fail him, he is delivered over either to absolute famine or to the protracted wretchedness of a life slowly wasted by the scarcity of food. Is it then to see the world filled with drooping, superannuated, half-starved, helpless, and unhelped animals, that you would alter the present system of pursuit and prey?

2. Which system is also to them the spring of motion and activity on both sides. The pursuit of its prey forms the employment, and appears to constitute the pleasure of a considerable part of the animal creation. The using of the means of defence, or flight, or precaution, forms also the business of another part. And even of this latter tribe, we have no reason to suppose that their happiness is much molested by their fears. Their danger exists continually; and in some cases they seem to be so far sensible of it as to provide, in the best manner they can, against it; but it is only when the attack is actually made upon them that they appear to suffer from it. To contemplate the insecurity of their condition with anxiety and dread, requires a degree of reflection which, happily for themselves, they do not possess. A *hare*, notwithstanding the number of its dangers and its enemies, is as playful an animal as any other.

3. But, to do justice to the question, the system of animal *destruction* ought always to be considered in strict connection with another property of animal nature, namely, *superfecundity*. They are countervailing qualities. One subsists by the correction of the other. In treating, therefore, of the subject under this view—which is, I believe, the true one—our business will be, first, to point out the advantages which are gained by the powers in nature of a superabundant multiplication; and then to show that these advantages are so many reasons for appointing that system of national hostilities which we are endeavoring to account for.

In almost all cases, nature produces her supplies with profusion. A single codfish spawns, in one season, a greater number of eggs than all the inhabitants of England amount to. A thousand other instances of prolific generation might be stated, which, though not equal to this, would carry on the increase of the species with a rapidity which outruns calculation, and to an immeasurable extent. The advantages of such a constitution are two: first, that it tends to keep the world always full; while, secondly, it allows the proportion between the several species of animals to be differently modified, as different purposes require, or as different situations may afford for them room and food. Where this vast fecundity meets with a vacancy fitted to receive the species, there it operates with its whole effect—there it pours in its numbers and replenishes the waste. We complain of what we call the exorbitant multiplication of some troublesome insects; not reflecting that large portions of nature might be left void without it. If the accounts of travellers may be depended upon, immense tracts of forest in North America would be nearly lost to sensitive existence, if it were not for *gnats*. "In the thinly inhabited regions of America, in which the waters stagnate and the climate is warm, the whole air is filled with crowds of these insects." Thus it is, that where we looked for solitude and death-like silence, we meet with animation, activity, enjoyment—with a busy, a happy, and a peopled world. Again, hosts of *mice* are reckoned among the plagues of the north-east part of Europe; whereas vast plains in Siberia, as we learn from good authority, would be lifeless without them. The Caspian deserts are converted by their presence into crowds of warrens. Between the Volga and the Yaik, and in the country of Hyrcania, the ground, says Pallas, is in many places *covered* with little hills, raised by the earth cast out in forming the burrows. Do we so envy these blissful abodes, as to pronounce the fecundity by which they are supplied with inhabitants to be an evil; a subject of complaint, and not of praise? Further, by virtue of this same superfecundity, what we term destruction becomes almost instantly the parent of life. What we call blights are oftentimes legions of animated beings, claiming their portion in the bounty of nature. What corrupts the produce of the earth to us, prepares it for them. And it is by means of their rapid multiplication that they take possession of their pasture; a slow propagation would not meet the opportunity.

But in conjunction with the occasional use of this fruitfulness, we observe, also, that it allows the proportion between the several species of animals to be differently modified, as different purposes of utility may require. When the forests of America come to be cleared, and the swamps drained, our gnats will give place to other inhabitants. If the population of Europe should spread to the north and the east, the mice will retire before the husbandman and the shepherd, and yield their station to herds and flocks. In what concerns the human species, it may be a part of the scheme of Providence, that the earth should be inhabited by a shifting, or perhaps a circulating population. In this economy, it is possible that there may be the following advantages. When old countries are become exceedingly corrupt, simpler modes of life, purer morals, and better institutions, may rise up in new ones, while fresh soils reward the cultivator with more plentiful returns. Thus the different portions of the globe come into use in succession, as the residence of man; and, in his absence, entertain other guests, which, by their sudden multiplication, fill the chasm. In domesticated animals, we find the effect of their fecundity to be, that we can always command numbers; we can always have as many of any particular species as we please, or as we can support. Nor do we complain of its excess; it being much more easy to regulate abundance than to supply scarcity.

But then this *superfecundity*, though of great occasional use and importance, exceeds the ordinary capacity of nature to receive or support its progeny. All superabundance supposes destruction, or must destroy itself. Perhaps there is no species of terrestrial animals whatever which would not overrun the earth, if it were permitted to multiply in perfect safety; or of fish, which would not fill the ocean: at least, if any single species were left to their natural increase without disturbance or restraint, the food of other species would be exhausted by their maintenance. It is necessary, therefore, that the effects of such prolific faculties be curtailed. In conjunction with other checks and limits, all subservient to the same purpose, are the *thinnings* which take place among animals by their action upon one another. In some instances, we ourselves experience, very directly, the use of these hostilities. One species of insect rids us of another species, or reduces their ranks. A third species, perhaps, keeps the second within bounds; and birds or lizards are a fence against the inordinate increase by which even these last might infest us. In other, more numerous, and possibly more important instances, this disposition of things, although less necessary or useful to us, and of course less observed by us, may be necessary and useful to certain other species; or even for the preventing of the loss of certain species from the universe—a misfortune which seems to be studiously guarded against. Though there may be the appearance of failure in some of the details of nature's works, in her great purposes there never are. Her species never fail. The provision which was originally made for continuing the replenishment of the world, has proved itself to be effectual through a long succession of ages.

What further shows that the system of destruction among animals holds an express relation to the system of fecundity, that they are parts indeed of one compensatory scheme, is, that in each species the fecundity bears a proportion to the smallness of the animal, to the weakness, to the shortness of its natural term of life, and to the dangers and enemies by which it is surrounded. An elephant produces but one calf; a butterfly lays six hundred eggs. Birds of prey seldom produce more than two eggs; the sparrow tribe and the duck tribe frequently sit upon a dozen. In the rivers, we meet with a thousand minnows for one pike; in the sea, a million of herrings for a single shark. Compensation obtains throughout. Defencelessness and devastation are repaired by fecundity.

We have dwelt the longer on these considerations, because the subject to which they apply, namely, that of animals *devouring* one another, forms the chief, if not the only instance, in the works of the Deity, of an economy, stamped by marks of design, in which the character of utility can be called in question. The case of *venomous* animals is of much inferior consequence to the case of prey, and, in some degree, is also included under it. To both cases it is probable that many more reasons belong than those of which we are in possession.

Our FIRST PROPOSITION, and that which we have hitherto been defending, was, "that in a vast plurality of instances, in which contrivance is perceived, the *design* of the contrivance is *beneficial*."

Our SECOND PROPOSITION is, "that the Deity has added *pleasure* to animal sensations beyond what was necessary for any other purpose, or when the purpose, so far as it was necessary, might have been effected by the operation of pain."

This proposition may be thus explained. The capacities which, according to the established course of nature, are *necessary* to the support or preservation of an animal, however manifestly they may be the result of an organization contrived for the purpose, can only be deemed an act or a part of the same will as that which decreed the existence of the animal itself; because, whether the creation proceeded from a benevolent or a malevolent being, these capacities must have been given, if the animal existed at all. Animal properties, therefore, which fall under this description, do not strictly prove the goodness of God: they may prove the existence of the Deity; they may prove a high degree of power and intelligence: but they do not prove his goodness; forasmuch as they must have been found in any creation which was capable of continuance, although it is possible to suppose that such a creation might have been produced by a being whose views rested upon misery.

But there is a class of properties which may be said to be superadded from an intention expressly directed to happiness—an intention to give a happy existence distinct from the general intention of providing the means of existence; and that is, of capacities for pleasure in cases wherein, so far as the conservation of the individual or of the species is concerned, they were not wanted, or wherein the purpose might have been secured by the operation of pain. The provision which is made of a variety of objects not necessary to life, and ministering only to our pleasures, and the properties given to the necessaries of life themselves, by which they contribute to pleasure as well as preservation, show a further design than that of giving existence.*

A single instance will make all this clear. Assuming the necessity of food for the support of animal life, it is requisite that the animal be provided with organs fitted for the procuring, receiving, and digesting of its food. It may also be necessary, that the animal be impelled by its sensations to exert its organs. But the pain of hunger would do all this. Why add pleasure to the act of eating; sweetness and relish to food? Why a new and appropriate sense for the perception of the pleasure? Why should the juice of a peach applied to the palate, affect the part so differently from what it does when rubbed upon the palm of the hand? This is a constitution which, so far as appears to me, can be resolved into nothing but the pure benevolence of the Creator. Eating is necessary, but the pleasure attending it is not necessary; and that this pleasure depends not only upon our being in possession of the sense of taste, which is different from every other, but upon a particular state of the organ in which it resides, a felicitous adaptation of the organ to the object, will be confessed by any one who may happen to have experienced that vitiation of taste which frequently occurs in fevers, when every taste is irregular, and every one bad.

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* See this topic considered in Dr. Balguy's Treatise upon the Divine Benevolence. This excellent author first, I think, proposed it, and nearly in the terms in which it is here stated. Some other observations also under this head are taken from that treatise.

In mentioning the gratifications of the palate, it may be said that we have made choice of a trifling example. I am not of that opinion. They afford a share of enjoyment to man; but to brutes I believe that they are of very great importance. A horse at liberty passes a great part of his waking hours in eating. To the ox, the sheep, the deer, and other ruminating animals, the pleasure is doubled. Their whole time almost is divided between browsing upon their pasture and chewing their cud. Whatever the pleasure be, it is spread over a large portion of their existence. If there be animals, such as the lupous fish, which swallow their prey whole and at once, without any time, as it should seem, for either drawing out or relishing the taste in the mouth, is it an improbable conjecture, that the seat of taste with them is in the stomach; or at least, that a sense of pleasure, whether it be taste or not, accompanies the dissolution of the food in that receptacle, which dissolution in general is carried on very slowly? If this opinion be right, they are more than repaid for the defect of palate. The feast lasts as long as the digestion.

In seeking for argument, we need not stay to insist upon the comparative importance of our example; for the observation holds equally of all, or of three at least of the other senses. The necessary purposes of hearing might have been answered without harmony; of smell, without fragrance; of vision, without beauty. Now, "if the Deity had been indifferent about our happiness or misery, we must impute to our good fortune—as all design by this supposition is excluded—both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted to excite it." I allege these as *two* felicities, for they are different things, yet both necessary: the sense being formed, the objects which were applied to it might not have suited it; the objects being fixed, the sense might not have agreed with them. A coincidence is here required which no accident can account for. There are three possible suppositions upon the subject, and no more. The first, that the sense, by its original constitution, was made to suit the object; the second, that the object, by its original constitution, was made to suit the sense; the third, that the sense is so constituted as to be able, either universally or within certain limits, by habit and familiarity, to render every object pleasant. Whichever of these suppositions we adopt, the effect evinces on the part of the Author of nature a studious benevolence. If the pleasures which we derive from any of our senses depend upon an original congruity between the sense and the properties perceived by it, we know by experience that the adjustment demanded, with respect to the qualities which were conferred upon the objects that surround us, not only choice and selection, out of a boundless variety of possible qualities with which these objects might have been endued, but a *proportioning also of degree*, because an excess or defect of intensity spoils the perception as much almost as an error in the kind and nature of the quality. Likewise the degree of dulness or acuteness in the sense itself is no arbitrary thing, but in order to preserve the congruity here spoken of, requires to be in an exact or near correspondency with the strength of the impression. The dulness of the senses forms the complaint of old-age. Persons in fevers, and I believe in most maniacal cases, experience great torment from their preternatural acuteness. An increased, no less than an impaired sensibility, induces a state of disease and suffering.

The doctrine of a specific congruity between animal senses and their objects, is strongly favored by what is observed of insects in the election of their food. Some of these will feed upon one kind of plant or animal, and upon no other; some caterpillars upon the cabbage alone, some upon the black currant alone. The species of caterpillar which eats the vine, will starve upon the alder; nor will that which we find upon fennel touch the rose-bush. Some insects confine themselves to two or three kinds of plants or animals. Some, again, show so strong a preference, as to afford reason to believe, that though they may be driven by hunger to others, they are led by the pleasure of taste to a few particular plants alone; and all this, as it should seem, independently of habit or imitation.

But should we accept the third hypothesis, and even carry it so far as to ascribe every thing which concerns the question to habit—as in certain species, the human species most particularly, there is reason to attribute something—we have then before us an animal capacity, not less perhaps to be admired than the native congruities which the other scheme adopts. It cannot be shown to result from any fixed necessity in nature, that what is frequently applied to the senses should of course become agreeable to them. It is, so far as it subsists, a power of accommodation provided in these senses by the Author of their structure, and forms a part of their perfection.

In whichever way we regard the senses, they appear to be specific gifts, ministering not only to preservation, but to pleasure. But what we usually call the *senses*, are probably themselves far from being the only vehicles of enjoyment, or the whole of our constitution which is calculated for the same purpose. We have many internal sensations of the most agreeable kind, hardly referable to any of the five senses. Some physiologists have held that all secretion is pleasurable; and that the complacency which in health, without any external assignable object to excite it, we derive from life itself, is the effect of our secretions going on well within us. All this may be true; but if true, what reason can be assigned for it, except the will of the Creator? It may reasonably be asked, Why is any thing a pleasure? and I know no answer which can be returned to the question but that which refers it to appointment.

We can give no account whatever of our pleasures in the simple and original perception; and even when physical sensations are assumed, we can seldom account for them in the secondary and complicated shapes in which they take the name of diversions. I never yet met with a sportsman who could tell me in what the sport consisted—who could resolve it into its principle, and state that principle. I have been a great follower of fishing myself, and in its cheerful solitude have passed some of the happiest hours of a sufficiently happy life; but to this moment I could never trace out the source of the pleasure which it afforded me.

The "quantum in rebus inane!" whether applied to our amusements or to our graver pursuits, to which, in truth, it sometimes equally belongs, is always an unjust complaint. If trifles engage, and if trifles make us happy, the true reflection suggested by the experiment is upon the tendency of nature to gratification and enjoyment; which is, in other words, the goodness of its Author towards his sensitive creation.

Rational natures also, as such, exhibit qualities which help to confirm the truth of our position. The degree of understanding found in mankind is usually much greater than what is necessary for mere preservation. The pleasure of choosing for themselves, and of prosecuting the object of their choice, should seem to be an original source of enjoyment. The pleasures received from things great, beautiful, or new, from imitation or from the liberal arts, are in some measure not only superadded, but unmixed gratifications, having no pains to balance them.*

I do not know whether our attachment to *property* be not something more than the mere dictate of reason, or even than the mere effect of association. Property communicates a charm to whatever is the object of it. It is the first of our abstract ideas; it cleaves to us the closest and the longest. It endears to the child its plaything, to the peasant his cottage, to the landholder his estate. It supplies the place of prospect and scenery. Instead of coveting the beauty of distant situations, it teaches every man to find it in his own. It gives boldness and grandeur to plains and fens, tinge and coloring to clays and fallows.

All these considerations come in aid of our *second* proposition. The reader will now bear in mind what our two propositions were. They were, firstly, that in a vast plurality of instances in which contrivance is perceived, the design of the contrivance is beneficial; secondly, that the Deity has added pleasure to animal sensations beyond what was necessary for any other purpose, or when the purpose, so far as it was necessary, might have been effected by the operation of pain.

While these propositions can be maintained, we are authorized to ascribe to the Deity the character of benevolence; and what is benevolence at all, must in him be *infinite* benevolence, by reason of the infinite, that is to say, the incalculably great number of objects upon which it is exercised.

Of the ORIGIN OF EVIL, no universal solution has been discovered; I mean, no solution which reaches to all cases of complaint. The most comprehensive is that which arises from the consideration of *general rules*. We may, I think, without much difficulty, be brought to admit the four following points: first, that important advantages may accrue to the universe from the order of nature proceeding according to general laws; secondly, that general laws, however well set and constituted, often thwart and cross one another; thirdly, that from these thwartings and crossings, frequent particular inconveniences will arise; and fourthly, that it agrees with our observations to suppose that some degree of these inconveniences takes place in the works of nature. These points may be allowed; and it may also be asserted, that the general laws with which we are acquainted are directed to beneficial ends. On the other hand, with many of these laws we are not acquainted at all, or we are totally unable to trace them in their branches and in their operation; the effect of which ignorance is, that they cannot be of importance to us as measures by which to regulate our conduct. The conservation of them may be of importance in other respects, or to other beings, but we are uninformed of their value or use; uninformed, consequently, when and how far they may or may not be suspended, or their effects turned aside by a presiding and benevolent will, without incurring greater evils than those which would be avoided. The consideration, therefore, of general laws, although it may concern the question of the origin of evil very nearly, which I think it does, rests in views disproportionate to our faculties, and in a knowledge which we do not possess. It serves rather to account for the obscurity of the subject, than to supply us with distinct answers to our difficulties. However, while we assent to the above-stated propositions as principles, whatever uncertainty we may find in the application, we lay a ground for believing that cases of apparent evil, for which *we* can suggest no particular reason, are governed by reasons which are more general, which lie deeper in the order of second causes, and which on that account are removed to a greater distance from us.

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* Balguy on the Divine Benevolence.

The doctrine of *imperfections*, or, as it is called, of evils of imperfection, furnishes an account, founded, like the former, in views of universal nature. The doctrine is briefly this: it is probable that creation may be better replenished by sensitive beings of different sorts, than by sensitive beings all of one sort. It is likewise probable, that it may be better replenished by different orders of beings rising one above another in gradation, than by beings possessed of equal degrees of perfection. Now, a gradation of such beings implies a gradation of imperfections. No class can justly complain of the imperfections which belong to its place in the scale, unless it were allowable for it to complain that a scale of being was appointed in nature; for which appointment there appear to be reasons of wisdom and goodness.

In like manner, *finiteness*, or what is resolvable into finiteness, in inanimate subjects, can never be a just subject of complaint; because if it were ever so, it would be always so: we mean, that we can never reasonably demand that things should be larger or more, when the same demand might be made, whatever the quantity or number was.

And to me it seems that the sense of mankind has so far acquiesced in these reasons, as that we seldom complain of evils of this class, when we clearly perceive them to be such. What I have to add, therefore, is, that we ought not to complain of some other evils which stand upon the same foot of vindication as evils of confessed imperfection. We never complain that the globe of our earth is too small, nor should we complain if it were even much smaller. But where is the difference to us, between a less globe, and part of the present being uninhabitable? The inhabitants of an island may be apt enough to murmur at the sterility of some parts of it, against its rocks, or sands, or swamps; but no one thinks himself authorized to murmur, simply because the island is not larger than it is. Yet these are the same griefs.

The above are the two metaphysical answers which have been given to this great question. They are not the worse for being metaphysical, provided they be founded—which I think they are—in right reasoning; but they are of a nature too wide to be brought under our survey, and it is often difficult to apply them in the detail. Our speculations, therefore, are perhaps better employed when they confine themselves within a narrower circle.

The observations which follow are of this more limited, but more determinate kind.

Of *bodily pain*, the principal observation, no doubt, is that which we have already made and already dwelt upon, namely, "that it is seldom the object of contrivance; that when it is so, the contrivance rests ultimately in good."

To which, however, may be added, that the annexing of pain to the means of destruction is a salutary provision; inasmuch as it teaches vigilance and caution: both gives notice of danger, and excites those endeavors which may be necessary to preservation. The evil consequence which sometimes arises from the want of that timely intimation of danger which pain gives, is known to the inhabitants of cold countries by the example of frost-bitten limbs. I have conversed with patients who had lost toes and fingers by this cause. They have in general told me, that they were totally unconscious of any local uneasiness at the time. Some I have heard declare, that while they were about their employment, neither their situation nor the state of the air was unpleasant. They felt no pain, they suspected no mischief, till, by the application of warmth, they discovered, too late, the fatal injury which some of their extremities had suffered. I say that this shows the use of pain, and that we stand in need of such a monitor. I believe also, that the use extends farther than we suppose, or can now trace; that to disagreeable sensations we and all animals owe, or have owed, many habits of action which are salutary, but which are become so familiar as not easily to be referred to their origin.

Pain also itself is not without its *alleviations*. It may be violent and frequent, but it is seldom both violent and long-continued; and its pauses and intermissions become positive pleasures. It has the power of shedding a satisfaction over intervals of ease, which I believe few enjoyments exceed. A man resting from a fit of the stone or gout is, for the time, in possession of feelings which undisturbed health cannot impart. They may be dearly bought, but still they are to be set against the price. And indeed it depends upon the duration and urgency of the pain, whether they be dearly bought or not. I am far from being sure that a man is not a gainer by suffering a moderate interruption of bodily ease for a couple of hours out of the four and twenty. Two very common observations favor this opinion: one is, that remissions of pain call forth, from those who experience them, stronger expressions of satisfaction and of gratitude towards both the author and the instruments of their relief, than are excited by advantages of any other kind; the second is, that the spirits of sick men do not sink in proportion to the acuteness of their sufferings, but rather appear to be roused and supported, not by pain, but by the high degree of comfort which they derive from its cessation, or even its subsidency, whenever that occurs; and which they taste with a relish that diffuses some portion of mental complacency over the whole of that mixed state of sensations in which disease has placed them.

In connection with bodily pain may be considered bodily *disease*, whether painful or not. Few diseases are fatal. I have before me the account of a dispensary in the neighborhood, which states six years' experience as follows:

Admitted, ...	6,420
Cured, ...	5,476
Dead, ...	234

And this I suppose nearly to agree with what other similar institutions exhibit. Now, in all these cases, some disorder must have been felt, or the patients would not have applied for a remedy; yet we see how large a proportion of the maladies which were brought forward, have either yielded to proper treatment, or, what is more probable, ceased of their own accord. We owe these frequent recoveries, and, where recovery does not take place, this patience of the human constitution under many of the distempers by which it is visited, to two benefactions of our nature. One is, that she works within certain limits, allows of a certain latitude within which health may be preserved, and within the confines of which it only suffers a graduated diminution. Different quantities of food, different degrees of exercise, different portions of sleep, different states of the atmosphere, are compatible with the possession of health. So likewise it is with the secretions and excretions, with many internal functions of the body, and with the state, probably, of most of its internal organs. They may vary considerably, not only without destroying life, but without occasioning any high degree of inconveniency. The other property of our nature, to which we are still more beholden, is its constant endeavor to restore itself, when disordered, to its regular course. The fluids of the body appear to possess a power of separating and expelling any noxious substance which may have mixed itself with them. This they do, in eruptive fevers, by a kind of despumation, as Sydenham calls it, analogous in some measure to the intestine action by which fermenting liquors work the yeast to the surface. The solids, on their part, when their action is obstructed, not only resume that action as soon as the obstruction is removed, but they struggle with the impediment. They take an action as near to the true one as the difficulty and the disorganization with which they have to contend will allow of.

Of *mortal* diseases, the great use is to reconcile us to death. The horror of death proves the value of life. But it is in the power of disease to abate, or even extinguish this horror; which it does in a wonderful manner, and oftentimes by a mild and imperceptible gradation. Every man who has been placed in a situation to observe it, is surprised with the change which has been wrought in himself, when he compares the view which he entertains of death upon a sick-bed, with the heart-sinking dismay with which he should some time ago have met it in health. There is no similitude between the sensations of a man led to execution and the calm expiring of a patient at the close of his disease. Death to him is only the last of a long train of changes; in his progress through which, it is possible that he may experience no shocks or sudden transitions.

Death itself, as a mode of removal and of succession, is so connected with the whole order of our animal world, that almost every thing in that world must be changed, to be able to do without it. It may seem likewise impossible to separate the fear of death from the enjoyment of life, or the perception of that fear from rational natures. Brutes are in a great measure delivered from all anxiety on this account by the inferiority of their faculties; or rather, they seem to be armed with the apprehension of death just sufficiently to put them upon the means of preservation, and no further. But would a human being wish to purchase this immunity at the expense of those mental powers which enable him to look forward to the future?

Death implies *separation;* and the loss of those whom we love must necessarily, so far as we can conceive, be accompanied with pain. To the brute creation, nature seems to have stepped in with some secret provision for their relief, under the rupture of their attachments. In their instincts towards their offspring, and of their offspring to them, I have often been surprised to observe how ardently they love and how soon they forget. The pertinacity of human sorrow—upon which time also at length lays its softening hand—is probably, therefore, in some manner connected with the qualities of our rational or moral nature. One thing however is clear, namely, that it is better that we should possess affections, the sources of so many virtues and so many joys, although they be exposed to the incidents of life as well as the interruptions of mortality, than, by the want of them, be reduced to a state of selfishness, apathy, and quietism.

Of other external evils—still confining ourselves to what are called physical or natural evils—a considerable part come within the scope of the following observation: the great principle of human satisfaction is *engagement*. It is a most just distinction, which the late Mr. Tucker has dwelt upon so largely in his works, between pleasures in which we are passive and pleasures in which we are active. And I believe every attentive observer of human life will assent to his position, that however grateful the sensations may occasionally be in which we are passive, it is not these, but the latter class of our pleasures, which constitute satisfaction—which supply that regular stream of moderate and miscellaneous enjoyments in which happiness, as distinguished from voluptuousness, consists. Now for rational occupation, which is, in other words, the very material of contented existence, there would be no place left, if either the things with which we had to do were absolutely impracticable to our endeavors, or if they were too obedient to our uses. A world furnished with advantages on one side, and beset with difficulties, wants, and inconveniences on the other, is the proper abode of free, rational, and active natures, being the fittest to stimulate and exercise their faculties. The very *refractoriness* of the objects they have to deal with, contributes to this purpose. A world in which nothing depended upon ourselves, however it might have suited an imaginary race of beings, would not have suited mankind. Their skill, prudence, industry—their various arts and their best attainments, from the application of which they draw, if not their highest, their most permanent gratifications, would be insignificant, if things could be either moulded by our volitions, or, of their own accord, conformed themselves to our views and wishes. Now it is in this refractoriness that we discern the seed and principle of *physical* evil, as far as it arises from that which is external to us.

Civil evils, or the evils of civil life, are much more easily disposed of than physical evils; because they are, in truth, of much less magnitude, and also because they result, by a kind of necessity, not only from the constitution of our nature, but from a part of that constitution which no one would wish to see altered. The case is this: mankind will in every country *breed up* to a certain point of distress. That point may be different in different countries or ages, according to the established usages of life in each. It will also shift upon the scale, so as to admit of a greater or less number of inhabitants, according as the quantity of provision, which is either produced in the country, or supplied to it from other countries, may happen to vary. But there must always be such a point, and the species will always breed up to it. The order of generation proceeds by something like a geometrical progression. The increase of provision, under circumstances even the most advantageous, can only assume the form of an arithmetic series. Whence it follows that the population will always overtake the provision, will pass beyond the line of plenty, and will continue to increase till checked by the difficulty of procuring subsistence.* Such difficulty, therefore, along with its attendant circumstances, *must* be found in every old country; and these circumstances constitute what we call poverty, which necessarily imposes labor, servitude, restraint.

It seems impossible to people a country with inhabitants who shall be all easy in circumstances. For suppose the thing to be done, there would be such marrying and giving in marriage among them, as would in a few years change the face of affairs entirely; that is, as would increase the consumption of those articles which supplied the natural or habitual wants of the country to such a degree of scarcity, as must leave the greatest part of the inhabitants unable to procure them without toilsome endeavors; or, out of the different kinds of these articles, to procure any kind except that which was most easily produced. And this, in fact, describes the condition of the mass of the community in all countries: a condition unavoidably, as it should seem, resulting from the provision which is made in the human, in common with all animal constitutions, for the perpetuity and multiplication of the species.

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* See a statement of this subject in a late treatise upon population.

It need not however dishearten any endeavors for the public service, to know that population naturally treads upon the heels of improvement. If the condition of a people be meliorated, the consequence will be, either that the *mean* happiness will be increased, or a greater number partake of it; or, which is most likely to happen, that both effects will take place together. There may be limits fixed by nature to both, but they are limits not yet attained, nor even approached, in any country of the world.

And when we speak of limits at all, we have respect only to provisions for animal wants. There are sources, and means, and auxiliaries, and augmentations of human happiness, communicable without restriction of numbers; as capable of being possessed by a thousand persons as by one. Such are those which flow from a mild, contrasted with a tyrannic government, whether civil or domestic; those which spring from religion; those which grow out of a sense of security; those which depend upon habits of virtue, sobriety, moderation, order; those, lastly, which are found in the possession of well-directed tastes and desires, compared with the dominion of tormenting, pernicious, contradictory, unsatisfied, and unsatisfiable passions.

The *distinctions* of civil life are apt enough to be regarded as evils by those who sit under them; but, in my opinion, with very little reason.

In the first place, the advantages which the higher conditions of life are supposed to confer, bear no proportion in value to the advantages which are bestowed by nature. The gifts of nature always surpass the gifts of fortune. How much, for example, is activity better than attendance; beauty than dress; appetite, digestion, and tranquil bowels, than all the studies of cookery, or than the most costly compilation of forced or far-fetched dainties!

Nature has a strong tendency to equalization. Habit, the instrument of nature, is a great leveller; the familiarity which it induces taking off the edge both of our pleasures and our sufferings. Indulgences which are habitual, keep us in ease, and cannot be carried much further. So that with respect to the gratifications of which the senses are capable, the difference is by no means proportionable to the apparatus. Nay, so far as superfluity generates fastidiousness, the difference is on the wrong side.

It is not necessary to contend, that the advantages derived from wealth are none—under due regulations they are certainly considerable—but that they are not greater than they ought to be. *Money* is the sweetener of human toil; the substitute for coercion; the reconciler of labor with liberty. It is, moreover, the stimulant of enterprise in all projects and undertakings, as well as of diligence in the most beneficial arts and employments. Now, did affluence, when possessed, contribute nothing to happiness, or nothing beyond the mere supply of necessaries, and the secret should come to be discovered, we might be in danger of losing great part of the uses which are at present derived to us through this important medium. Not only would the tranquillity of social life be put in peril by the want of a motive to attach men to their private concerns; but the satisfaction which all men receive from success in their respective occupations, which collectively constitutes the great mass of human comfort, would be done away in its very principle.

With respect to *station*, as it is distinguished from riches, whether it confer authority over others, or be invested with honors which apply solely to sentiment and imagination, the truth is, that what is gained by rising through the ranks of life, is not more than sufficient to draw forth the exertions of those who are engaged in the pursuits which lead to advancement, and which, in general, are such as ought to be encouraged. Distinctions of this sort are subjects much more of competition than of enjoyment; and in that competition their use consists. It is not, as has been rightly observed, by what the *lord mayor* feels in his coach, but by what the *apprentice* feels who gazes at him, that the public is served.

As we approach the summits of human greatness, the comparison of good and evil, with respect to personal comfort, becomes still more problematical; even allowing to ambition all its pleasures. The poet asks, "What is grandeur, what is power?" The philosopher answers, "Constraint and plague: *et in maxima quaque fortuna minimum licere.*" One very common error misleads the opinion of mankind on this head; namely, that, universally, authority is pleasant, submission painful. In the general course of human affairs, the very reverse of this is nearer the truth. Command is anxiety, obedience ease.

Artificial distinctions sometimes promote real equality. Whether they be hereditary, or be the homage paid to office, or the respect attached by public opinion to particular professions, they serve to *confront* that grand and unavoidable distinction which arises from property, and which is most overbearing where there is no other. It is of the nature of property, not only to be irregularly distributed, but to run into large masses. Public laws should be so constructed as to favor its diffusion as much as they can. But all that can be done by laws, consistently with that degree of government of his property which ought to be left to the subject, will not be sufficient to counteract this tendency. There must always, therefore, be the difference between rich and poor; and this difference will be the more grinding when no pretension is allowed to be set up against it.

So that the evils, if evils they must be called, which spring either from the necessary subordinations of civil life, or from the distinctions which have naturally, though not necessarily, grown up in most societies, so long as they are unaccompanied by privileges injurious or oppressive to the rest of the community, are such as may, even by the most depressed ranks, be endured with very little prejudice to their comfort.

The mischiefs of which mankind are the occasion to one another, by their private wickednesses and cruelties; by tyrannical exercises of power; by rebellions against just authority; by wars; by national jealousies and competitions operating to the destruction of third countries; or by other instances of misconduct either in individuals or societies, are all to be resolved into the character of man as a *free agent.* Free agency, in its very essence, contains liability to abuse. Yet, if you deprive man of his free agency, you subvert his nature. You may have order from him and regularity, as you may from the tides or the trade-winds, but you put an end to his moral character, to virtue, to merit, to accountableness, to the use indeed of reason. To which must be added the observation, that even the bad qualities of mankind have an origin in their good ones. The case is this: human passions are either necessary to human welfare, or capable of being made, and, in a great majority of instances, in fact are made, conducive to its happiness. These passions are strong and general; and perhaps would not answer their purpose unless they were so. But strength and generality, when it is expedient that particular circumstances should be respected, become, if left to themselves, excess and misdirection: from which excess and misdirection, the vices of mankind, the causes, no doubt, of much misery, appear to spring. This account, while it shows us the principle of vice, shows us, at the same time, the province of reason and of self-government; the want also of every support which can be procured to either from the aids of religion; and it shows this, without having recourse to any native, gratuitous malignity in the human constitution. Mr. Hume, in his posthumous dialogues, asserts, indeed, of *idleness*, or aversion to labor—which he states to lie at the root of a considerable part of the evils which mankind suffer—that it is simply and merely bad. But how does he distinguish idleness from the love of ease? Or is he sure that the love of ease in individuals is not the chief foundation of social tranquillity? It will be found, I believe, to be true, that in every community there is a large class of its members whose idleness is the best quality about them, being the corrective of other bad ones. If it were possible, in every instance, to give a right determination to industry, we could never have too much of it. But this is not possible, if men are to be free. And without this, nothing would be so dangerous as an incessant, universal, indefatigable activity. In the civil world, as well as in the material, it is the *vis inertiæ* which keeps things in their places.

NATURAL THEOLOGY has ever been pressed with this question: Why, under the regency of a supreme and benevolent Will, should there be in the world so much as there is of the appearance of *chance?*

The question in its whole compass lies beyond our reach; but there are not wanting, as in the origin of evil, answers which seem to have considerable weight in particular cases, and also to embrace a considerable number of cases.

I. There must be *chance* in the midst of design; by which we mean, that events which are not designed, necessarily arise from the pursuit of events which are designed. One man travelling to York, meets another man travelling to London. Their meeting is by chance, is accidental, and so would be called and reckoned, though the journeys which produced the meeting were, both of them, undertaken with design and from deliberation. The meeting, though accidental, was nevertheless hypothetically necessary—which is the only sort of necessity that is intelligible—for if the two journeys were commenced at the time, pursued in the direction, and with the speed in which and with which they were in fact begun and performed, the meeting could not be avoided. There was not, therefore, the less necessity in it for its being by chance. Again, the rencounter might be most unfortunate, though the errand upon which each party set out upon his journey were the most innocent or the most laudable. The by-effect may be unfavorable, without impeachment of the proper purpose, for the sake of which the train, from the operation of which these consequences ensued, was put in motion. Although no cause acts without a good purpose, accidental consequences, like these, may be either good or bad.

II. The *appearance of chance* will always bear a proportion to the ignorance of the observer. The cast of a die as regularly follows the laws of motion, as the going of a watch; yet, because we can trace the operation of those laws through the works and movements of the watch, and cannot trace them in the shaking or throwing of the die—though the laws be the same, and prevail equally in both cases—we call the turning up of the number of the die chance, the pointing of the index of the watch machinery, order, or by some name which excludes chance. It is the same in those events which depend upon the will of a free and rational agent. The verdict of a jury, the sentence of a judge, the resolution of an assembly, the issue of a contested election, will have more or less the appearance of chance, might be more or less the subject of a wager, according as we were less or more acquainted with the reasons which influenced the deliberation. The difference resides in the information of the observer, and not in the thing itself; which, in all the cases proposed, proceeds from intelligence, from mind, from counsel, from design.

Now, when this one cause of the appearance of chance, namely, the ignorance of the observer, comes to be applied to the operations of the Deity, it is easy to foresee how fruitful it must prove of difficulties and of seeming confusion. It is only to think of the Deity, to perceive what variety of objects, what distance of time, what extent of space and action, his counsels may, or rather must, comprehend. Can it be wondered at, that, of the purposes which dwell in such a mind as this, so small a part should be known to us? It is only necessary, therefore, to bear in our thought, that in proportion to the inadequateness of our information, will be the quantity in the world of apparent chance.

III. In a great variety of cases, and of cases comprehending numerous subdivisions, it appears, for many reasons, to be better that events rise up by *chance*, or, more properly speaking, with the appearance of chance, than according to any observable rule whatever. This is not seldom the case, even in human arrangements. Each person's place and precedency, in a public meeting, may be determined by *lot*. Work and labor may be *allotted*. Tasks and burdens may be *allotted:*

> —— —— Operumque laborem
> Partibus æquabat justis, aut *sorte* trahebat.

Military service and station may be *allotted*. The distribution of provision may be made by *lot*, as it is in a sailor's mess; in some cases also, the distribution of favors may be made by *lot*. In all these cases it seems to be acknowledged, that there are advantages in permitting events to chance, superior to those which would or could arise from regulation. In all these cases also, though events rise up in the way of chance, it is by appointment that they do so.

In other events, and such as are independent of human will, the reasons for this preference of uncertainty to rule appear to be still stronger. For example, it seems to be expedient that the period of human life should be *uncertain*. Did mortality follow any fixed rule, it would produce a security in those that were at a distance from it, which would lead to the greatest disorders; and a horror in those who approached it, similar to that which a condemned prisoner feels on the night before his execution. But, that death be uncertain, the young must sometimes die as well as the old. Also, were deaths never *sudden*, they who are in health would be too confident of life. The strong and the active, who want most to be warned and checked, would live without apprehension or restraint. On the other hand, were sudden deaths very frequent, the sense of constant jeopardy would interfere too much with the degree of ease and enjoyment intended for us; and human life be too precarious for the business and interests which belong to it. There could not be dependence either upon our own lives, or the lives of those with whom we were connected, sufficient to carry on the regular offices of human society. The manner, therefore, in which death is made to occur, conduces to the purposes of admonition, without overthrowing the necessary stability of human affairs.

Disease being the forerunner of death, there is the same reason for its attacks coming upon us under the appearance of chance, as there is for uncertainty in the time of death itself.

The *seasons* are a mixture of regularity and chance. They are regular enough to authorize expectation, while their being, in a considerable degree, irregular, induces, on the part of the cultivators of the soil, a necessity for personal attendance, for activity, vigilance, precaution. It is this necessity which creates farmers; which divides the profit of the soil between the owner and the occupier; which by requiring expedients, by increasing employment, and by rewarding expenditure, promotes agricultural arts and agricultural life—of all modes of life the best, being the most conducive to health, to virtue, to enjoyment. I believe it to be found in fact, that where the soil is the most fruitful, and the seasons the most constant, there the condition of the cultivators of the earth is the most depressed. Uncertainty, therefore, has its use even to those who sometimes complain of it the most. Seasons of scarcity themselves are not without their advantages. They call forth new exertions; they set contrivance and ingenuity at work; they give birth to improvements in agriculture and economy; they promote investigation and management of public resources.

Again, there are strong intelligible reasons why there should exist in human society great disparity of *wealth* and *station;* not only as these things are acquired in different degrees, but at the first setting out of life. In order, for instance, to answer the various demands of civil life, there ought to be among the members of every civil society a diversity of education, which can only belong to an original diversity of circumstances. As this sort of disparity, which ought to take place from the beginning of life, must, *ex hypothesi*, be previous to the merit or demerit of the persons upon whom it falls, can it be better disposed of than by chance? *Parentage* is that sort of chance; yet it is the commanding circumstance which, in general, fixes each man's place in civil life, along with every thing which appertains to its distinctions. It may be the result of a beneficial rule, that the fortunes or honors of the father devolve upon the son; and, as it should seem, of a still more necessary rule, that the low or laborious condition of the parent be communicated to his family; but with respect to the successor himself, it is the drawing of a ticket in a lottery. Inequalities, therefore, of fortune, at least the greatest part of them, namely, those which attend us from our birth and depend upon our birth, may be left as they are left, to *chance*, without any just cause for questioning the regency of a supreme Disposer of events.

But not only the donation, when by the necessity of the case they must be gifts, but even the *acquirability* of civil advantages, ought perhaps, in a considerable degree, to lie at the mercy of chance. Some would have all the virtuous rich, or at least removed from the evils of poverty; without perceiving, I suppose, the consequence, that all the poor must be wicked. And how such a society could be kept in subjection to government has not been shown; for the poor, that is, they who seek their subsistence by constant manual labor, must still form the mass of the community; otherwise the necessary labor of life could not be carried on—the work could not be done which the wants of mankind in a state of civilization, and still more in a state of refinement, require to be done.

It appears to be also true, that the exigencies of social life call not only for an original diversity of *external* circumstances, but for a mixture of different faculties, tastes, and tempers. Activity and contemplation, restlessness and quiet, courage and timidity, ambition and contentedness, not to say even indolence and dulness, are all wanted in the world, all conduce to the well going on of human affairs; just as the rudder, the sails, and the ballast of a ship all perform their part in the navigation. Now, since these characters require for their foundation different original talents, different dispositions, perhaps also different bodily constitutions; and since, likewise, it is apparently expedient that they be promiscuously scattered among the different classes of society; can the distribution of talents, dispositions, and the constitutions upon which they depend, be better made than by *chance?*

The *opposites* of apparent chance are constancy and sensible interposition; every degree of *secret* direction being consistent with it. Now, of *constancy*, or of fixed and known rules, we have seen in some cases the inapplicability; and inconveniences which we do not see, might attend their application in other cases.

Of *sensible* interposition we may be permitted to remark, that a providence, always and certainly distinguishable, would be neither more nor less than miracles rendered frequent and common. It is difficult to judge of the state into which this would throw us. It is enough to say, that it would cast us upon a quite different dispensation from that under which we live. It would be a total and radical change. And the change would deeply affect, or perhaps subvert, the whole conduct of human affairs. I can readily believe that, other circumstances being adapted to it, such a state might be better than our present state. It may be the state of other beings—it may be ours hereafter; but the question with which we are now concerned is, how far it would be consistent with our condition, supposing it in other respects to remain as it is? And in this question there seem to be reasons of great moment on the negative side. For instance, so long as bodily labor continues on so many accounts to be necessary for the bulk of mankind, any dependency upon supernatural aid, by unfixing those motives which promote exertion, or by relaxing those habits which engender patient industry, might introduce negligence, inactivity, and disorder, into the most useful occupations of human life; and thereby deteriorate the condition of human life itself.

As moral agents, we should experience a still greater alteration; of which more will be said under the next article.

Although, therefore, the Deity, who possesses the power of winding and turning, as he pleases, the course of causes which issue from himself, do in fact interpose to alter or intercept effects which, without such interposition, would have taken place; yet it is by no means incredible that his providence, which always rests upon final good, may have made a *reserve* with respect to the manifestation of his interference, a part of the very plan which he has appointed for our terrestrial existence, and a part conformable with, or in some sort required by, other parts of the same plan. It is at any rate evident, that a large and ample province remains for the exercise of providence without its being naturally perceptible by us; because obscurity, when applied to the interruption of laws, bears a necessary proportion to the imperfection of our knowledge when applied to the laws themselves, or rather to the effects which these laws, under their various and incalculable combinations, would of their own accord produce. And if it be said that the doctrine of divine Providence, by reason of the ambiguity under which its exertions present themselves, can be attended with no *practical* influence upon our conduct—that, although we believe ever so firmly that there is a Providence, we must prepare and provide and act as if there were none, I answer that this is admitted; and that we further allege, that so to prepare, and so to provide, is consistent with the most perfect assurance of the reality of a Providence; and not only so, but that it is probably one advantage of the present state of our information, that our provisions and preparations are not disturbed by it. Or if it be still asked, Of what use at all, then, is the doctrine, if it neither alter our measures nor regulate our conduct? I answer again, that it is of the greatest use, but that it is a doctrine of sentiment and piety, not—immediately at least—of action or conduct; that it applies to the consolation of men's minds, to their devotions, to the excitement of gratitude, the support of patience, the keeping alive and the strengthening of every motive for endeavoring to please our Maker; and that these are great uses.

Of ALL VIEWS under which human life has ever been considered, the most reasonable, in my judgment, is that which regards it as a state of *probation.* If the course of the world was separated from the contrivances of nature, I do not know that it would be necessary to look for any other account of it than what, if it may be called an account, is contained in the answer, that events rise up by chance. But since the contrivances of nature decidedly evince *intention;* and since the course of the world and the contrivances of nature have the same author, we are, by the force of this connection, led to believe that the appearance under which events take place is reconcilable with the supposition of design on the part of the Deity. It is enough that they be reconcilable with this supposition; and it is undoubtedly true that they may be reconcilable, though we cannot reconcile them. The mind, however, which contemplates the works of nature, and in those works sees so much of means directed to ends, of beneficial effects brought about by wise expedients, of concerted trains of causes terminating in the happiest results; so much, in a word, of counsel, intention, and benevolence: a mind, I say, drawn into the habit of thought which these observations excite, can hardly turn its view to the condition of our own species without endeavoring to suggest to itself some purpose, some design, for which the state in which we are placed is fitted, and which it is made to serve. Now we assert the most probable supposition to be, that it is a state of moral probation; and that many things in it suit with this hypothesis which suit no other. It is not a state of unmixed happiness, or of happiness simply; it is not a state of designed misery, or of misery simply; it is not a state of retribution; it is not a state of punishment. It suits with none of these suppositions. It accords much better with the idea of its being a condition calculated for the production, exercise, and improvement of moral qualities, with a view to a future state, in which these qualities, after being so produced, exercised, and improved, may, by a new and more favorable constitution of things, receive their reward, or become their own. If it be said, that this is to enter upon a religious rather than a philosophical consideration, I answer, that the name of religion ought to form no objection, if it shall turn out to be the case that the more religious our views are, the more probability they contain. The degree of beneficence, of benevolent intention, and of power, exercised in the construction of sensitive beings, goes strongly in favor, not only of a creative but of a continuing care, that is, of a ruling Providence. The degree of chance which appears to prevail in the world requires to be reconciled with this hypothesis. Now it is one thing to maintain the doctrine of Providence along with that of a future state, and another thing without it. In my opinion, the two doctrines must stand or fall together. For although more of this apparent chance may perhaps, upon other principles, be accounted for than is generally supposed, yet a future state alone rectifies all disorders; and if it can be shown that the appearance of disorder is consistent with the uses of life as a *preparatory* state, or that in some respects it promotes these uses, then, so far as this hypothesis may be accepted, the ground of the difficulty is done away.

In the wide scale of human condition, there is not perhaps one of its manifold diversities which does not bear upon the design here suggested. Virtue is infinitely various. There is no situation in which a rational being is placed, from that of the best-instructed Christian down to the condition of the rudest barbarian, which affords not room for moral agency, for the acquisition, exercise, and display of voluntary qualities, good and bad. Health and sickness, enjoyment and suffering, riches and poverty, knowledge and ignorance, power and subjection, liberty and bondage, civilization and barbarity, have all their offices and duties, all serve for the *formation* of character; for when we speak of a state of trial, it must be remembered that characters are not only tried or proved or detected, but that they are generated also and *formed* by circumstances. The best dispositions may subsist under the most depressed, the most afflicted fortunes. A West Indian slave, who, amid his wrongs, retains his benevolence, I for my part look upon as among the foremost of human candidates for the rewards of virtue. The kind master of such a slave, that is, he who, in the exercise of an inordinate authority, postpones in any degree his own interest to his slave's comfort, is likewise a meritorious character; but still he is inferior to his slave. All, however, which I contend for, is, that these destinies, opposite as they may be in every other view, are both *trials*, and equally such. The observation may be applied to every other condition; to the whole range of the scale, not excepting even its lowest extremity. *Savages* appear to us all alike; but it is owing to the distance at which we view savage life, that we perceive in it no discrimination of character. I make no doubt but that moral qualities both good and bad are called into action as much, and that they subsist in as great variety in these inartificial societies, as they are or do in polished life. Certain at least it is, that the good and ill treatment which each individual meets with, depends more upon the choice and voluntary conduct of those about him, than it does, or ought to do, under regular civil institutions and the coercion of public laws. So again, to turn our eyes to the other end of the scale, namely, that part of it which is occupied by mankind enjoying the benefits of learning, together with the lights of revelation, there also the advantage is all along *probationary.* Christianity itself—I mean, the revelation of Christianity—is not only a blessing but a trial. It is one of the diversified means by which the character is exercised; and they who require of Christianity, that the revelation of it should be universal, may possibly be found to require that one species of probation should be adopted, if not to the exclusion of others, at least to the narrowing of that variety which the wisdom of the Deity has appointed to this part of his moral economy.*

Now, if this supposition be well founded, that is, if it be true that our ultimate or our most permanent happiness will depend, not upon the temporary condition into which we are cast, but upon our behavior in it, then is it a much more fit subject of *chance* than we usually allow or apprehend it to be, in what manner the variety of external circumstances which subsist in the human world is distributed among the individuals of the species. "This life being a state of probation, it is immaterial," says Rousseau, "what kind of trials we experience in it, provided they produce their effects." Of two agents who stand indifferent to the moral Governor of the universe, one may be exercised by riches, the other by poverty. The treatment of these two shall appear to be very opposite, while in truth it is the same; for though, in many respects, there be great disparity between the conditions assigned, in one main article there may be none, namely, in that they are alike trials—have both their duties and temptations, not less arduous or less dangerous in one case than the other; so that if the final award follow the character, the original distribution of the circumstances under which that character is formed, may be defended upon principles not only of justice, but of equality. What hinders, therefore, but that mankind may draw lots for their condition? They take their portion of faculties and opportunities, as any unknown cause or concourse of causes, or as causes acting for other purposes, may happen to set them out; but the event is governed by that which depends upon themselves—the application of what they have received. In dividing the talents, no rule was observed—none was necessary; in rewarding the use of them, that of the most correct justice. The chief difference at last appears to be, that the right use of more talents, that is, of a greater trust, will be more highly rewarded than the right use of fewer talents, that is, of a less trust. And since, for other purposes, it is expedient that there be an inequality of concredited talents here, as well probably as an inequality of conditions hereafter, though all remuneratory; can any rule adapted to that inequality be more agreeable, even to our apprehensions of distributive justice, than this is?

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* The reader will observe that I speak of the revelation of Christianity as distinct from Christianity itself. The *dispensation* may already be universal. That part of mankind which never heard of Christ's name, may nevertheless be redeemed; that is, be placed in a better condition, with respect to their future state, by his intervention; may be the objects of his benignity and intercession, as well as of the propitiatory virtue of his passion. But this is not "natural theology;" therefore I will not dwell longer upon it.

We have said that the appearance of *casualty* which attends the occurrences and events of life, not only does not interfere with its uses as a state of probation, but that it promotes these uses.

Passive virtues—of all virtues the severest and the most sublime, and of all, perhaps, the most acceptable to the Deity—would, it is evident, be excluded from a constitution in which happiness and misery regularly followed virtue and vice. Patience and composure under distress, affliction, and pain; a steadfast keeping up of our confidence in God, and of our reliance upon his final goodness, at the time when every thing present is adverse and discouraging, and—what is no less difficult to retain—a cordial desire for the happiness of others, even when we are deprived of our own—these dispositions, which constitute perhaps the perfection of our moral nature, would not have found their proper office and object in a state of avowed retribution; and in which, consequently, endurance of evil would be only submission to punishment.

Again, one man's sufferings may be another man's trial. The family of a sick parent is a school of filial piety. The charities of domestic life, and not only these, but all the social virtues, are called out by distress. But then misery, to be the proper object of mitigation, or of that benevolence which endeavors to relieve, must be really or apparently casual. It is upon such sufferings alone that benevolence can operate. For were there no evils in the world but what were punishments properly and intelligibly such, benevolence would only stand in the way of justice. Such evils, consistently with the administration of moral government, could not be prevented or alleviated; that is to say, could not be remitted in whole or in part, except by the authority which inflicted them, or by an appellate or superior authority. This consideration, which is founded in our most acknowledged apprehensions of the nature of penal justice, may possess its weight in the divine counsels. Virtue perhaps is the greatest of all ends. In human beings, relative virtues form a large part of the whole. Now, relative virtue presupposes not only the existence of evil, without which it could have no object, no material to work upon, but that evils be apparently, at least, *misfortunes;* that is, the effects of apparent chance. It may be in pursuance, therefore, and in furtherance of the same scheme of probation, that the evils of life are made so to present themselves.

I have already observed, that when we let in religious considerations, we often let in light upon the difficulties of nature. So, in the fact now to be accounted for, the *degree* of happiness which we usually enjoy in this life may be better suited to a state of trial and probation than a greater degree would be. The truth is, we are rather too much delighted with the world than too little. Imperfect, broken, and precarious as our pleasures are, they are more than sufficient to attach us to the eager pursuit of them. A regard to a *future* state can hardly keep its place as it is. If we were designed therefore to be influenced by that regard, might not a more indulgent system, a higher or more uninterrupted state of gratification, have interfered with the design? At least, it seems expedient that mankind should be susceptible of this influence, when presented to them; that the condition of the world should not be such as to exclude its operation, or even to weaken it more than it does. In a religious view, however we may complain of them in every other, privation, disappointment, and satiety are not without the most salutary tendencies.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CONCLUSION.

In all cases wherein the mind feels itself in danger of being confounded by variety, it is sure to rest upon a few strong points, or perhaps upon a single instance. Among a multitude of proofs, it is *one* that does the business. If we observe in any argument that hardly two minds fix upon the same instance, the diversity of choice shows the strength of the argument, because it shows the number and competition of the examples. There is no subject in which the tendency to dwell upon select or single topics is so usual, because there is no subject of which, in its full extent, the latitude is so great, as that of natural history applied to the proof of an intelligent Creator. For my part, I take my stand in human anatomy; and the examples of mechanism I should be apt to draw out from the copious catalogue which it supplies, are the pivot upon which the head turns, the ligaments within the socket of the hip-joint, the pulley or trochlear muscles of the eye, the epiglottis, the bandages which tie down the tendons of the wrist and instep, the slit or perforated muscles at the hands and feet, the knitting of the intestines to the mesentery, the course of the chyle into the blood, and the constitution of the sexes as extended throughout the whole of the animal creation. To these instances the reader's memory will go back, as they are severally set forth in their places: there is not one of the number which I do not think decisive—not one which is not strictly mechanical; nor have I read or heard of any solution of these appearances, which in the smallest degree shakes the conclusion that we build upon them.

But of the greatest part of those who, either in this book or any other, read arguments to prove the existence of a God, it will be said, that they leave off only where they began; that they were never ignorant of this great truth, never doubted of it; that it does not therefore appear what is gained by researches from which no new opinion is learned, and upon the subject of which no proofs were wanted. Now, I answer, that by *investigation*, the following points are always gained in favor of doctrines even the most generally acknowledged, supposing them to be true, namely, stability and impression. Occasions will arise to try the firmness of our most habitual opinions. And upon these occasions it is a matter of incalculable use to feel our foundation, to find a support in argument for what we had taken up upon authority. In the present case, the arguments upon which the conclusion rests are exactly such as a truth of universal concern ought to rest upon. "They are sufficiently open to the views and capacities of the unlearned, at the same time that they acquire new strength and lustre from the discoveries of the learned." If they had been altogether abstruse and recondite, they would not have found their way to the understandings of the mass of mankind; if they had been merely popular, they might have wanted solidity.

But, secondly, what is gained by research in the stability of our conclusion, is also gained from it in *impression.* Physicians tell us, that there is a great deal of difference between taking a medicine, and the medicine getting into the constitution; a difference not unlike which, obtains with respect to those great moral propositions which ought to form the directing principles of human conduct. It is one thing to assent to a proposition of this sort; another, and a very different thing. to have properly imbibed its influence. I take the case to be this: perhaps almost every man living has a particular train of thought, into which his mind glides and falls, when at leisure from the impressions and ideas that occasionally excite it: perhaps, also, the train of thought here spoken of, more than any other thing, determines the character. It is of the utmost consequence, therefore, that this property of our constitution be well regulated. Now it is by frequent or continued meditation upon a subject, by placing a subject in different points of view, by induction of particulars, by variety of examples, by applying principles to the solution of phenomena, by dwelling upon proofs and consequences, that mental exercise is drawn into any particular channel. It is by these means, at least, that we have any power over it. The train of spontaneous thought, and the choice of that train, may be directed to different ends, and may appear to be more or less judiciously fixed, according to the purpose in respect of which we consider it; but, in a *moral view*, I shall not, I believe, be contradicted when I say, that if one train of thinking be more desirable than another, it is that which regards the phenomena of nature with a constant reference to a supreme intelligent Author. To have made this the ruling, the habitual sentiment of our minds, is to have laid the foundation of every thing which is religious. The world thenceforth becomes a temple, and life itself one continued act of adoration. The change is no less than this: that whereas formerly God was seldom in our thoughts, we can now scarcely look upon any thing without perceiving its relation to him. Every organized natural body, in the provisions which it contains for its sustentation and propagation, testifies a care, on the part of the Creator, expressly directed to these purposes. We are on all sides surrounded by such bodies: examined in their parts, wonderfully curious; compared with one another, no less wonderfully diversified. So that the mind, as well as the eye, may either expatiate in variety and multitude, or fix itself down to the investigation of particular divisions of the science. And in either case it will rise up from its occupation, possessed by the subject in a very different manner, and with a very different degree of influence, from what a mere assent to any verbal proposition which can be formed concerning the existence of the Deity—at least that merely complying assent with which those about us are satisfied, and with which we are too apt to satisfy ourselves—will or can produce upon the thoughts. More especially may this difference be perceived in the degree of admiration and of awe with which the Divinity is regarded, when represented to the understanding by its own remarks, its own reflections, and its own reasonings, compared with what is excited by any language that can be used by others. The works of nature want only to be contemplated. When contemplated, they have every thing in them which can astonish by their greatness; for, of the vast scale of operation through which our discoveries carry us, at one end we see an intelligent Power arranging planetary systems, fixing, for instance, the trajectory of *Saturn*, or constructing a ring of two hundred thousand miles diameter, to surround his body, and be suspended like a magnificent arch over the heads of his inhabitants; and, at the other, bending a hooked tooth, concerting and providing an appropriate mechanism for the clasping and reclasping of the filaments of the feather of the humming-bird. We have proof, not only of both these works proceeding from an intelligent agent, but of their proceeding from the same agent: for, in the first place, we can trace an identity of plan, a connection of system, from Saturn to our own globe; and when arrived upon our globe, we can, in the second place, pursue the connection through all the organized, especially the animated bodies which it supports. We can observe marks of a common relation, as well to one another as to the elements of which their habitation is composed Therefore one mind has planned, or at least has prescribed a general plan for all these productions. One Being has been concerned in all.

Under this stupendous Being we live. Our happiness, our existence, is in his hand. All we expect must come from him. Nor ought we to feel our situation insecure. In every nature, and in every portion of nature which we can descry, we find attention bestowed upon even the minutest parts. The hinges in the wings of an *earwig*, and the joints of its antennæ, are as highly wrought as if the Creator had

had nothing else to finish. We see no signs of diminution of care by multiplicity of objects, or of distraction of thought by variety. We have no reason to fear, therefore, our being forgotten, or overlooked, or neglected.

The existence and character of the Deity is, in every view, the most interesting of all human speculations. In none, however, is it more so, than as it facilitates the belief of the fundamental articles of *revelation.* It is a step to have it proved, that there must be something in the world more than what we see. It is a further step to know, that among the invisible things of nature, there must be an intelligent mind concerned in its production, order, and support. These points being assured to us by natural theology, we may well leave to revelation the disclosure of many particulars which our researches cannot reach respecting either the nature of this Being as the original cause of all things, or his character and designs as a moral governor; and not only so, but the more full confirmation of other particulars, of which, though they do not lie altogether beyond our reasonings and our probabilities, the certainty is by no means equal to the importance. The true theist will be the first to listen to *any* credible communication of divine knowledge. Nothing which he has learnt from natural theology will diminish his desire of further instruction, or his disposition to receive it with humility and thankfulness. He wishes for light; he rejoices in light. His inward veneration of this great Being will incline him to attend with the utmost seriousness, not only to all that can be discovered concerning him by researches into nature, but to all that is taught by a revelation which gives reasonable proof of having proceeded from him.

But, above every other article of revealed religion, does the anterior belief of a Deity bear with the strongest force upon that grand point which gives indeed interest and importance to all the rest—the resurrection of the human dead. The thing might appear hopeless, did we not see a power at work adequate to the effect, a power under the guidance of an intelligent will, and a power penetrating the inmost recesses of all substance. I am far from justifying the opinion of those who "thought it a thing incredible that God should raise the dead;" but I admit that it is first necessary to be persuaded that there *is* a God to do so. This being thoroughly settled in our minds, there seems to be nothing in this process—concealed as we confess it to be—which need to shock our belief. They who have taken up the opinion that the acts of the human mind depend upon *organization*, that the mind itself indeed consists in organization, are supposed to find a greater difficulty than others do in admitting a transition by death to a new state of sentient existence, because the old organization is apparently dissolved. But I do not see that any impracticability need be apprehended even by these; or that the change, even upon their hypothesis, is far removed from the analogy of some other operations which we know with certainty that the Deity is carrying on. In the ordinary derivation of plants and animals from one another, a particle, in many cases minuter than all assignable, all conceivable dimension—an aura, an effluvium, an infinitesimal—determines the organization of a future body; does no less than fix whether that which is about to be produced shall be a vegetable, a merely sentient, or a rational being—an oak, a frog, or a philosopher; makes all these differences; gives to the future body its qualities, and nature, and species. And this particle, from which springs and by which is determined a whole future nature, itself proceeds from and owes its constitution to a prior body; nevertheless, which is seen in plants most decisively, the incepted organization, though formed within and through and by a preceding organization, is not corrupted by its corruption, or destroyed by its dissolution; but, on the contrary, is sometimes extricated and developed by those very causes—survives and comes into action, when the purpose for which it was prepared requires its use. Now an economy which nature has adopted, when the purpose was to transfer an organization from one individual to another, may have something analogous to it when the purpose is to transmit an organization from one state of being to another state: and they who found thought in organization may see something in this analogy applicable to their difficulties; for, whatever can transmit a similarity of organization will answer their purpose, because, according even to their own theory, it may be the vehicle of consciousness, and because consciousness carries identity and individuality along with it through all changes of form or of visible qualities. In the most general case, that, as we have said, of the derivation of plants and animals from one another, the latent organization is either itself similar to the old organization, or has the power of communicating to new matter the old organic form. But it is not restricted to this rule. There are other cases, especially in the progress of insect life, in which the dormant organization does not much resemble that which incloses it, and still less suits with the situation in which the inclosing body is placed, but suits with a different situation to which it is destined. In the larva of the libellula, which lives constantly, and has still long to live, under water, are descried the wings of a fly, which two years afterwards is to mount into the air. Is there nothing in this analogy? It serves at least to show, that even in the observable course of nature, organizations are formed one beneath another; and, among a thousand other instances, it shows completely that the Deity can mould and fashion the parts of material nature so as to fulfil any purpose whatever which he is pleased to appoint.

They who refer the operations of mind to a substance totally and essentially different from matter—as most certainly these operations, though affected by material causes, hold very little affinity to any properties of matter with which we are acquainted—adopt perhaps a juster reasoning and a better philosophy; and by these the considerations above suggested are not wanted, at least in the same degree. But to such as find, which some persons do find, an insuperable difficulty in shaking off an adherence to those analogies which the corporeal world is continually suggesting to their thoughts—to such, I say, every consideration will be a relief which manifests the extent of that intelligent power which is acting in nature, the fruitfulness of its resources, the variety and aptness and success of its means; most especially, every consideration which tends to show that, in the translation of a conscious existence, there is not, even in their own way of regarding it, any thing greatly beyond or totally unlike what takes place in such parts—probably small parts—of the order of nature as are accessible to our observation.

Again, if there be those who think that the contractedness and debility of the human faculties in our present state seem ill to accord with the high destinies which the expectations of religion point out to us; I would only ask them, whether any one who saw a child two hours after its birth, could suppose that it would ever come to understand *fluxions*;[*] or who then shall say, what further amplification of intellectual powers, what accession of knowledge, what advance and improvement, the rational faculty, be its constitution what it will, may not admit of when placed amidst new objects, and endowed with a sensorium adapted, as it undoubtedly will be, and as our present senses are, to the perception of those substances, and of those properties of things, with which our concern may lie.

Upon the whole, in every thing which respects this awful, but, as we trust, glorious change, we have a wise and powerful Being—the author in nature of infinitely various expedients for infinitely various ends—upon whom to rely for the choice and appointment of means adequate to the execution of any plan which his goodness or his justice may have formed for the moral and accountable part of his terrestrial creation. That great office rests with *him:* be it *ours* to hope and to prepare, under a firm and settled persuasion, that, living and dying, we are his ; that life is passed in his constant presence, and that death resigns us to his merciful disposal.

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[*] See Search's Light of Nature, *passim*.

HORÆ PAULINÆ;

OR,

THE TRUTH OF THE SCRIPTURE HISTORY

OF

ST. PAUL EVINCED,

BY

A COMPARISON OF THE EPISTLES WHICH BEAR HIS
NAME WITH THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES,
AND WITH ONE ANOTHER.

BY WILLIAM PALEY, D.D.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

PAGE.

Exposition of the Argument, 5

CHAPTER II.

The Epistle to the Romans, 15

CHAPTER III.

The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 39

CHAPTER IV.

The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 56

CHAPTER V.

The Epistle to the Galatians, 84

CHAPTER VI.

The Epistle to the Ephesians, 113

CHAPTER VII.

The Epistle to the Philippians, 138

CHAPTER VIII.

The Epistle to the Colossians, 150

CHAPTER IX.

The First Epistle to the Thessalonians, 157

CHAPTER X.

The Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, 166

CHAPTER XI.

The First Epistle to Timothy, 172

CHAPTER XII.

The Second Epistle to Timothy, 180

CHAPTER XIII.

The Epistle to Titus, ... 189

CHAPTER XIV.

The Epistle to Philemon, ... 195

CHAPTER XV.

The Subscriptions of the Epistles, ... 200

CHAPTER XVI.

The Conclusion, ... 204

HORÆ PAULINÆ.

CHAPTER I.

EXPOSITION OF THE ARGUMENT.

The volume of Christian Scriptures contains thirteen letters purporting to be written by Saint Paul; it contains also a book which, among other things, professes to deliver the history, or rather memoirs of the history of this same person. By assuming the genuineness of the letters, we may prove the substantial truth of the history; or, by assuming the truth of the history, we may argue strongly in support of the genuineness of the letters. But I assume neither one nor the other. The reader is at liberty to suppose these writings to have been lately discovered in the library of the Escurial, and to come to our hands destitute of any extrinsic or collateral evidence whatever; and the argument I am about to offer is calculated to show, that a comparison of the different writings would, even under these circumstances, afford good reason to believe the persons and transactions to have been real, the letters authentic, and the narration in the main to be true.

Agreement or conformity between letters bearing the name of an ancient author, and a received history of that author's life, does not necessarily establish the credit of either; because,

1. The history may, like Middleton's Life of Cicero, or Jortin's Life of Erasmus, have been wholly, or in part, compiled from the letters; in which case it is manifest that the

history adds nothing to the evidence already afforded by the letters: or,

2. The letters may have been fabricated out of the history; a species of imposture which is certainly practicable, and which, without any accession of proof or authority, would necessarily produce the appearance of consistency and agreement: or,

3. The history and letters may have been founded upon some authority common to both; as upon reports and traditions which prevailed in the age in which they were composed, or upon some ancient record now lost, which both writers consulted: in which case also, the letters, without being genuine, may exhibit marks of conformity with the history; and the history, without being true, may agree with the letters.

Agreement, therefore, or conformity, is only to be relied upon so far as we can exclude these several suppositions. Now the point to be noticed is, that in the three cases above enumerated, conformity must be the effect of *design*. Where the history is compiled from the letters, which is the first case, the design and composition of the work are in general so confessed, or made so evident by comparison, as to leave us in no danger of confounding the production with original history, or of mistaking it for an independent authority. The agreement, it is probable, will be close and uniform, and will easily be perceived to result from the intention of the author, and from the plan and conduct of his work. Where the letters are fabricated from the history, which is the second case, it is always for the purpose of imposing a forgery upon the public; and in order to give color and probability to the fraud, names, places, and circumstances, found in the history, may be studiously introduced into the letters, as well as a general consistency be endeavored to be maintained. But here it is manifest, that whatever congruity appears is the consequence of meditation, artifice, and design. The third case is that wherein the history and the letters, without any direct privity or communication with each other, derive their materials from the same source; and, by reason of their common original, furnish instances of accordance and correspondency. This is a situation in which we must allow it to be possible for ancient writings to be placed; and it is a situation in which it is more difficult to distinguish spurious from genuine writings, than in either of the cases described in the preceding suppositions; inasmuch as the congruities observable are so far accidental, as that they are not produced by the immediate transplanting of names and circumstances out of one writing into the other. But although, with respect to each other, the agreement in these writings be mediate and secondary, yet is it not properly or absolutely undesigned; because with respect to the common original from which the information of the writer proceeds, it is studied and factitious. The case of which we treat must, as to the letters, be a case of forgery: and when the writer who is personating another sits down to his composition—whether we have the history with which we now compare the letters, or some other record before him, or whether we have only loose tradition and reports to go by—he must adapt his imposture, as well as he can, to what he finds in these accounts; and his adaptations will be the result of counsel, scheme, and industry: art must be employed; and vestiges will appear of management and design. Add to this, that, in most of the following examples, the circumstances in which the coincidence is remarked are of too particular and domestic a nature to have floated down upon the stream of general tradition.

Of the three cases which we have stated, the difference between the first and the two others is, that in the first the design may be fair and honest; in the others it must be accompanied with the consciousness of fraud; but in all there is design. In examining, therefore, the agreement between ancient writings, the character of truth and originality is undesignedness: and this test applies to every supposition; for whether we suppose the history to be true, but the letters spurious; or, the letters to be genuine, but the history false; or, lastly, falsehood to belong to both—the history to be a fable, and the letters fictitious—the same inference will result: that either there will be no agreement between them, or the agreement will be the effect of design. Nor will it elude the principle of this rule, to suppose the same person to have been the author of all the letters, or even the author both of the letters and the history; for no less design is necessary to produce coincidence between different parts of a man's own writings, especially when they are made to take the different forms of a history and of original letters, than to adjust them to the circumstances found in any other writing.

With respect to those writings of the New Testament which are to be the subject of our present consideration, I think that, as to the authenticity of the epistles, this argument, where it is sufficiently sustained by instances, is nearly conclusive; for I cannot assign a supposition of forgery, in which coincidences of the kind we inquire after are likely to appear. As to the history, it extends to these points: it proves the general reality of the circumstances; it proves the historian's knowledge of these circumstances. In the present instance, it confirms his pretensions of having been a contemporary, and in the latter part of his history a companion of St. Paul. In a word, it establishes the substantial truth of the narration; and *substantial* truth is that which, in every historical inquiry, ought to be the first thing sought after and ascertained: it must be the groundwork of every other observation.

The reader then will please to remember this word *undesignedness,* as denoting that upon which the construction and validity of our argument chiefly depend.

As to the proofs of undesignedness, I shall in this place say little; for I had rather the reader's persuasion should arise from the instances themselves, and the separate remarks with which they may be accompanied, than from any previous formulary or description of argument. In a great plurality of examples, I trust he will be perfectly convinced that no design or contrivance whatever has been exercised; and if some of the coincidences alleged appear to be minute, circuitous, or oblique, let him reflect that this very indirectness and subtilty is that which gives force and propriety to the example. Broad, obvious, and explicit agreements prove little, because it may be suggested that the insertion of such is the ordinary expedient of every forgery; and though they may occur, and probably will occur in genuine writings, yet it cannot be proved that they are peculiar to these. Thus what St. Paul declares in chapter eleven of first Corinthians, concerning the institution of the Lord's supper, "For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, That the Lord Jesus, the same night in which he was betrayed, took bread; and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat; this is my body, which is broken for you: this do in remembrance of me;" though it be in close and verbal conformity with the account of the same transaction preserved by St. Luke, is yet a conformity of which no use can be made in our argument; for if it should be objected that this was a mere recital from the gospel, borrowed by the author of the epistle, for the purpose of setting off his composition by an appearance of agreement with the received account of the Lord's supper, I should not know how to repel the insinuation. In like manner, the description which St. Paul gives of himself in his epistle to the Philippians, 3:5, "Circumcised the eighth day, of the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of the Hebrews; as touching the law, a Pharisee; concerning zeal, persecuting the church; touching the righteousness which is in the law, blameless"—is made up of particulars so plainly delivered concerning him in the Acts of the Apostles, the epistle to the Romans, and the epistle to the Galatians, that I cannot deny but that it would be easy for an impostor who was fabricating a letter in the name of St. Paul, to collect these articles into one view. This, therefore, is a conformity which we do not adduce. But when I read in the Acts of the Apostles, that when "Paul came to Derbe and Lystra, behold, a certain disciple was there, named Timotheus, the son of a certain woman *which was a Jewess;*" and when, in an epistle addressed to Timothy, I find him reminded of his "having known the holy Scriptures *from a child,*" which implies that he must, on one side or both, have been brought up by Jewish parents; I conceive that I remark a coincidence which shows, by its very *obliquity*, that scheme was not employed in its formation. In like manner, if a coincidence depend upon a comparison of dates, or rather of circumstances from which the dates are gathered, the more intricate that comparison shall be, the more numerous the intermediate steps through which the conclusion is deduced, in a word, the more *circuitous* the investigation is, the better; because the agreement which finally results is thereby further removed from the suspicion of contrivance, affectation, or design. And it should be remembered, concerning these coincidences, that it is one thing to be minute, and another to be precarious; one thing to be unobserved, and another to be obscure; one thing to be circuitous or oblique, and another to be forced, dubious, or fanciful. And this distinction ought always to be retained in our thoughts.

The very particularity of St. Paul's epistles; the perpetual recurrence of names of persons and places; the frequent allusions to the incidents of his private life, and the circumstances of his condition and history; and the connection and parallelism of these with the same circumstances in the Acts of the Apostles, so as to enable us, for the most part, to confront them one with another; as well as the relation which subsists between the circumstances, as mentioned or referred to in the different epistles, afford no inconsiderable proof of the genuineness of the writings, and the reality of the transactions. For as no advertency is sufficient to guard against slips and contradictions, when circumstances are multiplied, and when they are liable to be detected by contemporary accounts equally circumstantial, an impostor, I should expect, would either have avoided particulars entirely, contenting himself with doctrinal discussions, moral precepts, and general reflections;* or if, for the sake of imitating St. Paul's style, he should have thought it necessary to intersperse his composition with names and circumstances, he would have placed them out of the reach of comparison with the history. And I am confirmed in this opinion by the inspection of two attempts to counterfeit St. Paul's epistles, which have come down to us; and the only attempts, of which we have any knowledge, that are at all deserving of regard. One of these is an epistle to the Laodiceans, extant in Latin, and preserved by Fabricius in his collection of apocryphal scriptures. The other purports to be an epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, in answer to an epistle from the Corinthians to him. This was translated by Scroderus from a copy in the Armenian language, which had been sent to W. Whiston, and was afterwards, from a more perfect copy procured at Aleppo, published by his sons, as an appendix to their edition of Moses Chorenensis. No Greek copy exists of either: they are not only not supported by ancient testimony, but they are negatived and excluded, as they have never found admission into any catalogue of apostolical writings acknowledged by, or known to the early ages of Christianity. In the first of these I found, as I expected, a total *evitation* of circumstances. It is simply a collection of sentences from the canonical epistles, strung together with very little skill. The second, which is a more versute and specious forgery, is introduced with a list of names of persons who wrote to St. Paul from Corinth; and is preceded by an account sufficiently particular of the manner in which the epistle was sent from Corinth to St. Paul, and the answer returned. But they are names which no one ever heard of; and the account it is impossible to combine with any thing found in the Acts, or in the other epistles. It is not necessary for me to point out the internal marks of spuriousness and imposture which these compositions betray; but it was necessary to observe, that they do not afford those coincidences which we propose as proofs of authenticity in the epistles which we defend.

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* This, however, must not be misunderstood. A person writing to his friends, and upon a subject in which the transactions of his own life were concerned, would probably be led in the course of his letter, especially if it were a long one, to refer to passages found in his history. A person addressing an epistle to the public at large, or under the form of an epistle delivering a discourse upon some speculative argument, would not, it is probable, meet with an occasion of alluding to the circumstances of his life at all: he might, or he might not; the chance on either side is nearly equal. This is the situation of the catholic epistles. Although, therefore, the presence of these allusions and agreements be a valuable accession to the arguments by which the authenticity of a letter is maintained, yet the want of them certainly forms no positive objection.

Having explained the general scheme and formation of the argument, I may be permitted to subjoin a brief account of the manner of conducting it.

I have disposed the several instances of agreement under separate numbers; as well to mark more sensibly the divisions of the subject, as for another purpose, namely, that the reader may thereby be reminded that the instances are independent of one another. I have advanced nothing which I did not think probable; but the degree of probability by which different instances are supported, is undoubtedly very different. If the reader, therefore, meets with a number which contains an instance that appears to him unsatisfactory, or founded in mistake, he will dismiss that number from the argument, but without prejudice to any other. He will have occasion also to observe, that the coincidences discoverable in some epistles are much fewer and weaker than what are supplied by others. But he will add to his observation this important circumstance, that whatever ascertains the original of one epistle, in some measure establishes the authority of the rest. For, whether these epistles be genuine or spurious, every thing about them indicates that they come from the same hand. The diction, which it is extremely difficult to imitate, preserves its resemblance and peculiarity throughout all the epistles. Numerous expressions and singularities of style, found in no other part of the New Testament, are repeated in different epistles; and occur in their respective places, without the smallest appearance of force or art. An involved argumentation, frequent obscurities, especially in the order and transition of thought, piety, vehemence, affection, bursts of rapture, and of unparalleled sublimity, are properties, all or most of them, discernible in every letter of the collection. But although these epistles bear strong marks of proceeding from the same hand, I think it is still more certain that they were originally separate publications. They form no continued story; they compose no regular correspondence; they comprise not the transactions of any particular period; they carry on no connection of argument; they depend not upon one another; except in one or two instances, they refer not to one another. I will further undertake to say, that no study or care has been employed to produce or preserve an appearance of consistency among them. All which observations show that they were not intended by the person, whoever he was, that wrote them, to come forth or be read together—that they appeared at first separately, and have been collected since.

The proper purpose of the following work is to bring together, from the Acts of the Apostles, and from the different epistles, such passages as furnish examples of undesigned coincidence; but I have so far enlarged upon this plan, as to take into it some circumstances found in the epistles, which contributed strength to the conclusion, though not strictly objects of comparison.

It appeared also a part of the same plan to examine the difficulties which presented themselves in the course of our inquiry.

I do not know that the subject has been proposed or considered in this view before. Ludovicus Capellus, bishop Pearson, Dr. Benson, and Dr. Lardner, have each given a continued history of St. Paul's life, made up from the Acts of the Apostles and the epistles joined together. But this, it is manifest, is a different undertaking from the present, and directed to a different purpose.

If what is here offered shall add one thread to that complication of probabilities by which the Christian history is attested, the reader's attention will be repaid by the supreme importance of the subject, and my design will be fully answered.

CHAPTER II.

THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

I. The first passage I shall produce from this epistle, and upon which a good deal of observation will be founded, is the following:

"But now I go unto Jerusalem to minister unto the saints. For it hath pleased them of Macedonia and Achaia to make a certain contribution for the poor saints which are at Jerusalem." Rom. 15 : 25, 26.

In this quotation three distinct circumstances are stated: a contribution in Macedonia for the relief of the Christians of Jerusalem, a contribution in Achaia for the same purpose, and an intended journey of St. Paul to Jerusalem. These circumstances are stated as taking place at the same time, and that to be the time when the epistle was written. Now let us inquire whether we can find these circumstances elsewhere; and whether, if we do find them, they meet together in respect of date. Turn to the Acts of the Apostles, chap. 20, ver. 2, 3, and you read the following account: "When he had gone over those parts," namely, Macedonia, "and had given them much exhortation, he came into Greece, and there abode three months. And when the Jews laid wait for him, *as he was about to sail into Syria*, he proposed to return through Macedonia." From this passage, compared with the account of St. Paul's travels given before, and from the sequel of the chapter, it appears that upon St. Paul's *second* visit to the peninsula of Greece, his intention was, when he should leave the country, to proceed from Achaia directly by sea to Syria; but that to avoid the Jews, who were lying in wait to intercept him in his route, he so far changed his purpose as to go back through Macedonia, embark at Philippi, and pursue his voyage from thence towards Jerusalem. Here therefore is a journey to Jerusalem, but not a syllable of any contribution. And as St. Paul had taken several journeys to Jerusalem before, and one also immediately after his *first* visit into the peninsula of Greece, Acts 18 : 21, it cannot from hence be collected in which of these visits the epistle was written, or with certainty that it was written in either. The silence of the historian who professes to have been with St. Paul at the time, chap. 20, ver. 6, concerning any contribution, might lead us to look out for some different journey, or might induce us perhaps to question the consistency of the two records, did not a very accidental reference in another part of the same history afford us sufficient ground to believe that this silence was omission. When St. Paul made his reply before Felix to the accusations of Tertullus, he alleged, as was natural, that neither the errand which brought him to Jerusalem, nor his conduct while he remained there, merited the calumnies with which the Jews had aspersed him: "Now after many years," that is, of absence, "*I came to bring alms to my nation, and offerings.* Whereupon certain Jews from Asia found me purified in the temple, neither with multitude, nor with tumult; who ought to have been here before thee, and object, if they had aught against me." Acts 24 : 17–19. This mention of alms and offerings certainly brings the narrative in the Acts nearer to an accordancy with the epistle; yet no one, I am persuaded, will suspect that this clause was put into St. Paul's defence, either to supply the omission in the preceding narrative, or with any view to such accordancy.

After all, nothing is yet said or hinted concerning the *place* of the contribution—nothing concerning Macedonia and Achaia. Turn therefore to the first epistle to the Corinthians, chap. 16, ver. 1–4, and you have St. Paul delivering the following directions: "Concerning the collection for the saints, as I have given order to the churches of Galatia, even so do ye. Upon the first day of the week let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him, that there be no gatherings when I come. And when I come, whomsoever you shall approve by your letters, them will I send to bring your liberality unto Jerusalem. And if it be meet that I go also, they shall go with me." In this passage we find a contribution carrying on at Corinth, the capital of Achaia, for the Christians of Jerusalem; we find also a hint given of the possibility of St. Paul going up to Jerusalem himself, after he had paid his visit into Achaia; but this is spoken of rather as a possibility than as any settled intention; for his first thought was, "Whomsoever you shall approve by your letters, them will I *send* to bring your liberality unto Jerusalem;" and in the sixth verse he adds, "That ye may bring me on my journey *whithersoever* I go." This epistle purports to be written after St. Paul had been at Corinth; for it refers throughout to what he had done and said among them while he was there. The expression, therefore, "when I come," must relate to a *second* visit, against which visit the contribution spoken of was desired to be in readiness.

But though the contribution in Achaia be expressly mentioned, nothing is here said concerning any contribution in Macedonia. Turn therefore, in the third place, to the second epistle to the Corinthians, chap. 8, ver. 1–4, and you will discover the particular which remains to be sought for: "Moreover, brethren, we do you to wit of the grace of God bestowed on the *churches of Macedonia;* how that in a great trial of affliction, the abundance of their joy and their deep poverty abounded unto the riches of their liberality. For to their power I bear record, yea, and beyond their power, they were willing of themselves; praying us with much entreaty, that we would receive the gift, and take upon us the fellowship of the ministering to the saints." To which add, chap. 9, ver. 2, "I know the forwardness of your mind, for which I boast of you to them of Macedonia, that Achaia was ready a year ago." In this epistle we find St. Paul advanced as far as Macedonia, upon that *second* visit to Corinth which he promised in his former epistle; we find also, in the passages now quoted from it, that a contribution was going on in Macedonia at the same time with, or soon however following, the contribution which was made in Achaia; but for whom the contribution was made does not appear in this epistle at all: that information must be supplied from the first epistle.

Here therefore, at length, but fetched from three different writings, we have obtained the several circumstances we inquired after, and which the epistle to the Romans brings together, namely, a contribution in Achaia for the Christians of Jerusalem, a contribution in Macedonia for the same, and an approaching journey of St. Paul to Jerusalem. We have these circumstances—each by some hint in the passage in which it is mentioned, or by the date of the writing in which the passage occurs—fixed to a particular time; and we have that time turning out, upon examination, to be in all the *same*, namely, towards the close of St. Paul's second visit to the peninsula of Greece. This is an instance of conformity beyond the possibility, I will venture to say, of random writing to produce; I also assert, that it is in the highest degree improbable that it should have been the effect of contrivance and design. The imputation of *design* amounts to this: that the forger of the epistle to the Romans inserted in it the passage upon which our observations are founded, for the purpose of giving color to his forgery by the appearance of conformity with other writings which were then extant. I reply, in the first place, that if he did this to countenance his forgery, he did it for the purpose of an argument which would not strike one reader in ten thousand. Coincidences so circuitous as this answer not the ends of forgery; are seldom, I believe, attempted by it. In the second place, I observe that he must have had the Acts of the Apostles and the two epistles to the Corinthians before him at the time. In the Acts of the Apostles—I mean that part of the Acts which relates to this period—he would have found the journey to Jerusalem, but nothing about the contribution. In the first epistle to the Corinthians, he would have found a contribution going on in Achaia for the Christians of Jerusalem, and a distant hint of the possibility of the journey, but nothing concerning a contribution in Macedonia. In the second epistle to the Corinthians, he would have found a contribution in Macedonia accompanying that in Achaia, but no intimation for whom either was intended, and not a word about the journey. It was only by a close and attentive collation of the three writings, that he could have picked out the circumstances which he has united in his epistle, and by a still more nice examination, that he could have determined them to belong to the same period. In the third place, I remark, what diminishes very much the suspicion of fraud, how aptly and connectedly the mention of the circumstances in question, namely, the journey to Jerusalem and the occasion of that journey, arises from the context: "Whensoever I take my journey into Spain, I will come to you; for I trust to see you in my journey and to be brought on my way thitherward by you, if first I be somewhat filled with your company. *But now I go unto Jerusalem to minister unto the saints. For it hath pleased them of Macedonia and Achaia to make a certain contribution for the poor saints which are at Jerusalem.* It hath pleased them verily, and their debtors they are; for if the Gentiles have been made partakers of their spiritual things, their duty is also to minister unto them in carnal things. When therefore I have performed this, and have sealed to them this fruit, I will come by you into Spain." Is the passage in *italics* like a passage foisted in for an extraneous purpose? Does it not arise from what goes before, by a junction as easy as any example of writing upon real business can furnish? Could any thing be more natural than that St. Paul, in writing to the Romans, should speak of the time when he hoped to visit them; should mention the business which then detained him; and that he purposed to set forward upon his journey to them when that business was completed?

II. By means of the quotation which formed the subject of the preceding number, we collect that the epistle to the Romans was written at the conclusion of St. Paul's second visit to the peninsula of Greece; but this we collect, not from the epistle itself, nor from any thing *declared* concerning the time and place in any part of the epistle, but from a comparison of circumstances referred to in the epistle, with the order of events recorded in the Acts, and with references to the same circumstances, though for quite different purposes, in the two epistles to the Corinthians. Now, would the author of a forgery who sought to gain credit to a spurious letter by congruities depending upon the time and place in which the letter was supposed to be written, have left that time and place to be made out in a manner so obscure and indirect as this is? If, therefore, coincidences of circumstances can be pointed out in this epistle depending upon its date, or the place where it was written, while that date and place are only ascertained by other circumstances, such coincidences may fairly be stated as *undesigned*. Under this head I adduce,

Chap. 16:21–23: "Timotheus my workfellow, and Lucius, and Jason, and Sosipater, my kinsmen, salute you. I Tertius, who wrote this epistle, salute you in the Lord. Gaius mine host, and of the whole church, saluteth you; and Quartus, a brother." With this passage I compare Acts 20:4: "And there accompanied him into Asia, Sopater of Berea; and of the Thessalonians, Aristarchus and Secundus; and Gaius of Derbe, and Timotheus; and of Asia, Tychicus and Trophimus." The epistle to the Romans, we have seen, was written just before St. Paul's departure from Greece, after his second visit to that peninsula; the persons mentioned in the quotation from the Acts are those who accompanied him in that departure. Of seven whose names are joined in the salutation of the church of Rome, three, namely, Sosipater, Gaius, and Timothy, are proved by this passage in the Acts to have been with St. Paul at the time. And this is perhaps as much coincidence as could be expected from reality, though less, I am apt to think, than would have been produced by design. Four are mentioned in the Acts who are not joined in the salutation; and it is in the nature of the case probable that there should be many attending St. Paul in Greece who knew nothing of the converts at Rome, nor were known by them. In like manner, several are joined in the salutation who are not mentioned in the passage referred to in the Acts. This also was to be expected. The occasion of mentioning them in the Acts was their proceeding with St. Paul upon his journey. But we may be sure that there were many eminent Christians with St. Paul in Greece, besides those who accompanied him into Asia.*

But if any one shall still contend that a forger of the epistle, with the Acts of the Apostles before him, and having settled this scheme of writing a letter as from St. Paul upon his second visit into Greece, would easily think of the expedient of putting in the names of those persons who appeared to be with St. Paul at the time as an obvious recommendation of the imposture, I then repeat my observations, first, that he would have made the catalogue more complete; and secondly, that with this contrivance in his thoughts, it was certainly his business, in order to avail himself of the artifice, to have stated in the body of the epistle that Paul was in Greece when he wrote it, and that he was there upon his second visit; neither of which he has done, either directly, or even so as to be discoverable by any circumstance found in the narrative delivered in the Acts.

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* Of these, Jason is one, whose presence upon this occasion is very naturally accounted for. Jason was an inhabitant of Thessalonica, in Macedonia, and entertained St. Paul in his house upon his first visit to that country. Acts 17 : 7. St. Paul, upon this his second visit, passed through Macedonia, on his way to Greece, and from the situation of Thessalonica, most likely through that city. It appears, from various instances in the Acts, to have been the practice of many converts to attend St. Paul from place to place. It is therefore highly probable—I mean, that it is highly consistent with the account in the history—that Jason, according to that account a zealous disciple, the inhabitant of a city at no great distance from Greece, and through which, as it should seem, St. Paul had lately passed, should have accompanied St. Paul into Greece, and have been with him there at this time. Lucius is another name in the epistle. A very slight alteration would convert *Λουκιος* into *Λουκας*, Lucius into Luke, which would produce an additional coincidence; for if Luke was the author of the history, he was with St. Paul at the time; inasmuch as, describing the voyage which took place soon after the writing of this epistle, the historian uses the first person, "*We* sailed away from Philippi." Acts 20 : 6.

Under the same head, namely, of coincidences depending upon date, I cite from the epistle, chap. 16 : 3, the following salutation: "Greet Priscilla and Aquila, my helpers in Christ Jesus; who have for my life laid down their own necks: unto whom not only I give thanks, but also all the churches of the Gentiles." It appears from the Acts of the Apostles, that Priscilla and Aquila had originally been inhabitants of Rome; for we read, Acts 18 : 2, that Paul "found a certain Jew, named Aquila, born in Pontus, lately come from Italy, with his wife Priscilla, (because that Claudius had commanded all Jews to depart from *Rome*.") They were connected, therefore, with the place to which the salutations are sent. That is one coincidence; another is the following: St. Paul became acquainted with these persons at Corinth, during his first visit into Greece. They accompanied him upon his return into Asia; were settled for some time at Ephesus, Acts 18 : 19–26; and appear to have been with St. Paul when he wrote from that place his first epistle to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 16 : 19; not long after the writing of which epistle St. Paul went from Ephesus into Macedonia, and, "after he had gone over those parts," proceeded from thence upon his second visit into Greece; during which visit, or rather at the conclusion of it, the epistle to the Romans, as has been shown, was written.

We have therefore the time of St. Paul's residence at Ephesus after he had written to the Corinthians, the time taken up by his progress through Macedonia—which is indefinite, and was probably considerable—and his three months' abode in Greece; we have the sum of those three periods allowed for Aquila and Priscilla going back to Rome, so as to be there when the epistle before us was written. Now, what this quotation leads us to observe is, the danger of scattering names and circumstances in writings like the present, how implicated they often are with dates and places, and that nothing but truth can preserve consistency. Had the notes of time in the epistle to the Romans fixed the writing of it to any date prior to St. Paul's first residence at Corinth, the salutation of Aquila and Priscilla would have contradicted the history, because it would have been prior to his acquaintance with these persons. If the notes of time had fixed it to any period during *that* residence at Corinth, during his journey to Jerusalem when he first returned out of Greece, during his stay at Antioch, whither he went down to Jerusalem, or during his second progress through the lesser Asia, upon which he proceeded from Antioch, an equal contradiction would have been incurred; because, from Acts 18 : 2–18, 19–26, it appears that during all this time Aquila and Priscilla were either along with St. Paul, or were abiding at Ephesus. Lastly, had the notes of time in this epistle, which we have seen to be perfectly incidental, compared with the notes of time in the first epistle to the Corinthians, which are equally incidental, fixed this epistle to be either contemporary with that or prior to it, a similar contradiction would have ensued; because, first, when the epistle to the Corinthians was written, Aquila and Priscilla were along with St. Paul, as they joined in the salutation of that church, 1 Cor. 16 : 19; and because, secondly, the history does not allow us to suppose that between the time of their becoming acquainted with St. Paul and the time of St. Paul's writing to the Corinthians, Aquila and Priscilla could have gone to Rome, so as to have been saluted in an epistle to that city; and then come back to St. Paul at Ephesus, so as to be joined with him in saluting the church of Corinth. As it is, all things are consistent. The epistle to the Romans is posterior even to the second epistle to the Corinthians; because it speaks of a contribution in Achaia being completed, which the second epistle to the Corinthians, chap. 8, is only soliciting. It is sufficiently, therefore, posterior to the first epistle to the Corinthians to allow time in the interval for Aquila and Priscilla's return from Ephesus to Rome.

Before we dismiss these two persons, we may take notice of the terms of commendation in which St. Paul describes them, and of the agreement of that encomium with the history. "My helpers in Christ Jesus; who have for my life laid down their own necks: unto whom not only I give thanks, but also all the churches of the Gentiles." In the eighteenth chapter of the Acts, we are informed that Aquila and Priscilla were Jews; that St. Paul first met with them at Corinth; that for some time he abode in the same house with them; that St. Paul's contention at Corinth was with the unbelieving Jews, who at first "opposed and blasphemed," and afterwards "with one accord raised an insurrection" against him; that Aquila and Priscilla adhered, we may conclude, to St. Paul throughout this whole contest; for, when he left the city, they went with him. Acts 18:18. Under these circumstances, it is highly probable that they should be involved in the dangers and persecutions which St. Paul underwent from the Jews, being themselves Jews; and, by adhering to St. Paul in this dispute, deserters, as they would be accounted, of the Jewish cause. Further, as they, though Jews, were assisting to St. Paul in preaching to the Gentiles at Corinth, they had taken a decided part in the great controversy of that day, the admission of the Gentiles to a parity of religious situation with the Jews. For this conduct alone, if there was no other reason, they may seem to have been entitled to "thanks from the churches of the Gentiles." They were Jews taking part with Gentiles. Yet is all this so indirectly intimated, or rather so much of it left to inference, in the account given in the Acts, that I do not think it probable that a forger either could or would have drawn his representation from thence; and still less probable do I think it, that without having seen the Acts, he could, by mere accident, and without truth for his guide, have delivered a representation so conformable to the circumstances there recorded.

The two congruities last adduced depended upon the time; the two following regard the place of the epistle.

1. Chap. 16 : 23 : "Erastus the chamberlain of the city saluteth you." Of what city? We have seen, that is, we have inferred from circumstances found in the epistle, compared with circumstances found in the Acts of the Apostles, and in the two epistles to the Corinthians, that our epistle was written during St. Paul's second visit to the peninsula of Greece. Again, as St. Paul, in his epistle to the church of Corinth, 1 Cor. 16 : 3, speaks of a collection going on in that city, and of his desire that it might be ready against he came thither; and as in this epistle he speaks of that collection being ready, it follows that the epistle was written either while he was at Corinth, or after he had been there. Thirdly, since St. Paul speaks in this epistle of his journey to Jerusalem, as about instantly to take place; and as we learn, Acts 20 : 3, that his design and attempt was to sail upon that journey immediately from Greece, properly so called, that is, as distinguished from Macedonia, it is probable that he was in this country when he wrote the epistle, in which he speaks of himself as upon the eve of setting out. If in Greece, he was most likely at Corinth; for the two epistles to the Corinthians show that the principal end of his coming into Greece was to visit that city, where he had founded a church. Certainly we know no place in Greece in which his presence was so probable; at least, the placing

of him at Corinth satisfies every circumstance. Now, that Erastus was an inhabitant of Corinth, or had some connection with Corinth, is rendered a fair subject of presumption, by that which is accidentally said of him in the second epistle to Timothy, chap. 4 : 20 : "Erastus abode at *Corinth*." St. Paul complains of his solitude, and is telling Timothy what was become of his companions. "Erastus abode at Corinth; but Trophimus have I left at Miletus sick." Erastus was one of those who had attended St. Paul in his travels, Acts 19 : 22; and when those travels had upon some occasion brought our apostle and his train to Corinth, Erastus stayed there, for no reason so probable as that it was his home. I allow that this coincidence is not so precise as some others, yet I think it too clear to be produced by accident; for of the many places which this same epistle has assigned to different persons, and the innumerable others which it might have mentioned, how came it to fix upon Corinth for Erastus? And as far as it is a coincidence, it is certainly undesigned on the part of the author of the epistle to the Romans: because he has not told us of what city Erastus was the chamberlain; or, which is the same thing, from what city the epistle was written, the setting forth of which was absolutely necessary to the display of the coincidence, if any such display had been thought of: nor could the author of the epistle to Timothy leave Erastus at Corinth, from any thing he might have read in the epistle to the Romans, because Corinth is nowhere in that epistle mentioned either by name or description.

2. Chap. 16 : 1–3 : "I commend unto you Phebe our sister, which is a servant of the church which is at Cenchrea: that ye receive her in the Lord, as becometh saints, and that ye assist her in whatsoever business she hath need of you; for she hath been a succorer of many, and of myself also." Cenchrea adjoined to Corinth; St. Paul, therefore, at the time of writing the letter, was in the neighborhood of the woman whom he thus recommends. But fur-

ther, that St. Paul had before this been at Cenchrea itself, appears from the eighteenth chapter of the Acts; and appears by a circumstance as incidental and as unlike design as any that can be imagined. "Paul after this tarried there," namely, at Corinth, "yet a good while, and then took his leave of his brethren, and sailed thence into Syria, and with him Priscilla and Aquila, having shorn his head *in Cenchrea:* for he had a vow." Acts 18:18. The shaving of the head denoted the expiration of the Nazaritic vow. The historian, therefore, by the mention of this circumstance, virtually tells us that St. Paul's vow was expired before he set forward upon his voyage, having deferred probably his departure until he should be released from the restrictions under which his vow laid him. Shall we say that the author of the Acts of the Apostles feigned this anecdote of St. Paul at Cenchrea, because he had read in the epistle to the Romans that "Phebe, a servant of the church of Cenchrea, had been a succorer of many, and of him also?" Or shall we say that the author of the epistle to the Romans, out of his own imagination, created Phebe "*a servant of the church of Cenchrea*," because he read in the Acts of the Apostles that Paul had "shorn his head" in that place?

III. Chap. 1:13: "Now I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that *oftentimes I purposed to come unto you*, (but was let hitherto,) that I might have some fruit among you also, even as among other Gentiles." Again, 15:23–28, "But now having no more place in these parts, and having a great desire these many years," πολλα oftentimes, "to come unto you; whensoever I take my journey into Spain I will come to you: for I trust to see you in my journey, and to be brought on my way thitherward by you. But now I go up unto Jerusalem, to minister unto the saints. When, therefore, I have performed this, and have sealed to them this fruit, I will come by you into Spain."

With these passages compare Acts 19:21: "After these things were ended," namely, at Ephesus, "Paul purposed in the spirit, when he had passed through Macedonia and Achaia, to go to Jerusalem, saying, After I have been there, I must also see Rome."

Let it be observed, that our epistle purports to have been written at the conclusion of St. Paul's second journey into Greece; that the quotation from the Acts contains words said to have been spoken by St. Paul at Ephesus, some time before he set forward upon that journey. Now I contend that it is impossible that two independent fictions should have attributed to St. Paul the same purpose; especially a purpose so specific and particular as this, which was not merely a general design of visiting Rome after he had passed through Macedonia and Achaia, and after he had performed a voyage from those countries to Jerusalem. The conformity between the history and the epistle is perfect. In the first quotation from the epistle, we find that a design of visiting Rome had long dwelt in the apostle's mind: in the quotation from the Acts, we find that design expressed a considerable time before the epistle was written. In the history we find that the plan which St. Paul had formed was, to pass through Macedonia and Achaia, after that to go to Jerusalem, and when he had finished his visit there to sail for Rome. When the epistle was written he had executed so much of his plan as to have passed through Macedonia and Achaia, and was preparing to pursue the remainder of it, by speedily setting out towards Jerusalem; and in this point of his travels he tells his friends at Rome, that when he had completed the business which carried him to Jerusalem, he would come to them. Secondly, I say that the very inspection of the passages will satisfy us that they were not made up from one another.

"Whensoever I take my journey into Spain, I will come to you; for I trust to see you in my journey, and to be brought on my way thitherward by you. But now I go up unto Jerusalem, to minister unto the saints. When, therefore, I have performed this, and have sealed to them this fruit, I will come by you into Spain." This from the epistle.

"Paul purposed in the spirit, when he had passed through Macedonia and Achaia, to go to Jerusalem, saying, After I have been there, I must also see Rome." This from the Acts.

If the passage in the epistle was taken from that in the Acts, why was *Spain* put in? If the passage in the Acts was taken from that in the epistle, why was *Spain* left out? If the two passages were unknown to each other, nothing can account for their conformity but truth. Whether we suppose the history and the epistle to be alike fictitious, or the history to be true but the letter spurious, or the letter to be genuine but the history a fable, the meeting with this circumstance in both, if neither borrowed it from the other, is, upon all these suppositions, equally inexplicable.

IV. The following quotation I offer for the purpose of pointing out a geographical coincidence, of so much importance, that Dr. Lardner considered it as a confirmation of the whole history of St. Paul's travels:

Chap. 15:19: "So that from Jerusalem, and round about unto Illyricum, I have fully preached the gospel of Christ."

I do not think that these words necessarily import that St. Paul had penetrated into Illyricum, or preached the gospel in that province; but rather that he had come to the confines of Illyricum, (*μέχρι τοῦ Ἰλλυρικοῦ*,) and that these confines were the external boundary of his travels. St. Paul considers Jerusalem as the centre, and is here viewing the circumference to which his travels extended. The form of expression in the original conveys this idea: *ἀπὸ Ἰερουσαλὴμ καὶ κύκλῳ μέχρι τοῦ Ἰλλυρικοῦ.* Illyricum was the part of this circle which he mentions in an epistle to the Romans, because it lay in a direction from Jerusalem towards that city, and pointed out to the Roman readers the nearest place to them to which his travels from Jerusalem had brought him.

The name of Illyricum nowhere occurs in the Acts of the Apostles; no suspicion, therefore, can be received, that the mention of it was borrowed from thence. Yet I think it appears from these same Acts, that St. Paul, before the time when he wrote his epistle to the Romans, had reached the confines of Illyricum; or, however, that he might have done so, in perfect consistency with the account there delivered. Illyricum adjoins upon Macedonia; measuring from Jerusalem towards Rome, it lies close behind it. If, therefore, St. Paul traversed the whole country of Macedonia, the route would necessarily bring him to the confines of Illyricum, and these confines would be described as the extremity of his journey. Now the account of St. Paul's second visit to the peninsula of Greece is contained in these words: "He departed for to go into Macedonia. *And when he had gone over those parts*, and had given them much exhortation, he came into Greece." Acts 20: 2. This account allows, or rather leads us to suppose, that St. Paul, in going over Macedonia (διελθὼν τὰ μέρη ἐκεῖνα,) had passed so far to the west as to come into those parts of the country which were contiguous to Illyricum, if he did not enter into Illyricum itself. The history, therefore, and the epistles so far agree, and the agreement is much strengthened by a coincidence of *time*. At the time the epistle was written, St. Paul might say, in conformity with the history, that he had "come into Illyricum:" much before that time, he could not have said so; for, upon his former journey to Macedonia, his route is laid down from the time of his landing at Philippi to his sailing from Corinth. We trace him from Philippi to Amphipolis and Apollonia; from thence to Thessalonica; from Thessalonica to Berea; from Berea to Athens; and from Athens to Corinth: which track confines him to the eastern side of the peninsula, and therefore keeps him all the while at a considerable distance from Illyricum. Upon his second visit to Macedonia, the history, we have seen, leaves him at liberty. It must have been, therefore, upon that second visit, if at all, that he approached Illyricum; and this visit, we know, almost immediately preceded the writing of the epistle. It was natural that the apostle should refer to a journey which was fresh in his thoughts.

V. Chap. 15 : 30 : "Now I beseech you, brethren, for the Lord Jesus Christ's sake, and for the love of the Spirit, that ye strive together with me in your prayers to God for me, that I may be delivered from them that do not believe in Judea." With this compare Acts 20 : 22, 23 :

"And now, behold, I go bound in the spirit unto Jerusalem, not knowing the things that shall befall me there, save that the Holy Ghost witnesseth in every city, saying, that bonds and afflictions abide me."

Let it be remarked, that it is the same journey to Jerusalem which is spoken of in these two passages; that the epistle was written immediately before St. Paul set forward upon this journey from Achaia; that the words in the Acts were uttered by him when he had proceeded in that journey as far as Miletus, in Lesser Asia. This being remembered, I observe that the two passages, without any resemblance between them that could induce us to suspect that they were borrowed from one another, represent the state of St. Paul's mind, with respect to the event of the journey, in terms of substantial agreement. They both express his sense of danger in the approaching visit to Jerusalem; they both express the doubt which dwelt upon his thoughts concerning what might there befall him. When, in his epistle, he entreats the Roman Christians, "for the Lord Jesus Christ's sake, and for the love of the Spirit," to strive together with him in their prayers to God for him, that he might "be delivered from them that do not believe in Judea," he sufficiently confesses his fears. In the Acts of the Apostles, we see in him the same apprehensions, and the same uncertainty: "I go bound in the spirit unto Jerusalem, *not knowing* the things that shall befall me there." The only difference is, that in the history his thoughts are more inclined to despondency than in the epistle. In the epistle, he retains his hope "that he should come unto them with joy by the will of God:" in the history, his mind yields to the reflection, "that the Holy Ghost witnesseth in every city that bonds and afflictions awaited him." Now, that his fears should be greater, and his hopes less, in this stage of his journey than when he wrote his epistle, that is, when he first set out upon it, is no other alteration than might well be expected; since those prophetic intimations to which he refers, when he says, "the Holy Ghost witnesseth in every city," had probably been received by him in the course of his journey, and were probably similar to what we know he received in the remaining part of it at Tyre, chap. 21 : 4; and afterwards from Agabus at Cesarea. Chap. 21 : 11.

VI. There is another strong remark arising from the same passage in the epistle; to make which understood, it will be necessary to state the passage over again, and somewhat more at length:

"I beseech you, brethren, for the Lord Jesus Christ's sake, and for the love of the Spirit, that ye strive together with me in your prayers to God for me, that I may be delivered from them that do not believe in Judea—that I may come unto you with joy by the will of God, and may with you be refreshed."

I desire the reader to call to mind *that* part of St. Paul's history which took place after his arrival at Jerusalem, and which employs the last seven chapters of the Acts; and I build upon it this observation—that supposing the epistle to the Romans to have been a forgery, and the author of the forgery to have had the Acts of the Apostles before him, and to have there seen that St. Paul, in fact, was *not* delivered from the unbelieving Jews, but on the contrary, that he was taken into custody at Jerusalem, and brought to Rome a prisoner—it is next to impossible that he should have made St. Paul express expectations so contrary to what he saw had been the event; and utter prayers, with apparent hopes of success, which he must have known were frustrated in the issue.

This single consideration convinces me, that no concert or confederacy whatever subsisted between the epistle and the Acts of the Apostles; and that whatever coincidences have been or can be pointed out between them are unsophisticated, and are the result of truth and reality.

It also convinces me that the epistle was written not only in St. Paul's lifetime, but before he arrived at Jerusalem; for the important events relating to him which took place after his arrival at that city, must have been known to the Christian community soon after they happened: they form the most public part of his history. But had they been known to the author of the epistle—in other words, had they then taken place, the passage which we have quoted from the epistle would not have been found there.

VII. I now proceed to state the conformity which exists between the argument of this epistle and the history of its reputed author. It is enough for this purpose to observe, that the object of the epistle, that is, of the argumentative part of it, was to place the Gentile convert upon a parity of situation with the Jewish, in respect of his religious condition, and his rank in the divine favor. The epistle supports this point by a variety of arguments; such as, that no man of either description was justified by the works of the law—for this plain reason, that no man had performed them; that it became therefore necessary to appoint another medium or condition of justification, in which new medium the Jewish peculiarity was merged and lost; that Abraham's own justification was anterior to the law, and independent of it; that the Jewish converts were to consider the law as now dead, and themselves as married to another; that what the law in truth could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God had done by sending his Son; that God had rejected the unbelieving Jews, and had substituted in their place a society of believers in Christ, collected indifferently from Jews and Gentiles. Soon after the writing of thi epistle, St. Paul, agreeably to the intention intimated in the epistle itself, took his journey to Jerusalem. The day after he arrived there, he was introduced to the church. What passed at this interview is thus related, Acts 21 : 19–21 : "When he had saluted them, he declared particularly what things God had wrought among the Gentiles by his ministry. And when they heard it, they glorified the Lord, and said unto him, Thou seest, brother, how many thousands of Jews there are which believe ; and they are all zealous of the law : and they *are informed of thee*, that thou teachest all the Jews which are among the Gentiles to forsake Moses, saying, that they ought not to circumcise their children, neither to walk after the customs." St. Paul disclaimed the charge ; but there must have been something to have led to it. Now it is only to suppose that St. Paul openly professed the principles which the epistle contains ; that, in the course of his ministry, he had uttered the sentiments which he is here made to write, and the matter is accounted for. Concerning the accusation which public rumor had brought against him to Jerusalem, I will not say that it was just ; but I will say, that if he was the author of the epistle before us, and if his preaching was consistent with his writing, it was extremely natural ; for though it be not a necessary, surely it is an easy inference, that if the Gentile convert who did not observe the law of Moses, held as advantageous a situation in his religious interests as the Jewish convert who did, there could be no strong reason for observing that law at all. The remonstrance therefore of the church of Jerusalem, and the report which occasioned it, were founded in no very violent misconstruction of the apostle's doctrine. His reception at Jerusalem was exactly what I should have expected the author of this epistle to have met with. I am entitled therefore to argue, that a separate narrative of effects experienced by St. Paul, similar to what a person might be expected to experience who held the doctrines advanced in this epistle, forms a proof that he did hold these doctrines; and that the epistle bearing his name, in which such doctrines are laid down, actually proceeded from him.

VIII. This number is supplemental to the former. I propose to point out in it two particulars in the conduct of the argument, perfectly adapted to the historical circumstances under which the epistle was written; which yet are free from all appearance of contrivance, and which it would not, I think, have entered into the mind of a sophist to contrive.

1. The epistle to the Galatians relates to the same general question as the epistle to the Romans. St. Paul had founded the church of Galatia: at Rome he had never been. Observe now a difference in his manner of treating of the same subject, corresponding with this difference in his situation. In the epistle to the Galatians, he puts the point in a great measure upon *authority:* "I marvel that ye are so soon removed from him that called you into the grace of Christ unto another gospel." Gal. 1:6. "I certify you, brethren, that the gospel which was preached of me is not after man. For I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ." Chap. 1:11, 12. "I am afraid of you, lest I have bestowed upon you labor in vain." 4:11. "I desire to be present with you now, ... for I stand in doubt of you." 4:20. "Behold, I Paul say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." 5:2. "This persuasion cometh not of him that calleth you." 5:8. This is the style in which he accosts the Galatians. In the epistle to the converts of Rome, where his authority was not established, nor his person known, he puts the same points entirely upon *argument.* The perusal of the epistle will prove this to the satisfaction of every reader; and as the observation relates to the whole contents of the epistle, I forbear adducing separate extracts. I repeat, therefore,

that we have pointed out a distinction in the two epistles, suited to the relation in which the author stood to his different correspondents.

Another adaptation, and somewhat of the same kind, is the following:

2. The Jews, we know, were very numerous at Rome, and probably formed a principal part among the new converts; so much so, that the Christians seem to have been known at Rome rather as a denomination of Jews than as any thing else. In an epistle consequently to the Roman believers, the point to be endeavored after by St. Paul, was to reconcile the *Jewish* converts to the opinion that the Gentiles were admitted by God to a parity of religious situation with themselves, and that without their being bound by the law of Moses. The Gentile converts would probably accede to this opinion very readily. In this epistle, therefore, though directed to the Roman church in general, it is in truth a Jew writing to Jews. Accordingly you will take notice, that as often as his argument leads him to say any thing derogatory from the Jewish institution, he constantly follows it by a softening clause. Having, chap. 2:28, 29, pronounced, not much perhaps to the satisfaction of the native Jews, that "he is not a Jew which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision, which is outward in the flesh;" he adds immediately, "What advantage then hath the Jew, or what profit is there of circumcision? *Much every way.*" Having in the third chapter, ver. 28, brought his argument to this formal conclusion, "that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law," he presently subjoins, verse 31, "Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid. *Yea, we establish the law.*" In the seventh chapter, when in the sixth verse he had advanced the bold assertion, that "now we are delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held;" in the very next verse he comes in with this healing question, "What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin,

but by the law." Having in the following words insinuated, or rather more than insinuated, the inefficacy of the Jewish law, 8 : 3, "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh;" after a digression indeed, but that sort of a digression which he could never resist, a rapturous contemplation of his Christian hope, and which occupies the latter part of this chapter; we find him in the next, as if sensible that he had said something which would give offence, returning to his Jewish brethren in terms of the warmest affection and respect: "I say the truth in Christ Jesus, I lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost, that I have great heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart. For I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ *for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh: who are Israelites; to whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises; whose are the fathers, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came.*" When, in the thirty-first and thirty-second verses of this ninth chapter, he represented to the Jews the error of even the best of their nation, by telling them that "Israel, which followed after the law of righteousness, had not attained to the law of righteousness, . . . because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law; for they stumbled at that stumbling-stone," he takes care to annex to this declaration these conciliating expressions: "Brethren, *my heart's desire and prayer to God for Israel* is, that they might be saved. For I bear them record that they *have a zeal of God*, but not according to knowledge." Lastly, having, chap. 10 : 20, 21, by the application of a passage in Isaiah, insinuated the most ungrateful of all propositions to a Jewish ear, the rejection of the Jewish nation as God's peculiar people; he hastens, as it were, to qualify the intelligence of their fall by this interesting expostulation: "I say, then, hath God cast away his people," that is, wholly and entirely? "*God forbid.* For I also am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin. *God hath not cast away his people which he foreknew;*" and follows this thought, throughout the whole of the eleventh chapter, in a series of reflections calculated to soothe the Jewish converts, as well as to procure from their Gentile brethren respect to the Jewish institution. Now all this is perfectly natural. In a real St. Paul writing to real converts, it is what anxiety to bring them over to his persuasion would naturally produce; but there is an earnestness and a personality, if I may so call it, in the manner, which a cold forgery, I apprehend, would neither have conceived nor supported.

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS.

I. Before we proceed to compare this epistle with the history, or with any other epistle, we will employ one number in stating certain remarks applicable to our argument, which arise from a perusal of the epistle itself.

By an expression in the first verse of the seventh chapter, "Now concerning the things whereof ye wrote unto me," it appears that this letter to the Corinthians was written by St. Paul in answer to one which he had received from them; and that the seventh, and some of the following chapters, are taken up in resolving certain doubts, and regulating certain points of order, concerning which the Corinthians had in their letter consulted him. This alone is a circumstance considerably in favor of the authenticity of the epistle; for it must have been a far-fetched contrivance in a forgery, first to have feigned the receipt of a letter from the church of Corinth, which letter does not appear, and then to have drawn up a fictitious answer to it, relative to a great variety of doubts and inquiries, purely economical and domestic; and which, though likely enough to have occurred to an infant society, in a situation, and under an institution so novel as that of a Christian church then was, it must have very much exercised the author's invention, and could have answered no imaginable purpose of forgery, to introduce the mention of at all. Particulars of the kind we refer to are such as the following: the rule of duty and prudence relative to entering into marriage, as applicable to virgins, to widows; the case of husbands married to unconverted wives, of wives having unconverted husbands; that case where the unconverted party chooses to separate, where he chooses to continue the union; the effect which their conversion produced upon their prior state, of circumcision, of slavery; the eating of things offered to idols, as it was in itself, as others were affected by it; the joining in idolatrous sacrifices; the decorum to be observed in their religious assemblies, the order of speaking, the silence of women; the covering or uncovering of the head, as it became men, as it became women. These subjects, with their several subdivisions, are so particular, minute, and numerous, that though they be exactly agreeable to the circumstances of the persons to whom the letter was written, nothing, I believe, but the existence and reality of those circumstances could have suggested to the writer's thoughts.

But this is not the only nor the principal observation upon the correspondence between the church of Corinth and their apostle, which I wish to point out. It appears, I think, in this correspondence, that although the Corinthians had written to St. Paul, requesting his answer and his directions in the several points above enumerated, yet that they had not said one syllable about the enormities and disorders which had crept in among them, and in the blame of which they all shared; but that St. Paul's information concerning the irregularities then prevailing at Corinth had come round to him from other quarters. The quarrels and disputes excited by their contentious adherence to their different teachers, and by their placing of them in competition with one another, were not mentioned in their *letter*, but communicated to St. Paul by more private intelligence: "It hath been declared unto me of you, my brethren, *by them which are of the house of Chloe*, that there are contentions among you. Now this I say, that every one of you saith, I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ." 1:11, 12. The incestuous marriage "of a man with his father's wife," which St. Paul reprehends with so much severity in the fifth chapter of our epistle, and which was not the crime of an individual only, but a crime in which the whole church, by tolerating and conniving at it, had rendered themselves partakers, did not come to St. Paul's knowledge by the *letter*, but by a rumor which had reached his ears: "*It is reported commonly* that there is fornication among you, and such fornication as is not so much as named among the Gentiles, that one should have his father's wife. And ye are puffed up, and have not rather mourned, that he that hath done this deed might be taken away from among you." 5 : 1, 2. Their going to law before the judicature of the country, rather than arbitrate and adjust their disputes among themselves, which St. Paul animadverts upon with his usual plainness, was not intimated to him in the *letter*, because he tells them his opinion of this conduct before he comes to the contents of the letter. Their litigiousness is censured by St. Paul in the sixth chapter of his epistle, and it is only at the beginning of the seventh chapter that he proceeds upon the articles which he found in their letter; and he proceeds upon them with this preface: "Now concerning the things whereof ye wrote unto me," 7 : 1, which introduction he would not have used if he had been already discussing any of the subjects concerning which they had written. Their irregularities in celebrating the Lord's supper, and the utter perversion of the institution which ensued, were not in the letter, as is evident from the terms in which St. Paul mentions the notice he had received of it: "Now in this that I declare unto you, I praise you not, that ye come together not for the better, but for the worse. For first of all, when ye come together in the church, *I hear* that there be divisions among you; and *I partly believe it.*" Now that the Corinthians should, in their own letter, exhibit the fair side of their conduct to the apostle, and conceal from him the faults of their behavior, was extremely natural, and extremely probable; but it was a distinction which would not, I think, have easily occurred to the author of a forgery; and much less likely is it, that it should have entered into his thoughts to make the distinction *appear* in the way in which it does appear, namely, not by the original letter, not by any express observation upon it in the answer, but distantly by marks perceivable in the manner, or in the order in which St. Paul takes notice of their faults.

II. Our epistle purports to have been written after St. Paul had already been at Corinth: "I, brethren, *when I came to you*, came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom," 2:1; and in many other places to the same effect. It purports also to have been written upon the eve of another visit to that church: "I will come to you shortly, if the Lord will," 4:19; and again, "I will come unto you, when I shall pass through Macedonia." 16:5. Now the history relates that St. Paul did in fact visit Corinth *twice;* once as recorded at length in the eighteenth, and a second time as mentioned briefly in the twentieth chapter of the Acts. The same history also informs us, Acts 20:1, that it was from Ephesus St. Paul proceeded upon his second journey into Greece. Therefore, as the epistle purports to have been written a short time preceding that journey; and as St. Paul, the history tells us, had resided more than two years at Ephesus before he set out upon it, it follows that it must have been from Ephesus, to be consistent with the history, that the epistle was written; and every note of *place* in the epistle agrees with this supposition. "If, after the manner of men, I have fought with beasts at *Ephesus*, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not?" 15:32. I allow that the apostle might say this, wherever he was; but it was more natural and more to the purpose to say it, if he was at Ephesus at the time, and in the midst of those conflicts to which the expression relates. "The churches of Asia salute you." 16:19. Asia, throughout the Acts of the Apostles, and the epistles of St. Paul, does not mean the whole of Asia Minor or Anatolia, nor even the whole of the proconsular Asia, but a district in the anterior part of that country, called Lydian Asia, divided from the rest much as Portugal is from Spain, and of which district *Ephesus* was the capital. "Aquila and Priscilla salute you." 16:19. Aquila and Priscilla were at *Ephesus* during the period within which this epistle was written. Acts 18 : 18, 26. "I will tarry at *Ephesus* until Pentecost." 16 : 8. This, I apprehend, is in terms almost asserting that he was at Ephesus at the time of writing the epistle. "A great and effectual door is opened unto me." 16 : 9. How well this declaration corresponded with the state of things at Ephesus, and the progress of the gospel in these parts, we learn from the reflection with which the historian concludes the account of certain transactions which passed there: "So mightily grew the word of God and prevailed," Acts 19 , 20, as well as from the complaint of Demetrius, "that not alone at Ephesus, but almost throughout all Asia, this Paul hath persuaded and turned away much people." 19 : 26. "And there are many adversaries," says the epistle, 16 : 9. Look into the history of this period: "When divers were hardened, and believed not, but spake evil of that way before the multitude, he departed from them and separated the disciples." The conformity, therefore, upon this head of comparison is circumstantial and perfect. If any one think that this is a conformity so obvious, that any forger of tolerable caution and sagacity would have taken care to preserve it, I must desire such a one to read the epistle for himself; and when he has done so, to declare whether he has discovered one mark of art or design; whether the notes of *time* and *place* appear to him to be inserted with any reference to each other, with any view of their being compared with each other, or for the purpose of establishing a visible agreement with the history, in respect of them.

III. Chap. 4 : 17–19 : "For this cause I have sent unto you Timotheus, who is my beloved son and faithful in the Lord, who shall bring you into remembrance of my ways which be in Christ, as I teach everywhere in every church. Now some are puffed up, as though I would not come to you. But I will come to you shortly, if the Lord will."

With this I compare Acts 19 : 21, 22: "After these things were ended, Paul purposed in the spirit, when he had passed through Macedonia and *Achaia*, to go to Jerusalem; saying, After I have been there, I must also see Rome. *So* he sent into Macedonia two of them that ministered unto him, *Timotheus* and Erastus."

Though it be not said, it appears I think with sufficient certainty, I mean from the history independently of the epistle, that Timothy was sent upon this occasion into *Achaia*, of which Corinth was the capital city, as well as into Macedonia; for the sending of Timothy and Erastus is, in the passage where it is mentioned, plainly connected with St. Paul's own journey: *he sent them before him.* As he therefore purposed to go into *Achaia* himself, it is highly probable that they were to go thither also. Nevertheless, they are said only to have been sent into Macedonia, because Macedonia was in truth the country to which they went immediately from Ephesus; being directed, as we suppose, to proceed afterwards from thence into Achaia. If this be so, the narrative agrees with the epistle; and the agreement is attended with very little appearance of design. One thing at least concerning it is certain; that if this passage of St. Paul's history had been taken from his letter, it would have sent Timothy to Corinth by name, or expressly however into Achaia.

But there is another circumstance in these two passages much less obvious, in which an agreement holds without any room for suspicion that it was produced by design. We have observed that the sending of Timothy into the peninsula of Greece was connected in the narrative with St. Paul's own journey thither; it is stated as the effect of the same resolution. Paul purposed to go into Macedonia; "*so* he sent into Macedonia two of them that ministered unto him, Timotheus and Erastus." Now in the epistle also you remark, that when the apostle mentions his having sent Timothy unto them, in the very next sentence he speaks of his own visit: "For this cause have I sent unto you Timotheus, who is my beloved son," etc. "Now some are puffed up, as though I would not come to you. But I will come unto you shortly, if the Lord will." Timothy's journey, we see, is mentioned in the history and in the epistle, in close connection with St. Paul's own. Here is the same order of thought and intention; yet conveyed under such diversity of circumstance and expression, and the mention of them in the epistle so allied to the occasion which introduces it, namely, the insinuation of his adversaries that he would come to Corinth no more, that I am persuaded no attentive reader will believe that these passages were written in concert with one another, or will doubt but that the agreement is unsought and uncontrived.

But, in the Acts, Erastus accompanied Timothy in this journey, of whom no mention is made in the epistle. From what has been said in our observations upon the epistle to the Romans, it appears probable that Erastus was a Corinthian. If so, though he accompanied Timothy to Corinth, he was only returning home, and Timothy was the messenger charged with St. Paul's orders. At any rate, this discrepancy shows that the passages were not taken from one another.

IV. Chap. 16 : 10, 11 : "Now if Timotheus come, see that he may be with you without fear; for he worketh the work of the Lord, as I also do. Let no man therefore despise him: but conduct him forth in peace, that he may come unto me; for I look for him with the brethren."

From the passage considered in the preceding number, it appears that Timothy was sent to Corinth, either with the epistle, or before it: "For this cause have I sent unto you Timotheus." From the passage now quoted, we infer that Timothy was not sent *with* the epistle; for had he been the bearer of the letter, or accompanied it, would St. Paul in that letter have said, "*If* Timothy come?" Nor is the sequel consistent with the supposition of his carrying the letter; for if Timothy were with the apostle when he wrote the letter, could he say, as he does, "I look for him with the brethren?" I conclude, therefore, that Timothy had left St. Paul to proceed upon his journey before the letter was written. Further, the passage before us seems to imply that Timothy was not expected by St. Paul to arrive at Corinth till after they had received the letter. He gives them directions in the letter how to treat him when he should arrive: "If he come," act towards him so and so. Lastly, the whole form of expression is most naturally applicable to the supposition of Timothy's coming to Corinth, not directly from St. Paul, but from some other quarter; and that his instructions had been, when he should reach Corinth, to return. Now, how stands this matter in the history? Turn to the nineteecth chapter and twenty-first verse of the Acts, and you will find that Timothy did not, when sent from Ephesus, where he left St. Paul and where the present epistle was written, proceed by a straight course to Corinth, but that he went round through Macedonia. This clears up every thing; for, although Timothy was sent forth upon his journey before the letter was written, yet he might not reach Corinth till after the letter arrived there; and he would come to Corinth, when he did come, not directly from St. Paul at Ephesus, but from some part of Macedonia. Here, therefore, is a circumstantial and critical agreement, and unquestionably without design; for neither of the two passages in the epistle mentions Timothy's journey into Macedonia at all, though nothing but a circuit of that kind can explain and reconcile the expressions which the writer uses.

V. Chap. 1 : 12 : "Now this I say, that every one of you saith, I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I of Cephas; and I of Christ."

Also, chap. 3 : 6 : "I have planted, Apollos watered, but God gave the increase."

This expression, "I have planted, Apollos watered," imports two things: first, that Paul had been at Corinth before Apollos; secondly, that Apollos had been at Corinth after Paul, but before the writing of this epistle. This implied account of the several events, and of the order in which they took place, corresponds exactly with the history. St. Paul, after his first visit into Greece, returned from Corinth into Syria by the way of Ephesus; and dropping his companions Aquila and Priscilla at Ephesus, he proceeded forwards to Jerusalem; from Jerusalem he descended to Antioch; and from thence made a progress through some of the upper or northern provinces of the Lesser Asia, Acts 18 : 19, 23; during which progress, and consequently in the interval between St. Paul's first and second visit to Corinth, and consequently also before the writing of this epistle, which was at Ephesus, two years at least after the apostle's return from his progress, we hear of Apollos, and we hear of him at Corinth. While St. Paul was engaged, as has been said, in Phrygia and Galatia, Apollos came down to Ephesus; and being, in St. Paul's absence, instructed by Aquila and Priscilla, and having obtained letters of recommendation from the church at Ephesus, he passed over to Achaia; and when he was there, we read that he "helped them much which had believed through grace: for he mightily convinced the Jews, and that publicly." Acts 18 : 27, 28. To have brought Apollos into Achaia, of which Corinth was the capital city, as well as the principal Christian church, and to have shown that he preached the gospel in that country, would have been sufficient for our purpose. But the history happens also to mention Corinth by name, as the place in which Apollos, after his arrival in Achaia, fixed his residence; for, proceeding with the account of St. Paul's travels, it tells us, that while Apollos was at Corinth, Paul, having passed through the upper coasts, came down to Ephesus. Chap. 19 : 1. What is said, therefore, of Apollos in the epistle, coincides exactly, and especially in the point of chronology, with what is delivered concerning him in the history. The only question now is, whether the allusions were made with a regard to this coincidence. Now the occasions and purposes for which the name of Apollos is introduced in the Acts and in the epistles are so independent and so remote, that it is impossible to discover the smallest reference from one to the other. Apollos is mentioned in the Acts, in immediate connection with the history of Aquila and Priscilla, and for the very singular circumstance of his "knowing only the baptism of John." In the epistle, where none of these circumstances are taken notice of, his name first occurs for the purpose of reproving the contentious spirit of the Corinthians; and it occurs only in conjunction with that of some others: "Every one of you saith, I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ." The second passage in which Apollos appears, "I have planted, Apollos watered," fixes, as we have observed, the order of time among three distinct events; but it fixes this, I will venture to pronounce, without the writer perceiving that he was doing any such thing. The sentence fixes this order in exact conformity with the history; but it is itself introduced solely for the sake of the reflection which follows: "Neither is he that planteth any thing, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase."

VI. Chap. 4:11, 12: "Even unto this present hour we both hunger, and thirst, and are naked, and are buffeted, and have no certain dwelling-place; and labor, working with our own hands."

We are expressly told in the history, that at Corinth St. Paul labored with his own hands: "He found Aquila and Priscilla; and because he was of the same craft, he abode with them, and wrought; for by their occupation they were tent-makers." But in the text before us, he is made to say, that he labored "*even unto this present hour*," that is, to the time of writing the epistle at Ephesus. Now, in the narration of St. Paul's transactions at Ephesus, delivered in the nineteenth chapter of the Acts, nothing is said of his working with his own hands; but in the twentieth chapter we read, that upon his return from Greece, he sent for the elders of the church of Ephesus to meet him at Miletus; and in the discourse which he there addressed to them, amidst some other reflections which he calls to their remembrance, we find the following: "I have coveted no man's silver, or gold, or apparel. Yea, ye yourselves know, that these hands have ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me." The reader will not forget to remark, that though St. Paul be now at Miletus, it is to the elders of the church of Ephesus he is speaking, when he says, "Ye yourselves know that these hands have ministered unto my necessities;" and that the whole discourse relates to his conduct during his last preceding residence at Ephesus. That manual labor, therefore, which he had exercised at Corinth, he continued at Ephesus; and not only so, but continued it during that particular residence at Ephesus, near the conclusion of which this epistle was written; so that he might with the strictest truth say, at the time of writing the epistle, "*Even unto this present hour* we labor, working with our own hands." The correspondency is sufficient. Then, as to the undesignedness of it: it is manifest, to my judgment, that if the history in this article had been taken from the epistle, this circumstance, if it appeared at all, would have appeared in its *place*, that is, in the direct account of St. Paul's transactions at Ephesus. The correspondency would not have been effected, as it is, by a kind of reflected stroke, that is, by a reference in a subsequent speech to what in the narrative was omitted. Nor is it likely, on the other hand, that a circumstance which is not extant in the history of St. Paul at Ephesus, should have been made the subject of a factitious allusion in an epistle purporting to be written by him from that place; not to mention that the allusion itself, especially as to time, is too oblique and general to answer any purpose of forgery whatever.

VII. Chap. 9:20: "And unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the law, as under the law."

We have the disposition here described exemplified in two instances which the history records; one, Acts 16 : 3 : "Him," Timothy, "would Paul have to go forth with him: and took and circumcised him, *because of the Jews which were in those quarters;* for they knew all that his father was a Greek." This was before the writing of the epistle. The other, Acts 21 : 23, 26, and after the writing of the epistle: "Do therefore this that we say to thee: We have four men which have a vow on them: them take, and purify thyself with them, and be at charges with them, that they may shave their heads: and all may know that those things whereof they were informed concerning thee, are nothing; but that thou thyself also walkest orderly, and keepest the law. Then Paul took the men, and the next day *purifying himself with them, entered into the temple.*" Nor does this concurrence between the character and the instances look like the result of contrivance. St. Paul in the epistle describes, or is made to describe his own accommodating conduct towards Jews and towards Gentiles, towards the weak and over-scrupulous, towards men, indeed, of every variety of character: "To them that are without law, as without law, (being not without law to God, but under the law to Christ,) that I might gain them that are without law. To the weak became I as weak, that I might gain the weak: I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some." This is the sequel of the text which stands at the head of the present number. Taking, therefore, the whole passage together, the apostle's condescension to the Jews is mentioned only as a part of his general disposition towards all. It is not probable that this character should have been made up from the instances in the Acts, which relate solely to his dealings with the Jews. It is not probable that a sophist should take his hint from those instances, and then extend it so much beyond them; and it is still more incredible that the two instances in the Acts, circumstantially related and interwoven with the history, should have been fabricated in order to suit the character which St. Paul gives of himself in the epistle.

VIII. Chap. 1 : 14–17 : "I thank God that I baptized none of you but Crispus and Gaius, lest any should say that I baptized in mine own name. And I baptized also the household of Stephanas; besides, I know not whether I baptized any other. For Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel."

It may be expected that those whom the apostle baptized with his own hands were converts distinguished from the rest by some circumstance either of eminence or of connection with him. Accordingly, of the three names here mentioned, Crispus, we find from Acts 18 : 8, was a "chief ruler" of the Jewish synagogue at Corinth, who "believed on the Lord with all his house." Gaius, it appears from Rom. 16 : 26, was St. Paul's host at Corinth, and the host, he tells us, "of the whole church." The household of Stephanas, we read in the sixteenth chapter of this epistle, were "the first-fruits of Achaia." Here, therefore, is the propriety we expected; and it is a proof of reality not to be contemned; for their names appearing in the several places in which they occur, with a mark of distinction belonging to each, could hardly be the effect of chance, without any truth to direct it: and, on the other hand, to suppose that they were picked out from these passages, and brought together in the text before us, in order to display a conformity of names, is both improbable in itself, and is rendered more so by the purpose for which they are introduced. They come in to assist St. Paul's exculpation of himself against the possible charge of having assumed the character of the founder of a separate religion, and with no other visible, or, as I think, imaginable design.*

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* Chap. 1 : 1 : "Paul, called to be an apostle of Jesus Christ through the will of God, and Sosthenes our brother, unto the church of God which is at Corinth." The only account we have of any person who bore the name of Sosthenes, is found in the eighteenth chapter

IX. Chap. 16 : 11 : "Now, if Timotheus come, let no man despise him." Why *despise* him? This charge is not given concerning any other messenger whom St. Paul sent; and, in the different epistles, many such messengers are mentioned. Turn to 1 Timothy, chap. 4 : 12, and you will

of the Acts. When the Jews at Corinth had brought Paul before Gallio, and Gallio had dismissed their complaint as unworthy of his interference, and had driven them from the judgment-seat, "then all the Greeks," says the historian, "took Sosthenes, the chief ruler of the synagogue, and beat him before the judgment-seat." The Sosthenes here spoken of was a Corinthian; and, if he was a Christian, and with St. Paul when he wrote this epistle, was likely enough to be joined with him in the salutation of the Corinthian church. But here occurs a difficulty. If Sosthenes was a Christian at the time of this uproar, why should the *Greeks* beat him? The assault upon the Christians was made by the *Jews*. It was the *Jews* who had brought Paul before the magistrate. If it had been the Jews also who had beaten Sosthenes, I should not have doubted but that he had been a favorer of St. Paul, and the same person who is joined with him in the epistle. Let us see, therefore, whether there be not some error in our present text. The Alexandrian manuscript gives *πάντες* alone, without *οἱ Ἕλληνες*, and it is followed in this reading by the Coptic version, by the Arabian version, published by Erpenius, by the Vulgate, and by Bede's Latin version. The Greek manuscripts, again, as well as Chrysostom, give *οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι*, in the place of *οἱ Ἕλληνες*. A great plurality of manuscripts authorize the reading which is retained in our copies. In this variety it appears to me extremely probable that the historian originally wrote *πάντες* alone, and that *οἱ Ἕλληνες* and *οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι* have been respectively added as explanatory of what the word *παντες* was supposed to mean. The sentence, without the addition of either name, would run very perspicuously thus: "*καὶ ἀπήλασεν ἀὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος· ἐπιλαβόμενοι δὲ πάντες Σωσθένην τὸν ἀρχισυνάγωγον, ἔτυπτον ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ βήματος*,"—"and he drove them away from the judgment-seat; and they all," namely, the crowd of Jews whom the judge had bid begone, "took Sosthenes, and beat him before the judgment-seat." It is certain, that as the whole body of the people were Greeks, the application of *all* to them was unusual and hard. If I were describing an insurrection at Paris, I might say *all* the Jews, *all* the Protestants, or *all* the English, acted so and so; but I should scarcely say *all* the French, when the whole mass of the community were of that description. As what is here offered is founded upon a various reading, and that in opposition to the greater part of the manuscripts that are extant, I have not given it a place in the text.

find that Timothy was a *young man*, younger probably than those who were usually employed in the Christian mission; and that St. Paul, apprehending lest he should, on that account, be exposed to contempt, urges upon him the caution which is there inserted, "Let no man despise thy youth."

X. Chap. 16 : 1 : "Now, concerning the collection for the saints, as I have given orders to the churches of Galatia, even so do ye."

The churches of Galatia and Phrygia were the last churches which St. Paul had visited before the writing of this epistle. He was now at Ephesus, and he came thither immediately from visiting these churches: "He went over all the country of Galatia and Phrygia in order, strengthening all the disciples. And it came to pass that, while Apollos was at Corinth, Paul having passed through the upper coasts," namely, the above-named countries, called the upper coasts as being the northern part of Asia Minor, "came to Ephesus." Acts 18 : 23; 19 : 1. These therefore, probably, were the last churches at which he left directions for their public conduct during his absence. Although two years intervened between his journey to Ephesus and his writing this epistle, yet it does not appear that during that time he visited any other church. That he had not been silent, when he was in Galatia, upon this subject of contribution for the poor, is further made out from a hint which he lets fall in his epistle to that church: "Only they," namely, the other apostles, "would that we should remember the poor; the same which I also was forward to do."

XI. Chap. 4 : 18 : "Now some are puffed up, as though I would not come unto you."

Why should they suppose that he would not come? Turn to the first chapter of the second epistle to the Corinthians, and you will find that he had already *disappointed* them: "I was minded to come unto you before, that ye might have a second benefit; and to pass by you into Macedonia, and to come again out of Macedonia unto you, and of you to be brought on my way toward Judea. When I therefore was thus minded, did I use lightness? Or the things that I purpose, do I purpose according to the flesh, that with me there should be yea, yea, and nay, nay? But, as God is true, our word toward you was not yea and nay." It appears from this quotation that he had not only intended, but that he had promised them a visit before; for, otherwise, why should he apologize for the change of his purpose, or express so much anxiety lest this change should be imputed to any culpable fickleness in his temper; and lest he should thereby seem to them as one whose word was not, in any sort, to be depended upon? Besides which, the terms made use of plainly refer to a promise, "Our *word toward you* was not yea and nay." St. Paul, therefore, had signified an intention which he had not been able to execute; and this seeming breach of his word, and the delay of his visit had, with some who were evil affected towards him, given birth to a suggestion that he would come no more to Corinth.

XII. Chap. 5:7, 8: "For even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us: therefore let us keep the feast, not with old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice and wickedness; but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth."

Dr. Benson tells us, that from this passage, compared with chap. 16:8, it has been conjectured that this epistle was written about the time of the Jewish passover; and to me the conjecture appears to be very well founded. The passage to which Dr. Benson refers us is this: "I will tarry at Ephesus until Pentecost." With this passage he ought to have joined another in the same context: "and it may be that I will abide, yea, and winter with you;" for from the two passages laid together, it follows that the epistle was written before Pentecost, yet after winter, which necessarily determines the date to the part of the year within which the passover falls. It was written before Pentecost, because he says, "I will tarry at Ephesus until Pentecost." It was written after winter, because he tells them, "It may be that I may abide, yea, and winter with you." The winter which the apostle purposed to pass at Corinth was undoubtedly the winter next ensuing to the date of the epistle; yet it was a winter subsequent to the ensuing Pentecost, because he did not intend to set forwards upon his journey till after that feast. The words, "let us keep the feast, not with old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth," look very like words suggested by the season; at least, they have, upon that supposition, a force and significancy which do not belong to them upon any other; and it is not a little remarkable, that the hints casually dropped in the epistle, concerning particular parts of the year, should coincide with this supposition.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SECOND EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS.

I. I WILL not say that it is impossible, having seen the first epistle to the Corinthians, to construct a second with ostensible allusions to the first; or that it is impossible that both should be fabricated, so as to carry on an order and continuation of story, by successive references to the same events. But I say that this, in either case, must be the effect of craft and design. Whereas, whoever examines the allusions to the former epistle which he finds in this, while he will acknowledge them to be such as would rise spontaneously to the hand of the writer, from the very subject of the correspondence and the situation of the corresponding parties, supposing these to be real, will see no particle of reason to suspect, either that the clauses containing these allusions were *insertions* for the purpose, or that the several transactions of the Corinthian church were feigned, in order to form a train of narrative, or to support the appearance of connection between the two epistles.

1. In the first epistle, St. Paul announces his intention of passing through Macedonia, in his way to Corinth: "I will come to you when I shall pass through Macedonia." In the second epistle, we find him arrived in Macedonia, and about to pursue his journey to Corinth. But observe the manner in which this is made to appear: "I know the forwardness of your mind, for which I boast of you to them of Macedonia, that Achaia was ready a year ago; and your zeal hath provoked very many. Yet have I sent the brethren, lest our boasting of you should be in vain in this behalf; that, as I said, ye may be ready; lest haply if they of Macedonia come with me, and find you unprepared, we (that we say not, ye) be ashamed in this same confident boasting." Chap. 9:2–4. St. Paul's being in Macedonia at the time

of writing the epistle is, in this passage, inferred only from his saying that he had boasted to the Macedonians of the alacrity of his Achaian converts; and the fear which he expresses lest, if any of the Macedonian Christians should come with him unto Achaia, they should find his boasting unwarranted by the event. The business of the contribution is the sole cause of mentioning Macedonia at all. Will it be insinuated that this passage was framed merely to state that St. Paul was now in Macedonia; and, by that statement, to produce an apparent agreement with the purpose of visiting Macedonia, notified in the first epistle? Or will it be thought probable, that if a sophist had meant to place St. Paul in Macedonia, for the sake of giving countenance to his forgery, he would have done it in so oblique a manner as through the medium of a contribution? The same thing may be observed of another text in the epistle, in which the name of Macedonia occurs: "Furthermore, when I came to Troas to preach the gospel, and a door was opened unto me of the Lord, I had no rest in my spirit, because I found not Titus, my brother; but taking my leave of them, I went from thence into Macedonia." I mean, that it may be observed of this passage also, that there is a reason for mentioning Macedonia entirely distinct from the purpose of showing St. Paul to be *there*. Indeed, if the passage before us show that point at all, it shows it so obscurely that Grotius, though he did not doubt that Paul was now in Macedonia, refers this text to a different journey. Is this the hand of a forger, meditating to establish a false conformity? The text, however, in which it is most strongly implied that St. Paul wrote the present epistle from Macedonia, is found in the fourth, fifth, and sixth verses of the seventh chapter: "I am filled with comfort, I am exceeding joyful in all our tribulation. For, when we were come into Macedonia, our flesh had no rest, but we were troubled on every side: without were fightings, within were fears. Nevertheless God, that comforteth those that are cast down, comforted us by the coming of Titus." Yet even here, I think, no one will contend that St. Paul's coming to Macedonia, or being in Macedonia, was the principal thing intended to be told; or that the telling of it, indeed, was any part of the intention with which the text was written; or that the mention even of the name of Macedonia was not purely incidental, in the description of those tumultuous sorrows with which the writer's mind had been lately agitated, and from which he was relieved by the coming of Titus. The first five verses of the eighth chapter, which commend the liberality of the Macedonian churches, do not, in my opinion, by themselves, prove St. Paul to have been at Macedonia at the time of writing the epistle.

2. In the first epistle, St. Paul denounces a severe censure against an incestuous marriage which had taken place among the Corinthian converts, with the connivance, not to say with the approbation, of the church; and enjoins the church to purge itself of this scandal by expelling the offender from its society: "It is reported commonly that there is fornication among you, and such fornication as is not so much as named among the Gentiles, that one should have his father's wife. And ye are puffed up, and have not rather mourned, that he that hath done this deed might be taken away from among you. For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have judged already as though I were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to deliver such a one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus." 1 Cor. 5 : 1–5. In the second epistle, we find this sentence executed, and the offender to be so affected with the punishment that St. Paul now intercedes for his restoration: "Sufficient to such a man is this punishment, which was inflicted of many. So that contrariwise, ye ought rather to forgive him, and comfort him, lest perhaps such a one should be

swallowed up with overmuch sorrow. Wherefore I beseech you that ye would confirm your love toward him." 2 Cor. 2 : 6–8. Is this whole business feigned, for the sake of carrying on a continuation of story through the two epistles? The church also, no less than the offender, was brought by St. Paul's reproof to a deep sense of the impropriety of their conduct. Their penitence, and their respect to his authority, were, as might be expected, exceeding grateful to St. Paul: "We were comforted not by Titus' coming only, but by the consolation wherewith he was comforted in you, when he told us your earnest desire, your mourning, your fervent mind toward me; so that I rejoiced the more. For though I made you sorry with a letter, I do not repent, though I did repent: for I perceive that the same epistle hath made you sorry, though it were but for a season. Now I rejoice, not that ye were made sorry, but that ye sorrowed to repentance: for ye were made sorry after a godly manner, that ye might receive damage by us in nothing." Chap. 7 : 7–9. That this passage is to be referred to the incestuous marriage, is proved by the twelfth verse of the same chapter: "Though I wrote unto you, I did it not for his cause that had done the wrong, nor for his cause that suffered wrong, but that our care for you in the sight of God might appear unto you." There were, it is true, various topics of blame noticed in the first epistle; but there were none, except this of the incestuous marriage, which could be called a transaction between private parties, or of which it could be said that one particular person had "done the wrong," and another particular person "had suffered it." Could all this be without foundation; or could it be put in the second epistle merely to furnish an obscure sequel to what had been said about an incestuous marriage in the first?

3. In the sixteenth chapter of the first epistle, a collection for the saints is recommended to be set forward at Corinth: "Now concerning the collection for the saints, as

I have given order to the churches of Galatia, even so do ye." Chap. 16 : 1. In the ninth chapter of the second epistle such a collection is spoken of, as in readiness to be received: "As touching the ministering to the saints, it is superfluous for me to write to you: for I know the forwardness of your mind, for which I boast of you to them of Macedonia, that Achaia was ready a year ago; and your zeal hath provoked very many." Chap. 9 : 1, 2. This is such a continuation of the transaction as might be expected; or possibly it will be said, as might easily be counterfeited: but there is a circumstance of nicety in the agreement between the two epistles, which I am convinced the author of a forgery would not have hit upon, or which, if he had hit upon it, he would have set forth with more clearness. The second epistle speaks of the Corinthians as having begun this eleemosynary business a year before: "This is expedient for you, who have begun before, not only to do, but also to be forward a year ago." Chap. 8 : 10. "I boast of you to them of Macedonia, that Achaia was ready a year ago." Chap. 9 : 2. From these texts, it is evident that something had been done in the business a year before. It appears, however, from other texts in the epistle, that the contribution was not yet collected or paid; for brethren were sent from St. Paul to Corinth, "to make up their bounty." Chap. 9 : 5. They are urged to "perform the doing of it," chap. 8 : 11; and every man was exhorted to give as he purposed in his heart. Chap. 9 : 7. The contribution, therefore, as represented in our present epistle, was in readiness, yet not received from the contributors; was begun, was forward long before, yet not hitherto collected. Now this representation agrees with one, and only with one supposition, namely, that every man had laid by in store, had already provided the fund from which he was afterwards to contribute—the very case which the first epistle authorizes us to suppose to have existed; for in that epistle St. Paul had charged the Corinthians, "Upon the first day of the week, let every one of you lay by in store as God hath prospered him."[*] 1 Cor. 16 : 2.

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[*] The following observations will satisfy us concerning the purity of our apostle's conduct in the suspicious business of a pecuniary contribution :

1. He disclaims the having received any inspired authority for the directions which he is giving : "I speak not by commandment, but by occasion of the forwardness of others, and to prove the sincerity of your love." 2 Cor. 8 : 8. Who that had a sinister purpose to answer by the recommending of subscriptions, would thus distinguish, and thus lower the credit of his own recommendation?[*]

2. Although he asserts the general right of Christian ministers to a maintenance from their ministry, yet he protests against the making use of this right in his own person : "Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel. But I have used none of these things : neither have I written these things that it should be so done unto me : for it were better for me to die, than that any man should make my glorying," that is, my professions of disinterestedness, "void." 1 Cor. 9 : 14, 15.

3. He repeatedly proposes that there should be associates with himself in the management of the public bounty ; not colleagues of his own appointment, but persons elected for that purpose by the contributors themselves : "And when I come, whomsoever ye shall approve by your letters, them will I send to bring your liberality unto Jerusalem. And if it be meet that I go also, they shall go with me." 1 Cor. 16 : 3, 4. And in the second epistle, what is here proposed we find actually done, and done for the very purpose of guarding his character against any imputation that might be brought upon it, in the discharge of a pecuniary trust : "And we have sent with him the brother, whose praise is in the gospel throughout all the churches ; and not that only, but who was also chosen of the churches to travel with us with this grace," gift, "which is administered by us to the glory of the same Lord, and declaration of your ready mind : avoiding this, that no man should blame us in this abundance which is admin-

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[*] This remark seems to rest on an evident misinterpretation. The meaning of St. Paul is not to disclaim a divine warrant for the advice he offers, but to state emphatically that it is advice, and not a command, and that he would have the offering to be free and spontaneous. The delicacy of thought and feeling in the passage is greatly obscured, if we lose sight of the true meaning of the expression. Some duties are plain and absolute, and these he enforces with apostolic authority ; others are indirect, and have no value, unless as the free utterance of Christian love. In this case the apostle, under the teaching of the same Spirit, disclaims the exercise of authority, and simply pleads with them as a Christian brother.—Ed.

II. In comparing the second epistle to the Corinthians with the Acts of the Apostles, we are soon brought to observe, not only that there exists no vestige either of the epistle having been taken from the history, or the history from the epistle; but also that there appears in the contents of the epistle, positive evidence that neither was borrowed from the other. Titus, who bears a conspicuous part in the epistle, is not mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles at all. St. Paul's sufferings enumerated, chap. 11 : 24, "Of the Jews five times received I forty stripes save one, thrice was I beaten with rods, once was I stoned, thrice I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day have I been in the deep," cannot be made out from his history as delivered in the Acts; nor would this account have been given by a writer who either drew his knowledge of St Paul from that history, or who was careful to preserve a conformity with it. The account in the epistle of St. Paul's escape from Damascus, though agreeing in the main fact with the account of the same transaction in the Acts, is related with such difference of circumstance, as renders it utterly improbable that one should be derived from the other. The two accounts placed by the side of each other, stand as follows:

2 Cor. 11 : 32, 33: "In Damascus the governor under Aretas the king kept the city of the Damascenes with a garrison, desirous to apprehend *me:* and through a window in a basket was I let down by the wall, and escaped his hands."

Acts 9 : 23–25: "And after that many days were fulfilled, the Jews took counsel to kill him. But their laying wait was known of Saul. And they watched the gates day and night to kill him. Then the disciples took him by night, and let him down by the wall in a basket."

Now, if we be satisfied in general concerning these two ancient writings, that the one was not known to the writer of the other, or not consulted by him, then the accordances

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istered by us: providing for honest things, not only in the sight of the Lord, but also in the sight of men;" that is, not resting in the consciousness of our own integrity, but in such a subject, careful also to approve our integrity to the public judgment. 2 Cor. 8 : 18–21.

which may be pointed out between them will admit of no solution so probable, as the attributing of them to truth and reality, as to their common foundation.

III. The opening of this epistle exhibits a connection with the history which alone would satisfy my mind that the epistle was written by St. Paul, and by St. Paul in the situation in which the history places him. Let it be remembered, that in the nineteenth chapter of the Acts St. Paul is represented as driven away from Ephesus, or as leaving however Ephesus, in consequence of an uproar in that city excited by some interested adversaries of the new religion. The account of the tumult is as follows: "When they heard these sayings," namely, Demetrius' complaint of the danger to be apprehended from St. Paul's ministry to the established worship of the Ephesian goddess, "they were full of wrath, and cried out, saying, Great is Diana of the Ephesians. And the whole city was filled with confusion: and having caught Gaius and Aristarchus, men of Macedonia, Paul's companions in travel, they rushed with one accord into the theatre. And when Paul would have entered in unto the people, the disciples suffered him not. And certain of the chief of Asia, which were his friends, sent unto him desiring him that he would not adventure himself into the theatre. Some therefore cried one thing, and some another; for the assembly was confused, and the more part knew not wherefore they were come together. And they drew Alexander out of the multitude, the Jews putting him forward. And Alexander beckoned with his hand, and would have made his defence unto the people. But when they knew that he was a Jew, all with one voice about the space of two hours cried out, Great is Diana of the Ephesians. And after the uproar was ceased, Paul called unto him the disciples, and embraced them, and departed for to go into Macedonia." When he was arrived in Macedonia, he wrote the second epistle to the Corinthians, which is now before us; and he begins his epistle in this wise: "Blessed be God, even the

Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of mercies, and the God of all comfort; who comforteth us in all our tribulation, that we may be able to comfort them which are in any trouble by the comfort wherewith we ourselves are comforted of God. For as the sufferings of Christ abound in us, so our consolation also aboundeth by Christ. And whether we be afflicted, it is for your consolation and salvation, which is effectual in the enduring of the same sufferings which we also suffer; or whether we be comforted, it is for your consolation and salvation. And our hope of you is steadfast, knowing, that as ye are partakers of the sufferings, so shall ye be also of the consolation. For we would not, brethren, have you ignorant of our trouble *which came to us in Asia*, that we were pressed out of measure, above strength, insomuch that we despaired even of life: but we had the sentence of death in ourselves, that we should not trust in ourselves, but in God which raiseth the dead: who delivered us from so great a death, and doth deliver: in whom we trust that he will yet deliver us." Nothing could be more expressive of the circumstances in which the history describes St. Paul to have been at the time when the epistle purports to be written; or rather, nothing could be more expressive of the sensations arising from these circumstances, than this passage. It is the calm recollection of a mind emerged from the confusion of instant danger. It is that devotion and solemnity of thought which follows a recent deliverance. There is just enough of particularity in the passage to show that it is to be referred to the tumult at Ephesus: "We would not, brethren, have you ignorant of our trouble which came to us in Asia." And there is nothing more; no mention of Demetrius, of the seizure of St. Paul's friends, of the interference of the town-clerk, of the occasion or nature of the danger which St. Paul had escaped, or even of the city where it happened; in a word, no recital from which a suspicion could be conceived, either that the author of the epistle had made use of the narrative in the Acts, or, on the other hand, that he had sketched the outline, which the narrative in the Acts only filled up. That the forger of an epistle, under the name of St. Paul, should borrow circumstances from a history of St. Paul then extant, or that the author of a history of St. Paul should gather materials from letters bearing St. Paul's name, may be credited; but I cannot believe that any forger whatever should fall upon an expedient so refined as to exhibit sentiments adapted to a situation, and to leave his readers to seek out that situation from the history; still less that the author of a history should go about to frame facts and circumstances fitted to supply the sentiments which he found in the letter. It may be said, perhaps, that it does not appear from the history that any danger threatened St. Paul's life in the uproar at Ephesus, so imminent as that from which in the epistle he represents himself to have been delivered. This matter, it is true, is not stated by the historian in form; but the personal danger of the apostle, we cannot doubt, must have been extreme, when the "whole city was filled with confusion;" when the populace had "seized his companions;" when, in the distraction of his mind, he insisted upon "coming forth among them;" when the Christians who were about him would not suffer him; when "his friends, certain of the chief of Asia, sent unto him, desiring him that he would not adventure himself into the theatre;" when, lastly, he was obliged to quit immediately the place and the country, "and when the tumult was ceased, to depart into Macedonia." All which particulars are found in the narration, and justify St. Paul's own account, "that he was pressed out of measure, above strength, insomuch that he despaired even of life; that he had the sentence of death in himself;" that is, that he looked upon himself as a man condemned to die.

IV. It has already been remarked, that St. Paul's original intention was to have visited Corinth on his way to Macedonia: "I was minded to come unto you before, ... and to pass by you into Macedonia." 2 Cor. 1 : 15, 16. It has also been remarked that he changed his intention, and ultimately resolved upon going through Macedonia *first.* Now, upon this head there exists a circumstance of correspondency between our epistle and the history, which is not very obvious to the reader's observation, but which, when observed, will be found, I think, close and exact. Which circumstance is this: that though the change of St. Paul's intention be expressly mentioned only in the second epistle, yet it appears, both from the history and from this second epistle, that the change had taken place before the writing of the first epistle; that it appears however from neither, otherwise than by an inference, unnoticed perhaps by almost every one who does not sit down professedly to the examination.

First, then, how does this point appear from the history? In the nineteenth chapter of the Acts and the twenty-first verse, we are told, that "Paul purposed in the spirit, when he had passed through Macedonia and Achaia, to go to Jerusalem. So he sent into Macedonia two of them that ministered unto him, Timotheus and Erastus; but he himself stayed in Asia for a season." A short time after this, and evidently in pursuance of the same intention, we find, chap. 20 : 1, 2, that "Paul departed from Ephesus for to go into Macedonia; and that, when he had gone over those parts, he came into Greece." The resolution therefore of passing first through Macedonia, and from thence into Greece, was formed by St. Paul previously to the sending away of Timothy. The order in which the two countries are mentioned shows the direction of his intended route, "when he had passed through Macedonia and Achaia." Timothy and Erastus, who were to precede him in his progress, were sent by him from Ephesus into Macedonia. He himself a short time afterwards, and, as has been observed, evidently in continuation and pursuance of the same design, "departed for to go into Macedonia." If he had ever, therefore, entertained a different plan of his journey, which is not hinted in the history, he must have changed that plan before this time. But, from the seventeenth verse of the fourth chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians, we discover that Timothy had been sent away from Ephesus before that epistle was written: "For this cause have I sent unto you Timotheus, who is my beloved son." The change therefore of St. Paul's resolution, which was prior to the sending away of Timothy, was necessarily prior to the writing of the first epistle to the Corinthians.

Thus stands the order of dates, as collected from the history, compared with the first epistle. Now let us inquire, secondly, how this matter is represented in the epistle before us. In the sixteenth verse of the first chapter of this epistle, St. Paul speaks of the intention which he had once entertained of visiting Achaia in his way to Macedon: "In this confidence I was minded to come unto you before, that ye might have a second benefit: and to pass by you into Macedonia." After protesting, in the seventeenth verse, against any evil construction that might be put upon his laying aside of this intention, in the twenty-third verse he discloses the cause of it: "Moreover I call God for a record upon my soul, that to spare you I came not as yet unto Corinth." And then he proceeds as follows: "But I determined this with myself, that I would not come again to you in heaviness. For if I make you sorry, who is he then that maketh me glad, but the same which is made sorry by me? *And I wrote this same unto you*, lest, when I came, I should have sorrow from them of whom I ought to rejoice; having confidence in you all, that my joy is the joy of you all. For out of much affliction and anguish of heart *I wrote unto you with many tears;* not that ye should be grieved, but that ye might know the love which I have more abundantly unto you. But if any have caused grief, he hath not grieved me, but in part, that I may not overcharge you all. Sufficient to such a man is this punishment, which was inflicted of many." In this quotation, let the reader first direct his attention to the clause marked by Italics, "and I wrote this same unto you," and let him consider, whether, from the context and from the structure of the whole passage, it be not evident that this writing was after St. Paul had "determined with himself that he would not come again to them in heaviness;" whether, indeed, it was not in consequence of this determination, or at least with this determination upon his mind. And, in the next place, let him consider whether the sentence, "I determined this with myself, that I would not come again to you in heaviness," do not plainly refer to that postponing of his visit to which he had alluded in the verse but one before, when he said, "I call God for a record upon my soul, that to spare you, I came not as yet unto Corinth;" and whether this be not the visit of which he speaks in the sixteenth verse, wherein he informs the Corinthians, "that he had been minded to pass by them into Macedonia," but that, for reasons which argued no levity or fickleness in his disposition, he had been compelled to change his purpose. If this be so, then it follows that the writing here mentioned was posterior to the change of his intention. The only question, therefore, that remains, will be, whether this writing relate to the letter which we now have under the title of the first epistle to the Corinthians, or to some other letter not extant. And upon this question I think Mr. Locke's observation decisive; namely, that the second clause marked in the quotation by italics, "I wrote unto you with many tears," and the first clause so marked, "I wrote this same unto you," belong to one writing, whatever that was; and that the second clause goes on to advert to a circumstance which is found in our present first epistle to the Corinthians, namely, the case and punishment of the incestuous person. Upon the whole, then, we see that it is capable of being inferred from St. Paul's own words, in the long extract which we have quoted, that the first epistle to the Corinthians was written after St. Paul had determined to postpone his journey to Corinth ; in other words, that the change of his purpose with respect to the course of his journey, though expressly mentioned only in the second epistle, had taken place before the writing of the first—the point which we made out to be implied in the history, by the order of the events there recorded, and the allusions to those events in the first epistle. Now this is a species of congruity to be relied upon more than any other. It is not an agreement between two accounts of the same transaction, or between different statements of the same fact, for the fact is not stated : nothing that can be called an account is given ; but it is the junction of two conclusions, deduced from independent sources, and deducible only by investigation and comparison.

This point, namely, the change of the route being prior to the writing of the first epistle, also falls in with, and accounts for, the manner in which he speaks in that epistle of his journey. His first intention had been, as he declares, to "pass by them into Macedonia :" that intention having been previously given up, he writes, in his first epistle, "that he would not see them now by the way," that is, as he must have done upon his first plan ; but "that he trusted to tarry awhile with them, and possibly to abide, yea, and winter with them." 1 Cor. 16 : 5, 6. It also accounts for a singularity in the text referred to, which must strike every reader : "I will come to you when I pass through Macedonia ; for I do pass through Macedonia." The supplemental sentence, "for I do pass through Macedonia," imports that there had been some previous communication upon the subject of the journey ; and also that there had been some vacillation and indecisiveness in the apostle's plan ; both which we now perceive to have been the case. The sentence is as much as to say, "This is what I at last resolve upon." The expression, *ὅταν Μακεδονίαν διέλθω*, is ambiguous ; it may denote either "when I pass," or "when I shall have passed, through Macedonia :" the considerations offered above fix it to the latter sense. Lastly, the point we have endeavored to make out confirms, or rather, indeed, is necessary to the support of a conjecture which forms the subject of a number in our observations upon the first epistle, that the insinuation of certain of the church of Corinth, that he would come no more among them, was founded on some previous disappointment of their expectations.

V. But if St. Paul had changed his purpose before the writing of the first epistle, why did he defer explaining himself to the Corinthians, concerning the reason of that change, until he wrote the second? This is a very fair question; and we are able, I think, to return to it a satisfactory answer. The real cause, and the cause at length assigned by St. Paul for postponing his visit to Corinth, and not travelling by the route which he had at first designed, was the disorderly state of the Corinthian church at the time, and the painful severities which he should have found himself obliged to exercise, if he had come among them during the existence of these irregularities. He was willing therefore to try, before he came in person, what a letter of authoritative objurgation would do among them, and to leave time for the operation of the experiment. That was his scheme in writing the first epistle. But it was not for him to acquaint them with the scheme. After the epistle had produced its effect—and to the utmost extent, as it should seem, of the apostle's hopes—when he had wrought in them a deep sense of their fault, and an almost passionate solicitude to restore themselves to the approbation of their teacher; when Titus, chap. 7 : 6, 7, 11, had brought him intelligence "of their earnest desire, their mourning, their fervent mind towards him, of their sorrow and their penitence; what carefulness, what clearing of themselves, what indignation, what fear, what vehement desire, what zeal, what revenge," his letter and the general concern occasioned by it had excited among them, he then opens himself fully upon the subject. The affectionate mind of the apostle is touched by this return of zeal and duty. He tells them that he did not visit them at the time proposed, lest their meeting should have been attended with mutual grief; and with grief to him imbittered by the reflection, that he was giving pain to those from whom alone he could receive comfort: "I determined this with myself, that I would not come again to you in heaviness. For if I make you sorry, who is he then that maketh me glad, but the same which is made sorry by me?" chap. 2:1, 2: that he had written his former epistle to warn them beforehand of their fault, "lest, when he came, he should have sorrow from them of whom he ought to rejoice," chap. 2:3: that he had the further view, though perhaps unperceived by them, of making an experiment of their fidelity, "to know the proof of them, whether they are obedient in all things," chap. 2:9. This full discovery of his motive came very naturally from the apostle, after he had seen the success of his measures, but would not have been a seasonable communication before. The whole composes a train of sentiment and of conduct resulting from real situation, and from real circumstance, and as remote as possible from fiction or imposture.

VI. Chap. 11:9: "When I was present with you, and wanted, I was chargeable to no man; for that which was lacking to me the brethren which came from Macedonia supplied." The principal fact set forth in this passage, the arrival at Corinth of brethren from Macedonia during St. Paul's first residence in that city, is explicitly recorded, Acts 18:1, 5: "After these things Paul departed from Athens, and came to Corinth. And when Silas and Timotheus were come from Macedonia, Paul was pressed in the spirit, and testified to the Jews that Jesus was Christ."

VII. The above quotation from the Acts proves that Silas and Timotheus were assistants to St. Paul in preaching the gospel at Corinth. With which correspond the words of the epistle, chap. 1:19: "For the Son of God, Jesus Christ, who was preached among you by us, even by me and Silvanus and Timotheus, was not yea and nay; but in him was yea." I do admit that the correspondency, considered by itself, is too direct and obvious; and that an impostor with the history before him might, and probably would, produce agreements of the same kind. But let it be remembered, that this reference is found in a writing which, from many discrepancies, and especially from those noted No. II., we may conclude, was not composed by any one who had consulted, and who pursued the history. Some observation also arises upon the variation of the name. We read Silas in the Acts, Silvanus in the epistle. The similitude of these two names, if they were the names of different persons, is greater than could easily have proceeded from accident; I mean, that it is not probable that two persons placed in situations so much alike, should bear names so nearly resembling each other.* On the other hand, the difference of the name in the two passages negatives the supposition of the passages, or the account contained in them, being transcribed either from the other.

VIII. Chap. 2:12, 13: "When I came to Troas to preach Christ's gospel, and a door was opened unto me of the Lord, I had no rest in my spirit, because I found not Titus my brother; but taking my leave of them, I went from thence into Macedonia."

To establish a conformity between this passage and the history, nothing more is necessary to be presumed, than that St. Paul proceeded from Ephesus to Macedonia, upon the same course by which he came back from Macedonia to Ephesus, or rather to Miletus, in the neighborhood of Ephesus; in other words, that in his journey to the peninsula of Greece, he went and returned the same way. St. Paul is now in Macedonia, where he had lately arrived from Ephesus. Our quotation imports that in his journey he had stopped at Troas. Of this the history says nothing, leaving us only the short account, that "Paul departed from Ephesus, for to go into Macedonia." But the history says, that in his *return* from Macedonia to Ephesus, "Paul sailed from Philippi to *Troas;* and that, when the disciples came together on the first day of the week to break bread, Paul preached unto them all night; that from Troas he went by land to Assos; from Assos, taking ship and coasting along the front of Asia Minor, he came by Mitylene to Miletus." Which account proves, first, that Troas lay in the way by which St. Paul passed between Ephesus and Macedonia; secondly, that he had disciples there. In one journey between these two places, the epistle, and in another journey between the same places, the history makes him stop at this city. Of the first journey he is made to say, "that a door was in that city opened unto me of the Lord;" in the second, we find disciples there collected around him, and the apostle exercising his ministry with what was, even in him, more than ordinary zeal and labor. The epistle, therefore, is in this instance confirmed, if not by the terms, at least by the probability of the history; a species of confirmation by no means to be despised, because, as far as it reaches, it is evidently uncontrived.

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* That they were the same persons is farther confirmed by 1 Thess. 1:1, compared with Acts 17:10.

Grotius, I know, refers the arrival at Troas, to which the epistle alludes, to a different period, but I think very improbably; for nothing appears to me more certain, than that the meeting with Titus, which St. Paul expected at Troas, was the same meeting which took place in Macedonia, namely, upon Titus's coming out of Greece. In the quotation before us, he tells the Corinthians, "When I came to Troas, ... I had no rest in my spirit, because I found not Titus my brother; but, taking my leave of them, I went from thence into Macedonia." Then in the seventh chapter he writes, "When we were come into Macedonia, our flesh had no rest, but we were troubled on every side; without were fightings, within were fears. Nevertheless God, that comforteth them that are cast down, comforted us by the coming of Titus." These two passages plainly relate to the same journey of Titus, in meeting with whom St. Paul had been disappointed at Troas, and rejoiced in Macedonia. And among other reasons which fix the former passage to the coming of Titus out of Greece, is the consideration, that it was nothing to the Corinthians that St. Paul did not meet with Titus at Troas, were it not that he was to bring intelligence from Corinth. The mention of the disappointment in this place, upon any other supposition, is irrelative.

IX. Chap. 11 : 24, 25 : "Of the Jews five times received I forty stripes save one, thrice was I beaten with rods, once was I stoned, thrice I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day I have been in the deep."

These particulars cannot be extracted out of the Acts of the Apostles, which proves, as has been already observed, that the epistle was not framed from the history; yet they are consistent with it, which, considering how numerically circumstantial the account is, is more than could happen to arbitrary and independent fictions. When I say that these particulars are *consistent* with the history, I mean, first, that there is no article in the enumeration which is contradicted by the history; secondly, that the history, though silent with respect to many of the facts here enumerated, has left space for the existence of these facts, consistent with the fidelity of its own narration.

First, no contradiction is discoverable between the epistle and the history. When St. Paul says, *thrice* was I beaten with rods, although the history record only *one* beating with rods, namely, at Philippi, Acts 16 : 22, yet there is no contradiction. It is only the omission in one book of what is related in another. But had the history contained accounts of *four* beatings with rods, at the time of writing this epistle, in which St. Paul says that he had only suffered three, there would have been a contradiction properly so called. The same observation applies generally to the other parts of the enumeration concerning which the history is silent; but there is one clause in the quotation particularly deserving of remark, because, when confronted with the history, it furnishes the nearest approach to a contradiction, without a contradiction being actually incurred, of any I remember to have met with: "Once," says St. Paul, "was I stoned." Does the history relate that St. Paul, prior to the writing of this epistle, had been stoned more than once? The history mentions distinctly one occasion upon which St. Paul was stoned, namely, at Lystra in Lycaonia: "There came thither certain Jews from Antioch and Iconium, who persuaded the people, and, having stoned Paul, drew him out of the city, supposing he had been dead." Acts 14:19. And it mentions also another occasion in which "an assault was made, both of the Gentiles, and also of the Jews with their rulers, to use them despitefully and to stone them; but they were aware of it," the history proceeds to tell us, "and fled into Lystra and Derbe." This happened at Iconium, prior to the date of the epistle. Now, had the assault been completed—had the history related that a stone was thrown, as it relates that preparations were made both by Jews and Gentiles to stone Paul and his companions; or even had the account of this transaction stopped, without going on to inform us that Paul and his companions were "aware of their danger and fled," a contradiction between the history and the epistle would have ensued. Truth is necessarily consistent; but it is scarcely possible that independent accounts, not having truth to guide them, should thus advance to the very brink of contradiction without falling into it.

Secondly, I say, that if the Acts of the Apostles be silent concerning many of the instances enumerated in the epistle, this silence may be accounted for from the plan and fabric of the history. The date of the epistle synchronizes with the beginning of the twentieth chapter of the Acts. The part, therefore, of the history which precedes the twentieth chapter, is the only part in which can be found any notice of the persecutions to which St. Paul refers. Now it does not appear that the author of the history was with St. Paul until his departure from Troas, on his way to Macedonia, as related chap. 16 : 10 ; or rather indeed the contrary appears. It is in this point of the history that the language changes. In the seventh and eighth verses of this chapter the third person is used : "After *they* were come to Mysia, *they* assayed to go into Bithynia ; but the Spirit suffered them not. And *they* passing by Mysia came to Troas :" and the third person is in like manner constantly used throughout the foregoing part of the history. In the tenth verse of this chapter, the first person comes in : "After Paul had seen the vision, immediately *we* endeavored to go into Macedonia, assuredly gathering that the Lord had called *us* for to preach the gospel unto them." Now, from this time to the writing of the epistle, the history occupies four chapters ; yet it is in these, if in any, that a regular or continued account of the apostle's life is to be expected ; for how succinctly his history is delivered in the preceding part of the book, that is to say, from the time of his conversion to the time when the historian joined him at Troas, except the particulars of his conversion itself, which are related circumstantially, may be understood from the following observations :

The history of a period of sixteen years is comprised in less than three chapters ; and of these, a material part is taken up with discourses. After his conversion he continued in the neighborhood of Damascus, according to the history, for a certain considerable, though indefinite length of time—according to his own words, Gal. 1 : 18, for three years ; of which no other account is given than this short one, that "straightway he preached Christ in the synagogues, that he is the Son of God ; that all that heard him were amazed, and said, Is not this he that destroyed them which called on this name in Jerusalem ? that he increased the more in strength, and confounded the Jews which dwelt at Damascus ; and that after many days were fulfilled, the Jews took counsel to kill him." From Damascus he proceeded to Jerusalem; and of his residence there nothing more particular is recorded, than that "he was with the apostles, coming in and going out; that he spake boldly in the name of the Lord Jesus, and disputed against the Grecians, who went about to kill him." From Jerusalem, the history sends him to his native city of Tarsus. Acts 9:30. It seems probable, from the order and disposition of the history, that St. Paul's stay at Tarsus was of some continuance; for we hear nothing of him until, after a long apparent interval, and much interjacent narrative, Barnabas, desirous of Paul's assistance upon the enlargement of the Christian mission, "went to Tarsus for to seek him." Chap. 11:25. We cannot doubt but that the new apostle had been busied in his ministry; yet of what he did, or what he suffered, during this period, which may include three or four years, the history professes not to deliver any information. As Tarsus was situated upon the sea-coast, and as, though Tarsus was his home, yet it is probable he visited from thence many other places, for the purpose of preaching the gospel, it is not unlikely, that in the course of three or four years he might undertake many short voyages to neighboring countries, in the navigating of which we may be allowed to suppose that some of those disasters and shipwrecks befell him to which he refers in the quotation before us, "thrice I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day I have been in the deep." This last clause I am inclined to interpret of his being obliged to take an open boat, upon the loss of the ship, and his continuing out at sea in that dangerous situation, a night and a day. St. Paul is here recounting his sufferings, not relating miracles. From Tarsus, Barnabas brought Paul to Antioch, and there he remained a year; but of the transactions of that year no other description is given than what is contained in the last four verses of the eleventh chapter. After a more solemn dedication to the ministry, Barnabas and Paul proceeded from Antioch to Cilicia, and from thence they sailed to Cyprus, of which voyage no particulars are mentioned. Upon their return from Cyprus, they made a progress together through the Lesser Asia; and though two remarkable speeches be preserved, and a few incidents in the course of their travels circumstantially related, yet is the account of this progress, upon the whole, given professedly with conciseness: for instance, at Iconium, it is said that they abode a long time, Acts 14 : 3; yet of this long abode, except concerning the manner in which they were driven away, no memoir is inserted in the history. The whole is wrapped up in one short summary, "They spake boldly in the Lord, which gave testimony unto the word of his grace, and granted signs and wonders to be done by their hands." Having completed their progress, the two apostles returned to Antioch, "and there they abode a long time with the disciples." Here we have another large portion of time passed over in silence. To this succeeded a journey to Jerusalem, upon a dispute which then much agitated the Christian church, concerning the obligation of the law of Moses. When the object of that journey was completed, Paul proposed to Barnabas to go again and visit their brethren in every city where they had preached the word of the Lord. The execution of this plan carried our apostle through Syria, Cilicia, and many provinces of the Lesser Asia; yet is the account of the whole journey dispatched in four verses of the sixteenth chapter.

If the Acts of the Apostles had undertaken to exhibit regular annals of St. Paul's ministry, or even any continued account of his life, from his conversion at Damascus to his imprisonment at Rome, I should have thought the omission of the circumstances referred to in our epistle a matter of reasonable objection. But when it appears from the history itself, that large portions of St. Paul's life were either passed over in silence, or only slightly touched upon, and that nothing more than certain detached incidents and discourses is related; when we observe, also, that the author of the history did not join our apostle's society till a few years before the writing of the epistle, at least that there is no proof in the history that he did so; in comparing the history with the epistle. we shall not be surprised by the discovry of omissions: we shall ascribe it to truth that there is no contradiction.

X. Chap. 3:1: "Do we begin again to commend ourselves; or need we, as some others, letters of commendation from you?"

"As some others." Turn to Acts 18:27, and you will find that a short time before the writing of this epistle, Apollos had gone to Corinth with letters of commendation from the Ephesian Christians; "and when Apollos was disposed to pass into Achaia, the brethren wrote, exhorting the disciples to receive him." Here the words of the epistle bear the appearance of alluding to some specific instance, and the history supplies that instance; it supplies at least an instance as apposite as possible to the terms which the apostle uses, and to the date and direction of the epistle in which they are found. The letter which Apollos carried from Ephesus was precisely the letter of commendation which St. Paul meant; and it was to Achaia, of which Corinth was the capital, and indeed to Corinth itself, Acts 19:1, that Apollos carried it; and it was about two years before the writing of this epistle. If St. Paul's words be rather thought to refer to some general usage which then obtained among the Christian churches, the case of Apollos exemplifies that usage; and affords that species of confirmation to the epistle which arises from seeing the manners of the age, in which it purports to be written, faithfully preserved.

XI. Chap. 13:1: "This is the third time I am coming to you:" *τοίτον τοῦτο ἔρχομαι.*

Do not these words import that the writer had been at Corinth twice before? Yet if they import this, they overset every congruity we have been endeavoring to establish. The Acts of the Apostles record only two journeys of St. Paul to Corinth. We have all along supposed, what every mark of time except this expression indicates, that this epistle was written between the first and second of these journeys. If St. Paul had been already twice at Corinth, this supposition must be given up; and every argument or observation which depends upon it falls to the ground. Again, the Acts of the Apostles not only record no more than two journeys of St. Paul to Corinth, but do not allow us to suppose that more than two such journeys could be made or intended by him within the period which the history comprises; for from his first journey into Greece to his first imprisonment at Rome, with which the history concludes, the apostle's time is accounted for. If therefore the epistle was written after the second journey to Corinth, and upon the view and expectation of a third, it must have been written after his first imprisonment at Rome, that is, after the time to which the history extends. When I first read over this epistle with the particular view of comparing it with the history, which I chose to do without consulting any commentary whatever, I own that I felt myself confounded by this text. It appeared to contradict the opinion, which I had been led by a great variety of circumstances to form, concerning the date and occasion of the epistle. At length, however, it occurred to my thoughts to inquire, whether the passage did necessarily imply that St. Paul had been at Corinth twice; or whether, when he says, "this is the third time I am coming to you," he might mean only that this was the third time that he was ready, that he was prepared, that he intended to set out on his journey to Corinth. I recollected that he had once before this purposed to visit Corinth, and had been disappointed in this purpose; which disappointment forms the subject of much apology and protestation, in the first and second chapters of the epistle. Now, if the journey in which he had been disappointed was reckoned by him one of the times in which "he was coming to them," then the present would be the third time, that is, of his being ready and prepared to come; although he had been actually at Corinth only *once* before. This conjecture being taken up, a further examination of the passage and the epistle produced proofs which placed it beyond doubt. "This is the third time I am coming to you:" in the verse following these words, he adds, "I told you before, and foretell you, as if I were present, *the second time;* and being absent now I write to them which heretofore have sinned, and to all other, that, if I come again, I will not spare." In this verse the apostle is declaring beforehand what he would do in his intended visit: his expression, therefore, "as if I were present a second time," relates to that visit. But, if his future visit would only make him present among them a second time, it follows that he had been already there but once. Again, in the fifteenth verse of the first chapter, he tells them, "In this confidence I was minded to come unto you before, that ye might have a *second* benefit." Why a second, and not a third benefit? why δεύτεραν, and not τρίτην χάριν, if the τρίτον ἔρχομαι, in the fifteenth chapter, meant a *third* visit? for, though the visit in the first chapter be that visit in which he was disappointed, yet, as it is evident from the epistle that he had never been at Corinth from the time of the disappointment to the time of writing the epistle, it follows, that if it were only a second visit in which he was disappointed then, it could only be a second visit which he proposed now. But the text which I think is decisive of the question, if any question remain upon the subject, is the fourteenth verse of the twelfth chapter, "Behold, the third time I am ready to come to you:" Ἰδοὺ τρίτον ἑτοίμως ἔχω ἐλθεῖν. It is very clear that the τρίτον ἑτοίμως ἔχω ἐλθεῖν of the twelfth chapter, and the τρίτον τοῦτο ἔρχομαι of the thirteenth chapter, are equivalent expressions, were intended to convey the same meaning, and to relate to the same journey. The comparison of these phrases gives us St. Paul's own explanation of his own words; and it is that very explanation which we are contending for, namely, that τρίτον τοῦτο ἔρχομαι does not mean that he was coming a third time, but that this was the third time he was in readiness to come, τρίτον ἑτοίμως ἔχων. I do not apprehend, that after this it can be necessary to call to our aid the reading of the Alexandrian manuscript, which gives ἑτοίμως ἔχω ἐλθεῖν in the thirteenth chapter as well as in the twelfth; or of the Syriac and Coptic versions, which follow that reading; because I allow that this reading, besides not being sufficiently supported by ancient copies, is probably paraphrastical, and has been inserted for the purpose of expressing more unequivocally the sense which the shorter expression τρίτον τοῦτο ἔρχομαι was supposed to carry. Upon the whole, the matter is sufficiently certain: nor do I propose it as a new interpretation of the text which contains the difficulty, for the same was given by Grotius long ago; but I thought it the clearest way of explaining the subject, to describe the manner in which the difficulty, the solution, and the proofs of that solution successively presented themselves to my inquiries. Now, in historical researches, a reconciled inconsistency becomes a positive argument. First, because an impostor generally guards against the appearance of inconsistency; and secondly, because, when apparent inconsistencies are found, it is seldom that any thing but truth renders them capable of reconciliation. The existence of the difficulty proves the want or absence of that caution which usually accompanies the consciousness of fraud; and the solution proves, that it is not the collusion of fortuitous propositions which we have to deal with, but that a thread of truth winds through the whole, which preserves every circumstance in its place.

XII. Chap. 10:14–16: "We are come as far as to you also in preaching the gospel of Christ: not boasting of things without our measure, that is, of other men's labors; but having hope, when your faith is increased, that we shall be enlarged by you according to our rule abundantly to preach the gospel in the regions beyond you."

This quotation affords an indirect, and therefore unsuspicious, but at the same time a distinct and indubitable recognition of the truth and exactness of the history. I consider it to be implied by the words of the quotation, that Corinth was the extremity of St. Paul's travels *hitherto.* He expresses to the Corinthians his hope, that in some future visit he might "preach the gospel to the regions beyond them;" which imports that he had not hitherto proceeded "beyond them," but that Corinth was as yet the furthest point or boundary of his travels. Now, how is St. Paul's first journey into Europe, which was the only one he had taken before the writing of the epistle, traced out in the history? Sailing from Asia, he landed at Philippi; from Philippi, traversing the eastern coast of the peninsula, he passed through Amphipolis and Appollonia to Thessalonica; from thence through Berea to Athens, and from Athens to Corinth, *where he stopped;* and from whence, after a residence of a year and a half, he sailed back into Syria. So that Corinth was the last place which he visited in the peninsula; was the place from which he returned into Asia, and was, as such, the boundary and limit of his progress. He could not have said the same thing, namely, "I hope hereafter to visit the regions beyond you," in an epistle to the Philippians, or in an epistle to the Thessalonians, inasmuch as he must be deemed to have already visited the regions beyond *them*, having proceeded from those cities to other parts of Greece. But from Corinth he returned home: every part therefore beyond that city might properly be said, as it is said in the passage before us, to be unvisited. Yet is this propriety the spontaneous effect of truth, and produced without meditation or design.

CHAPTER V.

THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

I. The argument of this epistle in some measure proves its antiquity. It will hardly be doubted, but that it was written while the dispute concerning the circumcision of Gentile converts was fresh in men's minds; for, even supposing it to have been a forgery, the only credible motive that can be assigned for the forgery, was to bring the name and authority of the apostle into this controversy. No design could be so insipid, or so unlikely to enter into the thoughts of any man, as to produce an epistle written earnestly and pointedly upon one side of a controversy, when the controversy itself was dead, and the question no longer interesting to any description of readers whatever. Now the controversy concerning the circumcision of the Gentile Christians was of such a nature, that, if it arose at all, it must have arisen in the beginning of Christianity. As Judea was the scene of the Christian history—as the Author and preachers of Christianity were Jews—as the religion itself acknowledged and was founded upon the Jewish religion, in contradistinction from every other religion then professed among mankind, it was not to be wondered at, that some of its teachers should carry it out in the world rather as a sect and modification of Judaism, than as a separate original revelation; or that they should invite their proselytes to those observances in which they lived themselves. This was likely to happen; but if it did not happen *at first*—if, while the religion was in the hands of Jewish teachers, no such claim was advanced, no such condition was attempted to be imposed, it is not probable that the doctrine would be started, much less that it should prevail in any future period. I likewise think, that those pretensions of Judaism were much more likely to be insisted upon while the Jews continued a nation, than after their fall and dispersion—while Jerusalem and the temple stood, than after the destruction brought upon them by the Roman arms, the fatal cessation of the sacrifice and the priesthood, the humiliating loss of their country, and, with it, of the great rites and symbols of their institution. It should seem, therefore, from the nature of the subject and the situation of the parties, that this controversy was carried on in the interval between the preaching of Christianity to the Gentiles and the invasion of Titus; and that our present epistle, which was undoubtedly intended to bear a part in this controversy, must be referred to the same period.

But, again, the epistle supposes that certain designing adherents of the Jewish law had crept into the churches of Galatia, and had been endeavoring, and but too successfully, to persuade the Galatic converts that they had been taught the new religion imperfectly and at second hand—that the founder of their church himself possessed only an inferior and deputed commission, the seat of truth and authority being in the apostles and elders of Jerusalem; moreover, that whatever he might profess among them, he had himself, at other times and in other places, given way to the doctrine of circumcision. The epistle is unintelligible without supposing all this. Referring therefore to this, as to what had actually passed, we find St. Paul treating so unjust an attempt to undermine his credit, and to introduce among his converts a doctrine which he had uniformly reprobated, in terms of great asperity and indignation. And in order to refute the suspicions which had been raised concerning the fidelity of his teaching, as well as to assert the independency and divine original of his mission, we find him appealing to the history of his conversion, to his conduct under it, to the manner in which he had conferred with the apostles when he met with them at Jerusalem: alleging, that so far was his doctrine from being derived from them, or they from exercising any superiority over him, that they had simply assented to what he had already preached among the Gentiles, and which preaching was communicated not by them to him, but by himself to them; that he had maintained the liberty of the Gentile church by opposing, upon one occasion, an apostle to the face, when the timidity of his behavior seemed to endanger it; that from the first, that all along, that to that hour he had constantly resisted the claims of Judaism; and that the persecutions which he daily underwent, at the hands or by the instigation of the Jews, and of which he bore in his person the marks and scars, might have been avoided by him, if he had consented to employ his labors in bringing, through the medium of Christianity, converts over to the Jewish institution, for then "would the offence of the cross have ceased." Now an impostor who had forged the epistle for the purpose of producing St. Paul's authority in the dispute, which, as has been observed, is the only credible motive that can be assigned for the forgery, might have made the apostle deliver his opinion upon the subject in strong and decisive terms, or might have put his name to a train of reasoning and argumentation upon that side of the question which the impostor was intended to recommend. I can allow the possibility of such a scheme as that; but for a writer, with this purpose in view, to feign a series of transactions supposed to have passed among the Christians of Galatia, and then to counterfeit expressions of anger and resentment excited by these transactions; to make the apostle travel back into his own history, and into a recital of various passages of his life, some indeed directly, but others obliquely, and others even obscurely bearing upon the point in question; in a word, to substitute narrative for argument, expostulation and complaint for dogmatic positions and controversial reasoning, in a writing properly controversial, and of which the aim and design was to support one side of a much agitated question—is a method so intricate, and so unlike the methods pursued by all other impostors, as to require very flagrant proofs of imposition to induce us to believe it to be one.

II. In this number I shall endeavor to prove,

1. That the epistle to the Galatians and the Acts of the Apostles were written without any communication with each other.

2. That the epistle, though written without any communication with the history by recital, implication, or reference, bears testimony to many of the facts contained in it.

1. The epistle and the Acts of the Apostles were written without any communication with each other.

To judge of this point, we must examine those passages in each which describe the same transaction; for if the author of either writing derived his information from the account which he had seen in the other, when he came to speak of the same transaction, he would follow that account. The history of St. Paul at Damascus, as read in the Acts, and as referred to by the epistle, forms an instance of this sort. According to the Acts, Paul, after his conversion, was certain days with the "disciples which were at Damascus. And straightway he preached Christ in the synagogues, that he is the Son of God. But all that heard him were amazed, and said, Is not this he that destroyed them which called on his name in Jerusalem, and came hither for that intent, that he might bring them bound unto the chief priests? But Saul increased the more in strength, confounding the Jews which dwelt at Damascus, proving that this is very Christ. And after that many days were fulfilled, the Jews took counsel to kill him. But their laying wait was known to Saul. And they watched the gates day and night to kill him. Then the disciples took him by night, and let him down by the wall in a basket. And when Saul was come to Jerusalem, he assayed to join himself to the disciples." Chap. 9 : 19–26.

According to the epistle, "When it pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace, to reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the heathen; immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood: neither went I up to Jerusalem to them which were apostles before me; but I went into Arabia, and returned again unto Damascus. Then after three years I went up to Jerusalem."

Besides the difference observable in the terms and general complexion of these two accounts, "the journey into Arabia" mentioned in the epistle and omitted in the history, affords full proof that there existed no correspondence between these writers. If the narrative in the Acts had been made up from the epistle, it is impossible that this journey should have been passed over in silence; if the epistle had been composed out of what the author had read of St. Paul's history in the Acts, it is unaccountable that it should have been inserted.*

The journey to Jerusalem related in the second chapter of the epistle—"then fourteen years after, I went up again to Jerusalem"—supplies another example of the same kind. Either this was the journey described in the fifteenth chapter of the Acts, when Paul and Barnabas were sent from Antioch to Jerusalem to consult the apostles and elders upon the question of the Gentile converts, or it was some journey of which the history does not take notice. If the first opinion be followed, the discrepancy in the two accounts is so considerable, that it is not without difficulty they can be adapted to the same transaction; so that upon this supposition, there is no place for suspecting that the writers were guided or assisted by each other. If the latter opinion be preferred, we have then a journey to Jerusalem, and a conference with the principal members of the church there, circumstantially related in the epistle, and entirely omitted in the Acts; and we are at liberty to repeat the observation which we before made, that the omission of so material a fact in the history is inexplicable, if the historian had read the epistle; and that the insertion of it in the epistle, if the writer derived his information from the history, is not less so.

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* N. B. The Acts of the Apostles simply inform us that St. Paul left Damascus in order to go to Jerusalem, "after many days were fulfilled." If any doubt whether the words "many days" could be intended to express a period which included a term of three years, he will find a complete instance of the same phrase used with the same latitude in the first book of Kings, chap. 11 : 38, 39 : "And Shimei dwelt in Jerusalem *many days*. And it came to pass at the end of *three years*, that two of the servants of Shimei ran away."

St. Peter's visit to Antioch, during which the dispute arose between him and St. Paul, is not mentioned in the Acts.

If we connect with these instances the general observation that no scrutiny can discover the smallest trace of transcription or imitation, either in things or words, we shall be fully satisfied in this part of our case; namely, that the two records, be the facts contained in them true or false, come to our hands from independent sources.

Secondly, I say that the epistle thus proved to have been written without any communication with the history, bears testimony to a great variety of particulars contained in the history.

1. St. Paul, in the early part of his life, had addicted himself to the study of the Jewish religion, and was distinguished by his zeal for the institution, and for the traditions which had been incorporated with it. Upon this part of his character the history makes St. Paul speak thus: "I am verily a man which am a Jew, born in Tarsus, a city of Cilicia, yet brought up in this city at the feet of Gamaliel, and taught according to the perfect manner of the law of the fathers, and was zealous toward God, as ye all are this day." Acts 22 : 3.

The epistle is as follows: "I profited in the Jews' religion above many my equals in mine own nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of my fathers." Chap. 1 : 14.

2. St. Paul, before his conversion, had been a fierce persecutor of the new sect. "As for Saul, he made havoc of

the church, entering into every house, and haling men and women, committed them to prison." Acts 8 : 3.

This is the history of St. Paul, as delivered in the Acts; in the recital of his own history in the epistle, "Ye have heard," says he, "of my conversation in time past in the Jews' religion, how that beyond measure I persecuted the church of God." Chap. 1 : 13.

3. St. Paul was miraculously converted on his way to Damascus. "And as he journeyed, he came near Damascus: and suddenly there shined round about him a light from heaven; and he fell to the earth, and heard a voice saying unto him, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? And he said, Who art thou, Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest. It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks. And he trembling and astonished, said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" Acts 9 : 3–6. With these compare the epistle, chap. 1 : 15–17: "When it pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb and called me by his grace, to reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the heathen; immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood: neither went I up to Jerusalem to them that were apostles before me: but I went into Arabia, and returned again unto Damascus."

In this quotation from the epistle, I desire it to be remarked how incidentally it appears that the affair passed at *Damascus.* In what may be called the direct part of the account, no mention is made of the place of his conversion at all; a casual expression at the end, and an expression brought in for a different purpose, alone fixes it to have been at Damascus: "I returned again unto Damascus." Nothing can be more like simplicity and undesignedness than this is. It also draws the agreement between the two quotations somewhat closer, to observe, that they both state St. Paul to have preached the gospel immediately upon his call: "And straightway he preached Christ in the synagogues, that he is the Son of God." Acts 9 : 20. "When it pleased God . . . . to reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the heathen; immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood." Galatians 1 : 15.

4. The course of the apostle's travels after his conversion was this: he went from Damascus to Jerusalem, and from Jerusalem into Syria and Cilicia. At Damascus, "the disciples took him by night, and let him down by the wall in a basket. And when Saul was come to Jerusalem, he assayed to join himself to the disciples." Acts 9 : 25, 26. Afterwards, "when the brethren knew" the conspiracy formed against him at Jerusalem, "they brought him down to Cesarea, and sent him forth to Tarsus," a city in Cilicia. Ver. 30. In the epistle, St. Paul gives the following brief account of his proceedings within the same period: "After three years, I went up to Jerusalem to see Peter, and abode with him fifteen days. Afterwards I came into the regions of Syria and Cilicia." The history had told us that Paul passed from Cesarea to Tarsus: if he took his journey by land, it would carry him through Syria into Cilicia; and he would come, after his visit at Jerusalem, "into the regions of Syria and Cilicia," in the very order in which he mentions them in the epistle. This supposition of his going from Cesarea to Tarsus *by land*, clears up also another point. It accounts for what St. Paul says in the same place concerning the churches of Judea: "Afterwards I came into the regions of Syria and Cilicia; and was unknown by face unto the churches of Judea which were in Christ: but they had heard only, That he which persecuted us in times past, now preacheth the faith which once he destroyed. And they glorified God in me." Upon which passage I observe, first, that what is here said of the churches of Judea, is spoken in connection with his journey into the regions of Syria and Cilicia. Secondly, that the passage itself has little significancy, and that the *connection* is inexplicable, unless St. Paul went through Judea—though probably by a hasty journey—at the time that he came into the regions of

Syria and Cilicia.* Suppose him to have passed by land from Cesarea to Tarsus, all this, as has been observed, would be precisely true.

5. Barnabas was with St. Paul at Antioch. "Then departed Barnabas to Tarsus, for to seek Saul: and when he had found him, he brought him unto Antioch. And it came to pass, that a whole year they assembled themselves with the church." Acts 11 : 25, 26. Again, and upon another occasion, Paul and Barnabas "sailed to Antioch;" and there they continued a "long time with the disciples." Chap. 14 : 26.

Now, what says the epistle? "When Peter was come to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed. And the other Jews dissembled likewise with him; insomuch that Barnabas also was carried away with their dissimulation." Chap. 2 : 11, 13.

6. The stated residence of the apostles was at Jerusalem. "At that time there was a great persecution against the church which was at Jerusalem; and they were all scattered abroad throughout the regions of Judea and Samaria, except the apostles." Acts 8 : 1. "They," the Christians at Antioch, "determined that Paul and Barnabas, and certain other of them, should go up to Jerusalem unto the apostles and elders about this question." Acts 15 : 2. With these accounts agrees the declaration in the epistle: "Neither went I up to Jerusalem to them which were apostles before me," chap. 1 : 17; for this declaration implies, or rather assumes it to be known, that Jerusalem was the place where the apostles were to be met with.

7. There were at Jerusalem two apostles, or at the least, two eminent members of the church, of the name of James.

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* Dr. Doddridge thought that the Cesarea here mentioned was not the celebrated city of that name upon the Mediterranean sea, but Cesarea Philippi, near the borders of Syria, which lies in a much more direct line from Jerusalem to Tarsus than the other. The objection to this, Dr. Benson remarks, is, that Cesarea, without any addition, usually denotes Cesarea Palestine.

This is directly inferred from the Acts of the Apostles, which, in the second verse of the twelfth chapter, relates the death of James the brother of John; and yet, in the fifteenth chapter, and in a subsequent part of the history, records a speech delivered by James in the assembly of the apostles and elders. It is also strongly implied by the form of expression used in the epistle: "Other apostles saw I none, save James the *Lord's brother;*" that is, to distinguish him from James the brother of John.

To us who have been long conversant in the Christian history as contained in the Acts of the Apostles, these points are obvious and familiar; nor do we readily apprehend any greater difficulty in making them appear in a letter purporting to have been written by St. Paul, than there is in introducing them into a modern sermon. But to judge correctly of the argument before us, we must discharge this knowledge from our thoughts. We must propose to ourselves the situation of an author who sat down to the writing of the epistle without having seen the history, and then the concurrences we have deduced will be deemed of importance. They will at least be taken for separate confirmations of the several facts, and not only of these particular facts, but of the general truth of the history.

For what is the rule with respect to corroborative testimony which prevails in courts of justice, and which prevails only because experience has proved that it is a useful guide to truth? A principal witness in a cause delivers his account; his narrative, in certain parts of it, is confirmed by witnesses who are called afterwards. The credit derived from their testimony belongs not only to the particular circumstances in which the auxiliary witnesses agree with the principal witness, but in some measure to the whole of his evidence; because it is improbable that accident or fiction should draw a line which touched upon truth in so many points.

In like manner, if two records be produced manifestly independent, that is, manifestly written without any participation of intelligence, an agreement between them, even in few and slight circumstances—especially if from the different nature and design of the writings, few points only of agreement, and those incidental, could be expected to occur—would add a sensible weight to the authority of both in every part of their contents.

The same rule is applicable to history, with at least as much reason as any other species of evidence.

III. But although the references to various particulars in the epistle, compared with the direct account of the same particulars in the history, afford a considerable proof of the truth not only of these particulars, but of the narrative which contains them, yet they do not show, it will be said, that the epistle was written by St. Paul; for admitting what seems to have been proved, that the writer, whoever he was, had no recourse to the Acts of the Apostles; yet many of the facts referred to, such as St. Paul's miraculous conversion, his change from a virulent persecutor to an indefatigable preacher, his labors among the Gentiles, and his zeal for the liberties of the Gentile church, were so notorious as to occur readily to the mind of any Christian who should choose to personate his character and counterfeit his name; it was only to write what every body knew. Now, I think that this supposition—namely, that the epistle was composed upon general information and the general publicity of the facts alluded to, and that the author did no more than weave into his work what the common fame of the Christian church had reported to his ears—is repelled by the particularity of the recitals and references. This particularity is observable in the following instances; in perusing which, I desire the reader to reflect, whether they exhibit the language of a man who had nothing but general reputation to proceed upon, or of a man actually speaking of himself and of his own history, and consequently of things concerning which he possessed a clear, intimate, and circumstantial knowledge.

1. The history, in giving an account of St. Paul after his conversion, relates, "that after many days," effecting, by the assistance of the disciples, his escape from Damascus, "he proceeded to Jerusalem." Acts 9 : 25. The epistle, speaking of the same period, makes St. Paul say that "he went into Arabia," that he returned again to Damascus, and that after three years he went up to Jerusalem. Chap. 1 : 17, 18.

2. The history relates, that when Saul was come from Damascus, he was with the disciples "coming in and going out." Acts 9 : 28. The epistle, describing the same journey, tells us, that he "went up to Jerusalem to see Peter, and abode with him fifteen days." Chap. 1 : 18.

3. The history relates that when Paul was come to Jerusalem, "Barnabas took him, and brought him to the apostles." Acts 9 : 27. The epistle, that he saw Peter; but other of the apostles saw he "none, save James the Lord's brother." Chap. 1 : 19.

Now this is as it should be. The historian delivers his account in general terms, as of facts at which he was not present. The person who is the subject of that account, when he comes to speak of these facts himself, particularizes time, names, and circumstances.

4. The like notation of places, persons, and dates, is met with in the account of St. Paul's journey to Jerusalem, given in the second chapter of the epistle. It was fourteen years after his conversion; it was in company with Barnabas and Titus; it was then that he met with James, Cephas, and John; it was then also that it was agreed among them that they should go to the circumcision, and he unto the Gentiles.

5. The dispute with Peter, which occupies the sequel of the second chapter, is marked with the same particularity. It was at Antioch; it was after certain came from James; it was while Barnabas was there, who was carried away by their dissimulation. These examples negative the insinua-

tion, that the epistle presents nothing but indefinite allusions to public facts.

IV. Chap. 4 : 11–16 : "I am afraid of you, lest I have bestowed upon you labor in vain. Brethren, I beseech you, be as I am ; for I am as ye are : ye have not injured me at all. Ye know how through infirmity of the flesh I preached the gospel unto you at the first. And *my temptation which was in my flesh* ye despised not, nor rejected ; but received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus. Where is then the blessedness ye spake of? for I bear you record, that, if it had been possible, ye would have plucked out your own eyes, and have given them unto me. Am I therefore become your enemy because I tell you the truth ?"

With this passage compare 2 Cor. 12 : 1–9 : "It is not expedient for me doubtless to glory. I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord. I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago, (whether in the body, I cannot tell ; or whether out of the body, I cannot tell : God knoweth ;) such a one caught up to the third heaven. And I knew such a man, (whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell : God knoweth ;) how that he was caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter. Of such a one will I glory : yet of myself I will not glory, but in mine infirmities. For, though I would desire to glory, I shall not be a fool : for I will say the truth : but now I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth me to be, or that he heareth of me. And lest I should be exalted above measure through the abundance of the revelations, there was given to me *a thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan to buffet me*, lest I should be exalted above measure. For this thing I besought the Lord thrice, that it might depart from me. And he said unto me, My grace is sufficient for thee ; for my strength is made perfect in weakness. Most gladly therefore will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me."

There can be no doubt but that "the temptation which was in the flesh," mentioned in the epistle to the Galatians, and "the thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan to buffet him," mentioned in the epistle to the Corinthians, were intended to denote the same thing. Either therefore it was, what we pretend it to have been, the same person in both, alluding, as the occasion led him, to some bodily infirmity under which he labored—that is, we are reading the real letters of a real apostle; or it was, that a sophist who had seen the circumstance in one epistle, contrived, for the sake of correspondency, to bring it into another; or, lastly, it was a circumstance in St. Paul's personal condition, supposed to be well known to those into whose hands the epistle was likely to fall, and for that reason introduced into a writing designed to bear his name. I have extracted the quotations at length, in order to enable the reader to judge accurately of the manner in which the mention of this particular comes in, in each; because that judgment, I think, will acquit the author of the epistle of the charge of having studiously inserted it, either with a view of producing an apparent agreement between them, or for any other purpose whatever.

The context, by which the circumstance before us is introduced, is in the two places totally different, and without any mark of imitation; yet in both places does the circumstance rise aptly and naturally out of the context, and that context from the train of thought carried on in the epistle.

The epistle to the Galatians, from the beginning to the end, runs in a strain of angry complaint of their defection from the apostle, and from the principles which he had taught them. It was very natural to contrast with this conduct, the zeal with which they had once received him; and it was not less so to mention, as a proof of their former disposition towards him, the indulgence which, while he was among them, they had shown to his infirmity: "My temptation which was in my flesh ye despised not, nor rejected; but received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus

Where is then the blessedness ye spake of?" that is, the benedictions which you bestowed upon me; "for I bear you record, that, if it had been possible, ye would have plucked out your own eyes, and have given them to me."

In the two epistles to the Corinthians, especially in the second, we have the apostle contending with certain teachers in Corinth, who had formed a party in that church against him. To vindicate his personal authority, as well as the dignity and credit of his ministry among them, he takes occasion—but not without apologizing repeatedly for the folly, that is, for the indecorum, of pronouncing his own panegyric*—to meet his adversaries in their boastings: "Whereinsoever any is bold, (I speak foolishly,) I am bold also. Are they Hebrews? so am I. Are they Israelites? so am I. Are they the seed of Abraham? so am I. Are they the ministers of Christ? (I speak as a fool,) I am more; in labors more abundant, in stripes above measure, in prisons more frequent, in deaths oft." Being led to the subject, he goes on, as was natural, to recount his trials and dangers, his incessant cares and labors in the Christian mission. From the proofs which he had given of his zeal and activity in the service of Christ, he passes—and that with the same view of establishing his claim to be considered as "not a whit behind the very chiefest of the apostles"—to the visions and revelations which from time to time had been vouchsafed to him. And then, by a close and easy connection, comes in the mention of his infirmity: "Lest I should be exalted," says he, "above measure through the abundance of the revelations, there was given to me a thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan to buffet me."

Thus then, in both epistles, the notice of his infirmity is suited to the place in which it is found. In the epistle to the Corinthians, the train of thought draws up to the circumstance by a regular approximation. In this epistle, it is suggested by the subject and occasion of the epistle itself. Which observation we offer as an argument to prove that it is not, in either epistle, a circumstance industriously brought forward for the sake of procuring credit to an imposture.

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* "Would to God you would bear with me a little in my folly: and indeed bear with me." Chap. 11 : 1.

"That which I speak, I speak it not after the Lord, but as it were foolishly, in this confidence of boasting." Chap. 11 : 17.

"I am become a fool in glorying; ye have compelled me." Chap. 12 : 11.

A reader will be taught to perceive the force of this argument, who shall attempt to introduce a *given* circumstance into the body of a writing. To do this without abruptness, or without betraying marks of design in the transition, requires, he will find, more art than he expected to be necessary, certainly more than any one can believe to have been exercised in the composition of these epistles.

V. Chap. 4 : 29 : "But as then he that was born after the flesh persecuted him that was born after the Spirit, even so it is now."

Chap. 5 : 11 : "And I, brethren, if I yet preach circumcision, why do I yet suffer persecution? then is the offence of the cross ceased."

Chap. 6 : 17 : "From henceforth, let no man trouble me; for I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus."

From these several texts, it is apparent that the persecutions which our apostle had undergone, were from the hands or by the instigation of the Jews; that it was not for preaching Christianity in opposition to heathenism, but it was for preaching it as distinct from Judaism, that he had brought upon himself the sufferings which had attended his ministry. And this representation perfectly coincides with that which results from the detail of St. Paul's history, as delivered in the Acts. At Antioch, in Pisidia, the "word of the Lord was published throughout all the region. But the *Jews stirred up* the devout and honorable women, and the chief men of the city, and raised persecution against Paul and Barnabas, and expelled them out of their coasts." Acts 13 : 49, 50. Not long after, at Iconium, "a great multitude both of the Jews and also of the Greeks believed. But the *unbelieving Jews* stirred up the Gentiles, and made their minds evil-affected against the brethren." Chap. 14 : 1, 2. At Lystra "there came certain Jews from Antioch and Iconium, who persuaded the people, and having stoned Paul, drew him out of the city, supposing he had been dead." Chap. 14 : 19. The same enmity, and from the same quarter, our apostle experienced in Greece. At Thessalonica, "some of them," the Jews, "believed, and consorted with Paul and Silas; and of the devout Greeks a great multitude, and of the chief women not a few. But *the Jews which believed not*, moved with envy, took unto them certain lewd fellows of the baser sort, and gathered a company, and set all the city in an uproar, and assaulted the house of Jason, and sought to bring them out to the people." Chap. 17 : 4, 5. Their persecutors follow them to Berea: "When the *Jews* of Thessalonica had knowledge that the word of God was preached of Paul at Berea, they came thither also, and stirred up the people." Chap. 17 : 13. And lastly at Corinth, when Gallio was deputy of Achaia, "*the Jews* made insurrection with one accord against Paul, and brought him to the judgment-seat." I think it does not appear that our apostle was ever set upon by the Gentiles, unless they were first stirred up by the Jews, except in two instances; in both which the persons who began the assault were immediately interested in his expulsion from the place. Once this happened at Philippi, after the cure of the Pythoness: "When her masters saw that the hope of their gains was gone, they caught Paul and Silas, and drew them into the market-place, unto the rulers." Chap. 16 : 19. And a second time at Ephesus, at the instance of Demetrius, a silversmith, which made silver shrines for Diana; who called together "workmen of like occupation, and said, Sirs, ye know that by this craft we have our wealth. Moreover ye see and hear, that not alone at Ephesus, but almost throughout all Asia, this Paul hath persuaded and turned away much people, saying that they be no gods, which are made with hands; so that not only this our craft is in danger to be set at naught, but also that the temple of the great goddess Diana should be despised, and her magnificence should be destroyed, whom all Asia and the world worshippeth"

VI. I observe an agreement in a somewhat peculiar rule of Christian conduct, as laid down in this epistle, and as exemplified in the second epistle to the Corinthians. It is not the repetition of the same general precept, which would have been a coincidence of little value; but it is the general precept in one place, and the application of that precept to an actual occurrence in the other. In the sixth chapter and first verse of this epistle, our apostle gives the following direction: "Brethren, if a man be overtaken in a fault, ye which are spiritual restore such a one in the spirit of meekness." In 2 Cor. 2:6–8, he writes thus: "Sufficient to such a man"—the incestuous person mentioned in the first epistle—"is this punishment, which was inflicted of many. So that contrarywise, ye ought rather to forgive him and comfort him, lest perhaps such a one should be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow. Wherefore I beseech you that ye would confirm your love toward him." I have little doubt but that it was the same mind which dictated these two passages.

VII. Our epistle goes further than any of St. Paul's epistles; for it avows in direct terms the supersession of the Jewish law, as an instrument of salvation, even to the Jews themselves. Not only were the Gentiles exempt from this authority, but even the Jews were no longer to place any dependency upon it, or consider themselves as subject to it on a religious account. "Before faith came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed. Wherefore the law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith. But after that faith is come, *we are no longer under a schoolmaster.*" Chap. 3:23–25. This was undoubtedly spoken of Jews and to Jews. In like manner, chap. 4 : 1–5. "Now I say, that the heir, as long as he is a child, differeth nothing from a servant, though he be lord of all; but is under tutors and governors until the time appointed of the father. Even so we, when we were children, were in bondage under the elements of the world: but when the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to *redeem them that were under the law*, that we might receive the adoption of sons." These passages are nothing short of a declaration, that the obligation of the Jewish law, considered as a religious dispensation, the effects of which were to take place in another life, had ceased with respect even to the Jews themselves. What then should be the conduct of a Jew—for such St. Paul was—who preached this doctrine? To be consistent with himself, either he would no longer comply, in his own person, with the directions of the law; or, if he did comply, it would be for some other reason than any confidence which he placed in its efficacy, as a religious institution. Now so it happens, that whenever St. Paul's compliance with the Jewish law is mentioned in the history, it is mentioned in connection with circumstances which point out the motive from which it proceeded; and this motive appears to have been always exoteric, namely, a love of order and tranquillity, or an unwillingness to give unnecessary offence. Thus, Acts 16 : 3: "Him," Timothy, "would Paul have to go forth with him; and took and circumcised him, *because of the Jews which were in those quarters*." Again, Acts 21 : 26, when Paul consented to exhibit an example of public compliance with a Jewish rite by purifying himself in the temple, it is plainly intimated that he did this to satisfy "many thousands of Jews who believed, and who were all zealous of the law." So far the instances related in one book correspond with the doctrine delivered in another.

VIII. Chap. 1 : 18: "Then after three years I went up to Jerusalem to see Peter, and abode with him fifteen days."

The shortness of St. Paul's stay at Jerusalem is what I desire the reader to remark. The direct account of the same journey in the Acts, chap. 9 : 28, determines nothing concerning the time of his continuance there: "And he was with them," the apostles, "coming in and going out at Jerusalem. And he spake boldly in the name of the Lord Jesus, and disputed against the Grecians; but they went about to slay him. Which when the brethren knew, they brought him down to Cesarea." Or rather this account, taken by itself, would lead a reader to suppose that St. Paul's abode at Jerusalem had been longer than fifteen days. But turn to the twenty-second chapter of the Acts, and you will find a reference to this visit to Jerusalem, which plainly indicates that Paul's continuance in that city had been of short duration: "And it came to pass, that, when I was come again to Jerusalem, even while I prayed in the temple, I was in a trance; and saw him saying unto me, Make haste, and get thee quickly out of Jerusalem; for they will not receive thy testimony concerning me." Here we have the general terms of one text so explained by a distant text in the same book, as to bring an indeterminate expression into a close conformity with a specification delivered in another book: a species of consistency not, I think, usually found in fabulous relations.

IX. Chap. 6 : 11: "Ye see how large a letter I have written unto you with mine own hand."

These words imply that he did not always write with his own hand; which is consonant to what we find intimated in some other of the epistles. The epistle to the Romans was written by Tertius: "I Tertius, who wrote this epistle, salute you in the Lord." Chap. 16 : 22. The first epistle to the Corinthians, the epistle to the Colossians, and the second epistle to the Thessalonians, have all, near the conclusion, this clause, "the salutation of me, Paul, with mine own hand;" which must be understood, and is universally understood to import, that the rest of the epistle was written by another hand. I do not think it improbable that an impostor, who had remarked this subscription in some other epistle, should invent the same in a forgery; but that is not done here. The author of this epistle does not imitate the manner of giving St. Paul's signature; he only bids the Galatians observe how large a letter he had written to them with his own hand. He does not say this was different from his ordinary usage; this is left to implication. Now, to suppose that this was an artifice to procure credit to an imposture, is to suppose that the author of the forgery, because he knew that others of St. Paul's were *not* written by himself, therefore made the apostle say that this was; which seems an odd turn to give to the circumstance, and to be given for a purpose which would more naturally and more directly have been answered by subjoining the salutation or signature in the form in which it is found in other epistles.*

X. An exact conformity appears in the manner in which a certain apostle or eminent Christian whose name was James, is spoken of in the epistle and in the history. Both writings refer to a situation of his at Jerusalem, somewhat different from that of the other apostles; a kind of eminence or presidency in the church there, or at least a more fixed and stationary residence. Chap. 2 : 11, 12. "When Peter was at Antioch, ... before that certain came from James, he did eat with the Gentiles." This text plainly attributes a kind of preëminency to James; and, as we hear of him twice in the same epistle, dwelling at Jerusalem, chap. 1 : 19, and 2 : 9, we must apply it to the situation which he held in that church. In the Acts of the Apostles, divers intimations occur, conveying the same idea of James' situation. When Peter was miraculously delivered from prison, and had surprised his friends by his appearance among them, after declaring unto them how the Lord had brought him out of prison, "Go show," says he, "these things unto James and to the brethren." Acts 12 : 17. Here James is manifestly spoken of in terms of distinction. He appears again with like distinction in the twenty-first chapter and the seventeenth and eighteenth verses: "And when we," Paul and his company, "were come to Jerusalem, ... the day following Paul went in with us unto James; and all the elders were present." In the debate which took place upon the business of the Gentile converts in the council at Jerusalem, this same person seems to have taken the lead. It was he who closed the debate, and proposed the resolution in which the council ultimately concurred: "Wherefore my sentence is, that we trouble not them which from among the Gentiles are turned to God."

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* The words πηλίκοις γράμμασιν may probably be meant to describe the character in which he wrote, and not the length of the letter. But this will not alter the truth of our observation. I think, however, that as St. Paul by the mention of his own hand designed to express to the Galatians the great concern which he felt for them, the words, whatever they signify, belong to the whole of the epistle; and not, as Grotius, after St. Jerome, interprets it, to the few verses which follow.

Upon the whole, that there exists a conformity in the expressions used concerning *James* throughout the history, and in the epistle, is unquestionable. But admitting this conformity, and admitting also the undesignedness of it, what does it prove? It proves that the circumstance itself is founded in truth; that is, that James was a real person, who held a situation of eminence in a real society of Christians at Jerusalem. It confirms also those parts of the narrative which are connected with this circumstance. Suppose, for instance, the truth of the account of Peter's escape from prison was to be tried upon the testimony of a witness who, among other things, made Peter, after his deliverance, say, "Go show these things unto James, and to the brethren;" would it not be material, in such a trial, to make out by other independent proofs, or by a comparison of proofs, drawn from independent sources, that there was actually at that time living at Jerusalem such a person as James; that this person held such a situation in the society among whom these things were transacted, as to render the words which Peter is said to have used concerning him, proper and natural for him to have used? If this would be pertinent in the discussion of oral testimony, it is still more so in appreciating the credit of remote history.

It must not be dissembled that the comparison of our epistle with the history presents some difficulties, or to say the least, some questions of considerable magnitude. It may be doubted, in the first place, to what journey the words which open the second chapter of the epistle, "then, fourteen years afterwards, I went to Jerusalem," relate. That which best corresponds with the date, and that to which most interpreters apply the passage, is the journey of Paul and Barnabas to Jerusalem, when they went thither from Antioch, upon the business of the Gentile converts; and which journey produced the famous council and decree recorded in the fifteenth chapter of Acts. To me this opinion appears to be encumbered with strong objections. In the epistle, Paul tells us that he "went up by revelation." Chap. 2 : 2. In the Acts, we read that he was sent by the church of Antioch. After no small dissension and disputation, "they determined that Paul and Barnabas, and certain other of them, should go up to the apostles and elders about this question." Acts 15 : 2. This is not very reconcilable. In the epistle St. Paul writes, that when he came to Jerusalem, "he communicated that gospel which he preached among the Gentiles, but privately to them which were of reputation." Chap 2 : 2. If by "that gospel" he meant the immunity of the Gentile Christians from the Jewish law—and I know not what else it can mean—it is not easy to conceive how he should communicate that privately which was the object of his public message. But a yet greater difficulty remains, namely, that in the account which the epistle gives of what passed upon this visit at Jerusalem, no notice is taken of the deliberation and decree which are recorded in the Acts, and which, according to that history, formed the business for the sake of which the journey was undertaken. The mention of the council and of its determination, while the apostle was relating his proceedings at Jerusalem, could hardly have been avoided, if in truth the narrative belong to the same journey. To me it appears more probable that Paul and Barnabas had taken some journey to Jerusalem, the mention of which is omitted in the Acts. Prior to the apostolic decree, we read that "Paul and Barnabas abode at Antioch a long time with the disciples." Acts 14:28. Is it unlikely, that during this long abode, they might go up to Jerusalem and return to Antioch? Or would the omission of such a journey be unsuitable to the general brevity with which these memoirs are written, especially of those parts of St. Paul's history which took place before the historian joined them?

But again, the first account we find in the Acts of the Apostles of St. Paul's visiting Galatia, is in the sixteenth chapter and the sixth verse: "Now when they had gone through Phrygia and the region of Galatia, ... they assayed to go into Bithynia." The progress here recorded was subsequent to the apostolic decree; therefore that decree must have been extant when our epistle was written. Now, as the professed design of the epistle was to establish the exemption of the Gentile converts from the law of Moses, and as the decree pronounced and confirmed that exemption, it may seem extraordinary that no notice whatever is taken of that determination, nor any appeal made to its authority. Much, however, of the weight of this objection, which applies also to some other of St. Paul's epistles, is removed by the following reflections.

1. It was not St. Paul's manner, nor agreeable to it, to resort or defer much to the authority of the other apostles, especially while he was insisting, as he does strenuously throughout this epistle insist, upon his own original inspiration. He who could speak of the very chiefest of the apostles in such terms as the following—"of those who seemed

to be somewhat, (whatsoever they were it maketh no matter to me, God accepteth no man's person,) for they who seemed to be somewhat in conference added nothing to me"—he, I say, was not likely to support himself by their decision.

2. The epistle argues the point upon principle; and it is not perhaps more to be wondered at, that in such an argument St. Paul should not cite the apostolic decree, than it would be that in a discourse designed to prove the moral and religious duty of observing the Sabbath, the writer should not quote the thirteenth canon.

3. The decree did not go the length of the position maintained in the epistle; the decree only declares that the apostles and elders at Jerusalem did not impose the observance of the Mosaic law upon the Gentile converts, as a condition of their being admitted into the Christian church. Our epistle argues that the Mosaic institution itself was at an end, as to all effects upon a future state, even with respect to the Jews themselves.

4. They whose error St. Paul combated were not persons who submitted to the Jewish law because it was imposed by the authority, or because it was made part of the law of the Christian church; but they were persons who, having already become Christians, afterwards voluntarily took upon themselves the observance of the Mosaic code, under a notion of attaining thereby to a greater perfection. This, I think, is precisely the opinion which St. Paul opposes in this epistle. Many of his expressions apply exactly to it: "Are ye so foolish? having begun in the Spirit, are ye now made perfect by the flesh?" Chap. 3 : 3. "Tell me, ye that desire to be under the law, do ye not hear the law?" Chap. 4 : 21. "How turn ye again to the weak and beggarly elements, whereunto ye desire again to be in bondage?" Chap. 4 : 9. It cannot be thought extraordinary that St. Paul should resist this opinion with earnestness; for it both changed the character of the Christian dispensation, and derogated expressly from the completeness of that redemp-

tion which Jesus Christ had wrought for them that believed in him. But it was to no purpose to allege to such persons the decision at Jerusalem, for that only showed that they were not bound to these observances by any law of the Christian church; they did not pretend to be so bound: nevertheless, they imagined that there was an efficacy in these observances, a merit, a recommendation to favor, and a ground of acceptance with God for those who complied with them. This was a situation of thought to which the tenor of the decree did not apply. Accordingly, St. Paul's address to the Galatians, which is throughout adapted to this situation, runs in a strain widely different from the language of the decree: "Christ is become of no effect unto you, whosoever of you are justified by the law," chap. 5:4; that is, whosoever places his dependence upon any merit he may apprehend there is in legal observances. The decree had said nothing like this; therefore it would have been useless to produce the decree in an argument of which this was the burden. In like manner as in contending with an anchorite, who should insist upon the superior holiness of a recluse, ascetic life, and the value of such mortifications in the sight of God, it would be to no purpose to prove that the laws of the church did not require these vows, or even to prove that the laws of the church expressly left every Christian to his liberty. This would avail little towards abating his estimation of their merit, or towards settling the point in controversy.*

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* Mr. Locke's solution of this difficulty is by no means satisfactory. "St. Paul," he says, "did not remind the Galatians of the apostolic decree, because they already had it." In the first place, it does not appear with any certainty that they had it; in the second place, if they had it, this was rather a reason than otherwise for referring them to it. The passage in the Acts from which Mr. Locke concludes that the Galatic churches were in possession of the decree, is the fourth verse of the sixteenth chapter: "And as they," Paul and Timothy, "went through the cities, they delivered them the decrees for to keep, that were ordained of the apostles and elders which were at Jerusa-

Another difficulty arises from the account of Peter's conduct towards the Gentile converts at Antioch, as given in the epistle, in the latter part of the second chapter; which conduct, it is said, is consistent neither with the revelation

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lem." In my opinion, this delivery of the decree was confined to the churches to which St. Paul came, in pursuance of the plan upon which he set out, "of visiting the brethren in every city where he had preached the word of the Lord;" the history of which progress, and of all that pertained to it, is closed in the fifth verse, when the history informs us that "so were the churches established in the faith, and increased in number daily." Then the history proceeds upon a new section of the narrative, by telling us that "when they had gone throughout Phrygia and the region of Galatia, they assayed to go into Bithynia." The decree itself is directed to "the brethren which are of the Gentiles in Antioch, Syria, and Cilicia;" that is, to churches already founded, and in which this question had been stirred. And I think the observation of the noble author of the Miscellanea Sacra is not only ingenious but highly probable, namely, that there is in this place a dislocation of the text, and that the fourth and fifth verses of the sixteenth chapter ought to follow the last verse of the fifteenth, so as to make the entire passage run thus: "And they went through Syria and Cilicia," to the Christians of which country the decree was addressed, "confirming the churches; and as they went through the cities, they delivered them the decrees for to keep, that were ordained of the apostles and elders which were at Jerusalem; and so were the churches established in the faith, and increased in number daily." And then the sixteenth chapter takes up a new and unbroken paragraph: "Then came he to Derbe and Lystra," etc. When St. Paul came, as he did into Galatia, to preach the gospel, for the first time, in a new place, it is not probable that he would make mention of the decree, or rather letter, of the church of Jerusalem, which presupposed Christianity to be known, and which related to certain doubts that had risen in some established Christian communities.

The second reason which Mr. Locke assigns for the omission of the decree, namely, that "St. Paul's sole object in the epistle was to acquit himself of the imputation that had been charged upon him of actually preaching circumcision," does not appear to me to be strictly true. It was not the sole object. The epistle is written in general opposition to the Judaizing inclination which he found to prevail among his converts. The avowal of his own doctrine, and of his steadfast adherence to that doctrine, formed a necessary part of the design of his letter, but was not the whole of it.

communicated to him upon the conversion of Cornelius, nor with the part he took in the debate at Jerusalem. But, in order to understand either the difficulty or the solution, it will be necessary to state and explain the passage itself. "When Peter was come to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed. For, before that certain came from James, he did eat with the Gentiles: but when they were come, he withdrew, and separated himself, fearing them which were of the circumcision. And the other Jews dissembled likewise with him; insomuch that Barnabas also was carried away with their dissimulation. But when I saw that they walked not uprightly according to the truth of the gospel, I said unto Peter before them all, If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of Gentiles, and not as do the Jews, why compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews?" Now the question that produced the dispute to which these words relate, was not whether the Gentiles were capable of being admitted into the Christian covenant; that had been fully settled: nor was it whether it should be accounted essential to the profession of Christianity that they should conform themselves to the law of Moses; that was the question at Jerusalem: but it was, whether, upon the Gentiles becoming Christians, the Jews might henceforth eat and drink with them, as with their own brethren. Upon this point St. Peter betrayed some inconstancy; and so he might, agreeably enough to his history. He might consider the vision at Joppa as a direction for the occasion, rather than as universally abolishing the distinction between Jew and Gentile; I do not mean with respect to final acceptance with God, but as to the manner of their living together in society: at least, he might not have comprehended this point with such clearness and certainty, as to stand out upon it against the fear of bringing upon himself the censure and complaint of his brethren in the church of Jerusalem, who still adhered to their ancient prejudices. But Peter, it is said, compelled the Gentiles—*ἰόνδαιζειν*. "Why compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews?" How did he do that? The only way in which Peter appears to have compelled the Gentiles to comply with the Jewish institution, was by withdrawing himself from their society. By which he may be understood to have made this declaration: "We do not deny your right to be considered as Christians; we do not deny your title in the promises of the gospel, even without compliance with our law; but if you would have us Jews live with you as we do with one another, that is, if you would in all respects be treated by us as Jews, you must live as such yourselves." This, I think, was the compulsion which St. Peter's conduct imposed upon the Gentiles, and for which St. Paul reproved him.

As to the part which the historian ascribes to St. Peter in the debate at Jerusalem, besides that it was a different question which was there agitated from that which produced the dispute at Antioch, there is nothing to hinder us from supposing that the dispute at Antioch was prior to the consultation at Jerusalem; or that Peter, in consequence of this rebuke, might have afterwards maintained firmer sentiments.

CHAPTER VI.

THE EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS

I. THIS epistle, and the epistle to the Colossians, appear to have been transmitted to their respective churches by the same messenger: "But that ye also may know my affairs, and how I do, Tychicus, a beloved brother and faithful minister in the Lord, shall make known to you all things; whom I have sent unto you for the same purpose, that ye might know our affairs, and that he might comfort your hearts." Ephes. 6 : 21, 22. This text, if it do not expressly declare, clearly I think intimates, that the letter was sent by Tychicus. The words made use of by him in the epistle to the Colossians are very similar to these, and afford the same implication that Tychicus, in conjunction with Onesimus, was the bearer of the letter to that church: "All my state shall Tychicus declare unto you, who is a beloved brother, and a faithful minister and fellow-servant in the Lord; whom I have sent unto you for the same purpose, that he might know your estate, and comfort your hearts; with Onesimus, a faithful and beloved brother, who is one of you. They shall make known unto you all things which are done here." Col. 4 : 7–9. Both epistles represent the writer as under imprisonment for the gospel; and both treat of the same general subject. The epistle therefore to the Ephesians, and the epistle to the Colossians, import to be two letters written by the same person, at or nearly at the same time, and upon the same subject, and to have been sent by the same messenger. Now every thing in the sentiments, order, and diction of the two writings, corresponds with what might be expected from this circumstance of identity or cognation in their original. The leading doctrine of both epistles is the union of Jews and Gentiles under the Christian dispensation; and that doctrine in both is established by the same arguments, or more properly speaking, illustrated by the same similitudes :[*] "one head," "one body," "one new man," "one temple," are in both epistles the figures under which the society of believers in Christ, and their common relation to him as such, are represented.[†] The ancient, and, as had been thought, the indelible distinction between Jew and Gentile, in both epistles, is declared to be "now abolished by his cross." Besides this consent in the general tenor of the two epistles, and in the run also and warmth of thought with which they are composed, we may naturally expect, in letters produced under the circumstances in which these appear to have been written, a closer resemblance of style and diction, than between other letters of the same person but of distant dates, or between letters adapted to different occasions. In particular, we may look for many of the same expressions, and sometimes for whole sentences being alike ; since such expressions and sentences would be repeated in the second letter—whichever that was—as yet fresh in the author's mind from the writing of the first. This repetition occurs in the following examples :[‡]

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[*] St. Paul, I am apt to believe, has been sometimes accused of inconclusive reasoning, by our mistaking that for reasoning which was only intended for illustration. He is not to be read as a man whose own persuasion of the truth of what he taught always or solely depended upon the views under which he represents it in his writings. Taking for granted the certainty of his doctrine, as resting upon the revelation that had been imparted to him, he exhibits it frequently to the conception of his readers under images and allegories, in which, if an analogy may be perceived, or even sometimes a poetic resemblance be found, it is all perhaps that is required.

[†] Compare	Ephes. 1 : 22	with	Colos. 1 : 18.
	4 : 15		2 : 19.
	2 : 15		3 : 10, 11.
Also	Ephes. 2 : 14, 15	with	Colos. 2 : 14.
	2 : 16		1 : 18–21.
	2 : 20		2 : 7.

[‡] When *verbal* comparisons are relied upon, it becomes necessary to state the original; but that the English reader may be interrupted as little as may be, I shall in general do this in the notes.

Ephes. 1 : 7 : "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins."*

Colos. 1 : 14 : "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins."†

Besides the sameness of the words, it is further remarkable that the sentence is in both places preceded by the same introductory idea. In the epistle to the Ephesians, it is the "*Beloved,*" ἠγαπημένῳ; in that to the Colossians, it is "*his dear Son,*" υἱοῦ τῆς ἀγάπης αὐτοῦ, "in whom we have redemption." The sentence appears to have been suggested to the mind of the writer by the idea which had accompanied it before.

Ephes. 1 : 10 : "All things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth; even in him."‡

Colos. 1 : 20 : "All things by him, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven."§

This quotation is the more observable, because the connecting of things in earth with things in heaven is a very singular sentiment, and found nowhere else but in these two epistles. The words also are introduced by describing the union which Christ had effected, and they are followed by telling the Gentile churches that they were incorporated into it.

Ephes. 3 : 2 : "The dispensation of the grace of God, which is given me to you-ward."||

Colos. 1 : 25 : "The dispensation of God, which is given to me for you."¶

Of these sentences it may likewise be observed, that the

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* Ephes. 1 : 7 : Ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ, τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν παραπτωμάτων.

† Colos. 1 : 14 : Ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ, τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν. However, it must be observed, that in this latter text many copies have not διὰ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ.

‡ Ephes. 1 : 10 : Τά τε ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ἐν αὐτῷ.

§ Colos. 1 : 20 : Δι' αὐτοῦ εἴτε τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, εἴτε τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.

|| Ephes. 3 : 2 : Τὴν οἰκονομίαν χάριτος τοῦ Θεοῦ τῆς δοθέισης μοι εἰς ὑμᾶς.

¶ Colos. 1 : 25 : Τὴν οἰκονομίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι εἰς ὑμᾶς.

accompanying ideas are similar. In both places, they are immediately preceded by the mention of his present sufferings; in both places, they are immediately followed by the mention of the mystery which was the great subject of his preaching.

Ephes. 5 : 19 : "In psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing and making melody in your hearts to the Lord."*

Colos. 3 : 16 : "In psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing with grace in your hearts to the Lord."†

Ephes. 6 : 22 : "Whom I have sent unto you for the same purpose, that ye might know our affairs, and that he might comfort your hearts."‡

Colos. 4 : 8 : "Whom I have sent unto you for the same purpose, that he might know your estate, and comfort your hearts."§

In these examples, we do not perceive a cento of phrases gathered from one composition, and strung together in the other, but the occasional occurrence of the same expression to a mind a second time revolving the same ideas.

2. Whoever writes two letters, or two discourses, nearly upon the same subject, and at no great distance of time, but without any express recollection of what he had written before, will find himself repeating some sentences in the very order of the words in which he had already used them; but he will more frequently find himself employing some principal terms, with the order inadvertently changed, or with the order disturbed by the intermixture of other words and phrases expressive of ideas rising up at the time; or in

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* Ephes. 5 : 19 : *Ψαλμοῖς κὰι ὕμνοις, κὰι ὠδαῖς πνευματικαῖς ᾄδοντες κὰι ψάλλοντες ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν τῷ Κυρίῳ.*

† Colos. 3 : 16 : *Ψαλμοῖς κὰι ὕμνοις κάι ὠδαῖς πνευματικαῖς, ἐν χάριτι ᾄδοντες ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν τῳ Κυρίῳ.*

‡ Ephes. 6 : 22 : *Ὃν ἔπεμψα πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἵνα γνῶτε τὰ περὶ ἡμῶν, κὰι παρακαλέσῃ τας καρδίας ὑμῶν.*

§ Colos. 4 : 8 : *Ὃν ἔπεμψα πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἵνα γνῶτε τὰ περὶ ὑμῶν, κὰι παρακαλέσῃ τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν.*

many instances repeating not single words, nor yet whole sentences, but parts and fragments of sentences. Of all these varieties the examination of our two epistles will furnish plain examples; and I should rely upon this class of instances more than upon the last, because, although an impostor might transcribe into a forgery entire sentences and phrases, yet the dislocation of words, the partial recollection of phrases and sentences, the intermixture of new terms and new ideas with terms and ideas before used, which will appear in the examples that follow, and which are the natural properties of writings produced under the circumstances in which these epistles are represented to have been composed—would not, I think, have occurred to the invention of a forger; nor, if they had occurred, would they have been so easily executed. This studied variation was a refinement in forgery which I believe did not exist; or, if we can suppose it to have been practised in the instances adduced below, why, it may be asked, was not the same art exercised upon those which we have collected in the preceding class?

Ephes. 1:19 to 2:5: "To us-ward who believe, according to the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead, (and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. And hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be the head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all.) And you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins; (wherein in times past ye walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience: among whom also we all had our conversation in times past in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; and were by nature the children of wrath, even as others. But God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us,) even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ."[*]

Colos. 2 : 12, 13 : "Through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead : and you, being dead in your sins and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he quickened together with him."[†]

Out of the long quotation from the Ephesians take away the parentheses, and you have left a sentence almost in terms the same as the short quotation from the Colossians. The resemblance is more visible in the original than in our translation ; for what is rendered in one place, "the working," and in another the "operation," is the same Greek term *ἐνεργεία*: in one place it is, *τοῦς πιστένοντας κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*; in the other, *διὰ τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐνεργείας*. Here, therefore, we have the same sentiment, and nearly in the same words ; but, in the Ephesians, twice broken or interrupted by incidental thoughts, which St. Paul, as his manner was, enlarges upon by the way,[‡] and then returns to the thread of his discourse. It is interrupted the first time by a view which breaks in upon his mind of the exaltation of Christ ; and the second time by a description of heathen depravity. I have only to remark that Griesbach, in his very accurate edition, gives the parentheses very nearly in the same manner in which they are here placed ; and that without any respect to the comparison which we are proposing.

Ephes. 4 : 2–4 : "With all lowliness and meekness, with long-suffering, forbearing one another in love ; endeavoring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. There is one body and one Spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling."*

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[*] Ephes. 1 : 19, 20 ; 2 : 1, 5 : *Τοὺς πιστεύοντας κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ κράτους τῆς ἰσχύος αὐτοῦ, ἥν ἐνήργησεν ἐν τῷ Χρίστῳ, ἐγείρας αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν, κὰι ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξία αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις—κὰι ὑμᾶς ὄντᾶς νέκρους τοῖς παραπτῶμασι κὰι ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις—κὰι ὄντας ἡμᾶς νέκρους τοῖς παραπτώμασι, συνεζωοποίησε τῷ Χρίστῳ.*

[†] Colos. 2 : 12, 13 : *Διὰ τῆς πιστέως τῆς ἐνεργέιας του Θεοῦ τοῦ ἐγείοαντος ἀυτὸν ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν. Κὰι ὑμας νέκρους ὄντας ἐν τοῖς παραπτώμασι κὰι τῇ ἀκροβυστίᾳ τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν, συνεζωοποίησε σὺν αὐτῷ.*

[‡] Vide Locke in loc.

Colos. 3 : 12–15 : "Put on therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any: even as Christ forgave you, so also do ye. And above all these things put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness; and let the peace of God rule in your hearts, to the which also ye are called in one body."†

In these two quotations, the words *ταπεινοφροσύνη, πρᾳότης, μακροθυμία, ἀνεχόμενοι ἀλλήλων*, occur exactly in the same order: *αγάπη* is also found in both, but in a different connection; *σύνδεσμος τῆς εἰρήνης* answers to *σύνδεσμος τῆς τελειότητος*: *ἐκλήθητε ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι* to *ἕν σῶμα καθὼς κὰι ἐκλήθητε ἐν μιᾷ ἐλπίδι*: yet is this similitude found in the midst of sentences otherwise very different.

Ephes. 4 : 16 : "From whom the whole body fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body."‡

Colos. 2 : 19 : "From which all the body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered and knit together, increaseth with the increase of God."§

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* Ephes. 4 : 2–4 : *Μετὰ πάσης ταπεινοφροσύνης κὰι πρᾳότητος, μετὰ μακροθυμίας, ἀνεχόμενοι ἀλλήλων ἐν ἀγάπῃ· σπουδάζοντες τηρεῖν την ἑνότητα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τῷ συνδέσμῳ τῆς εἰρήνης. Ἓν σῶμα κὰι ἓν πνεῦμα, κάθὼς κὰι ἐκλήθητε ἐν μιᾶ ἐλπίδι τῆς κλήσεως ὑμῶν.*

† Colos. 3 : 12–15 : *Ἐνδύσασθε οὖν ὡς ἐκλεκτοὶ τοῦ Οεοῦ, ἅγιοι κὰι ἠγαπημένοι, σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρμῶν, χρηστότητα, ταπεινοφροσύνην, πρᾳότητα, μακροθυμίαν· ἀνεχόμενοι ἀλλήλων, κὰι χαριζόμενοι ἑαυτοῖς, ἐάν τις πρός τινα ἔχῃ μομφήν· καθὼς κὰι ὁ Χριστὸς ἐχαρίσατο ὑμῖν, οὕτω κὰι ὑμεῖς· ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις τὴν ἀγάπην, ἥτις ἐστὶ σύνδεσμος τῆς τελειότητος· κὰι ἡ εἰρήνη τοῦ Οεοῦ βραβευέτω ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν, εἰς ἣν και ἐκλήθῆτε ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι.*

‡ Ephes. 4 : 16 : *Ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, συναρμολογόυμενον κὰι συμβιβαζόμενον διὰ πάσης ἁφῆς τῆς ἐπιχορηγίας κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐν μέτρῳ ἑνὸς ἑκαστου μέρους, τὴν αὔξησιν του σῶματος ποιεῖται.*

§ Colos. 2 : 19 : *Ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, διὰ τῶν ἁφῶν κὰι συνδέσμων ἐπιχορηγούμενον κὰι συμβιβαζόμενον, αὔξει τὴν αὔξησιν τοῦ Οεου.*

In these quotations are read *ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συμβιβαζόμενον* in both places, *ἐπιχορηγούμενον* answering to *ἐπιχορηγίας, διὰ τῶν ἁφῶν* to *διὰ πάσης ἁφῆς, αὔξει τήν αὔξησιν* to *ποιεῖται τὴν αὔξησιν*: and yet the sentences are considerably diversified in other parts.

Ephes. 4:32: "And be kind one to another, tenderhearted, forgiving one another, even as God for Christ's sake hath forgiven you."[*]

Colos. 3:13: "Forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any: even as Christ forgave you, so also do ye."[†]

Here we have "forgiving one another, even as God for Christ's sake," *ἐν Χριστῷ*, "hath forgiven you," in the first quotation, substantially repeated in the second. But in the second the sentence is broken by the interposition of a new clause, "if any man have a quarrel against any;" and the latter part is a little varied: instead of "God in Christ," it is "Christ hath forgiven you."

Ephes. 4:22–24: "That ye put off concerning the former conversation the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts; and be renewed in the spirit of your mind; and that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness."[‡]

Colos. 3:9, 10: "Seeing that ye have put off the old man with his deeds; and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him."[§]

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[*] Ephes. 4:32: *Γίνεσθε δὲ ἐις ἀλλήλους χρηστὸι, εὔσπλαγχνοι, χαριζόμενοι ἑαυτοῖς, καθὼς κὰι ὁ Θεὸς ἐν Χριστῷ ἐχαρίσατο ὑμῖν.*

[†] Colos. 3:13: *'Ανεχόμενοι ἀλλήλων, κὰι χαριζόμενοι ἑαυτοῖς, ἐάν τις πρός τινα ἔχῃ μομφήν· καθὼς κὰι ὁ Χριστὸς ἐχαρίσατο ὑμῖν, οὕτω κὰι ὑμεῖς.*

[‡] Ephes. 4:22–24: *'Αποθέσθαι ὑμᾶς κατὰ τὴν προτὲραν ἀναστροφὴν τὸν παλαιὸν ανθρωπον τὸν φθειρόμενον κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἀπάτης· ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τῷ πνέυματι τοῦ νοὸς ὑμῶν, κὰι ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν κατὰ Θεὸν κτισθέντα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ κὰι ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθέιας.*

[§] Colos. 3:9, 10: *'Απεκδυσάμενοι τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον σὺν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἀυτοῦ· καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι τὸν νέον, τὸν ἀνακαινούμενον εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος ἀυτόν.*

In these quotations, "putting off the old man, and putting on the new," appears in both. The idea is further explained by calling it a renewal: in the one, "renewed in the spirit of your mind;" in the other, "renewed in knowledge." In both, the new man is said to be formed according to the same model: in the one, he is after God "created in righteousness and true holiness;" in the other, he is renewed "after the image of him that created him." In a word, it is the same person writing upon a kindred subject, with the terms and ideas which he had before employed still floating in his memory.*

Ephes. 5:6–8: "*Because of these things cometh the wrath of God upon the children of disobedience.* Be not ye therefore partakers with them. For ye were sometime darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord: walk as children of light."†

Colos. 3:6–8: "*For which things' sake the wrath of God cometh on the children of disobedience:* in the which ye also walked some time when ye lived in them. But now ye also put off all these."‡

These verses afford a specimen of that *partial* resemblance which is only to be met with when no imitation is designed, when no studied recollection is employed, but when the mind, exercised upon the same subject, is left to the spontaneous return of such terms and phrases as, having been used before, may happen to present themselves again.

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* In these comparisons we often perceive the reason why the writer, though expressing the same idea, uses a different term; namely, because the term before used is employed in the sentence under a different form: thus, in the quotations under our eye, the new man is *καινὸς ἄνθρωπος* in the Ephesians, and *τὸν νέον* in the Colossians; but then it is because *τὸν καινὸν* is used in the next word, *ἀνακαινούμενον*.

† Ephes. 5:6–8: *Διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ ἔρχεται ἡ ὀργὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς υἱοὺς τῆς ἀπειθείας. Μὴ οὖν γίνεσθε συμμέτοχοι αὐτῶν. Ἦτε γάρ ποτε σκότος, νῦν δὲ φῶς ἐν Κυρίῳ· ὡς τέκνα φωτὸς περιπατεῖτε.*

‡ Colos. 3:6–8: *Δι' ἃ ἔρχεται ἡ ὀργὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς υἱοὺς τῆς ἀπειθείας· ἐν οἷς καὶ ὑμεῖς περιεπατήσατέ ποτε, ὅτε ἐζῆτε ἐν αὐτοῖς. Νυνὶ δὲ ἀπόθεσθε καὶ ὑμεῖς τὰ πάντα.*

The sentiment of both passages is throughout alike: half of that sentiment, the denunciation of God's wrath, is expressed in identical words; the other half, namely, the admonition to quit their former conversation, in words entirely different.

Ephes. 5 : 15, 16 : "See then that ye walk circumspectly, not as fools, but as wise, redeeming the time."*

Colos. 4 : 5 : "Walk in wisdom toward them that are without, redeeming the time."†

This is another example of that mixture which we remarked of sameness and variety in the language of one writer. "Redeeming the time," *ἐξαγοραζόμενοι τὸν καιρὸν*, is a literal repetition. "Walk not as fools, but as wise," *περιπατεῖτε μὴ ὡς ἂσοφοι, ἀλλ' ὡς σοφοὶ*, answers exactly in sense, and nearly in terms, to "walk in wisdom," *ἐν σοφία περιπατεῖτε. Περιπατεῖτε ἀκριβῶς* is a very different phrase, but is intended to convey precisely the same idea as *περιπατεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω. 'Ακριβως* is not well rendered "circumspectly." It means what in modern speech we should call "correctly;" and when we advise a person to behave "correctly," our advice is always given with a reference "to the opinion of others," *πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω*. "Walk correctly, redeeming the time," that is, suiting yourselves to the difficulty and ticklishness of the times in which we live, "because the days are evil."

Ephes. 6 : 19, 20 : "And" praying "for me, that utterance may be given unto me, that I may open my mouth boldly, to make known the mystery of the gospel, for which I am an ambassador in bonds: that therein I may speak boldly, as I ought to speak."‡

Colos. 4 : 3, 4. "Withal praying also for us, that God would open unto us a door of utterance, to speak the mystery of Christ, for which I am also in bonds: that I may make it manifest, as I ought to speak."*

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* Ephes. 5 : 15, 16: *Βλέπετε οὖν πῶς ἀκριβῶς περιπατεῖτε· μὴ ὡς ασοφοι, ἀλλ' ὡς σοφοὶ, ἐξαγοραζόμενοι τὸν καιρὸν.*

† Colos. 4 : 5 : *'Εν σοφίᾳ περιπατεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω, τὸν καιρὸν ἐξαγοοαζόμευοι.*

‡ Ephes. 6 : 19, 20: *Κὰι ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ἱνα μοι δοθέιη λόγος ἐν ἀνόιξει τοῦ στυματός μου ἐν παῤῥησία, γνωρίσαι τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, ὑπὲρ οὑ πρεσβέυω ἐν ἁλύσει, ἵνα ἐν αὐτῷ παῤῥησιάσωμαι, ὡς δεῖ με λαλῆσαι.*

In these quotations, the phrase, "as I ought to speak," *ὡς δεῖ με λαλῆσαι*, the words "utterance," *λόγος*, a "mystery," *μυστήριον*, "open," *ἀνοίξῃ* and *ἐν ἀνοίξει*, are the same. "To make known the mystery of the gospel," *γνωρίσαι το μυστήριον*, answers to "make it manifest," *ἵνα φανερώσω ἀυτό*; "for which I am an ambassador in bonds," *ὑπερ οὗ πρεσβεύω ἐν ἁλύσει*, to "for which I am also in bonds," *δἰ ὃ κὰι δέδεμαι.*

Ephes. 5:22–33; 6:1–9: "*Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord.* For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church: and he is the Saviour of the body. Therefore as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in every thing. *Husbands, love your wives*, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it; that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word, that he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish. So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself. For no man ever yet hated his own flesh; but nourisheth and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the church: for we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh. This is a great mystery: but I speak concerning Christ and the church. Nevertheless, let every one of you in particular so love his wife even as himself; and the wife see that she reverence her husband. *Children, obey your parents in the Lord: for this is right.* Honor thy father and mother,

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* Colos. 4:3, 4: Προσευχόμενοι ἅμα κὰι περὶ ἡμῶν, ἵνα ὁ Θεὸς ἀνόιξῃ ἡμῖν θύραν τοῦ λόγου, λαλῆσαι τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ Χριστοῦ, δι' ὃ κὰι δέδεμαι, ἵνα φανεοώσω αὐτὸ, ὡς δεῖ με λαλῆσαι.

(which is the first commandment with promise,) that it may be well with thee, and thou mayest live long on the earth. *And ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath:* but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. *Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ: not with eye-service, as men-pleasers; but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men: knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free.* And, ye masters, do the same things unto them, forbearing threatening: *knowing that your Master also is in heaven;* neither is there respect of persons with him."*

Colos. 3 : 18 :† "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord. Husbands, love your wives, and be not bitter against them. Children, obey your parents in all things; for this is well pleasing unto the Lord. Fathers, provoke not your children to anger, lest they be discouraged. Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh: not with eye-service, as men-pleasers; but in singleness of heart, fearing God: and whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men: knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance; for ye serve the Lord Christ. But he that doeth wrong, shall receive for the wrong which he hath done; and there is no respect of persons. Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal; knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven."

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* Ephes. 5 : 22 : *Αἱ γυναῖκες, τοῖς ἰδιόις ἀνδράσιν ὑποτάσσεσθε, ὡς τῷ Κυρίῳ.*

† Colos. 3 : 18 : *Αἱ γυναῖκες, ὑποτάσσεσθε τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν, ὡς ʼανῆκεν ἐν Κυρίῳ.*

Ephes. 5 : 25 : *Οἱ ʼανδρες, ἀγαπᾶτε τὰς γυναῖκας ἑαυτῶν.*

Colos. 3 : 19 : *Οἱ ʼανδρες, ἀγαπᾶτε τὰς γυναῖκας.*

Ephes. 6 : 1 : *Τὰ τέκνα, ὑπακούετε τοῖς γονεῦσιν ὑμῶν ἐν Κυρίῳ· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι δίκαιον.*

Colos. 3 : 20 : *Τὰ τέκνα, ὑπακούετε τοῖς γονεῦσιν κατὰ πάντα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν εὐάρεστον τῷ Κυρίῳ.*

Ephes. 6 : 4 : *Κὰι οἱ πατέρες, μὴ παροργίζετε τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν.*

Colos. 3 : 21 : *Οἱ πατέρες, μὴ ἐρεθίζετε* τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν.*

Ephes. 6 : 5–8 : *Οἱ δοῦλοι, ὑπακούετε τοῖς κυρίοις κατὰ σαρκα μετὰ φόβου κὰι τρόμου, ἐν ἁπλότητι τῆς καρδίας ὑμῶν, ὡς τῷ Χριστῷ· μὴ κατ' ὀφθαλμοδουλείαν, ὡς ἀνθροπάρεσκοι, ἀλλ' ὡς δοῦλοι τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ποιοῦντες τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκ ψυχῆς· μετ' εὐνοίας δουλέυοντες [ὡς] τῷ Κυρίῳ, κὰι οὐκ ἀνθρώποις· εἰδότες ὅτι ὃ ἐάν τι ἕκαστος ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὸν, τοῦτο κομιεῖται παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου, εἴτε δοῦλος, εἴτε ἐλέυθερος.*

Colos. 3 : 22 : *Οἱ δοῦλοι, ὑπακόυετε κατὰ πάντα τοῖς κατὰ σάρκα κυρίοις, μὴ ἐν ὀφθαλμοδουλέιαις, ὡς ἀνθροπάρεσκοι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἁπλότητι καρδίας, φοβοίμενοι τὸν Θεὸν· κὰι πᾶν ὅ,τι ἐὰν ποιῆτε, ἐκ ψυχης ἐργάζεσθε, ὡς τῷ Κυρίῳ, καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώποις· εἰδότες ὅτι ἀπὸ Κυρίοῦ ἀπολήψεσθε τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν τῆς κληρονομίας· τῷ γὰρ Κυρίῳ Χριστῷ δουλεύετε.*

* *παροργίζετε*, lectio non spernenda. GRIESBACH.

The passages marked by italics in the quotation from the Ephesians, bear a strict resemblance, not only in signification, but in terms, to the quotation from the Colossians. Both the words and the order of the words are, in many clauses, a duplicate of one another. In the epistle to the Colossians, these passages are laid together; in that to the Ephesians, they are divided by intermediate matter, especially by a long digressive allusion to the mysterious union between Christ and his church; which possessing, as Mr. Locke has well observed, the mind of the apostle, from being an incidental thought, grows up into the principal subject. The affinity between these two passages in signification, in terms, and in the order of the words, is closer than can be pointed out between any parts of any two epistles in the volume.

If the reader would see how the same subject is treated by a different hand, and how distinguishable it is from the production of the same pen, let him turn to the second and third chapters of the first epistle of St. Peter. The duties of servants, of wives, and of husbands, are enlarged upon in that epistle, as they are in the epistle to the Ephesians; but the subjects both occur in a different order, and the train of sentiment subjoined to each is totally unlike.

3. In two letters issuing from the same person, nearly at the same time, and upon the same general occasion, we may expect to trace the influence of association in the order in which the topics follow one another. Certain ideas universally or usually suggest others. Here the order is what we call natural, and from such an order nothing can be concluded. But when the order is arbitrary, yet alike, the concurrence indicates the effect of that principle by which ideas which have been once joined commonly revisit the thoughts together. The epistles under consideration furnish the two following remarkable instances of this species of agreement:

Ephes. 4 : 24, 25 : "And that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness. Wherefore putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbor : for we are members one of another."*

Colos. 3 : 9, 10 : "Lie not one to another, seeing that ye have put off the old man with his deeds ; and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge."†

The vice of "lying," or a correction of that vice, does not seem to bear any nearer relation to the "putting on the new man," than a reformation in any other article of morals. Yet these two ideas, we see, stand in both epistles in immediate connection.

Ephes. 5 : 20, 21, 22 : "Giving thanks always for all things unto God and the Father, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ ; submitting yourselves one to another in the fear of God. Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord."‡

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* Ephes. 4:24, 25 : Κὰι ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ῎ανθρωπον, τὸν κατὰ Θεὸν κτισθέντα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ κὰι ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθέιας· διὸ ἀποθέμενοι τὸ ψεῦδος, λαλεῖτε ἀλήθειαν ἕκαστος μετὰ τοῦ πλησίον αὑτοῦ· ὅτι ἐσμὲν ἀλλήλῶν μέλη.

† Colos. 3 : 9, 10 : Μὴ ψεύδεσθε εἰς ἀλλήλους, ἀπεκδυσάμενοι τὸν παλαιὸν ῎ανθρωπον, σὺν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἀυτοῦ, κὰι ἐνδυσάμενοι τὸν νέον, τὸν ἀνακαινούμενον εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν.

‡ Ephes. 5 : 20, 21, 22 : Εὐχαριστοῦντες πάντοτε ὑπὲρ πάντων, ἐν

Colos. 3 : 17, 18 : "Whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him. Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord."*

In both these passages, submission follows giving of thanks, without any similitude in the ideas which should account for the transition.

It is not necessary to pursue the comparison between the two epistles further. The argument which results from it stands thus. No two other epistles contain a circumstance which indicates that they were written at the same, or nearly at the same time. No two other epistles exhibit so many marks of correspondency and resemblance. If the original which we ascribe to these two epistles be the true one, that is, if they were both really written by St. Paul, and both sent to their respective destination by the same messenger, the similitude is in all points what should be expected to take place. If they were forgeries, then the mention of Tychicus in both epistles, and in a manner which shows that he either carried or accompanied both epistles, was inserted for the purpose of accounting for their similitude; or else the structure of the epistles was designedly adapted to the circumstance; or lastly, the conformity between the contents of the forgeries, and what is thus directly intimated concerning their date, was only a happy accident. Not one of these three suppositions will gain credit with a reader who peruses the epistles with attention, and who reviews the several examples we have pointed out, and the observations with which they were accompanied.

II. There is such a thing as a peculiar word or phrase cleaving, as it were, to the memory of a writer or speaker,

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ὀνόματι τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, τῷ Θεῷ και πατρί, ὑποτασσόμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἐν φόβῳ Θεοῦ. Αἱ γυναῖκες, τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν ὑποτάσσεσθε, ὡς τῷ Κυρίῳ.

* Colos. 3 : 17, 18 : Κὰι πᾶν ὅ,τι ἂν ποιῆτε, ἐν λόγῳ, ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ, πάντα ἐν ὀνόματι Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ, εὐχαριστοῦντες τῷ Θεῷ κὰι πατρὶ δι' αὐτοῦ. Αἱ γυναῖκες, ὑποτάσσεσθε τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν, ὡς ἀνῆκεν ἐν Κυρίῳ.

and presenting itself to his utterance at every turn. When we observe this, we call it a *cant* word or a *cant* phrase. It is a natural effect of habit; and would appear more frequently than it does, had not the rules of good writing taught the ear to be offended with the iteration of the same sound, and oftentimes caused us to reject, on that account, the word which offered itself first to our recollection. With a writer who, like St. Paul, either knew not these rules, or disregarded them, such words will not be avoided. The truth is, an example of this kind runs through several of his epistles, and in the epistle before us *abounds;* and that is in the word *riches,* πλοῦτος, used metaphorically as an augmentative of the idea to which it happens to be subjoined. Thus, "the *riches* of his glory," "his *riches* in glory," "*riches* of the glory of his inheritance," "*riches* of the glory of this mystery," Rom. 9 : 23; Ephes. 3 : 16; Phil. 4 : 19; Ephes. 1 : 18; Colos. 1 : 27 : "*riches* of his grace," twice in the Ephesians, 1 : 7, and 2 : 7; "*riches* of the full assurance of understanding," Colos. 2 : 2; "*riches* of his goodness," Rom. 2 : 4; "*riches* of the wisdom and knowledge of God," Rom. 11 : 33; "*riches* of Christ," Ephes. 3 : 8. In a like sense, the adjective, Rom. 10 : 12, "*rich* unto all that call upon him;" Ephes. 2 : 4, "*rich* in mercy;" 1 Tim. 6 : 18, "*rich* in good works." Also the adverb, Colos. 3 : 16, "let the word of Christ dwell in you *richly.*" This figurative use of the word, though so familiar to St Paul, does not occur in any part of the New Testament, except once in the epistle of St. James, 2 : 5: "Hath not God chosen the *poor* of this world *rich* in faith?" where it is manifestly suggested by the antithesis. I propose the frequent, yet seemingly unaffected use of this phrase, in the epistle before us, as one internal mark of its genuineness.

III. There is another singularity in St. Paul's style, which, wherever it is found, may be deemed a badge of authenticity; because, if it were noticed, it would not, I think, be imitated, inasmuch as it almost always produces embarrassment and interruption in the reasoning. This singularity is a species of digression which may properly, I think, be denominated *going off at a word.* It is turning aside from the subject upon the occurrence of some particular word, forsaking the train of thought then in hand, and entering upon a parenthetic sentence in which that word is the prevailing term. I shall lay before the reader some examples of this collected from the other epistles, and then propose two examples of it which are found in the epistle to the Ephesians. In 2 Cor. 2 : 14–17, at the word *savor:* "Now thanks be unto God, which always causeth us to triumph in Christ, and maketh manifest the *savor* of his knowledge by us in every place. (For we are unto God a sweet *savor* of Christ, in them that are saved, and in them that perish: to the one we are the *savor* of death unto death, and to the other the *savor* of life unto life. And who is sufficient for these things?) For we are not as many which corrupt the word of God: but as of sincerity, but as of God, in the sight of God speak we in Christ." Again, 2 Cor. 3 : 1–3, at the word *epistle:* "Need we, as some others, *epistles* of commendation to you, or of commendation from you? (Ye are our *epistle* written in our hearts, known and read of all men: forasmuch as ye are manifestly declared to be the *epistle* of Christ ministered by us, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God: not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the heart.") The position of the words in the original, shows more strongly than in the translation, that it was the occurrence of the word ἐπιστολὴ which gave birth to the sentence that follows: 2 Cor. 3 : 1. Εἰ μὴ χρήζομεν, ὥς τινες, συστατικῶν ἐπιστολῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἢ ἐξ ὑμῶν συστατικῶν; ἡ ἐπιστολὴ ἡμῶν ὑμεῖς ἐστε, ἐγγεγραμμένη ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν, γινωσκομένη καὶ ἀναγινωσκομένη ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων· φανερούμενοι ὅτι ἐστὲ ἐπιστολὴ Χριστοῦ διακονηθεῖσα ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐγγεγραμμένη οὐ μέλανι, ἀλλὰ πνεύματι Θεοῦ ζῶντος· οὐκ ἐν πλαξὶ λιθίναις, ἀλλ' ἐν πλαξὶ καρδίας σαρκίναις.

Again, 2 Cor. 3 : 12, etc., at the word *veil:* "Seeing then that we have such hope, we use great plainness of speech: and not as Moses, which put a *veil* over his face, that the children of Israel could not steadfastly look to the end of that which is abolished: but their minds were blinded; for until this day remaineth the same *veil* untaken away in the reading of the Old Testament, which *veil* is done away in Christ. But even unto this day, when Moses is read, the *veil* is upon their heart. Nevertheless, when it shall turn to the Lord, the *veil* shall be taken away. (Now the Lord is that Spirit; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.) But we all with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord. Therefore seeing we have this ministry, as we have received mercy, we faint not."

Who sees not that this whole allegory of the *veil* arises entirely out of the occurrence of the word, in telling us that "Moses put a *veil* over his face," and that it drew the apostle away from the proper subject of his discourse, the dignity of the office in which he was engaged? which subject he fetches up again almost in the words with which he had left it: "therefore seeing we have this ministry, as we have received mercy, we faint not." The sentence which he had before been going on with, and in which he had been interrupted by the *veil*, was, "Seeing then that we have such hope, we use great plainness of speech."

In the epistle to the Ephesians, the reader will remark two instances in which the same habit of composition obtains: he will recognize the same pen. One he will find, chap. 4:8–11, at the word *ascended:* "Wherefore he saith, When he *ascended* up on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men. (Now that he *ascended*, what is it but that he also descended first unto the lower parts of the earth? He that descended is the same also that *ascended* up far above all heavens, that he might fill all things.) And he gave some, apostles," etc.

The other appears, chap. 5 : 12–15, at the word *light:* "For it is a shame even to speak of those things which are done of them in secret. But all things that are reproved, are made manifest by the *light:* (for whatsoever doth make manifest is *light.* Wherefore he saith, Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee *light.*) See then that ye walk circumspectly."

IV. Although it does not appear to have ever been disputed that the epistle before us was written by St. Paul, yet it is well known that a doubt has long been entertained concerning the persons to whom it was addressed. The question is founded partly on some ambiguity in the external evidence. Marcion, a heretic of the second century, as quoted by Tertullian, a father in the beginning of the third, calls it the epistle to the Laodiceans. From what we know of Marcion, his judgment is little to be relied upon; nor is it perfectly clear that Marcion was rightly understood by Tertullian. If, however, Marcion be brought to prove that some copies in his time gave ἐν Λαοδικείᾳ in the superscription, his testimony, if it be truly interpreted, is not diminished by his heresy; for, as Grotius observes, "*cur in câ re mentiretur nihil crat causæ.*" The name ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, in the first verse, upon which word singly depends the proof that the epistle was written to the Ephesians, is not read in all the manuscripts now extant. I admit, however, that the external evidence preponderates with a manifest excess on the side of the received reading. The objection, therefore, principally arises from the contents of the epistle itself, which, in many respects, militate with the supposition that it was written to the church at Ephesus. According to the history, St. Paul had passed two whole years at Ephesus. Acts 19 : 10. And in this point, namely, of St. Paul having preached for a considerable length of time at Ephesus, the history is confirmed by the two epistles to the Corinthians, and by the two epistles to Timothy. "I will tarry at *Ephesus* until Pentecost." 1 Cor. 16 : 8. "We would not have you ignorant of our trouble which came to us in *Asia*." 2 Cor. 1 : 8. "As I besought thee to abide still at *Ephesus* when I went into Macedonia." 1 Tim. 1 : 3. "And in how many things he ministered to me at *Ephesus*, thou knowest very well." 2 Tim. 1 : 18. I adduce these testimonies, because, had it been a competition of credit between the history and the epistle, I should have thought myself bound to have preferred the epistle. Now, every epistle which St. Paul wrote to churches which he himself had founded, or which he had visited, abounds with references and appeals to what had passed during the time that he was present among them; whereas there is not a text, in the epistle to the Ephesians, from which we can collect that he had ever been at Ephesus at all. The two epistles to the Corinthians, the epistle to the Galatians, the epistle to the Philippians, and the two epistles to the Thessalonians are of this class; and they are full of allusions to the apostle's history, his reception, and his conduct while among them: the total want of which, in the epistle before us, is very difficult to account for, if it was in truth written to the church of Ephesus, in which city he had resided for so long a time. This is the first and strongest objection. But further, the epistle to the Colossians was addressed to a church in which St. Paul had never been. This we infer from the first verse of the second chapter: "For I would that ye knew what great conflict I have for you, and for them at Laodicea, and for as many as have not seen my face in the flesh." There could be no propriety in thus joining the Colossians and Laodiceans with those "who had not seen his face in the flesh," if they did not also belong to the same description.* Now, his address to the Colossians, whom he had not visited, is precisely the same as his address to the Christians to whom he wrote in the epistle which we are now considering: "We give thanks to God and the Father of our

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* Dr. Lardner contends against the validity of this conclusion; but I think without success. LARDNER, vol. 14, p. 473, edit. 1757.

Lord Jesus Christ, praying always for you, *since we heard of your faith* in Christ Jesus, and of the love which ye have to all the saints." Col. 1 : 3. Thus he speaks to the Ephesians, in the epistle before us, as follows : "Wherefore I also, *after I heard of your faith* in the Lord Jesus, and love unto all the saints, cease not to give thanks for you, making mention of you in my prayers." Chap. 1 : 15. The terms of this address are observable. The words "having *heard* of your faith and love," are the very words, we see, which he uses towards strangers ; and it is not probable that he should employ the same in accosting a church in which he had long exercised his ministry, and whose "faith and love" he must have personally known.* The epistle to the Romans was written before St. Paul had been at Rome ; and his address to them runs in the same strain with that just now quoted : "I thank my God through Jesus Christ for you all, that your faith is *spoken* of throughout the whole world." Rom. 1 : 8. Let us now see what was the form in which our apostle was accustomed to introduce his epistles, when he wrote to those with whom he was already acquainted. To the Corinthians it was this : "I thank my God always on your behalf, for the grace of God which is given you by Jesus Christ." 1 Cor. 1 : 4. To the Philippians : "I thank my God upon every remembrance of you." Phil. 1 : 3. To the Thessalonians : "We give thanks to God always for you all, making mention of you in our prayers ; remembering without ceasing your work of faith, and labor of love." 1 Thess. 1 : 3. To Timothy : "I thank God, whom I serve from my fore-fathers with pure conscience, that without ceasing I have remembrance of thee in my prayers night and day." 2 Tim. 1 : 3. In these quotations, it is usually his *remembrance*, and never his *hearing* of them, which he makes the subject of his thankfulness to God.

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* Mr. Locke endeavors to avoid this difficulty, by explaining "*their faith*, of which St. Paul had heard," to mean the steadfastness of their persuasion that they were called into the kingdom of God, without subjection to the Mosaic institution. But this interpretation seems to me extremely *hard ;* for in the manner in which faith is here joined with love, in the expression "your faith and love," it could not mean to denote any particular tenet which distinguished one set of Christians from others ; forasmuch as the expression describes the general virtues of the Christian profession. Vide Locke in loc.

As great difficulties stand in the way of supposing the epistle before us to have been written to the church of Ephesus, so I think it probable that it is actually the epistle to the Laodiceans referred to in the fourth chapter of the epistle to the Colossians. The text which contains that reference is this: "When this epistle is read among you, cause that it be read also in the church of the Laodiceans, and that ye likewise read the epistle from Laodicea." Ver. 16. The "epistle *from* Laodicea," was an epistle sent by St. Paul to that church, and by them transmitted to Colosse. The two churches were mutually to communicate the epistles they had received. This is the way in which the direction is explained by the greater part of commentators, and is the most probable sense that can be given to it. It is also probable that the epistle alluded to was an epistle which had been received by the church of Laodicea *lately*. It appears then, with a considerable degree of evidence, that there existed an epistle of St. Paul's nearly of the same date with the epistle to the Colossians, and an epistle directed to a church—for such the church of Laodicea was—in which St. Paul had never been. What has been observed concerning the epistle before us, shows that it answers perfectly to that character.

Nor does the mistake seem very difficult to account for. Whoever inspects the map of Asia Minor will see, that a person proceeding from Rome to Laodicea would probably land at Ephesus, as the nearest frequented seaport in that direction. Might not Tychicus then, in passing through Ephesus, communicate to the Christians of that place the letter with which he was charged? And might not copies of that letter be multiplied and preserved at Ephesus?

Might not some of the copies drop the words of designation ἐν τῇ Λαοδικείᾳ,* which it was of no consequence to an Ephesian to retain? Might not copies of the letter come out into the Christian church at large from Ephesus; and might not this give occasion to a belief that the letter was written to that church? And lastly, might not this belief produce the error which we suppose to have crept into the inscription?

V. As our epistle purports to have been written during St. Paul's imprisonment at Rome, which lies beyond the period to which the Acts of the Apostles brings up his history; and as we have seen and acknowledged that the epistle contains no reference to any transaction at Ephesus during the apostle's residence in that city, we cannot expect that it should supply many marks of agreement with the narrative. One coincidence however occurs, and a coincidence of that minute and less obvious kind, which, as has been repeatedly observed, is most to be relied upon.

Chap. 6 : 19, 20, we read, praying "for me, that I may open my mouth boldly, to make known the mystery of the gospel, for which I am an ambassador in bonds." "*In bonds*," ἐν ἁλύσει, in a *chain*. In the twenty-eighth chapter of the Acts, we are informed that Paul, after his arrival at Rome, was suffered to dwell by himself with a soldier that kept him. Dr. Lardner has shown that this mode of custody was in use among the Romans, and that whenever it was adopted, the prisoner was bound to the soldier by a single chain: in reference to which St. Paul, in the twentieth verse of this chapter, tells the Jews whom he had assembled, "For this cause therefore have I called for you, to see you, and to speak with you, because that for the hope of Israel I am bound *with this chain*," τὴν ἄλυσιν ταύτην περίκειμαι. It is in exact conformity therefore with the truth of St. Paul's situation at the time, that he declares of himself in the epistle, πρεσβεύω ἐν ἁλύσει. And the exactness is the more remarkable, as ἄλυσις—a chain—is nowhere used in the singular number to express any other kind of custody. When the prisoner's hands or feet were bound together, the word was δεσμὸι, bonds, as in the twenty-sixth chapter of the Acts, where Paul replies to Agrippa, "I would to God that not only thou, but also all that hear me this day, were both almost, and altogether such as I am, except *these bonds*," παρεκτὸς τῶν δεσμῶν τούτων. When the prisoner was confined between two soldiers, as in the case of Peter, Acts 12:6, two chains were employed; and it is said upon his miraculous deliverance, that the "chains"—ἁλύσεις, in the plural—"fell from his hands." Δεσμὸς the noun, and δέδεμαι the verb, being general terms, were applicable to this in common with any other species of personal coercion; but ἄλυσις, in the singular number, to none but this.

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* And it is remarkable that there seem to have been some ancient copies without the words of designation, either the words *in Ephesus*, or the words *in Laodicea*. St. Basil, a writer of the fourth century, speaking of the present epistle, has this very singular passage: "And writing to the Ephesians, as truly united to him who is through knowledge, he," Paul, "calleth them in a peculiar sense *such who are*; saying *to the saints who are and*," or *even*, "*the faithful in Christ Jesus*; for so those before us have transmitted it, and we have found it in ancient copies." Dr. Mill interprets—and, notwithstanding some objections that have been made to him, in my opinion rightly interprets—these words of Basil, as declaring that his father had seen certain copies of the epistle in which the words "in Ephesus" were wanting. And the passage, I think, must be considered as Basil's, fanciful way of explaining what was really a corrupt and defective reading; for I do not believe it possible that the author of the epistle could have originally written ἁγίοις τοῖς οὖσιν, without any name of place to follow it.

If it can be suspected that the writer of the present epistle, who in no other particular appears to have availed himself of the information concerning St. Paul delivered in the Acts, had in this verse borrowed the word which he read in that book, and had adapted his expression to what he found there recorded of St. Paul's treatment at Rome; in short, that the coincidence here noted was effected by craft and design—I think it a strong reply to remark, that in the parallel passage of the epistle to the Colossians, the same allusion is not preserved: the words there are, "praying also for us, that God would open unto us a door of utterance, to speak the mystery of Christ, for which *I am also in bonds*," *δι' ὃ καὶ δέδεμαι.* After what has been shown in a preceding number, there can be little doubt but that these two epistles were written by the same person. If the writer, therefore, sought for, and fraudulently inserted the correspondency into one epistle, why did he not do it in the other? A real prisoner might use either general words which comprehend this among many other modes of custody, or might use appropriate words which specified this, and distinguished it from any other mode. It would be accidental which form of expression he fell upon. But an impostor, who had the art in one place to employ the appropriate term for the purpose of fraud, would have used it in both places.

CHAPTER VII.

THE EPISTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS.

I. WHEN a transaction is referred to in such a manner as that the reference is easily and immediately understood by those who are beforehand, or from other quarters, acquainted with the fact, but is obscure or imperfect, or requires investigation or a comparison of different parts, in order to be made clear to other readers, the transaction so referred to is probably real; because, had it been fictitious, the writer would have set forth his story more fully and plainly, not merely as conscious of the fiction, but as conscious that his readers could have no other knowledge of the subject of his allusion than from the information of which he put them in possession.

The account of Epaphroditus, in the epistle to the Philippians, of his journey to Rome, and of the business which brought him thither, is the article to which I mean to apply this observation. There are three passages in the epistle which relate to this subject. The first, chap. 1 : 7, "Even as it is meet for me to think this of you all, because I have you in my heart; inasmuch as both in my bonds, and in the defence and confirmation of the gospel, ye all are *συγκοινωνόι μου τῆς χάριτος*, joint contributors to the gift which I have received."* Nothing more is said in this place. In the latter part of the second chapter, and at the distance of half the epistle from the last quotation, the subject appears again: "Yet I supposed it necessary to send to you Epaphroditus, my brother, and companion in labor, and fellow-soldier, but your messenger, and *he that ministered to my wants.* For he longed after you all, and was full of heaviness, because that ye had heard that he had been sick. For indeed he was sick nigh unto death; but God had mercy on him; and not on him only, but on me also, lest I should have sorrow upon sorrow. I sent him therefore the more carefully, that, when ye see him again, ye may rejoice, and that I may be the less sorrowful. Receive him therefore in the Lord with all gladness; and hold such in reputation: because for the work of Christ he was nigh unto death, not regarding his life, *to supply your lack of service towards me.*" Chap. 2:25–30. The matter is here dropped, and no further mention made of it till it is taken up near the conclusion of the epistle as follows: "But I rejoiced in the Lord greatly, that now at the last your care of me hath flourished again; wherein ye were also careful, but ye lacked opportunity. Not that I speak in respect of want: for I have learned, in whatsoever state I am, therewith to be content. I know both how to be abased, and I know how to abound; everywhere and in all things I am instructed both to be full and to be hungry, both to abound and to suffer need. I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me. Notwithstanding, ye have well done that ye did communicate with my affliction. Now ye Philippians, know also, that in the beginning of the gospel, when I departed from Macedonia, no church communicated with me as concerning giving and receiving, but ye only. For even in Thessalonica ye sent once and again unto my necessity. Not because I desire a gift: but I desire fruit that may abound to your account. But I have all, and abound: I am full, having received of Epaphroditus the things which were sent from you." Chap. 4:10–18. To the Philippian reader, who knew that contributions were wont to be made in that church for the apostle's subsistence and relief, that the supply which they were accustomed to send to him had been delayed by the want of opportunity, that Epaphroditus had undertaken the charge of conveying their liberality to the hands of the apostle, that he had acquitted himself of this commission at the peril of his life, by hastening to Rome under the oppression of a grievous sickness—to a reader who knew all this beforehand, every line in the above quotations would be plain and clear. But how is it with a stranger? The knowledge of these several particulars is necessary to the perception and explanation of the references; yet that knowledge must be gathered from a comparison of passages lying at a great distance from one another. Texts must be interpreted by texts long subsequent to them, which necessarily produces embarrassment and suspense. The passage quoted from the beginning of the epistle contains an acknowledgment, on the part of the apostle, of the liberality which the Philippians had exercised towards him; but the allusion is so general and indeterminate, that, had nothing more been said in the sequel of the epistle, it would hardly have been applied to this occasion at all. In the second quotation, Epaphroditus is declared to have "ministered to the apostle's wants," and "to have supplied their lack of service towards him;" but *how*, that is, at whose expense or from what fund he "ministered," or what was "the lack of service" which he supplied, are left very much unexplained, till we arrive at the third quotation, where we find that Epaphroditus "ministered to St. Paul's wants," only by conveying to his hands the contributions of the Philippians: "I am full, having received of Epaphroditus the things which were sent from you;" and that "the lack of service which he supplied" was a delay or interruption of their accustomed bounty, occasioned by the want of opportunity: "I rejoiced in the Lord greatly, that now at the last your care of me hath flourished again; wherein ye were also careful, but ye lacked opportunity." The affair at length comes out clear; but it comes out by piecemeal. The clearness is the result of the reciprocal illustration of divided texts. Should any one choose therefore to insinuate, that this whole story of Epaphroditus, or his journey, his errand, his sickness, or even his existence might, for what we know, have no other foundation than in the invention of the forger of the epistle; I answer, that a forger would have set forth this story connectedly, and also more fully and more perspicuously. If the epistle be authentic, and the transaction real, then every thing which is said concerning Epaphroditus and his commission would be clear to those into whose hands the epistle was expected to come. Considering the Philippians as his readers, a person might naturally write upon the subject, as the author of the epistle has written; but there is no supposition of forgery with which it will suit.

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* Pearce, I believe, was the first commentator who gave this sense to the expression; and I believe also that his exposition is now generally assented to. He interprets in the same sense the phrase in the fifth verse, which our translation renders "your fellowship in the gospel;" but which in the original is not *κοινωνίᾳ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*, or *κοινωνίᾳ ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ*, but *κοινωνίᾳ ἐις τὸ εὐαγγέλιον.*

II. The history of Epaphroditus supplies another observation: "Indeed he was sick, nigh unto death; but God had mercy on him: and not on him only, but on me also, lest I should have sorrow upon sorrow." In this passage no intimation is given that Epaphroditus' recovery was miraculous. It is plainly, I think, spoken of as a natural event. This instance, together with one in the second epistle to Timothy, "Trophimus have I left at Miletum sick," affords a proof that the power of performing cures, and, by parity of reason, of working other miracles, was a power which only visited the apostles occasionally, and did not at all depend upon their own will. Paul undoubtedly would have healed Epaphroditus if he could. Nor, if the power of working cures had awaited his disposal, would he have left his fellow-traveller at Miletus sick. This, I think, is a fair observation upon the instances adduced; but it is not the observation I am concerned to make. It is more for the purpose of my argument to remark, that forgery, upon such an occasion, would not have spared a miracle; much less would it have introduced St. Paul professing the utmost anxiety for the safety of his friend, yet acknowledging himself unable to help him; which he does, almost expressly, in the case of Trophimus, for he "left him sick;" and virtually in the passage before us, in which he felicitates himself upon the recovery of Epaphroditus, in terms which almost exclude the supposition of any supernatural means being employed to effect it. This is a reserve which nothing but truth would have imposed.

III. Chap. 4 : 15, 16 : "Now ye Philippians, know also, that in the beginning of the gospel, when I departed from Macedonia, no church communicated with me as concerning giving and receiving, but ye only. For even in Thessalonica ye sent once and again unto my necessity."

It will be necessary to state the Greek of this passage, because our translation does not, I think, give the sense of it accurately.

Οἴδατε δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς, Φιλιππήσιοι, ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, ὅτε ἔξῆλθον ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας, οὐδεμία μοι ἐκκλησία ἐκοινώνησεν, ἐις λόγον δόσεως καὶ λήψεως, εἰ μὴ ὑμεῖς μόνοι· ὅτι καὶ ἐν Θεσσαλονίκῃ καὶ ἅπαξ καὶ δὶς ἐις τὴν χρειάν μοι ἐπέμψατε.

The reader will please to direct his attention to the corresponding particulars *ὁτι* and *ὁτι καὶ*, which connect the words *ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, ὅτε ἐξῆλθον ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας*, with the words *ἐν Θεσσαλονίκῃ*, and denote, as I interpret the passage, two distinct donations, or rather donations at two distinct periods, one at Thessalonica, *ἅπαξ καὶ δὶς*, the other after his departure from Macedonia, *ὅτε ἐξῆλθον ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας*.* I would render the passage so as to mark these different periods, thus : "Now ye Philippians, know also, that in the beginning of the gospel, when I was departed from Macedonia, no church communicated with me as concerning giving and receiving, but ye only. And that also in Thessalonica ye sent once and again unto my necessity." Now with this exposition of the passage compare 2 Cor. 11:8, 9: "I robbed other churches, taking wages of them, to do you service. And when I was present with you, and wanted, I was chargeable to no man; for that which was lacking to me the brethren which came from Macedonia supplied."

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* Luke 2 : 15 : Καὶ *ἐγένετο, ὡς ἀπῆλθον ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐις τὸν οὐρανὸν οἱ ᾽αγγελοι*, "as the angels were gone away," that is, *after* their departure, *οἱ ποιμένες εἶπον πρὸς ἀλλήλους*. Mat. 12 : 43 : Ὅταν *δὲ τὸ ἀκάθάρτον πνεύμα ἐξέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, "when the unclean spirit is gone," that is, *after* his departure, *διέρχεται*. John 13 : 30 : Ὅτε *ἐξῆλθε* ('Ιούδας,) "when he was gone," that is, *after* his departure, *λέγει* 'Ιησοῦς. Acts 10 : 7 : *ὥς δὲ ἀπῆλθεν ὁ ᾽αγγελος ὁ λαλῶν τῷ Κορνηλίῳ*, "and when the angel which spake unto him was departed," that is, *after* his departure, ***φωνήσας δυὸ τῶν οἰκέτῶν***, etc.

It appears from St. Paul's history, as related in the Acts of the Apostles, that upon leaving Macedonia, he passed, after a very short stay at Athens, into Achaia. It appears, secondly, from the quotation out of the epistle to the Corinthians, that in Achaia he accepted no pecuniary assistance from the converts of that country; but that he drew a supply for his wants from the Macedonian Christians. Agreeably whereunto it appears, in the third place, from the text which is the subject of the present number, that the brethren in Philippi, a city of Macedonia, had followed him with their munificence, ὅτε ἐξῆλθον ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας, when he was departed from Macedonia, that is, when he was *come into Achaia.*

The passage under consideration affords another circumstance of agreement deserving of our notice. The gift alluded to in the epistle to the Philippians is stated to have been made "in the beginning of the gospel." This phrase is most naturally explained to signify the first preaching of the gospel in these parts; namely, on that side of the Ægean sea. The succors referred to in the epistle to the Corinthians, as received from Macedonia, are stated to have been received by him upon his first visit to the peninsula of Greece. The dates therefore assigned to the donation in the two epistles agree; yet is the date in one ascertained very incidentally, namely, by the considerations which fix the date of the epistle itself; and in the other, by an expression—"the beginning of the gospel"—much too general to have been used if the text had been penned with any view to the correspondency we are remarking.

Further, the phrase, "in the *beginning* of the gospel," raises an idea in the reader's mind that the gospel had been preached there more than once. The writer would hardly have called the visit to which he refers the "beginning of the gospel," if he had not also visited them in some other stage of it. The fact corresponds with this idea. If we consult the sixteenth and twentieth chapters of the Acts, we shall find, that St. Paul, before his imprisonment at Rome, during which this epistle purports to have been written, had been *twice* in Macedonia, and each time at Philippi.

IV. That Timothy had been long with St. Paul at Philippi is a fact which seems to be implied in this epistle twice. First, he joins in the salutation with which the epistle opens: "Paul and Timotheus, the servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi." Secondly, and more directly, the point is inferred from what is said concerning him, chap. 2:19: "But I trust in the Lord Jesus to send Timotheus shortly unto you, that I also may be of good comfort, when I know your state. For I have no man like-minded, who will naturally care for your state. For all seek their own, not the things which are Jesus Christ's. But *ye know the proof of him*, that as a son with the father, he hath served with me in the gospel." Had Timothy's presence with St. Paul at Philippi, when he preached the gospel there, been expressly remarked in the Acts of the Apostles, this quotation might be thought to contain a contrived adaptation to the history; although, even in that case, the averment, or rather the allusion in the epistle, is too oblique to afford much room for such suspicion. But the truth is, that in the history of St. Paul's transactions at Philippi, which occupies the greatest part of the sixteenth chapter of the Acts, no mention is made of Timothy at all. What appears concerning Timothy in the history, so far as relates to the present subject, is this: when Paul came to Derbe and Lystra, "behold a certain disciple was there, named Timotheus. . . . Him would Paul have to go forth with him." The narrative then proceeds with the account of St. Paul's progress through various provinces of the lesser Asia, till it brings him down to Troas. At Troas he was warned in a vision to pass over into Macedonia. In obedience to which, he crossed the Ægean sea to Samothracia, the next day to Neapolis, and from thence to Philippi. His preaching, miracles, and persecutions at Philippi followed next: after which Paul and his company, when they had passed through Amphipolis and Apollonia, came to Thessalonica, and from Thessalonica to Berea. From Berea the brethren sent away Paul, "but Silas and *Timotheus* abode there still." The itinerary, of which the above is an abstract, is undoubtedly sufficient to support an inference that Timothy was along with St. Paul at Philippi. We find them setting out together upon this progress from Derbe, in Lycaonia; we find them together near the conclusion of it, at Berea, in Macedonia. It is highly probable, therefore, that they came together to Philippi, through which their route between these two places lay. If this be thought probable, it is sufficient. For what I wish to be observed is, that in comparing, upon this subject, the epistle with the history, we do not find a recital in one place of what is related in another; but that we find, what is much more to be relied upon, an oblique allusion to an implied fact.

V. Our epistle purports to have been written near the conclusion of St. Paul's imprisonment at Rome, and after a residence in that city of considerable duration. These circumstances are made out by different intimations, and the intimations upon the subject preserve among themselves a just consistency, and a consistency certainly unmeditated. First, the apostle had already been a prisoner at Rome so long, as that the reputation of his bonds, and of his constancy under them, had contributed to advance the success of the gospel: "But I would ye should understand, brethren, that the things which happened unto me have fallen out rather unto the furtherance of the gospel; so that my bonds in Christ are manifest in all the palace, and in all other places; and many of the brethren in the Lord, waxing confident by my bonds, are much more bold to speak the word without fear." Secondly, the account given of Epaphroditus imports, that St. Paul, when he wrote the epistle, had been in Rome a considerable time: "He longed after you all, and was full of heaviness, because that ye had heard that he had been sick." Epaphroditus was with St. Paul at Rome. He had been sick. The Philippians had heard of his sickness, and he again had received an account how much they had been affected by the intelligence. The passing and repassing of these advices must necessarily have occupied a long portion of time, and must have all taken place during St. Paul's residence at Rome. Thirdly, after a residence at Rome thus proved to have been of considerable duration, he now regards the decision of his fate as nigh at hand. He contemplates either alternative—that of his deliverance, chap. 2:23: "Him, therefore," Timothy, "I hope to send *presently*, so soon as I shall see how it will go with me. But I trust in the Lord that I also myself shall come shortly:" that of his condemnation, ver. 17: "Yea, and if I be offered* upon the sacrifice and service of your faith, I joy and rejoice with you all." This consistency is material, if the consideration of it be confined to the epistle. It is further material, as it agrees, with respect to the duration of St. Paul's first imprisonment at Rome, with the account delivered in the Acts, which, having brought the apostle to Rome, closes the history by telling us "that he dwelt there *two whole years* in his own hired house."

VI. Chap. 1:23: "For I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better."

With this compare 2 Cor. 5:8: "We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord."

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* *'Αλλ' εἰ καὶ σπένδομαι ἐπὶ τῇ θυσίᾳ τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν*, if my blood be poured out as a libation upon the sacrifice of your faith.

The sameness of sentiment in these two quotations is obvious. I rely, however, not so much upon that, as upon the similitude in the train of thought which in each epistle leads up to this sentiment, and upon the suitableness of that train of thought to the circumstances under which the epistles purport to have been written. This, I conceive, bespeaks the production of the same mind, and of a mind operating upon real circumstances. The sentiment is in both places preceded by the contemplation of imminent personal danger. To the Philippians he writes, in the twentieth verse of this chapter, "According to my earnest expectation, and my hope, that in nothing I shall be ashamed, but that with all boldness, as always, *so now also*, Christ shall be magnified in my body, whether it be by life, or by death." To the Corinthians, "Troubled on every side, yet not distressed; perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed; always bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus." This train of reflection is continued to the place from whence the words which we compare are taken. The two epistles, though written at different times, from different places, and to different churches, were both written under circumstances which would naturally recall to the author's mind the precarious condition of his life, and the perils which constantly awaited him. When the epistle to the Philippians was written the author was a prisoner at Rome, expecting his trial. When the second epistle to the Corinthians was written he had lately escaped a danger in which he had given himself over for lost. The epistle opens with a recollection of this subject, and the impression accompanied the writer's thoughts throughout.

I know that nothing is easier than to transplant into a forged epistle a sentiment or expression which is found in a true one; or, supposing both epistles to be forged by the same hand, to insert the same sentiment or expression in both; but the difficulty is to introduce it in just and close connection with a train of thought going before, and with a train of thought apparently generated by the circumstances under which the epistle is written. In two epistles, purporting to be written on different occasions, and in different periods of the author's history, this propriety would not easily be managed.

VII. Chap. 1 : 29, 30 ; 2 : 1, 2 : "For unto you is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake ; having the same conflict which *ye saw in me*, and now hear to be in me. If there be therefore any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of love, if any fellowship of the Spirit, if any bowels and mercies, fulfil ye my joy, that ye be like-minded, having the same love, being of one accord, of one mind."

With this compare Acts 16 : 22 : "And the multitude," at Philippi, "rose up together against them," Paul and Silas : "and the magistrates rent off their clothes, and commanded to beat them. And when they had laid many stripes upon them, they cast them into prison, charging the jailer to keep them safely. Who having received such a charge, thrust them into the inner prison, and made their feet fast in the stocks."

The passage in the epistle is very remarkable. I know not an example in any writing of a juster pathos, or which more truly represents the workings of a warm and affectionate mind, than what is exhibited in the quotation before us.* The apostle reminds the Philippians of their being joined with himself in the endurance of persecution for the sake of Christ. He conjures them by the ties of their common profession and their common sufferings, to "fulfil his joy ;" to complete, by the unity of their faith, and by their mutual love, that joy with which the instances he had received of their zeal and attachment had inspired his breast.

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* The original is very spirited : Ἐι τις οὖν παράκλησις ἐν Χριστῷ, ει τι παραμύθιον ἀγάπης, εἴ τις κοινωνία Πνεύματος, εἴ τινα σπλάγχνα καὶ οἰκτιρμοὶ, πληρώσατέ μου τὴν χαρὰν.

Now if this was the real effusion of St. Paul's mind, of which it bears the strongest internal character, then we have in the words "the same conflict which ye saw in me," an authentic confirmation of so much of the apostle's history in the Acts, as relates to his transactions at Philippi ; and, through that, of the intelligence and general fidelity of the historian.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE EPISTLE TO THE COLOSSIANS.

I. There is a circumstance of conformity between St. Paul's history and his letters, especially those which were written during his first imprisonment at Rome, and more especially the epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians, which being too close to be accounted for from accident, yet too indirect and latent to be imputed to design, cannot easily be resolved into any other original than truth: which circumstance is this, that St. Paul in these epistles attributes his imprisonment, not to his preaching of Christianity, but to his asserting the right of the Gentiles to be admitted into it without conforming themselves to the Jewish law. This was the doctrine to which he considered himself as a martyr. Thus, in the epistle before us, chap. 1 : 24: I Paul, "who now rejoice in my sufferings for you"—"*for you*," that is, for those whom he had never seen; for a few verses afterwards he adds, "I would that ye knew what great conflict I have for you, and for them in Laodicea, and for as many as have not seen my face in the flesh." His suffering therefore for *them* was, in their general capacity of Gentile Christians, agreeably to what he explicitly declares in his epistle to the Ephesians, 3 : 1: "For this cause, I Paul, the prisoner of Jesus Christ *for you Gentiles*." Again, in the epistle now under consideration, 4 : 3: "Withal praying also for us, that God would open unto us a door of utterance, to speak the *mystery* of Christ, for which I am also in bonds." What that "mystery of Christ" was, the epistle to the Ephesians distinctly informs us: "Whereby, when ye read, ye may understand my knowledge in the *mystery of Christ*, which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men, as it is now revealed unto the holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit, *that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of his promise* *in Christ, by the gospel.*" This, therefore, was the *confession* for which he declares himself to be in bonds. Now let us inquire how the occasion of St. Paul's imprisonment is represented in the history. The apostle had not long returned to Jerusalem from his second visit into Greece, when an uproar was excited in that city by the clamor of certain Asiatic Jews, who, "having seen Paul in the temple, stirred up all the people, and laid hands on him." The charge advanced against him was, that "he taught all men everywhere against the people, and the law, and this place; and further, brought Greeks also into the temple, and hath polluted this holy place." The former part of the charge seems to point at the doctrine which he maintained, of the admission of the Gentiles, under the new dispensation, to an indiscriminate participation of God's favor with the Jews. But what follows makes the matter clear. When, by the interference of the chief captain, Paul had been rescued out of the hands of the populace, and was permitted to address the multitude who had followed him to the stairs of the castle, he delivered a brief account of his birth, of the early course of his life, of his miraculous conversion; and is proceeding in this narrative, until he comes to describe a vision which was presented to him, as he was praying in the temple: and which bid him depart out of Jerusalem; "for I will send thee far hence *unto the Gentiles*." Acts 22:21. "They gave him audience," says the historian, "*unto this word*, and then lifted up their voices, and said, Away with such a fellow from the earth." Nothing can show more strongly than this account does, what was the offence which drew down upon St. Paul the vengeance of his countrymen. His mission to the Gentiles, and his open avowal of that mission, was the intolerable part of the apostle's crime. But although the real motive of the prosecution appears to have been the apostle's conduct towards the Gentiles, yet when his accusers came before a Roman magistrate, a charge was to be framed of a more legal form. The profanation of the temple was the article they chose to rely upon. This, therefore, became the immediate subject of Tertullus' oration before Felix, and of Paul's defence. But that he all along considered his ministry among the Gentiles as the actual source of the enmity that had been exercised against him, and in particular, as the cause of the insurrection in which his person had been seized, is apparent from the conclusion of his discourse before Agrippa: "I have appeared unto thee," says he, describing what passed upon his journey to Damascus, "for this purpose, to make thee a minister and a witness both of these things which thou hast seen, and of those things in the which I will appear unto thee; delivering thee from the people and from the Gentiles, unto whom now I send thee, to open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith that is in me. Whereupon, O king Agrippa, I was not disobedient unto the heavenly vision; but showed first unto them of Damascus, and at Jerusalem, and throughout all the coasts of Judea, and then to the Gentiles, that they should repent and turn to God, and do works meet for repentance. *For these causes* the Jews caught me in the temple, and went about to kill me." The seizing, therefore, of St. Paul's person, from which he was never discharged till his final liberation at Rome, and of which, therefore, his imprisonment at Rome was the continuation and effect, was not in consequence of any general persecution set on foot against Christianity; nor did it befall him simply as professing or teaching Christ's religion, which James and the elders at Jerusalem did as well as he, and yet, for any thing that appears, remained at that time unmolested; but it was distinctly and specifically brought upon him by his activity in preaching to the Gentiles, and by his placing them upon a level with the once-favored and still self-flattered posterity of Abraham. How well St. Paul's letters, purporting to be written during this imprisonment, agree with this account of its cause and origin, we have already seen.

II. Chap. 4 : 10, 11 : "Aristarchus, my fellow-prisoner, saluteth you, and Marcus, sister's son to Barnabas, (touching whom ye received commandments : if he come unto you, receive him,) and Jesus, which is called Justus, who are of the circumcision."

We find Aristarchus as a companion of our apostle in the nineteenth chapter of the Acts and the twenty-ninth verse : "And the whole city" of Ephesus "was filled with confusion : and having caught Gaius and *Aristarchus*, men of Macedonia, *Paul's companions in travel*, they rushed with one accord into the theatre." And we find him upon his journey with St. Paul to Rome, in the twenty-seventh chapter and the second verse : "And when it was determined that we should sail into Italy, they delivered Paul and certain other prisoners unto one named Julius, a centurion of Agustus' band. And entering into a ship of Adramyttium, we launched, meaning to sail by the coasts of Asia ; one *Aristarchus, a Macedonian of Thessalonica, being with us.*" But might not the author of the epistle have consulted the history ; and, observing that the historian had brought Aristarchus along with Paul to Rome, might he not for that reason, and without any other foundation, have put down his name among the salutations of an epistle purporting to be written by the apostle from that place ? I allow so much of possibility to this objection, that I should not have proposed this in the number of coincidences clearly undesigned, had Aristarchus stood alone. The observation that strikes me in reading the passage is, that together with Aristarchus, whose journey to Rome we trace in the history, are joined Marcus and Justus, of whose coming to Rome the history says nothing. Aristarchus alone appears in the history, and Aristarchus alone would have appeared in the epistle, if the author had regulated himself by that conformity. Or if you take it the other way—if you suppose the history to have been made out of the epistle, why the journey of Aristarchus to Rome should be recorded, and not that of Marcus and Justus, if the groundwork of the narrative was the appearance of Aristarchus' name in the epistle, seems to be unaccountable.

"Marcus, *sister's son* to Barnabas." Does not this hint account for Barnabas' adherence to Mark in the contest that arose with our apostle concerning him? "And some days after, Paul said unto Barnabas, Let us go again and visit our brethren in every city where we have preached the word of the Lord, and see how they do. And *Barnabas determined to take with them John, whose surname was Mark.* But Paul thought not good to take him with them, who departed from them from Pamphylia, and went not with them to the work. And the contention was so sharp between them, that they departed asunder one from the other: and so Barnabas took Mark and sailed unto Cyprus." The history, which records the dispute, has not preserved the circumstance of Mark's relationship to Barnabas. It is nowhere noticed but in the text before us. As far, therefore, as it applies, the application is certainly undesigned.

"*Sister's* son to Barnabas." This woman, the mother of Mark, and the sister of Barnabas, was, as might be expected, a person of some eminence among the Christians of Jerusalem. It so happens that we hear of her in the history. When Peter was delivered from prison, "he came to the house of *Mary the mother of John, whose surname was Mark;* where many were gathered together praying." Acts 12:12. There is somewhat of coincidence in this—somewhat bespeaking real transactions among real persons.

III. The following coincidence, though it bear the appearance of great nicety and refinement, ought not, perhaps, to be deemed imaginary. In the salutations with which this, like most of St. Paul's epistles, concludes, we have "Aristarchus and Marcus, and Jesus, which is called Justus, *who are of the circumcision.*" Chap. 4:10, 11. Then follow also, "Epaphras, Luke the beloved physician, and Demas." Now, as this description, "who are of the circumcision," is added after the first three names, it is inferred, not without great appearance of probability, that the rest, among whom is Luke, were not of the circumcision. Now, can we discover any expression in the Acts of the Apostles which ascertains whether the author of the book was a Jew or not? If we can discover that he was not a Jew, we fix a circumstance in his character which coincides with what is here, indirectly indeed, but not very uncertainly, intimated concerning Luke: and we so far confirm both the testimony of the primitive church, that the Acts of the Apostles was written by St. Luke, and the general reality of the persons and circumstances brought together in this epistle. The text in the Acts, which has been construed to show that the writer was not a Jew, is the nineteenth verse of the first chapter, where, in describing the field which had been purchased with the reward of Judas' iniquity, it is said, "that it was known unto all the dwellers at Jerusalem; insomuch as that field is called in *their* proper tongue, Aceldama, that is to say, The field of blood." These words are by most commentators taken to be the words and observation of the historian, and not a part of St. Peter's speech, in the midst of which they are found. If this be admitted, then it is argued that the expression, "in *their* proper tongue," would not have been used by a Jew, but is suitable to the pen of a Gentile writing concerning Jews.* The reader will judge of the probability of this conclusion, and we urge the coincidence no further than the probability extends. The coincidence, if it be one, is so remote from all possibility of design, that nothing need be added to satisfy the reader upon that part of the argument.

IV. Chap. 4 : 9 : "With Onesimus, a faithful and beloved brother, *who is one of you.*"

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* Vide Benson's Dissertation, vol. 1, p. 318 of his works, edit. 1756.

Observe how it may be made out that Onesimus was a Colossian. Turn to the epistle to Philemon, and you will find that Onesimus was the servant or slave of Philemon. The question, therefore, will be, to what city Philemon belonged. In the epistle addressed to him this is not declared. It appears only that he was of the same place, whatever that place was, with an eminent Christian named Archippus. "Paul, a prisoner of Jesus Christ, and Timothy our brother, unto Philemon our dearly beloved, and fellow-laborer, and to our beloved Apphia, and *Archippus* our fellow-soldier, and to the church in thy house." Now turn back to the epistle to the Colossians, and you will find Archippus saluted by name among the Christians of that church. "Say to Archippus, Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received in the Lord, that thou fulfil it." Chap. 4 : 17. The necessary result is, that Onesimus also was of the same city, agreeably to what is said of him, "he is one of you." And this result is either the effect of truth, which produces consistency without the writer's thought or care, or of a contexture of forgeries confirming and falling in with one another by a species of fortuity of which I know no example. The supposition of design, I think, is excluded, not only because the purpose to which the design must have been directed, namely, the verification of the passage in our epistle, in which it is said concerning Onesimus, "he is one of you," is a purpose which would be lost upon ninety-nine readers out of a hundred; but because the means made use of are too circuitous to have been the subject of affectation and contrivance. Would a forger, who had this purpose in view, have left his readers to hunt it out, by going forward and backward from one epistle to another, in order to connect Onesimus with Philemon, Philemon with Archippus, and Archippus with Colosse? all which he must do before he arrives at his discovery, that it was truly said of Onesimus, "he is one of you."

CHAPTER IX.

THE FIRST EPISTLE TO THE THESSALONIANS.

I. It is known to every reader of Scripture that the first epistle to the Thessalonians speaks of the coming of Christ in terms which indicate an expectation of his speedy appearance: "For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that *we* which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then *we which are alive and remain* shall be caught up together with them in the clouds. But ye, brethren, are not in darkness, that that day should overtake you as a thief." Chap. 4:15–17; 5:4.

Whatever other construction these texts may *bear*, the idea they leave upon the mind of an ordinary reader, is that of the author of the epistle looking for the day of judgment to take place in his own time, or near to it. Now the use which I make of this circumstance is, to deduce from it a proof that the epistle itself was not the production of a subsequent age. Would an impostor have given this expectation to St. Paul, after experience had proved it to be erroneous? or would he have put into the apostle's mouth, or, which is the same thing, into writings purporting to come from his hand, expressions, if not necessarily conveying, at least easily interpreted to convey, an opinion which was then known to be founded in mistake? I state this as an argument to show that the epistle was contemporary with St. Paul, which is little less than to show that it actually proceeded from his pen. For I question whether any ancient forgeries were executed in the lifetime of the person whose name they bear; nor was the primitive situation of the church likely to give birth to such an attempt.

II. Our epistle concludes with a direction that it should be publicly read in the church to which it was addressed: "I charge you by the Lord that this epistle be read unto all the holy brethren." The existence of this clause in the body of the epistle is an evidence of its authenticity; because to produce a letter purporting to have been publicly read in the church of Thessalonica, when no such letter in truth had been read or heard of in that church, would be to produce an imposture destructive of itself. At least, it seems unlikely that the author of an imposture would voluntarily and even officiously afford a handle to so plain an objection. Either the epistle was publicly read in the church of Thessalonica during St. Paul's lifetime, or it was not. If it was, no publication could be more authentic, no species of notoriety more unquestionable, no method of preserving the integrity of the copy more secure. If it was not, the clause we produce would remain a standing condemnation of the forgery, and one would suppose, an invincible impediment to its success.

If we connect this article with the preceding, we shall perceive that they combine into one strong proof of the genuineness of the epistle. The preceding article carries up the date of the epistle to the time of St. Paul; the present article fixes the publication of it to the church of Thessalonica. Either therefore the church of Thessalonica was imposed upon by a false epistle, which in St. Paul's lifetime they received and read publicly as his, carrying on a communication with him all the while, and the epistle referring to the continuance of that communication; or other Christian churches, in the same lifetime of the apostle, received an epistle purporting to have been publicly read in the church of Thessalonica, which nevertheless had not been heard of in that church; or lastly, the conclusion remains, that the epistle now in our hands is genuine.

III. Between our epistle and the history the accordancy in many points is circumstantial and complete. The history relates that, after Paul and Silas had been beaten with many stripes at Philippi, shut up in the inner prison, and their feet made fast in the stocks, as soon as they were discharged from their confinement they departed from thence, and, when they had passed through Amphipolis and Apollonia, came to Thessalonica, where Paul opened and alleged that Jesus was the Christ. Acts 16, 17. The epistle written in the name of Paul and Silvanus, i. e. Silas, and of Timotheus, who also appears to have been along with them at Philippi, (vide Philippians, No. IV.,) speaks to the church of Thessalonica thus: "Even after that we had suffered before, and were shamefully entreated, as ye know, at Philippi, we were bold in our God to speak unto you the gospel of God with much contention." Chap. 2:2.

The history relates, that after they had been some time at Thessalonica, "the Jews which believed not . . . . . set all the city on an uproar, and assaulted the house of Jason," where Paul and Silas were, "and sought to bring them out to the people." Acts 17:5. The epistle declares, "When we were with you, we told you before that we should suffer tribulation; even *as it came to pass, and ye know.*" Chap. 3:4.

The history brings Paul and Silas and Timothy together at Corinth, soon after the preaching of the gospel at Thessalonica: "And when Silas and Timotheus were come from Macedonia" to Corinth, "Paul was pressed in spirit." Acts 18:5. The epistle is written in the name of these three persons, who consequently must have been together at the time, and speaks throughout of their ministry at Thessalonica as a recent transaction: "We, brethren, *being taken from you for a short time* in presence, not in heart, endeavored the more abundantly to see your face with great desire." Chap. 2:17.

The harmony is indubitable; but the points of history in which it consists are so expressly set forth in the narrative, and so directly referred to in the epistle, that it becomes necessary for us to show that the facts in one writing were not copied from the other. Now, amid some minuter discrepancies, which will be noticed below, there is one circumstance which mixes itself with all the allusions in the epistle, but does not appear in the history anywhere; and that is of a visit which St. Paul had intended to pay to the Thessalonians during the time of his residing at Corinth: "Wherefore we would have come unto you, even I Paul, once and again; but Satan hindered us." Chap. 2:18. "Night and day praying exceedingly that we might see your face, and might perfect that which is lacking in your faith. Now God himself and our Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ, direct our way unto you." Chap. 3:10, 11. Concerning a design which was not executed, although the person himself, who was conscious of his own purpose, should make mention in his letters, nothing is more probable than that his historian should be silent, if not ignorant. The author of the epistle could not, however, have learned this circumstance from the history, for it is not there to be met with; nor, if the historian had drawn his materials from the epistle, is it likely that he would have passed over a circumstance which is among the most obvious and prominent of the facts to be collected from that source of information.

IV. Chap. 3:1, 6, 7: "Wherefore, when we could no longer forbear, we thought it good *to be left at Athens alone;* and sent Timotheus, our brother, and minister of God, and our fellow-laborer in the gospel of Christ, to establish you, and to comfort you concerning your faith. But now, when Timotheus came from you unto us, and brought us good tidings of your faith and charity, ... we were comforted over you in all our affliction and distress by your faith."

The history relates, that when Paul came out of Macedonia to Athens, Silas and Timothy stayed behind at Berea. "The brethren sent away Paul, to go as it were to the sea; but Silas and Timotheus abode there still. And they that conducted Paul brought him unto Athens." Acts 17:14, 15. The history further relates, that after Paul had tarried some time at Athens, and had proceeded from thence to Corinth, while he was exercising his ministry in that city, Silas and Timothy came to him from Macedonia. Acts 18 : 5. But to reconcile the history with the clause in the epistle which makes St. Paul say, "I thought it good to be left at Athens alone, and to send Timothy unto you," it is necessary to suppose that Timothy had come up with St. Paul at Athens—a circumstance which the history does not mention. I remark, therefore, that although the history does not expressly notice this arrival, yet it contains intimations which render it extremely probable that the fact took place. First, as soon as Paul had reached Athens, he sent a message back to Silas and Timothy, "for to come to him with all speed." Acts 17 : 15. Secondly, his stay at Athens was on purpose that they might join him there. "Now, while Paul *waited for them at Athens*, his spirit was stirred in him." Acts 17 : 16. Thirdly, his departure from Athens does not appear to have been in any sort hastened or abrupt. It is said, "after these things," namely, his disputation with the Jews, his conferences with the philosophers, his discourse at Areopagus, and the gaining of some converts, "he departed from Athens, and came to Corinth." It is not hinted that he quitted Athens before the time that he had intended to leave it; it is not suggested that he was driven from thence, as he was from many cities, by tumults or persecutions, or because his life was no longer safe. Observe then the particulars which the history *does* notice—that Paul had ordered Timothy to follow him without delay, that he waited at Athens on purpose that Timothy might come up with him, that he stayed there as long as his own choice led him to continue. Laying these circumstances which the history does disclose together, it is highly probable that Timothy came to the apostle at Athens; a fact which the epistle, we have seen, virtually asserts, when it makes Paul send Timothy back from Athens to Thessalonica. The *sending back of Timothy into Macedonia* accounts also for his not coming to Corinth till after Paul had been fixed in that city for some considerable time. Paul had found out Aquila and Priscilla, abode with them and wrought, being of the same craft; and reasoned in the synagogue every Sabbath-day, and persuaded the Jews and the Greeks. Acts 18 : 1–5. All this passed at Corinth before Silas and Timotheus were come from Macedonia. Acts 18 : 5. If this was the first time of their coming up with him after their separation at Berea, there is nothing to account for a delay so contrary to what appears from the history itself to have been St. Paul's plan and expectation. This is a conformity of a peculiar species. The epistle discloses a fact which is not preserved in the history, but which makes what is said in the history more significant, probable, and consistent. The history bears marks of an omission; the epistle by reference furnishes a circumstance which supplies that omission.

V. Chap. 2 : 14 : "For ye, brethren, became followers of the churches of God which in Judea are in Christ Jesus; for ye also have suffered like things *of your own countrymen*, even as they have of the Jews."

To a reader of the Acts of the Apostles it might seem, at first sight, that the persecutions which the preachers and converts of Christianity underwent, were suffered at the hands of their old adversaries the Jews. But if we attend carefully to the accounts there delivered, we shall observe that, though the opposition made to the gospel usually *originated* from the enmity of the Jews, yet, in almost all places, the Jews went about to accomplish their purpose by stirring up the Gentile inhabitants against their converted countrymen. Out of Judea they had not power to do much mischief in any other way. This was the case at Thessalonica in particular: "The Jews which believed not, moved with envy, set all the city in an uproar." Acts 17 : 5. It was the same a short time afterwards at Berea: "When the Jews of Thessalonica had knowledge that the word of God was preached of Paul at Berea, they came thither also, and stirred up the people." Acts 17 : 13. And before this, our apostle had met with a like species of persecution, in his progress through the Lesser Asia: in every city "the unbelieving Jews stirred up the Gentiles, and made their minds evil-affected against the brethren." Acts 14:2. The epistle therefore represents the case accurately as the history states it. It was the Jews always who set on foot the persecutions against the apostles and their followers. He speaks truly therefore of them, when he says in the epistle, they "both killed the Lord Jesus and their own prophets, and have *persecuted us;* forbidding us to speak unto the Gentiles." Chap. 2:15, 16. But out of Judea it was at the hands of the Gentiles, it was "of their own countrymen," that the injuries they underwent were immediately sustained: "Ye have suffered like things of your own countrymen, even as they have of the Jews."

VI. The apparent discrepancies between our epistle and the history, though of magnitude sufficient to repel the imputation of confederacy or transcription—in which view they form a part of our argument—are neither numerous nor very difficult to reconcile.

One of these may be observed in the ninth and tenth verses of the second chapter: "For ye remember, brethren, our labor and travail: for laboring night and day, because we would not be chargeable unto any of you, we preached unto you the gospel of God. Ye are witnesses, and God also, how holily, and justly, and unblamably we behaved ourselves among you that believe." A person who reads this passage is naturally led by it to suppose that the writer had dwelt at Thessalonica for some considerable time; yet of St. Paul's ministry in that city the history gives no other account than the following: that "he came to Thessalonica, where was a synagogue of the Jews;" that, "as his manner was," he "went in unto them, and *three Sabbath-days* reasoned with them out of the Scriptures;" that "some of them believed, and consorted with Paul and Silas." The history then proceeds to tell us that the Jews which believed not set the city in an uproar, and assaulted the house of Jason, where Paul and his companions lodged; that the consequence of this outrage was, that "the brethren immediately sent away Paul and Silas by night unto Berea." Acts 17 : 1–10. From the mention of his preaching three Sabbath-days in the Jewish synagogue, and from the want of any further specification of his ministry, it has usually been taken for granted that Paul did not continue at Thessalonica more than three weeks. This, however, is inferred without necessity. It appears to have been St. Paul's practice, in almost every place that he came to, upon his first arrival to repair to the synagogue. He thought himself bound to propose the gospel to the Jews first, agreeably to what he declared at Antioch in Pisidia: "It was necessary that the word of God should first have been spoken to you." Acts 13 : 46. If the Jews rejected his ministry, he quitted the synagogue and betook himself to a Gentile audience. At Corinth, upon his first coming there, he reasoned in the synagogue every Sabbath; "but when the Jews opposed themselves, and blasphemed," he departed thence, expressly telling them, "From henceforth I will go unto the Gentiles;" and he remained in that city "a year and six months." Acts 18 : 6–11. At Ephesus, in like manner, for the space of three months he went into the synagogue; but "when divers were hardened, and believed not, but spake evil of that way before the multitude, he departed from them, and separated the disciples, disputing daily in the school of one Tyrannus. And this continued by the space of two years." Acts 19 : 9, 10. Upon inspecting the history, I see nothing in it which negatives the supposition that St. Paul pursued the same plan at Thessalonica which he adopted in other places; and that, though he resorted to the synagogue only three Sabbath-days, yet he remained in the city and in the exercise of his ministry among the Gentile citizens much longer; and until the success of his preaching had provoked the Jews to excite the tumult and insurrection by which he was driven away.

Another seeming discrepancy is found in the ninth verse of the first chapter of the epistle: "For they themselves show of us what manner of entering in we had unto you, and how *ye turned to God from idols*, to serve the living and true God." This text contains an assertion that, by means of St. Paul's ministry at Thessalonica, many idolatrous Gentiles had been brought over to Christianity. Yet the history, in describing the effects of that ministry, only says, that "some of them," the Jews, "believed, and consorted with Paul and Silas; and of the devout Greeks a great multitude, and of the chief women not a few." Chap. 17 : 4. The devout Greeks were those who already worshipped the one true God; and therefore could not be said, by embracing Christianity, "to be turned to God from idols."

This is the difficulty. The answer may be assisted by the following observations. The Alexandrine and Cambridge manuscripts read, for τῶν σεβομένων Ἑλλήνων πολύ πλῆθος, τῶν σεβομένων κὰι Ἑλλήνων πολύ πλῆθος· in which reading they are also confirmed by the Vulgate Latin. And this reading is, in my opinion, strongly supported by the considerations, first, that οἱ σεβομένοι alone, that is, without Ἑλλῆνες, is used in this sense in the same chapter—Paul being come to Athens, διελέγετο ἐν τῇ συναγώγῇ τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις κὰι τοῖς σεβομένοις secondly, that σεβομένοι and Ἑλλῆνες nowhere come together. The expression is redundant. The οἱ σεβομένοι must be Ἑλλῆνες. Thirdly, that the καὶ is much more likely to have been left out, *incuriâ manûs*, than to have been put in. Or, after all, if we be not allowed to change the present reading, which is undoubtedly retained by a great plurality of copies, may not the passage in the history be considered as describing only the effects of St. Paul's discourses during the three Sabbath-days in which he preached in the synagogue? And may it not be true, as we have remarked above, that his application to the Gentiles at large, and his success among them, were posterior to this?

CHAPTER X.

THE SECOND EPISTLE TO THE THESSALONIANS.

I. It may seem odd to allege obscurity itself as an argument, or to draw a proof in favor of a writing from that which is naturally considered as the principal defect in its composition. The present epistle, however, furnishes a passage hitherto unexplained, and probably inexplicable by us, the existence of which, under the darkness and difficulties that attend it, can be accounted for only by the supposition of the epistle being genuine; and upon that supposition is accounted for with great ease. The passage which I allude to is found in the second chapter: "That day shall not come, except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition; who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God. Remember ye not, that WHEN I WAS YET WITH YOU, I TOLD YOU THESE THINGS? *And now ye know what withholdeth that he might be revealed in his time.* For the mystery of iniquity doth already work: *only he who now letteth will let, until he be taken out of the way.* And then shall that Wicked be revealed, whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall destroy with the brightness of his coming." It were superfluous to prove, because it is in vain to deny, that this passage is involved in great obscurity, more especially the clauses distinguished by italics. Now the observation I have to offer is founded upon this, that the passage expressly refers to a conversation which the author had previously holden with the Thessalonians upon the same subject: "Remember ye not, that when I was yet with you, *I told you these things? And now ye know* what withholdeth." If such conversation actually passed—if, while "he was yet with them, he *told* them those things," then it follows that the epistle is authentic. And of the reality of this conversation it appears to be a proof, that what is said in the epistle might be understood by those who had been present at such conversation, and yet be incapable of being explained by any other. No man writes unintelligibly on purpose. But it may easily happen, that a part of a letter which relates to a subject upon which the parties had conversed together before, which refers to what had been before *said*, which is in truth a portion or continuation of a former discourse, may be utterly without meaning to a stranger who should pick up the letter upon the road, and yet be perfectly clear to the person to whom it is directed, and with whom the previous communication had passed. And if, in a letter which thus accidentally fell into my hands, I found a passage expressly referring to a former conversation, and difficult to be explained without knowing that conversation, I should consider this very difficulty as a proof that the conversation had actually passed, and consequently that the letter contained the real correspondence of real persons.

II. Chap. 3 : 8, 9 : "Neither did we eat any man's bread for naught ; but wrought with labor and travail night and day, that we might not be chargeable to any of you : not because we have not power, but to make ourselves an ensample unto you to follow us."

In a letter purporting to have been written to another of the Macedonian churches, we find the following declaration :

"Now ye Philippians, know also, that in the beginning of the gospel, when I departed from Macedonia, *no church communicated with me, as concerning giving and receiving, but ye only.*"

The conformity between these two passages is strong and plain. They confine the transaction to the same period. The epistle to the Philippians refers to what passed "in the beginning of the gospel," that is to say, during the first preaching of the gospel on that side of the Ægean sea.

The epistle to the Thessalonians speaks of the apostle's conduct in that city upon "his first entrance in unto them," which the history informs us was in the course of his first visit to the peninsula of Greece.

As St. Paul tells the Philippians, that "no church communicated with him, as concerning giving and receiving, but they only," he could not, consistently with the truth of this declaration, have received any thing from the neighboring church of Thessalonica. What thus appears by general implication in an epistle to another church, when he writes to the Thessalonians themselves, is noticed expressly and particularly: "Neither did we eat any man's bread for naught; but wrought night and day, that we might not be chargeable to any of you."

The texts here cited further also exhibit a mark of conformity with what St. Paul is made to say of himself in the Acts of the Apostles. The apostle not only reminds the Thessalonians that he had not been chargeable to any of them, but he states likewise the motive which dictated this reserve: "Not because we have not power, but to make ourselves an ensample unto you to follow us." Chap. 3 : 9. This conduct, and what is much more precise, the end which he had in view by it, was the very same as that which the history attributes to St. Paul in a discourse which it represents him to have addressed to the elders of the church of Ephesus: "Yea, ye yourselves know, that these hands have ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me. I have *showed* you all things, how *that so laboring ye ought to support the weak.*" Acts 20 : 34. The sentiment in the epistle and in the speech is in both parts of it so much alike, and yet the words which convey it show so little of imitation or even of resemblance, that the agreement cannot well be explained without supposing the speech and the letter to have really proceeded from the same person.

III. Our reader remembers the passage in the first epistle to the Thessalonians, in which St. Paul spoke of the coming of Christ: "This we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven, ... and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air; and so shall we ever be with the Lord. But ye, brethren, are not in darkness, that that day should overtake you as a thief." 1 Thess. 4:15–17; 5:4. It should seem that the Thessalonians, or some however among them, had from this passage conceived an opinion—and that not very unnaturally—that the coming of Christ was to take place instantly, ὅτι ἐνέστηκεν;* and that this persuasion had produced, as it well might, much agitation in the church. The apostle therefore now writes, among other purposes, to quiet this alarm and to rectify the misconstruction that had been put upon his words: "Now we beseech you, brethren, by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by our gathering together unto him, that ye be not soon shaken in mind, or be troubled, neither by spirit, nor by word, *nor by letter as from us*, as that the day of Christ is at hand." If the allusion which we contend for be admitted, namely, if it be admitted that the passage in the second epistle relates to the passage in the first, it amounts to a considerable proof of the genuineness of both epistles. I have no conception, because I know no example, of such a device in a forgery, as first to frame an ambiguous passage in a letter, then to represent the persons to whom the letter is addressed as mistaking the meaning of the passage, and lastly, to write a second letter in order to correct this mistake.

I have said that this argument arises out of the text, *if* the allusion be admitted; for I am not ignorant that many expositors understand the passage in the second epistle as referring to some forged letters which had been produced in St. Paul's name, and in which the apostle had been made to say that the coming of Christ was then at hand. In defence, however, of the explanation which we propose, the reader is desired to observe,

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* "Ὅτι ἐνέστηκεν, nempe hoc anno," namely, in this year, says Grotius; "ἐνέστηκεν hic dicitur de re præsenti, ut Rom. 8:38; 1 Cor. 3:22; Gal. 1:4; Heb. 9:9"—it is here used in reference to something present, as in Rom. 8:38, etc.

1. The strong fact, that there exists a passage in the first epistle to which that in the second is capable of being referred, that is, which accounts for the error the writer is solicitous to remove. Had no other epistle than the second been extant, and had it under these circumstances come to be considered, whether the text before us related to a forged epistle or to some misconstruction of a true one, many conjectures and many probabilities might have been admitted in the inquiry, which can have little weight when an epistle is produced containing the very sort of passage we were seeking, that is, a passage liable to the misinterpretation which the apostle protests against.

2. That the clause which introduces the passages in the second epistle bears a particular affinity to what is found in the passage cited from the first epistle. The clause is this: "We beseech you, brethren, by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and *by our gathering together unto him.*" Now, in the first epistle the description of the coming of Christ is accompanied with the mention of this very circumstance of his saints being collected round him: "The Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God; and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, *to meet the Lord* in the air." 1 Thess. 4:16, 17. This I suppose to be the "gathering together unto him," intended in the second epistle; and that the author, when he used these words, retained in his thoughts what he had written on the subject before.

3. The second epistle is written in the joint name of Paul, Silvanus, and Timotheus, and it cautions the Thessalonians against being misled "by letter as from us," *ὡς δι' ἡμῶν*. Do not these words, *δι' ἡμῶν*, appropriate the reference to some writing which bore the name of these three teachers? Now this circumstance, which is a very close one, belongs to the epistle at present in our hands; for the epistle which we call the First Epistle to the Thessalonians contains these names in its superscription.

4. The words in the original, as far as they are material to be stated, are these: *εἰς τό μὴ ταχέως σαλευθῆναι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ νοός, μήτε θροεῖσθαι, μήτε διὰ πνεύματος, μήτε διὰ λόγου, μήτε δι' ἐπιστολῆς, ὡς δι' ἡμῶν, ὡς ὅτι ἐνέστηκεν ἡ ἡμέρα τοῦ Χριστοῦ.* Under the weight of the preceding observations, may not the words *μήτε διὰ λόγου, μήτε δι' ἐπιστολῆς, ὡς δι' ἡμῶν*, be construed to signify *quasi nos quid tale aut dixerimus aut scripserimus*,* intimating that their words had been mistaken, and that they had in truth said or written no such thing?

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* Should a contrary interpretation be preferred, I do not think that it implies the conclusion that a false epistle had then been published in the apostle's name. It will completely satisfy the allusion in the text to allow, that some one or other at Thessalonica had pretended to have been told by St. Paul and his companions, or to have seen a letter from them, in which they had said that the day of Christ was at hand. In like manner as, Acts 15:1, 24, it is recorded, that some had pretended to have received instructions from the church of Jerusalem, which had been received, "to whom they gave no such commandment." And thus Dr. Benson interpreted the passage *μήτε θροεῖσθαι, μήτε διὰ πνεύματος, μήτε διά λόγου, μήτε δι' ἐπιστολῆς ὡς δι' ἡμῶν*, "nor be dismayed by any revelation, or discourse, or epistle, which any one shall pretend to have heard or received from us."

CHAPTER XI.

THE FIRST EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

From the third verse of the first chapter, "As I besought thee to abide still at Ephesus, when I went into Macedonia," it is evident that this epistle was written soon after St. Paul had gone to Macedonia from Ephesus. Dr. Benson fixes its date to the time of St. Paul's journey recorded in the beginning of the twentieth chapter of the Acts: "And after the uproar" excited by Demetrius at Ephesus "was ceased, Paul called unto him the disciples, and embraced them, and departed for to go into Macedonia." And in this opinion Dr. Benson is followed by Michaelis, as he was preceded by the greater part of the commentators who have considered the question. There is, however, one objection to the hypothesis, which these learned men appear to me to have overlooked; and it is no other than this, that the superscription of the second epistle to the Corinthians seems to prove, that at the time St. Paul is supposed by them to have written this epistle to Timothy, Timothy in truth was with St. Paul in Macedonia. Paul, as it is related in the Acts, left Ephesus "for to go into Macedonia." When he had got into Macedonia he wrote his second epistle to the Corinthians. Concerning this point there exists little variety of opinion. It is plainly indicated by the contents of the epistle. It is also strongly implied, that the epistle was written *soon* after the apostle's arrival in Macedonia; for he begins his letter by a train of reflection, referring to his persecutions in Asia as to recent transactions, as to dangers from which he had lately been delivered. But in the salutation with which the epistle opens, *Timothy was joined with St. Paul*, and consequently could not at that time be "left behind at Ephesus." And as to the only solution of the difficulty which can be thought of, namely, that Timothy, though he was left behind at Ephesus upon St. Paul's departure from Asia, yet might follow him so soon after as to come up with the apostle in

Macedonia, before he wrote his epistle to the Corinthians, that supposition is inconsistent with the terms and tenor of the epistle throughout; for the writer speaks uniformly of his intention to return to Timothy at Ephesus, and not of his expecting Timothy to come to him in Macedonia: "These things write I unto thee, *hoping to come unto thee shortly:* but if I tarry long, that thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house of God." Chap. 3:14, 15. "*Till I come*, give attendance to reading, to exhortation, to doctrine." Chap. 4:13.

Since, therefore, the leaving of Timothy behind at Ephesus when Paul went into Macedonia, suits not with any journey into Macedonia recorded in the Acts, I concur with Bishop Pearson in placing the date of this epistle and the journey referred to in it, at a period subsequent to St. Paul's first imprisonment at Rome, and consequently subsequent to the era up to which the Acts of the Apostles brings his history. The only difficulty which attends our opinion is, that St. Paul must, according to us, have come to Ephesus after his liberation at Rome, contrary, as it should seem, to what he foretold to the Ephesian elders, that "they should see his face no more." And it is to save the infallibility of this prediction, and for no other reason of weight, that an earlier date is assigned to this epistle. The prediction itself, however, when considered in connection with the circumstances under which it was delivered, does not seem to demand so much anxiety. The words in question are found in the twenty-fifth verse of the twentieth chapter of the Acts: "And now, behold, I know that ye all, among whom I have gone preaching the kingdom of God, shall see my face no more." In the twenty-second and twenty-third verses of the same chapter, that is, two verses before, the apostle makes this declaration: "And now, behold, I go bound in the spirit unto Jerusalem, not knowing the things that shall befall me there: save that the Holy Ghost witnesseth in every city, saying, that bonds and afflictions abide me." This "witnessing of the Holy Ghost" was undoubtedly prophetic and supernatural. But it went no further than to foretell that bonds and afflictions awaited him. And I can very well conceive, that this might be all which was communicated to the apostle by extraordinary revelation, and that the rest was the conclusion of his own mind, the desponding inference which he drew from strong and repeated intimations of approaching danger. And the expression "I know," which St. Paul here uses, does not perhaps, when applied to future events affecting himself, convey an assertion so positive and absolute as we may at first sight apprehend. In the first chapter of the epistle to the Philippians, and the twenty-fifth verse, "I know," says he, "that I shall abide and continue with you all for your furtherance and joy of faith." Notwithstanding this strong declaration, in the second chapter and twenty-third and twenty-fourth verses of this same epistle, and speaking also of the very same event, he is content to use a language of some doubt and uncertainty: "Him therefore I hope to send presently, so soon *as I shall see how it will go with me.* But *I trust* in the Lord that I also myself shall come shortly." And a few verses preceding these, he not only seems to doubt of his safety, but almost to despair; to contemplate the possibility at least of his condemnation and martyrdom: "Yea, and if I be offered upon the sacrifice and service of your faith, I joy and rejoice with you all."

I. But can we show that St. Paul visited Ephesus after his liberation at Rome; or rather, can we collect any hints from his other letters which make it probable that he did? If we can, then we have a *coincidence;* if we cannot, we have only an unauthorized supposition, to which the exigency of the case compels us to resort. Now, for this purpose, let us examine the epistle to the Philippians and the epistle to Philemon. These two epistles purport to be written while St. Paul was yet a prisoner at Rome. To the Philippians he writes as follows: "I trust in the Lord that

I also myself shall come shortly." To Philemon, who was a Colossian, he gives this direction: "But withal prepare me also a lodging: for I trust that through your prayers I shall be given unto you." An inspection of the map will show us that Colosse was a city of the Lesser Asia, lying eastward and at no great distance from Ephesus. Philippi was on the other, that is, the western side of the Ægean sea. If the apostle executed his purpose—if, in pursuance of the intention expressed in his letter to Philemon, he came to Colosse soon after he was set at liberty at Rome, it is very improbable that he would omit to visit Ephesus, which lay so near to it, and where he had spent three years of his ministry. As he was also under a promise to the church of Philippi to see them "shortly," if he passed from Colosse to Philippi, or from Philippi to Colosse, he could hardly avoid taking Ephesus in his way.

II. Chap. 5 : 9 : "Let not a widow be taken into the number under threescore years old."

This accords with the account delivered in the sixth chapter of the Acts: "And in those days, when the number of the disciples was multiplied, there arose a murmuring of the Grecians against the Hebrews, *because their widows were neglected in the daily ministration*." It appears that from the first formation of the Christian church, provision was made out of the public funds of the society for the indigent *widows* who belonged to it. The history, we have seen, distinctly records the existence of such an institution at Jerusalem a few years after our Lord's ascension, and is led to the mention of it very incidentally; namely, by a dispute of which it was the occasion, and which produced important consequences to the Christian community. The epistle, without being suspected of borrowing from the history, refers, briefly indeed, but decisively, to a similar establishment subsisting some years afterwards at Ephesus. This agreement indicates that both writings were founded upon real circumstances.

But in this article, the material thing to be noticed is the mode of expression, "Let not a widow be taken into the number." No previous account or explanation is given, to which these words, "into the number," can refer; but the direction comes concisely and unpreparedly, "Let not a widow be taken into the number." Now, this is the way in which a man writes who is conscious that he is writing to persons already acquainted with the subject of his letter, and who he knows will readily apprehend and apply what he says by virtue of their being so acquainted; but it is not the way in which a man writes upon any other occasion, and least of all, in which a man would draw up a feigned letter, or introduce a supposititious fact.*

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* It is not altogether unconnected with our general purpose to remark, in the passage before us, the selection and reserve which St. Paul recommends to the governors of the church of Ephesus in the bestowing relief upon the poor, because it refutes a calumny which has been insinuated, that the liberality of the first Christians was an artifice to catch converts, or one of the temptations, however, by which the idle and mendicant were drawn into this society: "Let not a widow be taken into the number under threescore years old, having been the wife of one man, well reported of for good works; if she have brought up children, if she have lodged strangers, if she have washed the saints' feet, if she have relieved the afflicted, if she have diligently followed every good work. But the younger widows refuse." Ch. 5:9, 10, 11. And in another place, "If any man or woman that believeth have widows, let them relieve them, and let not the church be charged; that it may relieve them that are widows indeed." And to the same effect, or rather more to our present purpose, the apostle writes in the second epistle to the Thessalonians, "Even when we were with you, this we commanded you, that if any would not work, neither should he eat," that is, at the public expense. "For we hear that there are some which walk among you disorderly, *working not at all*, but are busybodies. Now them that are such we command and exhort by our Lord Jesus Christ, that with quietness they work, and eat their own bread." Could a designing or dissolute poor take advantage of bounty regulated with so much caution; or could the mind which dictated those sober and prudent directions be influenced, in his recommendations of public charity, by any other than properest motives of beneficence?

III. Chap. 3 : 2, 3 : "A bishop then must be blameless, the husband of one wife, vigilant, sober, of good behavior, given to hospitality, apt to teach ; not given to wine, no striker, not greedy of filthy lucre ; but patient ; not a brawler, not covetous ; one that ruleth well his own house."

"*No striker:*" that is the article which I single out from the collection, as evincing the antiquity at least, if not the genuineness of the epistle, because it is an article which no man would have made the subject of caution who lived in an advanced era of the church. It agreed with the infancy of the society, and with no other state of it. After the government of the church had acquired the dignified form which it soon and naturally assumed, this injunction could have no place. Would a person who lived under a hierarchy, such as the Christian hierarchy became when it had settled into a regular establishment, have thought it necessary to prescribe concerning the qualification of a bishop, that "he should be no striker?" And this injunction would be equally alien from the imagination of the writer, whether he wrote in his own character, or personated that of an apostle.

IV. Chap. 5 : 23 : "Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thine often infirmities."

Imagine an impostor sitting down to forge an epistle in the name of St. Paul. Is it credible that it should come into his head to give such a direction as this ; so remote from every thing of doctrine or discipline, every thing of public concern to the religion or the church, or to any sect, order, or party in it, and from every purpose with which such an epistle could be written ? It seems to me, that nothing but reality, that is, the real valetudinary situation of a real person, could have suggested a thought of so domestic a nature.

But if the peculiarity of the advice be observable, the place in which it stands is more so. The context is this :

"Lay hands suddenly on no man, neither be partaker of other men's sins: keep thyself pure. Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thine often infirmities. Some men's sins are open beforehand, going before to judgment; and some men they follow after." The direction to Timothy about his diet stands between two sentences, as wide from the subject as possible. The train of thought seems to be broken to let it in. Now, when does this happen? It happens when a man writes as he remembers; when he puts down an article the moment that it occurs, lest he should afterwards forget it. Of this, the passage before us bears strongly the appearance. In actual letters, in the negligence of real correspondence, examples of this kind frequently take place; seldom, I believe, in any other production. For, the moment a man regards what he writes as a *composition*, which the author of a forgery would of all writers be the first to do, notions of order in the arrangement and succession of his thoughts present themselves to his judgment and guide his pen.

V. Chap. 1 : 15, 16 : "This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners; of whom I am chief. Howbeit, for this cause I obtained mercy, that in me first Jesus Christ might show forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them which should hereafter believe on him to life everlasting."

What was the mercy which St. Paul here commemorates, and what was the crime of which he accuses himself, is apparent from the verses immediately preceding: "I thank Christ Jesus our Lord, who hath enabled me, for that he counted me faithful, putting me into the ministry; *who was before a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and injurious:* but I obtained *mercy*, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Ver. 12, 13. The whole quotation plainly refers to St. Paul's original enmity to the Christian name, the interposition of Providence in his conversion, and his subsequent designation to the ministry of the gospel; and by this reference affirms indeed the substance of the apostle's history delivered in the Acts. But what in the passage strikes my mind most powerfully, is the observation that is raised out of the fact: "For this cause I obtained mercy, that in me first Jesus Christ might show forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them which should hereafter believe on him to life everlasting." It is a just and solemn reflection, springing from the circumstances of the author's conversion, or rather from the impression which that great event had left upon his memory. It will be said, perhaps, that an impostor acquainted with St. Paul's history may have put such a sentiment into his mouth; or, what is the same thing, into a letter drawn up in his name. But where, we may ask, is such an impostor to be found? The piety, the truth, the benevolence of the thought ought to protect it from this imputation. For though we should allow that one of the great masters of the ancient tragedy could have given to his scene a sentiment as virtuous and as elevated as this is, and at the same time as appropriate, and as well suited to the particular situation of the person who delivers it; yet whoever is conversant in these inquiries will acknowledge, that to do this in a fictitious production is beyond the reach of the understandings which have been employed upon any *fabrications* that have come down to us under Christian names.

CHAPTER XII.

THE SECOND EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

I. It was the uniform tradition of the primitive church, that St. Paul visited Rome twice, and twice there suffered imprisonment; and that he was put to death at Rome at the conclusion of his second imprisonment. This opinion concerning St. Paul's *two* journeys to Rome is confirmed by a great variety of hints and allusions in the epistle before us, compared with what fell from the apostle's pen in other letters purporting to have been written from Rome. That our present epistle was written while St. Paul was a *prisoner*, is distinctly intimated by the eighth verse of the first chapter: "Be not thou therefore ashamed of the testimony of our Lord, nor of me his prisoner." And while he was a prisoner *at Rome*, by the sixteenth and seventeenth verses of the same chapter: "The Lord give mercy unto the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he was in Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me." Since it appears from the former quotation that St. Paul wrote this epistle in confinement, it will hardly admit of doubt that the word *chain*, in the latter quotation, refers to that confinement—the chain by which he was *then* bound, the custody in which he was *then* kept. And if the word "chain" designate the author's confinement at the time of writing the epistle, the next words determine it to have been written from Rome: "He was not ashamed of my chain; but, when he was in Rome, he sought me out very diligently." Now that it was not written during the apostle's first imprisonment at Rome, or during the same imprisonment in which the epistles to the Ephesians, the Colossians, the Philippians, and Philemon were written, may be gathered, with considerable evidence, from a comparison of these several epistles with the present.

1. In the former epistles, the author confidently looked

forward to his liberation from confinement, and his speedy departure from Rome. He tells the Philippians, chap. 2 : 24, "I trust in the Lord that I also myself shall come shortly." Philemon he bids to prepare for him a lodging ; "for I trust," says he, "that through your prayers I shall be given unto you." Ver. 22. In the epistle before us, he holds a language extremely different : "I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand. I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith : henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give me at that day." Chap. 4 : 6–8.

2. When the former epistles were written from Rome, Timothy was with St. Paul ; and is joined with him in writing to the Colossians, the Philippians, and to Philemon. The present epistle implies that he was absent.

3. In the former epistles, Demas was with St. Paul at Rome : "Luke, the beloved physician, and Demas greet you." In the epistle now before us : "Demas hath forsaken me, having loved this present world, and is departed unto Thessalonica."

4. In the former epistles, Mark was with St. Paul, and joins in saluting the Colossians. In the present epistle, Timothy is ordered to bring him with him, "for he is profitable to me for the ministry." Chap 4 : 11.

The case of Timothy and of Mark might be very well accounted for, by supposing the present epistle to have been written *before* the others ; so that Timothy, who is here exhorted "to come shortly unto him," chap. 4 : 9, might have arrived, and that Mark, "whom he was to bring with him," chap. 4 : 11, might have also reached Rome in sufficient time to have been with St. Paul when the four epistles were written ; but then such a supposition is inconsistent with what is said of Demas, by which the posteriority of this to the other epistles is strongly indicated : for in the other epistles Demas was with St. Paul ; in the present he has "forsaken him, and is gone to Thessalonica." The opposition also of sentiment, with respect to the event of the persecution, is hardly reconcilable to the same imprisonment.

The two following considerations, which were first suggested upon this question by Ludovicus Capellus, are still more conclusive:

1. In the twentieth verse of the fourth chapter, St. Paul informs Timothy, that "Erastus abode at Corinth," *Ἔραστος ἔμεινεν ἐν Κορίνθῳ.* The form of expression implies, that Erastus had stayed behind at Corinth when St. Paul left it. But this could not be meant of any journey from Corinth which St. Paul took prior to his first imprisonment at Rome; for when Paul departed from Corinth, as related in the twentieth chapter of the Acts, Timothy was with him: and this was the last time the apostle left Corinth before his coming to Rome, because he left it to proceed on his way to Jerusalem; soon after his arrival at which place he was taken into custody, and continued in that custody till he was carried to Cesar's tribunal. There could be no need, therefore, to inform Timothy that "Erastus stayed behind at Corinth" upon this occasion, because if the fact were so, it must have been known to Timothy, who was present, as well as to St. Paul.

2. In the same verse our epistle also states the following article: "Trophimus have I left at Miletum sick." When St. Paul passed through Miletum on his way to Jerusalem, as related Acts 20, 21, Trophimus was not left behind, but accompanied him to that city. He was indeed the occasion of the uproar at Jerusalem in consequence of which St. Paul was apprehended; "for they had seen," says the historian, "before with him in the city Trophimus an Ephesian, whom they supposed that Paul had brought into the temple." This was evidently the last time of Paul's being at Miletus before his first imprisonment; for, as has been said, after his apprehension at Jerusalem, he remained in custody till he was sent to Rome.

In these two articles we have a journey referred to, which must have taken place subsequently to the conclusion of St. Luke's history, and of course after St. Paul's liberation from his first imprisonment. The epistle, therefore, which contains this reference, since it appears from other parts ot it to have been written while St. Paul was a prisoner at Rome, proves that he had returned to that city again, and undergone there a second imprisonment.

I do not produce these particulars for the sake of the support which they lend to the testimony of the fathers concerning St. Paul's *second* imprisonment, but to remark their consistency and agreement with one another. They are all resolvable into one supposition; and although the supposition itself be in some sort only negative, namely, that the epistle was not written during St. Paul's first residence at Rome, but in some future imprisonment in that city, yet is the consistency not less worthy of observation; for the epistle touches upon names and circumstances connected with the date and with the history of the first imprisonment, and mentioned in letters written during that imprisonment, and so touches upon them as to leave what is said of one consistent with what is said of others, and consistent also with what is said of them in different epistles. Had one of these circumstances been so described as to have fixed the date of the epistle to the first imprisonment, it would have involved the rest in contradiction. And when the number and particularity of the articles which have been brought together under this head are considered, and when it is considered also that the comparisons we have formed among them were in all probability neither provided for, nor thought of, by the writer of the epistle, it will be deemed something very like the effect of truth, that no invincible repugnancy is perceived between them.

II. In the Acts of the Apostles, in the sixteenth chapter and at the first verse, we are told that Paul "came to Derbe and Lystra: and behold, a certain disciple was there, named

Timotheus, the son of a certain woman which was a Jewess, and believed, but his father was a Greek." In the epistle before us, in the first chapter and at the fourth and fifth verses, St. Paul writes to Timothy thus: "Greatly desiring to see thee, being mindful of thy tears, that I may be filled with joy; when I call to remembrance the unfeigned faith that is in thee, which dwelt first in thy grandmother Lois, *and thy mother Eunice;* and I am persuaded that in thee also." Here we have a fair unforced example of coincidence. In the history, Timothy was the "son of a Jewess *that* believed:" in the epistle, St. Paul applauds "the *faith* which dwelt in his mother Eunice." In the history it is said of the mother, that she "was a Jewess, and believed;" of the father, that he "was a Greek." Now when it is said of the mother *alone,* that she "believed," the father being nevertheless mentioned in the same sentence, we are led to suppose of the father that he did not believe, that is, either that he was dead, or that he remained unconverted. Agreeably hereunto, while praise is bestowed in the epistle upon one parent, and upon her sincerity in the faith, no notice is taken of the other. The mention of the grandmother is the addition of a circumstance not found in the history; but it is a circumstance which, as well as the names of the parties, might naturally be expected to be known to the apostle, though overlooked by his historian.

III. Chap. 3:15: "And that from a child thou hast known the holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus."

This verse discloses a circumstance which agrees exactly with what is intimated in the quotation from the Acts, adduced in the last number. In that quotation it is recorded of Timothy's mother, that she "was a Jewess." This description is virtually, though, I am satisfied, undesignedly, recognized in the epistle, when Timothy is reminded in it, "that from a child he had known the holy Scriptures." "The holy Scriptures" undoubtedly meant the Scriptures of the Old Testament. The expression bears that sense in every place in which it occurs. Those of the New had not yet acquired the name; not to mention, that in Timothy's childhood probably none of them existed. In what manner then could Timothy have known "from a child" the Jewish Scriptures, had he not been born, on one side or on both, of Jewish parentage? Perhaps he was not less likely to be carefully instructed in them, for that his mother alone professed that religion.

IV. Chap. 2:22: "Flee also *youthful* lusts; but follow righteousness, faith, charity, peace, with them that call on the Lord out of a pure heart."

"*Flee also youthful lusts.*" The suitableness of this precept to the age of the person to whom it is addressed, is gathered from 1 Timothy, 4:12: "Let no man despise thy youth." Nor do I deem the less of this coincidence because the propriety resides in a single epithet, or because this one precept is joined with, and followed by a train of others not more applicable to Timothy than to any ordinary convert. It is on these transient and cursory allusions that the argument is best founded. When a writer dwells and rests upon a point in which some coincidence is discerned, it may be doubted whether he himself had not fabricated the conformity, and was endeavoring to display and set it off. But when the reference is contained in a single word, unobserved perhaps by most readers, the writer passing on to other subjects, as unconscious that he had hit upon a correspondency, or unsolicitous whether it were remarked or not, we may be pretty well assured that no fraud was exercised, no imposition intended.

V. Chap. 3:10, 11: "But thou hast fully known my doctrine, manner of life, purpose, faith, long-suffering, charity, patience, persecutions, afflictions, which came unto me *at Antioch, at Iconium, at Lystra;* what persecutions I endured: but out of them all the Lord delivered me."

The Antioch here mentioned was not Antioch the capital of Syria, where Paul and Barnabas resided "a long time," but Antioch in Pisidia, to which place Paul and Barnabas came in their first apostolic progress, and where Paul delivered a memorable discourse, which is preserved in the thirteenth chapter of the Acts. At this Antioch the history relates, that "the Jews stirred up the devout and honorable women, and the chief men of the city, *and raised persecution against Paul and Barnabas*, and expelled them out of their coasts. But they shook off the dust of their feet against them, and came unto *Iconium*. . . . . And it came to pass in Iconium, that they went both together into the synagogue of the Jews, and so spake, that a great multitude both of the Jews and also of the Greeks believed. But the unbelieving Jews stirred up the Gentiles, and made their minds evil-affected against the brethren. Long time therefore abode they, speaking boldly in the Lord, which gave testimony unto the word of his grace, and granted signs and wonders to be done by their hands. But the multitude of the city was divided; and part held with the Jews, and part with the apostles. And when there was an assault made both of the Gentiles, and also of the Jews with their rulers, *to use them despitefully and to stone them*, they were aware of it, and fled unto *Lystra* and Derbe, cities of Lycaonia, and unto the region that lieth round about; and there they preached the gospel. . . . . And there came thither certain Jews from Antioch and Iconium, who persuaded the people, and having stoned Paul, drew him out of the city, supposing he had been dead. Howbeit, as the disciples stood round about him, he rose up, and came into the city; and the next day he departed with Barnabas to Derbe. And when they had preached the gospel to that city, and had taught many, they returned again to Lystra, and to Iconium, and to Antioch." This account comprises the period to which the allusion in the epistle is to be referred. We have so far, therefore, a conformity between the history and the epistle, that St. Paul is asserted in the history to have suffered persecutions in the three cities, his persecutions at which are appealed to in the epistle; and not only so, but to have suffered these persecutions both in immediate succession, and in the order in which the cities are mentioned in the epistle. The conformity also extends to another circumstance. In the apostolic history, Lystra and Derbe are commonly mentioned together: in the quotation from the epistle, Lystra is mentioned, and not Derbe. And the distinction will appear on this occasion to be accurate, for St. Paul is here enumerating his persecutions; and although he underwent grievous persecutions in each of the three cities through which he passed to Derbe, at Derbe itself he met with none: "The next day he departed," says the historian, "to Derbe; and when they had preached the gospel to that city, and had taught many, they returned again to Lystra." The epistle, therefore, in the names of the cities, in the order in which they are enumerated, and in the place at which the enumeration stops, corresponds exactly with the history.

But a second question remains, namely, how these persecutions were "known" to Timothy, or why the apostle should recall these in particular to his remembrance, rather than many other persecutions with which his ministry had been attended. When some time, probably three years afterwards, (vide Pearson's "Annales Paulinas,") St. Paul made a second journey through the same country, "in order to go again and visit the brethren in every city where he had preached the word of the Lord," we read, Acts 16:1, that when "he came to Derbe and Lystra, behold, a certain disciple was there, named Timotheus." One or other, therefore, of these cities was the place of Timothy's abode. We read, moreover, that he was well reported of by the brethren that were at Lystra and Iconium; so that he must have been well acquainted with these places. Also again, when Paul came to Derbe and Lystra, Timothy was already a disciple: "Behold, a certain disciple was there, named Timotheus." He must therefore have been converted *be-*

fore. But since it is expressly stated in the epistle, that Timothy was converted by St. Paul himself, that he was "his own son in the faith," it follows that he must have been converted by him upon his former journey into those parts, which was the very time when the apostle underwent the persecutions referred to in the epistle. Upon the whole, then, persecutions at the several cities named in the epistle are expressly recorded in the Acts; and Timothy's knowledge of this part of St. Paul's history, which knowledge is appealed to in the epistle, is fairly deduced from the place of his abode and the time of his conversion. It may further be observed, that it is probable from this account, that St. Paul was in the midst of those persecutions when Timothy became known to him. No wonder then that the apostle, though in a letter written long afterwards, should remind his favorite convert of those scenes of affliction and distress under which they first met.

Although this coincidence, as to the names of the cities, be more specific and direct than many which we have pointed out, yet I apprehend that there is no just reason for thinking it to be artificial; for had the writer of the epistle sought a coincidence with the history upon this head, and searched the Acts of the Apostles for the purpose, I conceive he would have sent us at once to Philippi and Thessalonica, where Paul suffered persecution, and where, from what is stated, it may easily be gathered that Timothy accompanied him, rather than have appealed to persecutions as known to Timothy, in the account of which persecutions Timothy's presence is not mentioned; it not being till after one entire chapter, and in the history of a journey three years future to this, that Timothy's name occurs in the Acts of the Apostles for the first time.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE EPISTLE TO TITUS.

I. A VERY characteristic circumstance in this epistle is the quotation from Epimenides, chap. 1 : 12 : "One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said, The Cretians are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies."

Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, κακὰ ϑηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί.

I call this quotation characteristic, because no writer in the New Testament, except St. Paul, appealed to heathen testimony ; and because St. Paul repeatedly did so. In his celebrated speech at Athens, preserved in the seventeenth chapter of the Acts, he tells his audience that in God "we live, and move, and have our being ; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring :"

—*τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.*

The reader will perceive much similarity of manner in these two passages. The reference in the speech is to a heathen poet ; it is the same in the epistle. In the speech, the apostle urges his hearers with the authority of a poet *of their own;* in the epistle, he avails himself of the same advantage. Yet there is a variation, which shows that the hint of inserting a quotation in the epistle was not, as it may be suspected, borrowed from seeing the like practice attributed to St. Paul in the history ; and it is this, that in the epistle the author cited is called a *prophet*, "one of themselves, even a *prophet* of their own." Whatever might be the reason for calling Epimenides a prophet ; whether the names of poet and prophet were occasionally convertible ; whether Epimenides in particular had obtained that title, as Grotius seems to have proved ; or whether the appellation was given to him, in this instance, as having delivered a description of the Cretan character, which the future state of morals among them verified : whatever was the reason—and any of these reasons will account for the variation, supposing St. Paul to have been the author—one point is plain, namely, if the epistle had been forged, and the author had inserted a quotation in it merely from having seen an example of the same kind in a speech ascribed to St. Paul, he would so far have imitated his original as to have introduced his quotation in the same manner; that is, he would have given to Epimenides the title which he saw there given to Aratus. The other side of the alternative is, that the history took the hint from the epistle. But that the author of the Acts of the Apostles had not the epistle to Titus before him, at least that he did not use it as one of the documents or materials of his narrative, is rendered nearly certain by the observation that the name of Titus does not once occur in his book.

It is well known, and was remarked by St. Jerome, that the apothegm in the fifteenth chapter of the Corinthians, "Evil communications corrupt good manners," is an iambic of Menander's:

Φθέιρουσιν ἤθη χρῆσθ' ὁμιλίαι κακαί.

Here we have another unaffected instance of the same turn and habit of composition. Probably there are some hitherto unnoticed; and more, which the loss of the original authors renders impossible to be now ascertained.

II. There exists a visible affinity between the epistle to Titus and the first epistle to Timothy. Both letters were addressed to persons left by the writer to preside in their respective churches during his absence. Both letters are principally occupied in describing the qualifications to be sought for in those whom they should appoint to offices in the church; and the ingredients of this description are in both letters nearly the same. Timothy and Titus are likewise cautioned against the same prevailing corruptions, and in particular against the same misdirection of their cares and studies. This affinity obtains not only in the subject of the letters, which, from the similarity of situation in the persons to whom they were addressed, might be expected to be somewhat alike, but extends, in a great variety of instances, to the phrases and expressions. The writer accosts his two friends with the same salutation, and passes on to the business of his letter by the same transition.

"Unto Timothy, *my own son in the faith;* Grace, mercy, and peace, from God our Father and Jesus Christ our Lord. *As I besought thee to abide still at Ephesus, when I went into Macedonia*," etc. 1 Tim. 1 : 2, 3.

"To Titus, *mine own son after the common faith:* grace, mercy, and peace, from God the Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ our Saviour. *For this cause left I thee in Crete*." Tit. 1 : 4, 5.

If Timothy was not to "*give heed to fables* and endless *genealogies*, which minister *questions*," 1 Tim. 1 : 4, Titus also was to "avoid foolish *questions*, and *genealogies*, and contentions," chap. 3 : 9, and was to "rebuke them sharply, *not giving heed to Jewish fables*." Chap. 1 : 13, 14. If Timothy was to be a pattern, *τύπος*, 1 Tim. 4 : 12, so was Titus. Chap. 2 : 7. If Timothy was to "let no man despise his youth," 1 Tim. 4 : 12, Titus also was to "let no man despise him." Chap. 2 : 15. This verbal consent is also observable in some very peculiar expressions, which have no relation to the particular character of Timothy or Titus.

The phrase, "it is a faithful saying," *πιστὸς ὁ λόγος*, made use of to preface some sentence upon which the writer lays a more than ordinary stress, occurs three times in the first epistle to Timothy, once in the second, and once in the epistle before us, and in no other part of St. Paul's writings; and it is remarkable that these three epistles were probably all written towards the conclusion of his life; and that they are the only epistles which were written after his first imprisonment at Rome.

The same observation belongs to another singularity of expression, and that is in the epithet "*sound*," *ὑγιαίνων*, as applied to words or doctrine. It is thus used twice in the first epistle to Timothy, twice in the second, and three times in the epistle to Titus, besides two cognate expressions, *ὑγιαίνοντας τῇ πίστει*, and *λόγον ὑγιῆ*; and it is found, in the same sense, in no other part of the New Testament.

The phrase, "God our Saviour," stands in nearly the same predicament. It is repeated three times in the first epistle to Timothy, as many in the epistle to Titus, and in no other book of the New Testament occurs at all, except once in the epistle of Jude.

Similar terms, intermixed indeed with others, are employed in the two epistles, in enumerating the qualifications required in those who should be advanced to stations of authority in the church.

"A bishop then must be blameless, *the husband of one wife*, vigilant, *sober*, of good behavior, *given to hospitality*, apt to teach; *not given to wine, no striker, not greedy of filthy lucre;* but patient; not a brawler, not covetous; one that ruleth well his own house, having his children in subjection with all gravity."[*] 1 Tim. 3 : 2–4.

"If any be *blameless, the husband of one wife*, having faithful children, not accused of riot, or unruly. For a bishop must be blameless, as the steward of God: not self-willed, not soon angry, *not given to wine, no striker, not given to filthy lucre; but a lover of hospitality*, a lover of good men, sober, just, holy, temperate."[†] Titus 1 : 6–8.

The most natural account which can be given of these resemblances, is to suppose that the two epistles were written nearly at the same time, and while the same ideas and phrases dwelt in the writer's mind. Let us inquire, therefore, whether the notes of time extant in the two epistles in any manner favor this supposition.

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[*] *"Δεῖ οὖν τὸν ἐπίσκοπον ἀνεπίληπτον εἶναι, μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἄνδρα, νηφάλιον, σώφρονα, κόσμιον, φιλόξενον, διδακτικόν, μὴ πάροινον, μὴ πλήκτην, μή αἰσχροκερδῆ· ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῆ, ἄμαχον, ἀφιλάργυρον· τοῦ ἰδίου οἴκου καλῶς προϊστάμενον, τέκνα ἔχοντα ἐν ὑποταγῇ μετὰ πάσης σεμνότητος."*

[†] *"Ἔι τις ἐστὶν ἀνέγκλητος, μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἀνὴρ, τέκνα ἔχων πιστὰ, μὴ ἐν κατηγορία ἀσωτίας, ἢ ἀνυπότακτα. Δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἐπίσκοπον ἀνέγκλητον εἶναι, ὡς Θεου οἰκονόμον, μὴ αὐθάδη, μὴ ὀργίλον, μὴ πάροινον, μὴ πλήκτην, μὴ αἰσχροκερδῆ· ἀλλὰ φιλόξενον, φιλάγαθον, σώφρονα, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, ἐγκρατῆ."*

We have seen that it was necessary to refer the first epistle to Timothy to a date subsequent to St. Paul's first imprisonment at Rome, because there was no journey into Macedonia prior to that event, which accorded with the circumstance of leaving Timothy behind at Ephesus. The journey of St. Paul from Crete, alluded to in the epistle before us, and in which Titus "was left in Crete to set in order the things that were wanting," must, in like manner, be carried to the period which intervened between his first and second imprisonment. For the history, which reaches, we know, to the time of St. Paul's first imprisonment, contains no account of his going to Crete, except upon his voyage as a prisoner to Rome; and that this could not be the occasion referred to in our epistle is evident from hence, that when St. Paul wrote this epistle, he appears to have been at liberty; whereas after that voyage, he continued for two years at least in confinement. Again, it is agreed that St. Paul wrote his first epistle to Timothy from Macedonia: "As I besought thee to abide still at Ephesus, when I went," or came, "into Macedonia." And that he was in these parts, that is, in this peninsula, when he wrote the epistle to Titus, is rendered probable by his directing Titus to come to him to Nicopolis: "When I shall send Artemas unto thee, or Tychicus, be diligent," make haste, "to come unto me to Nicopolis; for I have determined there to winter." The most noted city of that name was in Epirus, near to Actium. And I think the form of speaking, as well as the nature of the case, renders it probable that the writer was at Nicopolis, or in the neighborhood thereof, when he dictated this direction to Titus.

Upon the whole, if we may be allowed to suppose that St. Paul, after his liberation at Rome, sailed into Asia, taking Crete in his way; that from Asia and from Ephesus, the capital of that country, he proceeded into Macedonia, and crossing the peninsula in his progress, came into the neighborhood of Nicopolis, we have a route which falls in with every thing. It executes the intention expressed by the apostle of visiting Colosse and Philippi, as soon as he should be set at liberty at Rome. It allows him to leave Titus at Crete, and Timothy at Ephesus, as he went into Macedonia; and to write to both not long after from the peninsula of Greece, and probably the neighborhood of Nicopolis; thus bringing together the dates of these two letters, and thereby accounting for that affinity between them, both in subject and language, which our remarks have pointed out. I confess that the journey which we have thus traced out for St. Paul is, in a great measure, hypothetic; but it should be observed, that it is a species of consistency which seldom belongs to falsehood, to admit of an hypothesis which includes a great number of independent circumstances without contradiction.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE EPISTLE TO PHILEMON.

I. The singular correspondency between this epistle and that to the Colossians has been remarked already. An assertion in the epistle to the Colossians, namely, that "Onesimus was one of them," is verified, not by any mention of Colosse, any the most distant intimation concerning the place of Philemon's abode, but singly by stating Onesimus to be Philemon's servant, and by joining in the salutation Philemon with Archippus; for this Archippus, when we go back to the epistle to the Colossians, appears to have been an inhabitant of that city, and, as it should seem, to have held an office of authority in that church. The case stands thus. Take the epistle to the Colossians alone, and no circumstance is discoverable which makes out the assertion, that Onesimus was "one of them." Take the epistle to Philemon alone, and nothing at all appears concerning the place to which Philemon or his servant Onesimus belonged. For any thing that is said in the epistle, Philemon might as well have been a Thessalonian, a Philippian, or an Ephesian, as a Colossian. Put the two epistles together, and the matter is clear. The reader perceives a *junction* of circumstances, which ascertains the conclusion at once. Now all that is necessary to be added in this place is, that this correspondency evinces the genuineness of one epistle, as well as of the other. It is like comparing the two parts of a cloven tally. Coincidence proves the authenticity of both.

II. And this coincidence is perfect; not only in the main article, of showing, by implication, Onesimus to be a Colossian, but in many dependent circumstances.

1. "I beseech thee for my son Onesimus, ... whom I *have sent* again." Verses 10–12. It appears from the epistle to the Colossians, that in truth Onesimus was sent at that time to Colosse: "All my state shall Tychicus declare

unto you, ... whom I have sent unto you for the same purpose, ... *with Onesimus*, a faithful and beloved brother." Colos. 4 : 7–9.

2. "I beseech thee for my son Onesimus, *whom I have begotten in my bonds*." Ver. 10. It appears from the preceding quotation, that Onesimus was with St. Paul when he wrote the epistle to the Colossians; and that he wrote that epistle *in imprisonment*, is evident from his declaration in the fourth chapter and third verse: "Praying also for us, that God would open unto us a door of utterance, to speak the mystery of Christ, for which I am also *in bonds*."

3. St. Paul bids Philemon prepare for him a lodging: "For I trust," says he, "that through your prayers I shall be given unto you." This agrees with the expectation of speedy deliverance which he expressed in another epistle, written during the same imprisonment: "Him," Timothy, "I hope to send presently, so soon as I shall see how it will go with me. *But I trust in the Lord that I also myself shall come shortly*." Phil. 2 : 23 : 24.

4. As the letter to Philemon and that to the Colossians were written at the same time and sent by the same messenger, the one to a particular inhabitant, the other to the church of Colosse, it may be expected that the same or nearly the same persons would be about St. Paul, and join with him, as was the practice, in the salutations of the epistle. Accordingly we find the names of Aristarchus, Marcus, Epaphras, Luke, and Demas, in both epistles. Timothy, who is joined with St. Paul in the superscription of the epistle to the Colossians, is joined with him in this. Tychicus did not salute Philemon, because he accompanied the epistle to Colosse, and would undoubtedly there see him. Yet the reader of the epistle to Philemon will remark one considerable diversity in the catalogue of saluting friends, and which shows that the catalogue was not copied from that to the Colossians. In the epistle to the Colossians, Aristarchus is called by St. Paul his fellow-prisoner, Colos.

4 : 10 ; in the epistle to Philemon, Aristarchus is mentioned without any addition, and the title of fellow-prisoner is given to Epaphras.*

And let it also be observed, that notwithstanding the close and circumstantial agreement between the two epistles, this is not the case of an opening left in a genuine writing, which an impostor is induced to fill up ; nor of a reference to some writing not extant, which sets a sophist at work to supply the loss, in like manner as, because St. Paul was supposed, Colos. 4 : 16, to allude to an epistle written by him to the Laodiceans, some person has from thence taken the hint of uttering a forgery under that title. The present, I say, is not the case ; for Philemon's name is not mentioned in the epistle to the Colossians ; Onesimus' servile condition is nowhere hinted at, any more than his crime, his flight, or the place or time of his conversion. The story therefore of the epistle, if it be a fiction, is a fiction to which the author could not have been guided by any thing he had read in St. Paul's genuine writings.

III. Ver. 4, 5 : "I thank my God, making mention of thee always in my prayers, hearing of thy love and faith, which thou hast toward the Lord Jesus, and toward all saints."

"*Hearing of thy love and faith.*" This is the form of speech which St. Paul was wont to use towards those churches which he had not seen, or then visited. See Rom. 1 : 8 ; Ephes. 1 : 15 ; Col. 1 : 3, 4. Towards those churches and persons with whom he was previously acquainted, he employed a different phrase ; as, "I thank my God always on your behalf," 1 Cor. 1 : 4 ; 2 Thess. 1 : 3 ; or, "upon every *remembrance* of you," Phil. 1 : 3 ; 1 Thess. 1 : 2, 3 ; 2 Tim. 1 : 3 ; and never speaks of *hearing of them*. Yet, I think it must be concluded, from the nineteenth verse of this epistle, that Philemon had been converted by St. Paul himself: "Albeit, I do not say to thee how *thou owest unto me* even thine own self besides." Here then is a peculiarity. Let us inquire whether the epistle supplies any circumstance which will account for it. We have seen that it may be made out, not from the epistle itself, but from a comparison of the epistle with that to the Colossians, that Philemon was an inhabitant of Colosse ; and it further appears from the epistle to the Colossians, that St. Paul had never been in that city : "I would that ye knew what great conflict I have for you and for them at Laodicea, and for as many as have not seen my face in the flesh." Col. 2 : 1. Although, therefore, St. Paul had formerly met with Philemon at some other place, and had been the immediate instrument of his conversion, yet Philemon's faith and conduct afterwards, inasmuch as he lived in a city which St. Paul had never visited, could only be known to him by fame and reputation.

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* Dr. Benson observes, and perhaps truly, that the appellation of fellow-prisoner, as applied by St. Paul to Epaphras, did not imply that they were imprisoned together *at the time ;* any more than your calling a person your fellow-traveller imports that you are then upon your travels. If he had upon any former occasion travelled with you, you might afterwards speak of him under that title. It is just so with the term fellow-prisoner.

IV. The tenderness and delicacy of this epistle have long been admired : "Though I might be much bold in Christ to enjoin thee that which is convenient, yet for love's sake I rather beseech thee, being such a one as Paul the aged, and now also a prisoner of Jesus Christ ; I beseech thee for my son Onesimus, whom I have begotten in my bonds." There is something certainly very melting and persuasive in this and every part of the epistle. Yet, in my opinion, the character of St. Paul prevails in it throughout. The warm, affectionate, authoritative teacher is interceding with an absent friend for a beloved convert. He urges his suit with an earnestness befitting perhaps not so much the occasion, as the ardor and sensibility of his own mind. Here also, as everywhere, he shows himself conscious of the weight and dignity of his mission ; nor does he suffer Philemon for a moment to forget it : "I *might* be much bold in Christ to enjoin thee that which is convenient." He is careful also to recall, though obliquely, to Philemon's memory, the sacred obligation under which he had laid him, by bringing to him the knowledge of Jesus Christ: "I do not say to thee how thou owest unto me even thine own self besides." Without laying aside, therefore, the apostolic character, our author softens the imperative style of his address by mixing with it every sentiment and consideration that could move the heart of his correspondent. Aged and in prison, he is contented to supplicate and entreat. Onesimus was rendered dear to him by his conversion and his services: the child of his affliction, and "ministering unto him in the bonds of the gospel." This ought to recommend him, whatever had been his fault, to Philemon's forgiveness: "Receive him as myself, as my own bowels." Every thing, however, should be voluntary. St. Paul was determined that Philemon's compliance should flow from his own bounty: "Without thy mind would I do nothing; that thy benefit should not be as it were of necessity, but willingly;" trusting nevertheless to his gratitude and attachment for the performance of all that he requested, and for more: "Having confidence in thy obedience, I wrote unto thee, knowing that thou wilt also do more than I say."

St. Paul's discourse at Miletus; his speech before Agrippa; his epistle to the Romans, as has been remarked, No. VIII.; that to the Galatians, chap. 4 : 11–20; to the Philippians, chap. 1 : 29; 2 : 2; the second to the Corinthians, chap. 6 : 1–13; and indeed some part or other of almost every epistle, exhibit examples of a similar application to the feelings and affections of the persons whom he addresses. And it is observable, that these pathetic effusions, drawn for the most part from his own sufferings and situation, usually precede a command, soften a rebuke, or mitigate the harshness of some disagreeable truth.

CHAPTER XV.

THE SUBSCRIPTIONS OF THE EPISTLES.

Six of these *subscriptions* are false or improbable; that is, they are either absolutely contradicted by the contents of the epistle, or are difficult to be reconciled with them.

I. The subscription of the first epistle to the Corinthians states that it was written from Philippi, notwithstanding that in the sixteenth chapter and the eighth verse of the epistle, St. Paul informs the Corinthians that he will "tarry at Ephesus until Pentecost;" and notwithstanding that he begins the salutations in the epistle by telling them, "the churches of Asia salute you:" a pretty evident indication that he himself was in Asia at this time.

II. The epistle to the Galatians is by the subscription dated from Rome; yet in the epistle itself St. Paul expresses his surprise "that they were *so soon* removing from him that called them;" whereas his journey to Rome was ten years posterior to the conversion of the Galatians. And what, I think, is more conclusive, the author, though speaking of himself in this more than any other epistle, does not once mention his bonds, or call himself a prisoner; which he had not failed to do in every one of the four epistles written from that city, and during that imprisonment.

III. The first epistle to the Thessalonians was written, the subscription tells us, from Athens; yet the epistle refers expressly to the coming of Timotheus from Thessalonica, chap. 3 : 6; and the history informs us, Acts 18 : 5, that Timothy came out of Macedonia to St. Paul at *Corinth.*

IV. The second epistle to the Thessalonians is dated, and without any discoverable reason, from Athens also. If it be truly the *second*—if it refer, as it appears to do, chap. 2 : 2, to the first, and the first was written from Corinth, the place must be erroneously assigned, for the history does not allow us to suppose that St. Paul, after he had reached Corinth, went back to Athens.

V. The first epistle to Timothy the subscription asserts to have been sent from Laodicea; yet when St. Paul writes, "I besought thee to abide still at Ephesus," *πορευόμενος εἰς Μακεδονίαν*, "when I set out for Macedonia," the reader is naturally led to conclude that he wrote the letter upon his arrival in that country.

VI. The epistle to Titus is dated from Nicopolis in Macedonia, while no city of that name is known to have existed in that province.

The use, and the only use which I make of these observations, is to show how easily errors and contradictions steal in, where the writer is not guided by original knowledge. There are only eleven distinct assignments of date to St. Paul's epistles—for the four written from Rome may be considered as plainly contemporary—and of these, six seem to be erroneous. I do not attribute any authority to these subscriptions. I believe them to have been conjectures founded sometimes upon loose traditions, but more generally upon a consideration of some particular text, without sufficiently comparing it with other parts of the epistle, with different epistles, or with the history. Suppose, then, that the subscriptions had come down to us as authentic parts of the epistles, there would have been more contrarieties and difficulties arising out of these final verses than from all the rest of the volume. Yet, if the epistles had been forged, the whole must have been made up of the same elements as those of which the subscriptions are composed, namely, tradition, conjecture, and inference; and it would have remained to be accounted for, how, while so many errors were crowded into the concluding clauses of the letters, so much consistency should be preserved in other parts.

The same reflection arises from observing the oversights and mistakes which learned men have committed, when arguing upon allusions which relate to time and place, or when endeavoring to digest scattered circumstances into a continued story. It is indeed the same case; for these subscriptions must be regarded as ancient scholia, and as nothing more. Of this liability to error I can present the reader with a notable instance; and which I bring forward for no other purpose than that to which I apply the erroneous subscriptions. Ludovicus Capellus, in that part of his "Historica Apostolica Illustrata," which is entitled *De Ordine Epist. Paul.*, writing upon the second epistle to the Corinthians, triumphs unmercifully over the want of sagacity in Baronius, who it seems makes St. Paul write his epistle to Titus from Macedonia upon his second visit into that province; whereas it appears from the history, that Titus, instead of being at Crete, where the epistle places him, was at that time sent by the apostle from Macedonia to Corinth. "*Animadvertere est*," says Capellus, "*magnam hominis ilius* ἀβλεψιαν, *qui vult Titum a Paulo in Cretam abductum, illicque relictum, cum inde Nicopolim navigaret, quem tamen agnoscit a Paulo ex Macedoniâ missum esse Corinthum.*" This probably will be thought a detection of inconsistency in Baronius. But what is the most remarkable is, that in the same chapter in which he thus indulges his contempt for Baronius' judgment, Capellus himself falls into an error of the same kind, and more gross and palpable than that which he reproves. For he begins the chapter by stating the second epistle to the Corinthians and the first epistle to Timothy to be nearly contemporary; to have been both written during the apostle's second visit into Macedonia; and that a doubt subsisted concerning the immediate priority or their dates: "*Posterior ad eosdem Corinthios Epistola, et prior ad Timotheum certant de prioritate, et sub judice lis est; utraque autem scripta est paulo postquam Paulus Epheso discessisset, adeoque dum Macedoniam peragraret, sed utra tempore præcedat, non liquet.*" Now, in the first place, it is highly improbable that the two epistles should have been written either nearly together, or during the same journey through Macedonia; for, in the epistle to the Corinthians, Timothy appears to have been *with* St. Paul; in the epistle addressed to him, to have been left behind at Ephesus, and not only left behind, but directed to continue there till St. Paul should return to that city. In the second place, it is inconceivable that a question should be proposed concerning the priority of date of the two epistles; for when St. Paul, in his epistle to Timothy, opens his address to him by saying, "as I besought thee to abide still at Ephesus when I went into Macedonia," no reader can doubt but that he here refers to the *last* interview which had passed between them; that he had not seen him since: whereas, if the epistle be posterior to that to the Corinthians, yet written upon the same visit into Macedonia, this could not be true; for as Timothy was along with St. Paul when he wrote to the Corinthians, he must, upon this supposition, have passed over to St. Paul in Macedonia after he had been left by him at Ephesus, and must have returned to Ephesus again before the epistle was written. What misled Ludovicus Capellus was simply this, that he had entirely overlooked Timothy's name in the superscription of the second epistle to the Corinthians. Which oversight appears not only in the quotation we have given, but from his telling us as he does, that Timothy came from Ephesus to St. Paul at *Corinth;* whereas the superscription proves that Timothy was already with St. Paul when he wrote to the Corinthians from Macedonia.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE CONCLUSION.

In the outset of this inquiry, the reader was directed to consider the Acts of the Apostles and the thirteen epistles of St. Paul as certain ancient manuscripts lately discovered in the closet of some celebrated library. We have adhered to this view of the subject. External evidence of every kind has been removed out of sight; and our endeavors have been employed to collect the indications of truth and authenticity which appeared to exist in the writings themselves, and to result from a comparison of their different parts. It is not however necessary to continue this supposition longer. The testimony which other remains of contemporary, or the monuments of adjoining ages afford to the reception, notoriety, and public estimation of a book, form, no doubt, the first proof of its genuineness. And in no books whatever is this proof more complete than in those at present under our consideration. The inquiries of learned men, and, above all, of the excellent Lardner, who never overstates a point of evidence, and whose fidelity in citing his authorities has in no one instance been impeached, have established, concerning these writings, the following propositions:

I. That in the age immediately posterior to that in which St. Paul lived, his letters were publicly read and acknowledged.

Some of them are quoted or alluded to by almost every Christian writer that followed, by Clement of Rome, by Hermas, by Ignatius, by Polycarp, disciples or contemporaries of the apostles; by Justin Martyr, by the churches of Gaul, by Irenæus, by Athenagoras, by Theophilus, by Clement of Alexandria, by Hermias, by Tertullian, who occupied the succeeding age. Now when we find a book quoted or referred to by an ancient author, we are entitled to conclude that it was read and received in the age and country in which that author lived. And this conclusion does not, in any degree, rest upon the judgment or character of the author making such reference. Proceeding by this rule, we have, concerning the first epistle to the Corinthians in particular, within forty years after the epistle was written, evidence not only of its being extant at Corinth, but of its being known and read at Rome. Clement, bishop of that city, writing to the church of Corinth, uses these words: "Take into your hands the epistle of the blessed Paul the apostle. What did he at first write unto you in the beginning of the gospel? Verily he did by the Spirit admonish you concerning himself, and Cephas, and Apollos, because that even then you did form parties."* This was written at a time when probably some must have been living at Corinth who remembered St. Paul's ministry there and the receipt of the epistle. The testimony is still more valuable, as it shows that the epistles were preserved in the churches to which they were sent, and that they were spread and propagated from them to the rest of the Christian community. Agreeably to which natural mode and order of their publication, Tertullian, a century afterwards, for proof of the integrity and genuineness of the apostolic writings, bids "any one, who is willing to exercise his curiosity profitably in the business of their salvation, to visit the apostolical churches, in which their very authentic letters are recited—ipsæ authenticæ literæ eorum recitantur." Then he goes on: "Is Achaia near you? You have Corinth. If you are not far from Macedonia, you have Philippi, you have Thessalonica. If you can go to Asia, you have Ephesus; but if you are near to Italy, you have Rome."† I adduce this passage to show, that the distinct churches or Christian societies, to which St. Paul's epistles were sent, subsisted for some ages afterwards; that his several epistles were all along respectively read in those churches; that Christians at large received them from those churches, and appealed to those churches for their originality and authenticity.

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* See Lardner, vol. 12, p. 22.

† Lardner, vol. 2, p. 598

Arguing in like manner from citations and allusions, we have, within the space of a hundred and fifty years from the time that the first of St. Paul's epistles was written, proofs of almost all of them being read in Palestine, Syria, the countries of Asia Minor, in Egypt, in that part of Africa which used the Latin tongue, in Greece, Italy, and Gaul.* I do not mean simply to assert, that within the space of a hundred and fifty years St. Paul's epistles were read in those countries, for I believe that they were read and circulated from the beginning; but that proofs of their being so read occur within that period. And when it is considered how few of the primitive Christians wrote, and of what was written how much is lost, we are to account it extraordinary, or rather as a sure proof of the extensiveness of the reputation of these writings, and of the general respect in which they were held, that so many testimonies, and of such antiquity, are still extant. "In the remaining works of Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian, there are perhaps more and larger quotations of the small volume of the New Testament, than of all the works of Cicero in the writings of all characters for several ages."† We must add, that the epistles of Paul come in for their full share of this observation; and that all the thirteen epistles, except that to Philemon, which is not quoted by Irenæus or Clement, and which probably escaped notice merely by its brevity, are severally cited, and expressly recognized as St. Paul's by each of these Christian writers. The Ebionites, an early, though inconsiderable Christian sect, rejected St. Paul and his epistles;‡ that is, they rejected these epistles not because they were not, but because they were St. Paul's; and because, adhering to the obligation of the Jewish law, they chose to dispute his doctrine and authority. Their suffrage as to the genuineness of the epistles does not contradict that of other Christians. Marcion, a heretical writer in the former part of the second century, is said by Tertullian to have rejected three of the epistles which we now receive, namely, the two epistles to Timothy and the epistle to Titus. It appears to me not improbable, that Marcion might make some such distinction as this: that no apostolic epistle was to be admitted which was not read or attested by the church to which it was sent; for it is remarkable, that together with these epistles to private persons, he rejected also the catholic epistles. Now the catholic epistles and the epistles to private persons agree in the circumstance of wanting this particular species of attestation. Marcion, it seems, acknowledged the epistle to Philemon, and is upbraided for his inconsistency in doing so by Tertullian,* who asks, "Why, when he received a letter written to a single person, he should refuse two to Timothy and one to Titus, composed upon the affairs of the church?" This passage so far favors our account of Marcion's objection, as it shows that the objection was supposed by Tertullian to have been founded in something which belonged to the nature of a private letter.

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* See Lardner's Recapitulation, vol. 12, p. 53. † Ibid.

‡ Lardner, vol. 2, p. 808.

Nothing of the works of Marcion remains. Probably he was, after all, a rash, arbitrary, licentious critic—if he deserved indeed the name of critic—and who offered no reason for his determination. What St. Jerome says of him intimates this, and is besides founded in good sense: speaking of him and Basilides, "If they assigned any reason," says he, "why they did not reckon these epistles," namely, the first and second to Timothy and the epistle to Titus, "to be the apostle's, we would have endeavored to answer them, and perhaps might have satisfied the reader; but when they take upon them, by their own authority, to pronounce one epistle to be Paul's, and another not, they can only be replied to in the same manner."† Let it be remembered, however, that Marcion received ten of these epistles. His authority, therefore, even if his credit had been better than it is, forms a very small exception to the uniformity of the evidence. Of

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* Lardner, vol. 14, p. 455.

† Ibid, p. 458.

Basilides we know still less than we do of Marcion. The same observation, however, belongs to him, namely, that his objection, as far as appears from this passage of St. Jerome, was confined to the three private epistles. Yet is this the only opinion which can be said to disturb the consent of the first two centuries of the Christian era; for as to Tatian, who is reported by Jerome alone to have rejected some of St. Paul's epistles, the extravagant or rather delirious notions into which he fell, take away all weight and credit from his judgment. If, indeed, Jerome's account of this circumstance be correct; for it appears from much older writers than Jerome, that Tatian owned and used many of these epistles.*

II. They who in those ages disputed about so many other points, agreed in acknowledging the Scriptures now before us. Contending sects appealed to them in their controversies, with equal and unreserved submission. When they were urged by one side, however they might be interpreted or misinterpreted by the other, their authority was not questioned. "*Reliqui omnes,*" says Irenæus, speaking of Marcion, "*falso scientiæ nomine inflati, Scripturas quidem confitentur, interpretationes vero convertunt.*"†

III. When the genuineness of some other writings which were in circulation, and even of a few which are now received into the canon, was contested, these were never called into dispute. Whatever was the objection, or whether in truth there ever was any real objection to the authenticity of the second epistle of Peter, the second and third of John, the epistle of James, or that of Jude, or to the book of the Revelation of St. John, the doubts that appear to have been entertained concerning them exceedingly strengthen the force of the testimony as to those writings about which there was no doubt; because it shows, that the matter was a subject, among the early Christians, of examination and discussion; and that where there was any room to doubt, they did doubt.

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* Lardner, vol. 1, p. 313.

† Iren. advers. Hær. quoted by Lardner, vol. 15, p. 425. "All the rest, inflated with a false pretence of knowledge, recognize the Scriptures, but wrest their interpretation."

What Eusebius has left upon the subject is directly to the purpose of this observation. Eusebius, it is well known, divided the ecclesiastical writings which were extant in his time into three classes: the "*ἀναντιῤῥητα*, uncontradicted," as he calls them in one chapter, or, "scriptures universally acknowledged," as he calls them in another; the "controverted, yet well known and approved by many;" and the "spurious." What were the shades of difference in the books of the second, or of those in the third class, or what it was precisely that he meant by the term *spurious*, it is not necessary in this place to inquire. It is sufficient for us to find, that the thirteen epistles of St. Paul are placed by him in the first class, without any sort of hesitation or doubt.

It is further also to be collected from the chapter in which this distinction is laid down, that the method made use of by Eusebius, and by the Christians of his time, namely, the close of the third century, in judging concerning the sacred authority of any books, was to inquire after and consider the testimony of those who lived near the age of the apostles.[*]

IV. That no ancient writing which is attested as these epistles are, has had its authenticity disproved, or is in fact questioned. The controversies which have been moved concerning suspected writings, as the epistles, for instance, of Phalaris, or the eighteen epistles of Cicero, begin by showing that this attestation is wanting. That being proved, the question is thrown back upon internal marks of spuriousness or authenticity; and in these the dispute is occupied. In which disputes it is to be observed, that the contested writings are commonly attacked by arguments drawn from some opposition which they betray to "authentic history," to "true epistles," to the "real sentiments or circumstances of the author whom they personate;"[†] which authentic history, which true epistles, which real sentiments themselves, are no other than ancient documents, whose early existence and reception can be proved, in the manner in which the writings before us are traced up to the age of their reputed author, or to ages near to his. A modern who sits down to compose the history of some ancient period, has no stronger evidence to appeal to for the most confident assertion, or the most undisputed fact that he delivers, than writings whose genuineness is proved by the same medium through which we evince the authenticity of ours Nor, while he can have recourse to such authorities as these, does he apprehend any uncertainty in his accounts, from the suspicion of spuriousness or imposture in his materials.

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[*] Lardner, vol. 8, p. 106.

[†] See tracts by Tunstal and Middleton, upon certain suspected epistles ascribed to Cicero.

V. It cannot be shown that any forgeries, properly so called,* that is, writings published under the name of the person who did not compose them, made their appearance in the first century of the Christian era, in which century these epistles undoubtedly existed. I shall set down under this proposition the guarded words of Lardner himself: "There are no quotations of any books of them—spurious and apocryphal books—in the apostolical fathers, by whom I mean Barnabas, Clement of Rome, Hermas, Ignatius, and Polycarp, whose writings reach from the year of our Lord 70 to the year 108. *I say this confidently, because I think it has been proved.*" Lardner, vol. 12, p. 158.

Nor when they did appear were they much used by the primitive Christians. "Irenæus quotes not any of these books. He mentions some of them, but he never quotes them. The same may be said of Tertullian: he has mentioned a book called 'Acts of Paul and Thecla,' but it is only to condemn it. Clement of Alexandria and Origen have mentioned and quoted several such books, but never as authority, and sometimes with express marks of dislike. Eusebius quoted no such books in any of his works. He has mentioned them, indeed; but how? Not by way of approbation, but to show that they were of little or no value, and that they never were received by the sounder part of Christians." Now, if with this, which is advanced after the most minute and diligent examination, we compare what the same cautious writer had before said of our received Scriptures, "that in the works of three only of the above-mentioned fathers, there are more and larger quotations of the small volume of the New Testament than of all the works of Cicero in the writings of all characters for several ages;" and if with the marks of obscurity or condemnation which accompanied the mention of the several apocryphal Christian writings, when they happened to be mentioned at all, we contrast what Dr. Lardner's work completely and in detail makes out concerning the writings which we defend, and what, having so made out, he thought himself authorized in his conclusion to assert, that these books were not only received from the beginning, but received with the greatest respect; have been publicly and solemnly read in the assemblies of Christians throughout the world, in every age from that time to this; early translated into the languages of divers countries and people; commentaries written to explain and illustrate them; quoted by way of proof in all arguments of a religious nature; recommended to the perusal of unbelievers, as containing the authentic account of the Christian doctrine: when we attend, I say, to this representation, we perceive in it not only full proof of the early notoriety of these books, but a clear and sensible line of discrimination, which separates these from the pretensions of any others.

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* I believe that there is a great deal of truth in Dr. Lardner's observation, that comparatively few of those books which we call apocryphal were strictly and originally forgeries. Lardner, vol. 12, p. 167.

The epistles of St. Paul stand particularly free of any doubt or confusion that might arise from this source. Until the conclusion of the fourth century, no intimation appears of any attempt whatever being made to counterfeit these writings; and then it appears only of a single and obscure instance. Jerome, who flourished in the year 392, has this expression: "*Legunt quidam et ad Laodicenses; sed ab omnibus exploditur,*" there is also an epistle to the Laodiceans, but it is rejected by every body.* Theodoret, who wrote in the year 423, speaks of this epistle in the same terms.† Besides these, I know not whether any ancient writer mentions it. It was certainly unnoticed during the first three centuries of the church; and when it came afterwards to be mentioned, it was mentioned only to show that, though such a writing did exist, it obtained no credit. It is probable that the forgery to which Jerome alludes, is the epistle which we now have under that title. If so, as has been already observed, it is nothing more than a collection of sentences from the genuine epistles; and was perhaps, at first, rather the exercise of some idle pen, than any serious attempt to impose a forgery upon the public. Of an epistle to the Corinthians under St. Paul's name, which was brought into Europe in the present century, antiquity is entirely silent. It was unheard of for sixteen centuries; and at this day, though it be extant, and was first found in the Armenian language, it is not, by the Christians of that country, received into their Scriptures. I hope, after this, that there is no reader who will think there is any competition of credit, or of external proof, between these and the received epistles; or rather, who will not acknowledge the evidence of authenticity to be confirmed by the want of success which attended imposture.

When we take into our hands the letters which the suffrage and consent of antiquity has thus transmitted to us, the first thing that strikes our attention is the air of reality and business, as well as of seriousness and conviction which pervades the whole. Let the sceptic read them. If he be not sensible of these qualities in them, the argument can have no weight with him. If he be, if he perceive in almost every page the language of a mind actuated by real occasions, and operating upon real circumstances, I would wish it to be observed, that the proof which arises from this perception is not to be deemed occult or imaginary, because it is incapable of being drawn out in words, or of being conveyed to the apprehension of the reader in any other way than by sending him to the books themselves.

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* Lardner, vol. 10, p. 103.

† Ibid, vol. 11, p. 88.

And here, in its proper place, comes in the argument which it has been the office of these pages to unfold. St. Paul's epistles are connected with the history by their particularity, and by the numerous circumstances which are found in them. When we descend to an examination and comparison of these circumstances, we not only observe the history and the epistles to be independent documents unknown to, or at least unconsulted by each other, but we find the substance and oftentimes minute articles of the history recognized in the epistles, by allusions and references which can neither be imputed to *design*, nor, without a foundation in truth, be accounted for by accident; by hints and expressions and single words, dropping as it were fortuitously from the pen of the writer, or drawn forth each by some occasion proper to the place in which it occurs, but widely removed from any view to consistency or agreement. These we know are effects which reality naturally produces, but which, without reality at the bottom, can hardly be conceived to exist.

When, therefore, with a body of external evidence which is relied upon, and which experience proves may safely be relied upon, in appreciating the credit of ancient writings, we combine characters of genuineness and originality which are not found, and which, in the nature and order of things, cannot be expected to be found in spurious compositions, whatever difficulties we may meet with in other topics of the Christian evidence, we can have little in yielding our assent to the following conclusions: that there was such a person as St. Paul; that he lived in the age which we ascribe to him; that he went about preaching the religion of which Jesus Christ was the founder; and that the letters which we now read were actually written by him upon the subject, and in the course of that his ministry.

And if it be true that we are in possession of the very letters which St. Paul wrote, let us consider what confirmation they afford to the Christian history. In my opinion they substantiate the whole transaction. The great object of modern research is to come at the epistolary correspondence of the times. Amid the obscurities, the silence, or the contradictions of history, if a letter can be found, we regard it as the discovery of a landmark—as that by which we can correct, adjust, or supply the imperfections and uncertainties of other accounts. One cause of the superior credit which is attributed to letters is this, that the facts which they disclose generally come out *incidentally*, and therefore without design to mislead the public by false or exaggerated accounts. This reason may be applied to St. Paul's epistles with as much justice as to any letters whatever. Nothing could be further from the intention of the writer than to record any part of his history. That his history was *in fact* made public by these letters, and has by the same means been transmitted to future ages, is a secondary and unthought-of effect. The sincerity, therefore, of the apostle's declarations cannot reasonably be disputed; at least, we are sure that it was not vitiated by any desire of setting himself off to the public at large. But these letters form a part of the muniments of Christianity, as much to be valued for their contents as for their originality. A more inestimable treasure the care of antiquity could not have sent down to us. Besides the proof they afford of the general reality of St. Paul's history, of the knowledge which the author of the Acts of the Apostles had obtained of that history, and the consequent probability that he was, what he professes himself to have been, a companion of the apostle's—besides the support they lend to these important inferences, they meet specially some of the principal objections upon which the adversaries of Christianity have thought proper to rely. In particular they show,

I. That Christianity was not a story set on foot amid the confusions which attended and immediately preceded the destruction of Jerusalem; when many extravagant reports were circulated, when men's minds were broken by terror and distress, when amid the tumults that surrounded them inquiry was impracticable. These letters show incontestably, that the religion had fixed and established itself before this state of things took place.

II. Whereas it has been insinuated that our gospels may have been made up of reports and stories which were current at the time, we may observe that, with respect to the epistles, this is impossible. A man cannot write the history of his own life from reports; nor, what is the same thing, be led by reports to refer to passages and transactions in which he states himself to have been immediately present and active. I do not allow that this insinuation is applied to the historical part of the New Testament with any color of justice or probability; but I say, that to the epistles it is not applicable at all.

III. These letters prove that the converts to Christianity were not drawn from the barbarous, the mean, or the ignorant set of men which the representations of infidelity would sometimes make them. We learn from letters the character, not only of the writer, but, in some measure, of the persons to whom they are written. To suppose that these letters were addressed to a rude tribe, incapable of thought or reflection, is just as reasonable as to suppose Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding to have been written for the instruction of savages. Whatever may be thought of these letters in other respects, either of diction or argument, they are certainly removed as far as possible from the habits and comprehension of a barbarous people.

IV. St. Paul's history, I mean so much of it as may be collected from his letters, is so *implicated* with that of the other apostles, and with the substance, indeed, of the Christian history itself, that I apprehend it will be found impossible to admit St. Paul's story—I do not speak of the miraculous part of it—to be true, and yet to reject the rest as fabulous. For instance, can any one believe that there was such a man as Paul, a preacher of Christianity, in the age which we assign to him, and *not* believe that there was also at the same time such a man as Peter and James, and other apostles, who had been companions of Christ during his life, and who after his death published and avowed the same things concerning him which Paul taught? Judea, and especially Jerusalem, was the scene of Christ's ministry. The witnesses of his miracles lived there. St. Paul, by his own account, as well as that of his historian, appears to have frequently visited that city; to have carried on a communication with the church there; to have associated with the rulers and elders of that church, who were some of them apostles; to have acted, as occasions offered, in correspondence, and sometimes in conjunction with them. Can it, after this, be doubted, but that the religion and the general facts relating to it, which St. Paul appears by his letters to have delivered to the several churches which he established at a distance, were at the same time taught and published at Jerusalem itself, the place where the business was transacted; and taught and published by those who had attended the founder of the institution in his miraculous, or pretendedly miraculous, ministry?

It is observable, for so it appears both in the epistles and from the Acts of the Apostles, that Jerusalem, and the society of believers in that city, long continued the centre from which the missionaries of the religion issued, with which all other churches maintained a correspondence and connection, to which they referred their doubts, and to whose relief, in times of public distress, they remitted their charitable assistance. This observation I think material, because it proves that this was not the case of giving our accounts in one country of what is transacted in another, without affording the hearers an opportunity of knowing whether the things related were credited by any, or even published, in the place where they are reported to have passed.

V. St. Paul's letters furnish evidence—and what better evidence than a man's own letters can be desired?—of the soundness and sobriety of his judgment. His caution in distinguishing between the occasional suggestions of inspiration, and the ordinary exercise of his natural understanding, is without example in the history of human enthusiasm. His morality is everywhere calm, pure, and rational; adapted to the condition, the activity, and the business of social life and of its various relations; free from the over-scrupulousness and austerities of superstition, and from what was more perhaps to be apprehended, the abstractions of quietism and the soarings and extravagances of fanaticism. His judgment concerning a hesitating conscience; his opinion of the moral indifferency of many actions, yet of the prudence and even the duty of compliance, where non-compliance would produce evil effects upon the minds of the persons who observed it, is as correct and just as the most liberal and enlightened moralist could form at this day. The accuracy of modern ethics has found nothing to amend in these determinations.

What Lord Lyttelton has remarked of the preference ascribed by St. Paul to inward rectitude of principle above every other religious accomplishment, is very material to our present purpose. "In his first epistle to the Corinthians, chap. 13 : 1–3, St. Paul has these words: *Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.* Is this the language of enthusiasm? Did ever enthusiast prefer that universal benevolence which comprehendeth all moral virtues, and which, as appeareth by the following verses, is meant by charity here? did ever enthusiast, I say, prefer that benevolence," which, we may add, is attainable by every man, "to faith and to miracles, to those religious opinions which he had embraced, and to those supernatural graces and gifts which he imagined he had acquired; nay, even to the merit of martyrdom? Is it not the genius of enthusiasm to set moral virtues infinitely below the merit of faith; and of all moral virtues to value that least which is most particularly enforced by St. Paul—a spirit of candor, moderation, and peace? Certainly, neither the temper nor the opinions of a man subject to fanatic delusions are to be found in this passage." Lord Lyttelton's Considerations on the Conversion, etc.

I see no reason, therefore, to question the integrity of his understanding. To call him a visionary because he appealed to visions, or an enthusiast because he pretended to inspiration, is to take the whole question for granted. It is to take for granted that no such visions or inspirations existed; at least, it is to assume, contrary to his own assertions, that he had no other proofs than these to offer of his mission, or of the truth of his relations.

One thing I allow, that his letters everywhere discover great zeal and earnestness in the cause in which he was engaged; that is to say, he was convinced of the truth of what he taught; he was deeply impressed, but not more so than the occasion merited, with a sense of its importance. This produces a corresponding animation and solicitude in the exercise of his ministry. But would not these considerations, supposing them to be well founded, have holden the same place, and produced the same effect in a mind the strongest and the most sedate?

VI. These letters are decisive as to the sufferings of the author; also as to the distressed state of the Christian church, and the dangers which attended the preaching of the gospel.

"Whereof I Paul am made a minister; who now rejoice in my sufferings for you, and fill up that which is behind of the afflictions of Christ in my flesh, for his body's sake, which is the church." Col. 1:23, 24.

"If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." 1 Cor. 15 : 19.

"Why stand we in jeopardy every hour? I protest by your rejoicing which I have in Christ Jesus our Lord, I die daily. If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not?" 1 Cor. 15 : 30–32.

"If children, then heirs: heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together. For I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us." Rom. 8 : 17, 18.

"Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? As it is written, For thy sake we are killed all the day long; we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter." Rom. 8 : 35, 36.

"Rejoicing in hope; *patient in tribulation;* continuing instant in prayer." Rom. 12 : 12.

"Now concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord: yet I give my judgment as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful. I suppose, therefore, that this is good *for the present distress;* I say, that it is good for a man so to be." 1 Cor. 7 : 25, 26.

"For unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake; having the same conflict which ye saw in me, and now hear to be in me." Phil. 1 : 29, 30.

"God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world." "From henceforth let no man trouble me, for I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus." Gal. 6 : 14, 17.

"Ye became followers of us, and of the Lord, having received the word in much affliction, with joy of the Holy Ghost." 1 Thess. 1 : 6.

"We ourselves glory in you in the churches of God, for your patience and faith in all your persecutions and tribulations that ye endure." 2 Thess. 1 : 4.

We may seem to have accumulated texts unnecessarily; but besides that the point which they are brought to prove is of great importance, there is this also to be remarked in every one of the passages cited, that the allusion is drawn from the writer by the argument or the occasion—that the notice which is taken of his sufferings, and of the suffering condition of Christianity, is perfectly incidental, and is dictated by no design of stating the facts themselves. Indeed, they are not stated at all: they may rather be said to be assumed. This is a distinction upon which we have relied a good deal in former parts of this treatise; and where the writer's information cannot be doubted, it always, in my opinion, adds greatly to the value and credit of the testimony.

If any reader require from the apostle more direct and explicit assertions of the same thing, he will receive full satisfaction in the following quotations:

"Are they ministers of Christ? (I speak as a fool,) I am more; in labors more abundant, in stripes above measure, in prisons more frequent, in deaths oft. Of the Jews five times received I forty stripes save one. Thrice was I beaten with rods, once was I stoned, thrice I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day I have been in the deep; in journeyings often, in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils by mine own countrymen, in perils by the heathen, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils among false brethren; in weariness and painfulness; in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and nakedness." 2 Cor. 11 : 23–27.

Can it be necessary to add more? "I think that God hath set forth us the apostles last, as it were appointed to death; for we are made a spectacle unto the world, and to angels, and to men. Even unto this present hour we both hunger, and thirst, and are naked, and are buffeted, and have no certain dwelling-place; and labor, working with our own hands. Being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we suffer it; being defamed, we entreat: we are made as the filth of the world, and are the offscouring of all things unto this day." 1 Cor. 4 : 9–13. I subjoin this passage to the former, because it extends to the other apostles of Christianity much of that which St. Paul declared concerning himself.

In the following quotations, the reference to the author's sufferings is accompanied with a specification of time and place, and with an appeal for the truth of what he declares to the knowledge of the persons whom he addresses: "Even after that we had suffered before, and were shamefully entreated, *as ye know, at Philippi*, we were bold in our God to speak unto you the gospel of God with much contention." 1 Thess. 2 : 2.

"But *thou hast fully known* my doctrine, manner of life, purpose, faith, long-suffering, persecutions, afflictions, which came unto me *at Antioch, at Iconium, at Lystra;* what persecutions I endured: but out of them all the Lord delivered me." 2 Tim. 3 : 10, 11.

I apprehend that to this point, as far as the testimony of St. Paul is credited, the evidence from his letters is complete and full. It appears under every form in which it could appear, by occasional allusions and by direct assertions, by general declarations and by specific examples.

VII. St. Paul in these letters asserts, in positive and unequivocal terms, his performance of miracles strictly and properly so called.

"He therefore that ministereth to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles, *ἐνεργῶν δυνάμεις*, among you, doeth he it by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith?" Gal. 3 : 5.

"For I will not dare to speak of any of those things which Christ hath not wrought by me,* to make the Gentiles obedient, by word and deed, through mighty signs and wonders *ἐν δυνάμει σημείων κὰι τεράτων*, by the power of the Spirit of God . so that from Jerusalem, and round about unto Illyricum, I have fully preached the gospel of Christ." Rom. 15 : 18, 19.

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* That is, "I will speak of nothing but what Christ hath wrought by *me;*" or, as Grotius interprets it, "Christ hath wrought so great things by me, that I will not dare to say what he hath not wrought."

"Truly the signs of an apostle were wrought among you in all patience, in signs, and wonders, and mighty deeds," *ἐν σημέιοις κὰι τέρασι κὰι δυνάμεσι.** 2 Cor. 12 : 12.

These words, signs, wonders, and mighty deeds, *σημεῖα, κὰι τέρατα, κὰι δυνάμεις*, are the specific appropriate terms throughout the New Testament, employed when public sensible miracles are intended to be expressed. This will appear by consulting, among other places, the texts referred to in the note ;† and it cannot be shown that they are ever employed to express any thing else.

Secondly, these words not only denote miracles as opposed to natural effects, but they denote visible, and what may be called external miracles, as distinguished,

First, from *inspiration*. If St. Paul had meant to refer only to secret illuminations of his understanding, or secret influences upon his will or affections, he could not, with truth, have represented them as "signs and wonders *wrought* by him," of "signs and wonders and mighty deeds wrought *among* them."

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* To these may be added the following indirect allusions, which—though if they had stood alone, that is, without plainer texts in the same writings, they might have been accounted dubious; yet, when considered in conjunction with the passages already cited—can hardly receive any other interpretation than that which we give them.

"My speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power: that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God." 1 Cor. 2 : 4, 5.

"The gospel, whereof I was made a minister, according to the gift of the grace of God given unto me by the effectual working of his power." Ephes. 3 : 6, 7.

"For he that wrought effectually in Peter to the apostleship of the circumcision, the same was mighty in me toward the Gentiles." Gal. 2 : 8.

"For our gospel came not unto you in word only, but also in power, and in the Holy Ghost, and in much assurance." 1 Thess. 1 : 5.

† Mark 16 : 20; Luke 23 : 8; John 2 : 11–23; 3 : 2; 4 : 48–54; 11 : 49; Acts 2 : 22; 4 : 3; 5 : 12; 6 : 8; 7 : 16; 14 : 3; 15 : 12; Heb. 2 : 4.

Secondly, from *visions*. These would not by any means satisfy the force of the terms, "signs, wonders, and mighty deeds:" still less could they be said to be "*wrought* by him," or "wrought *among* them;" nor are these terms and expressions anywhere applied to visions. When our author alludes to the supernatural communications which he had received, either by vision or otherwise, he uses expressions suited to the nature of the subject, but very different from the words which we have quoted. He calls them revelations, but never signs, wonders, or mighty deeds. "I will come," says he, "to visions and *revelations* of the Lord;" and then proceeds to describe a particular instance, and afterwards adds, "Lest I should be exalted above measure through the abundance of the revelations, there was given me a thorn in the flesh."

Upon the whole, the matter admits of no softening qualification, or ambiguity whatever. If St. Paul did not work actual, sensible, public miracles, he has knowingly, in these letters, borne his testimony to a falsehood. I need not add, that, in two also of the quotations, he has advanced his assertion in the face of those persons among whom he declares the miracles to have been wrought.

Let it be remembered, that the Acts of the Apostles described various particular miracles wrought by St. Paul, which in their nature answer to the terms and expressions which we have seen to be used by St. Paul himself.

Here, then, we have a man of liberal attainments, and in other points, of sound judgment, who had addicted his life to the service of the gospel. We see him, in the prosecution of his purpose, travelling from country to country, enduring every species of hardship, encountering every extremity of danger, assaulted by the populace, punished by the magistrates, scourged, beat, stoned, left for dead; expecting, wherever he came, a renewal of the same treatment and the same dangers, yet, when driven from one city, preaching in the next; spending his whole time in the employment, sacrificing to it his pleasures, his ease, his safety; persisting in this course to old age, unaltered by the experience of perverseness, ingratitude, prejudice, desertion; unsubdued by anxiety, want, labor, persecutions; unwearied by long confinement, undismayed by the prospect of death. Such was St. Paul. We have his letters in our hands; we have also a history purporting to be written by one of his fellow-travellers, and appearing, by a comparison with these letters, certainly to have been written by some person well acquainted with the transactions of his life. From the letters, as well as from the history, we gather not only the account which we have stated of *him*, but that he was one out of many who acted and suffered in the same manner; and that of those who did so, several had been the companions of Christ's ministry, the ocular witnesses, or pretending to be such, of his miracles, and of his resurrection. We moreover find this same person referring in his letters to his supernatural conversion, the particulars and accompanying circumstances of which are related in the history, and which accompanying circumstances, if all or any of them be true, render it impossible to have been a delusion. We also find him positively, and in appropriate terms, asserting that he himself worked miracles, strictly and properly so called, in support of the mission which he executed; the history meanwhile recording various passages of his ministry, which come up to the extent of this assertion. The question is, whether falsehood was ever attested by evidence like this. Falsehoods, we know, have found their way into reports, into tradition, into books; but is an example to be met with, of a man voluntarily undertaking a life of want and pain, of incessant fatigue, of continual peril; submitting to the loss of his home and country, to stripes and stoning, to tedious imprisonment, and the constant expectation of a violent death, for the sake of carrying about a story of what was false, and of what, if false, he must have known to be so?



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